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Abstract
Despite renewed scholarly interest in war aims during the First World War, those of 
Austria-Hungary have so far been neglected. This thesis examines the efforts of the 
Monarchy’s elite decision-makers to establish and achieve their war aims in the Balkans. It 
covers the decisive period of war aims formation (1914-1917) and focuses particularly on 
the leadership of Foreign Minister Istvan Burian (1915-1916) and the forces which affected 
his decision-making.
The thesis demonstrates that Austria-Hungary’s most vital political, economic, and 
military interests principally lay in the Balkans, where the Monarchy’s war aims were most 
aggressive and expansionist. Despite facing enormous pressure for radicalization from the 
annexationist General Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf and the mostly non-annexationist 
Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza, the Foreign Ministry retained overarching decision­
making authority in the war aims question. This stands in stark contrast to Germany, where 
military influence became predominant. Buridn pursued coherent and consistent war aims 
aimed at expanding Austro-Hungarian power, prestige, influence, and territory in the 
Balkans. By emphasizing Austria-Hungary’s pre-eminence there, its leaders incurred 
serious German and Bulgarian opposition.
Despite facing grave military setbacks and the risk of slipping into vassalage to 
Germany, until May 1917 the Monarchy’s highest echelons refused to seriously entertain 
peace options until its Balkan war aims were met. Continued involvement in the First 
World War thus served a political purpose, and this thesis demonstrates that Austro- 
Hungarian war aims in the Balkans were among the underlying factors prolonging the 
world conflagration. The work concludes by demonstrating a continuing Austro-Hungarian 
interest in Balkan expansion right up to the closing stages of the war.
The thesis addresses one of the most significant gaps in the literature on Austria- 
Hungary. It does so by using formerly secret Austrian and Hungarian materials in 
Budapest, in addition to employing national and military archives in Austria, Hungary, 
Germany, the UK, and the United States.
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Glossary and Abbreviations
AA
AOK
Cisleithania
GMR
GG
HHStA
Honved
KA
KK
k.k.
k.ung.
k.u.k.
Landwehr
MdÄ
MGG
NARA
OHL
PA
REZL
Transleithania
Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry), also referred to as 
Wilhelmstrasse
Armee Oberkommando (Austro-Hungarian High Command)
lit. this side of the Leitha River, reference to Austrian territory, also known 
as Austrian Empire or Austria
Gemeinsamer Ministerrat (Austro-Hungarian Common Ministerial 
Council)
Governor General
Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Austrian Diplomatie Archives, Vienna) 
lit. Homeland Defense, Transleithanian (Hungarian) national guard units 
Kriegsarchiv (Austrian War Archives, Vienna)
Kreiskommando (District Command)
kaiserlich-königlich (Imperial-Royal), refers to institutions of the Austrian 
(Cisleithanian) government
königlich ungarisch (Royal Hungarian), refers to institutions of the 
Hungarian (Transleithanian) government
kaiserlich und königlich (Imperial and Royal), refers only to the common 
Austro-Hungarian government, armed forces, or institutions
lit. Land Defense, Cisleithanian (Austrian) national guard units
Ministerium des Äußern (Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry), also 
referred to as Ballhausplatz
Militärgeneralgouvernment (Military Occupation Administration)
National Archives Records Administration, Washington, DC, USA
Oberste Heeresleitung (German High Command)
Politisches Archiv (Political archives section of the HHStA)
Magyarorszagi Reformat us Egyhaz Zsinati Leveltar (Hungarian Reformed 
Church Synodal Archives, Budapest)
lit. Across the Leitha River, reference to Hungarian territory, also known 
as Kingdom of Hungary or the Crown Lands of St. Stephen
7
List of Principal Characters
(alphabetical)
Name Rank / Position Dates of Service in WWI
Andrian zu Werburg, 
Leopold Frh. v.
MdÄ representative 
in Warsaw 16 Dec 1915 -  Jan 1917
Arz von Straussenburg, 
Arthur v.
Chief of the 
General Staff, AOK 2 Mar 1917-31 Oct 1918
Avarna di Gualtieri, 
Guiseppe Duke de
Italian Ambassador 
in Vienna 17 Feb 1912-13 Jan 1915
Berchtold, Leopold Graf Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister 17 Feb 1912-13 Jan 1915
Bethmann Hol 1 weg, 
Theobald v. German Reichskanzler 14 Jul 1909-14 Jul 1917
Bolfras, Arthur Frh. v.
Generaladjutant of Kaiser 
Franz Josef, Chief of the 
Kabinettskanzlei
1889- 1916
Buriän v. Rajecz, 
Istvan Baron 
(later Graf)
1. Hungarian Minister
a latere
2. Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Minister
3. Joint k.u.k. 
Finance Minister 
4. Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Minister
1. 1913-1915
2. 13 Jan 1915 — 
22 Dec 1916
3. 25 Oct 1916- 
22 Dec 1916
4. 16 Apr 1918 -  
24 Oct 1918
Clam-Martinic, 
Heinrich Graf
Austrian Prime Minister 20 Dec 1916 -  23 Jun 1917
Conrad von Hötzendorf, 
Franz Freiherr 
(later Graf)
Chief of the 
General Staff, AOK 12 Dec 1912 — 1 Mar 1917
Cramon, General August 
Friedrich Wilhelm v.
German Military Liaison 
Officer to the AOK Throughout
Czernin von und zu 
Chudenitz, Otto Graf
Austro-Hungarian 
Minister in Sofia 24 Jan 1917-Nov 1918
Czemin von und zu 
Chudenitz, Ottokar Graf
1. Austro-Hungarian 
Minister in Bucharest 
2. Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister
1. 25 May 1913-
27 Aug 1916
2. 22 Dec 1916 -
14 Apr 1918
Enver, Ismail 
(aka Enver Pasha)
Ottoman War Minister 1914-1918
Falkenhayn, Erich v. Chief of the General Staff, OHL 14 Nov 1914-A ug  1916
Forgäch v. Ghymes u. Gäcs, 
Johann Graf
Second Section Chief 
at the MdÄ 28 Aug 1913- 4 Jan 1917
8
Archduke Friedrich, 
Duke ofTeschen
Supreme Commander of the 
Austro-Hungarian Army, 
AOK
1914 — Feb 1917
Hindenburg v. Chief of the 29 Aug 1916 —
Beneckendorff, Paul v. [ General Staff, OHL 25Junl919
Hintze, Paul v. German State Secretary for 1f.10 ,  „ t l f .10 v ■ At*-■ 9 Aug 1918-3 Oct 1918 Foreign Affairs °
Hoyos, Alexander Graf
1 Chief of the Minister’s 1
Secretariat (Kabinett des Apr 1912-6 May 1915 
Ministers)
Jagow, Gottlieb v. German State Secretary for 1 xT 1ft1,  Foreign Affairs
Krai, August
Austro-Hungarian Consul 1 
General in Albania, later , 
Zivillandeskommissar in irouglou 
1 occupied Albania
Krobatin, Alexander Frh. v. l 9 Dec 1912 -  10 Apr 1917
Kühlmann, Richard v. German State Secretary for ~ Ai i  , o t _  m i o  r  ■ A f f  ■ 7 Aug 1 9 1 7 -9 Jun 1918 Foreign Affairs °
Ludendorff, Erich Quartermaster General, OHL Aug 1916-26 Oct 1918 
Austro-Hungarian 1 11 Aug 1914-
Macchio, Karl rrn. v. Ambassador in Rome 23 May 1915
Mensdorff-Pou i 1 ly- 
Dietrichstein, 
Albert Graf
Former Austro-Hungarian 1 
Ambassador in London, 1 0 1 7  i q i o  
employed by Czemin to 1 1 Iy i* 
1 pursue peace feelers
Merey v. Kapos-Merey, 
Kajetan 1 " Z “ 6" 1 ^  Jan 1915-Nov 1918
Michaelis, Georg I German Reichskanzler 1 14 Jul 1917-1 Nov 1917 
Austro-Hungarian Charge 1 ~ 
1 d ' f l f f n i Y P . s  in Sofia. later NfdÄ 1
Mittag, Baron Rudolf Oriental Department Chief ~  
(Referent)
Otto, Eduard
1. Austro-Hungarian 1 13N 1 9 1 3  
Representative in Montenegro '  s  a ° V i q  m ~  
2 .  Zivillandeskommissar and ug 1914 
MdÄ Representative at the .  .
MGG/Montenegro , y i 6 ~  1918
Pallavicini, Johann 
(Jänos) Markgraf
Austro-Hungarian 1 f l n ,  , nio 
Ambassador in Constantinople -N ov 1918
Sonnino, Sidney 1 Italian Foreign Minister | 5 Nov 1914-23 Jun 1919
9
Stiirgkh, Karl Graf Austrian Prime Minister 3 Nov 1911- 21 Oct 1916t
Szilässy v. Szilas, Julius
1. Austro-Hungarian 
Minister in Athens 
2. Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry Official
1. 7Nov 1913-O c t 1916
2. Oct 1916-O c t 1917
Talat, Mehmed 
(aka Talat Pasha)
1. Ottoman Interior Minister 
2. Ottoman Grand Vizier
1. 1914-1917
2. 1917-1918
Tamowski, Adam Graf Austro-Hungarian Minister in Sofia Nov 1913-A p r 1917
Thum-Valsassina, 
Douglas Graf
Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry Representative 
attheAOK
Jan 1915-1918
Tisza v. Boros-Jenö und 
Szeged, Istvän Graf Hungarian Prime Minister 5 Jun 1913-15 Jun 1917
Tschirschky u. Bögendorff, 
Heinrich v.
German Ambassador 
in Vienna 1907-15 Nov 1916f
Wedel, Botho Graf German Ambassador in Vienna Nov 1916-JuI 1919
Wekerle, Sändor Hungarian Prime Minister 20 Aug 1917- 23 Oct 1918
Wiesner, Dr. Friedrich
Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry Representative at the 
AOK, later at Mackensen 
High Command, also 
Sektionsrat at MdÄ
3 Aug 1914-Jan 1917
Zimmermann, Arthur
1, German Undersecretary of
State for Foreign Affairs
2. German Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
1. 1911-21 Nov 1916 
2. 21 Nov 1916- 
5 Aug 1917
10
War Aims and Peace Conditions: 
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Balkans,
July 1914-M ay 1917________ _ _ _
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Overview
In the minds o f many historians, students, and the general public, Austria- 
Hungary's role in the First World War has been relegated to that o f a mere ‘corpse,’ 
shackled to its powerful German ally and entirely dependent on it for survival. True, the 
Great War ended the Dual Monarchy’s existence, but only after more than four years o f 
war, a front line stretching over two-thirds o f its borders, and conflict with five o f its seven 
neighbors. Moreover, Austria-Hungary was the second strongest member o f the Central 
Powers, the vital land link to Germany’s oriental allies Turkey and Bulgaria, and the only 
reason why Germany did not face the combined might o f  the three Entente powers entirely 
alone, against which she would have succumbed much sooner.
Military historians can argue about the Monarchy’s failings on the battlefield or 
whether it was indeed as useless as many Germans considered it. What this thesis concerns 
itself with is why, if the war was going so badly, did Austria-Hungary not sign a separate 
peace, lose some territory, but survive the war essentially intact? Its officials later claimed 
this was due to unacceptable terms by the Entente, or the threat o f a German invasion if  the 
Monarchy abandoned its treaty obligations. These arguments made sense in an interwar 
period when many sought to punish those government officials who had started the 
devastating war, as well as those who had let it continue until ten million lay dead and 
much o f  Europe was impoverished and in ruins. But to post-World War II generations a 
more disturbing explanation for Austria-Hungary’s continued involvement seems more 
accurate. Using previously unseen sources, this thesis argues that the Monarchy fought on 
during the Great War right up to its dissolution because it weighed its options and chose to
fight on.
This is a point seldom appreciated regarding Austria-Hungary, whose continued 
involvement in the Great War is rarely questioned. Why did the country fight on in what
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even its civilian leaders realized after the first few months was a near-hopeless battle 
against overwhelming odds? In part for the same reason it declared war in the first place: 
to achieve political, territorial, and economic dominance in the Balkans. Initially, its goals 
-  termed war aims -  were limited to just its original opponent, Serbia, but when the 
localized conflict became a world conflagration, so too the stakes rose. Austria-Hungary 
had to justify its losses just like the other belligerents. Thus, the Monarchy embarked on a 
policy of expansion against its adversaries which was greater during victorious phases and
lesser after battlefield setbacks.
At the center of this policy stood the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, charged 
with the task of coordinating the Monarchy’s complex domestic decision-making structure 
and formulating a eoherent policy. He wrestled on the one hand with the Army, which 
sought near-boundless annexations against the Monarchy’s adversaries, and on the other 
hand against the Hungarians, who sought either no annexations or changes favoring only 
themselves. Eventually it fell to the Foreign Minister to take charge of the process, exclude 
the other decision-making factors, and propel forward a policy which failed to satisfy any 
party but which was made in the interest of the Monarchy as a whole. This policy, 
however, brought it into direct conflict with its allies Germany and Bulgaria.
These internal debates were not trivial. Discussions of whether to annex all or just 
parts of Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Italy went to the core of how Austria- 
Hungup perceived its future role and what It hoped to achieve in this war. This thesis 
argues that it was in these regions that the policymakers sought restitution for a war which 
risked its very existence and cost so much. While control of Poland caused an ongoing 
debate between Vienna and Berlin, for Austria-Hungary the Balkans were non-negotiable. 
Only when the military and domestic food situation became truly disastrous did the
officials seek to abandon some (though not all) o f their territorial goals there.
Arguments
The purpose o f this thesis is therefore to investigate and analyze the development of
Austro-Hungarian war aims and peace conditions in the Balkans during the First World 
War, with special emphasis on the period July 1914 -  May 1917. Though millions 
marched in 1914 towards and across each other’s national frontiers, one of the heaviest 
burdens was borne by Austria-Hungary, which faced the crushing might of the Russian 
army in Galicia. It is not surprising that the majority of Austria-Hungary’s casualties
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during the war were sustained in its northern campaigns, and it is furthermore logical that 
significant Austro-Hungarian diplomatic and military efforts should have been focused on 
diminishing the existential threat to the Monarchy from Russia. Yet, it is the first 
argument of this thesis that Austria-Hungary’s northern campaign (1914-1917), followed 
by its south-western campaign against Italy (1915-1918), were distractions from Austria- 
Hungary’s principal military, political, and economic objectives, which lay in the Balkans 
and were fueled by hope for a victorious peace. The ultimately successful campaigns of the 
Central Powers against Serbia and Montenegro (1914-1916) and against Rumania (1916) 
brought the Austro-Hungarians closer than they had ever been to their dream of Balkan 
domination.
Decision-making and elaboration of war aims was split between a variety of forces 
within Austria-Hungary, namely the Emperor, his Foreign Minister, his Common 
Ministerial Council (and with it the Austrian and Hungarian national government leaders), 
and his Military High Command (Armeeoberkommando or AOK). Each had an important 
role to play in wartime. The military decisions were reached exclusively by the General 
Staff. The Foreign Ministry (Ministerium des Aussern, abbreviated MdA), on the other 
hand, had to compete with additional interests when formulating its foreign political and 
economic policy. Focusing on the struggle between the AOK and the MdA, the second 
argument of this thesis is that the Foreign Ministry generally managed to retain control of 
Imperial foreign policy and overall managed to implement its conception of Austro- 
Hungarian aims in the Balkans. Although it is argued that the AOK had a serious and 
radicalizing effect on the MdA especially in times of military success, its role never 
matched that of the German High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL), which 
managed to usurp control over foreign policy decision-making in Germany and forced 
draconian peace treaties against the defeated adversaries. The third argument of this 
thesis is that the MdA’s foreign policy remained surprisingly consistent across foreign 
ministers and military events, fluctuating only in degree and not undergoing wholesale 
alteration and expansion as was the case in Germany. While some historians have argued 
that the Austro-Hungarian moderate line, especially when compared with the AOK and 
OHL positions, was the result of confusion and the lack of clear goals, it is argued here that 
the MdA’s core war aims, as elucidated by the Foreign Minister, were on the whole boih 
coherent and consistent.
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This consistency and the difference between the OHL and the AOK 
notwithstanding, Austro-Hungarian war aims were not as limited as one might think, and 
only military defeats and, in the latter half of the war, hunger, forced the Foreign Ministry 
to adopt an even more conciliatory line in its conception of the Monarchy’s vital interests 
and war aims. Still, its conciliatory line beginning in earnest in 1917 was not enough to 
make peace possible, due to its consistent pursuit of its war aims in the Balkans, a pursuit 
which helped lead to the eventual destruction of the Empire. It is therefore the fourth 
argument of this thesis that the Great War was prolonged as a direct result of Austria- 
Hungary’s aims in the Balkans and its unwillingness to conclude anything but a general 
peace that would have maintained its staunch alliance with Germany. Thus, if Austria- 
Hungary’s willingness to stand by its German ally until the end kept Germany in the war by 
allowing it to Fight on without encirclement, Vienna’s Balkan aspirations kept Austria- 
Hungary in the war in the First place.
Time Frame
The thesis concentrates on the period from the July Crisis of 1914 and the outbreak 
of the First World War until the dismissal of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Istvan Tisza, in 
late May 1917. The majority of Austria-Hungary’s war aims in the Balkans were 
developed and executed in the First half of the war. After the death of Franz Joseph, his 
successor Karl faced a deplorable military situation, exhausted reserves and raw materials, 
declining manpower and morale, and empire-wide hunger. Karl and his Foreign Minister 
Ottokar Czernin’s goals revolved mainly around ending the war as quickly as possible, 
rather than securing offensive war aims as under First Leopold Graf Berchtold and more 
extensively under Baron Istvàn Buriàn during Franz Joseph’s reign. The emphasis of this 
thesis is on a period when the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy establishment had enough 
confidence in the domestic and military situation for offensive war aims still to be pursued. 
The period 1914-1917 was marked by intense disagreement over territorial and economic 
war aims between the Hungarians, the military, and the Foreign Ministry, as well as 
externally vis-à-vis the Monarchy’s allies. After the dismissal of General Conrad von 
Hotzendorf, then Buriàn, and Finally Tisza in May 1917, the approach of the Austro- 
Hungarian leadership became more homogenous and geared towards an immediate, 
honorable peace, rather than pursuing parity with Germany and territorial, economic, and 
diplomatic war aims in the Balkans.
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Structure
The thesis is divided into an introduction and literature review, five substantive 
chapters, and a conclusion which contains an epilogue. Given the length of time covered 
(July 1914 -  May 1917) and the number of belligerents involved, the core of the thesis is 
divided into four chronological chapters (Chapters 3-6). The Epilogue takes the issue of 
Austro-Hungarian war aims right to the end of the war and demonstrates their altered and
subordinated nature compared to pre-May 1917.
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: Literature Review
• Chapter 3: July 1914-December 1914
• Chapter4: January 1915-September 1915
• Chapter 5: October 1915-June 1916
• Chapter 6: June 1916-M ay 1917
.  Chapter 7: Epilogue (May 1917 -  November 1918) and Conclusion
This structure, to be elaborated on later, has been chosen to mark key turning points 
in the war aims policy of Austria-Hungary, owing chiefly to changes in government or 
battlefield events. In Chapters 3 and 4, there are additionally two distinct thematic 
subdivisions o f Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans, which are referred to
throughout the thesis in this manner:
Wpstem Balkans, representing all territories which were either located 
geographically in the western Balkans (including the eastern Adriatic, Montenegro, 
Albania, north-west Greece, and Italy’s area of influence), or which were under the 
direct control of Austro-Hungarian occupying forces (including MGG/Serbia); and 
(b) Eastern Balkans, representing all territories which were located geographically in 
the eastern Balkans (including Rumania, Bulgaria, and Bessarabia) as well as those 
Balkan territories which were not under the direct control of Austro-Hungarian 
occupying forces, including Bulgarian-administered Macedonia and Serbia, the 
Negotin Circle, Salonika, and north-east Greece/Thrace/Kavalla).
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The ‘Eastern Balkans,’ as they are described here, comprise territories that at no 
time during the First World War were under the direct and exclusive control of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. In the Serbian case, the territory was divided between the Monarchy 
and Bulgaria as per the agreements reached in late 1915, while Rumania was under a 
Central Power ‘Condominium’ occupation after its defeat in December 1916. Thus, 
southern and eastern Serbian territory such as in Macedonia, the Negotin district, and 
regions east of the Ma£va came under Bulgarian control. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary 
either had specific designs and plans for these territories (such as the Iron Gate on the 
Danube near Tum-Severin or the Negotin circle) or it had more economic than territorial 
interests (such as in Macedonia down to Salonika). The ‘Eastern Balkans’ also refers to 
territory which the Monarchy ruled officially in condominium with its Quadruple Alliance 
members (such as the Dobrudja, or through the MGG/Rumania the strategic mountain 
passes in Transylvania) and which it either wanted to annex or use as a bartering item to 
obtain concessions elsewhere.
Throughout these two geographical/thematic subsections the influence of Germany 
is omnipresent, and therefore represents a consistent theme, negating the need for one of its 
own. As for Turkey, whose influence is also not limited by geography, its role will be 
assessed where it is most important, such as in Albania and other areas of high Muslim 
population concentrations. Major battlefield occurrences are described in a chronological 
fashion as they occur, interspersed with the international diplomatic developments which 
are at the core of this thesis.
Definitions
The purpose of this thesis is to ask the most fundamental of all questions when a 
country goes to war, which is ‘what are they actually fighting for?’ To answer th is . 
question, the thesis looks at elite decision-making within Austria-Hungary on matters of 
desired post-war territorial, economic, or political adjustments. It is, at its core, an analysis 
of the intense debate which arose between the different institutions and leaders of the 
Monarchy on the vital question of why continued conflict was necessary. For this reason, 
the thesis analyzes first and foremost the perspective of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
Recognizing, however, that other factors played a role in influencing this decision, the 
thesis also includes the role of foreign allies on the domestic war aims debate and setting.
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W ar aims are the desired territorial, economic, military, or other benefits expected 
following successful conclusion of a war. Intangibles, such as prestige or power, can also 
represent war aims, though often (albeit not always) their achievement is framed w ithin a 
more tangible context (e.g. conquest restores prestige, annexation increases power, etc.). 
War aims can be short-term and subject to change, and usually exist along a spectrum 
between maximum and minimum extremes. At times, war aims are explicitly stated 
internally or externally in a policy decision, while at other times (as was mainly the case in 
Austria-Hungary), the war aims are merely discussed but not published, remaining instead 
in the form of memoranda or instructions. Given their dependence on the military situation, 
war aims were usually fluid concepts and difficult to define, even for the highest 
government officials. Hence, this thesis looks at what war aims were considered among the 
diplomats and generals, what consensus was reached (or why none was reached), which 
figures retained most authority during this process, how foreign policy was shaped by war 
aims, and how events on the ground (usually controlled by the military) differed from the 
policy decisions of the diplomats and politicians.
Among the Viennese diplomatic elite of 1914-1918, “positive war aims [positive 
Kriegsziele]" was a phrase referring to tangible outcomes, and corresponds to war aims in 
English. The fact that this German term exists (instead of merely Kriegsziele alone) 
implies the possibility of “negative war aims [negative Kriegsziele)”. This thesis differs in 
an important respect from most previous works on war aims by expanding the traditionally 
limited definition of war aims to include these ‘negative war aims’, which are defined as 
the prevention of undesired outcomes. The prevention o f undesired outcomes, including 
limiting or eliminating the war aims of another state, is included only insofar as it is 
relevant to achieving other, positive war aims. To demonstrate this distinction, wc draw on 
an example supplied by Holger Affierbach, who argued that Austria-Hungary’s 1912 
attitude towards the Balkans was to retain the status quo, and had a “negative interest’’ in 
not allowing Serbia to grow further.1 In the absence of a positive war aim, the negative war 
aim would simply be referred to as ‘foreign policy.’ However, given the linkage between 
the ‘positive war aim’ and ‘negative war aim’ (i.e. the Army’s demand to annex Serbia 
failed at least in part because o f the Foreign Ministry ’s fear o f a Rumanian attack), it is *
* Afflcrbach, H„ Der Dreibund: Europäische Grossmacht- und AUiarcpolitik vor dem Ersten Heil krieg,
Wien, 2002, 724.
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usually appropriate to refer to both forms of imperial policy as war aims without explicitly 
distinguishing their type, as this is clear from the context.
The third category of wartime foreign policy goals discussed in this thesis is that of 
peace conditions. Peace conditions can be thought of as minimal war aims. If war aims 
are desired beneficial outcomes, peace conditions are the minimum, sine qua non outcomes 
without which the belligerent state will not conclude peace. Peace conditions are actually 
more a basis for beginning negotiations towards a settlement, rather than determining the 
resulting peace treaty itself. An example of a peace condition is Austria-Hungary’s 
territorial integrity, about which it was not prepared to negotiate. In World War I, there 
existed a nexus between war aims and peace conditions, in that maximum peace conditions 
can be thought of as the minimal war aims. After the terrible losses experienced by the 
belligerent powers, their governments felt unable to make peace without tangible benefits 
to show for such sacrifices, which is why a ‘peace without victory’ as advocated by 
Woodrow Wilson never materialized. Because peace conditions were easier for the 
policymakers to define, they often fluctuated less than war aims and were therefore usually 
longer-term. Nevertheless, there existed both maximum and minimum peace conditions.
It is also important to state what this thesis is not trying to do. The thesis does not 
concern itself with the Balkan states themselves during World War I, or the war aims 
developed by those Balkan states against Austria-Hungary. It is also not a study of the 
military history of Balkan operations or occupation regimes, but rather an international 
history of diplomatic and political decision-making influenced by military developments on 
the ground. Although the conflicting Central Power war aims play an important role in the 
setting of Austro-Hungarian ones, the thesis does not attempt to analyze the origin of 
German, Bulgarian, or Turkish war aims. Likewise, the sources o f Entente war aims are 
not relevant to the analysis here. Hence, both Entente and other Central Power war aims 
are taken as givens, and only their influence on Austria-Hungary’s goals is analyzed The 
thesis also does not attempt to address the influence of public opinion on war aims 
formation, for reasons described in the literature review below.
Terminology and Decision-making
Although all states have complex civil-military relations and political hierarchies, 
Austria-Hungary’s decision-making structure stands apart. This is due to the fact that 
Austria-Hungary, as its name suggests, was not a unitary nation-state. Rather, it was a
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multi-ethnic monarchy of 53 million people speaking twelve official languages, the second 
largest country in Europe by territory and third by population, and united only by the 
scepter of a Habsburg Emperor. The Monarchy was a set of contradictions and tensions, as 
this ancient and deeply conservative royal institution entered into the modem world. The 
most obvious division was between Austria and Hungary. Following the Compromise or 
Equalization {Ausgleich, Kiegyezes) in 1867, the Austrian Empire was reorganized into two 
halves, the self-governing Austrian and Hungarian portions, and the country was thereafter 
known as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This Compromise was renegotiated every ten 
years, including in 1917, and foreign relations were disrupted while domestic affairs were 
being sorted out. From 1867 to 1918, the state lived two separate political lives based in 
Vienna and Budapest, with two governments, two parliaments, two Prime Ministers, and 
two civilian bureaucracies controlling all domestic matters in the two halves of the 
Monarchy. Some areas, however, remained under the direct control of the Emperor. The 
Common Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance, as well as the Austro-Hungarian 
Army and Navy, taken together constituted the core of the central government.
The nomenclature attached to the various bodies within Austria-Hungary give a clue 
to their lines of control and accountability. The Common Ministries and all matters ruled 
jointly and centrally from Vienna were referred to as kaiserlich und königlich (k.u.k.), 
meaning imperial and royal. Here ‘Imperial’ referred to Austria and ‘royal’ referred to the 
Kingdom of Hungary, hence the joint name referred to an institution working on behalf of 
the entire Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Gesamtmonarchie). For matters relating only to 
the Austrian half of the Monarchy, the term kaiserlich-königlich (k.k.) was used, meaning 
‘imperial-royal,’ but the term ‘royal’ instead referred to the Bohemian crown lands. The 
Austrian half of the Monarchy was also referred to as Cisleithania, referring to the 
Austrian/Hungarian border at the Leitha river. Finally, for institutions relating to the 
Hungarian portion, or Transleithania, the term k. ung. {königlich-ungarisch) or M.k. 
{Magyar kirdlyi), meaning ‘royal Hungarian’ was used. When referring to the country as a 
whole, this thesis generally refers to the Gesamtmonarchie by its full common name, 
Austria-Hungary, or by synonyms such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Dual Monarchy, 
or simply the Monarchy. At times when the international context is clear -  such as Austro- 
Hungarian/German relations -  the shortened form of Austria will be used, as confusion 
with k.k. policy is unlikely.
Foreign policy was directed by the joint minister closest to the Emperor, 
traditionally labeled the Foreign Minister. However, his full title was Minister des k. u, k. 
Hauses und des Äußern, meaning he was firstly the Minister of the House of Habsburg who 
also directed (the Emperor’s) foreign policy. This made the Common Foreign Minister the 
most powerful government official and the hierarchical equivalent of the Reichskanzler in 
Germany.
The armed forces were also sub-divided into the joint, overarching (k.u.k.) Austro- 
Hungarian Army, the Austrian Landwehr, and the Hungarian Homed. The latter two can 
be considered territorial defense or national guard units, under the command of their 
respective home governments, which in wartime answered to the highest military decision­
making authority, the Armee Oberkommando or AOK. The AOK, under the operational 
direction of the Chief of the General Staff and a nominal Habsburg Commander in Chief, 
was the body directing military operations. Given that it answered only to the Emperor and 
not to either of the two governments or the joint ministers, it had tremendous political 
power. The Chief of the General Staff interacted either directly with the Emperor or 
through the Emperor’s military-bureaucratic arm, the Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät, or 
Military Chancellery, labeled MKSM.
The diverging lines of control meant that decision-making was extremely 
convoluted. The only body specifically tasked with approving foreign policy as conducted 
by the Foreign Minister was the Gemeinsamer Ministerrat, or Joint Ministerial Council, 
labeled GMR. The attendees included the Foreign Minister, the two Prime Ministers, the 
War and Finance Common Ministers, and at times the Chief of the General Staff. Emperor 
Franz Joseph traditionally left its direction to his Foreign Minister, while Emperor Karl 
tended to chair the GMRs himself. The Foreign Minister, like all other members of the 
GMR, was appointed by the Emperor. Given his role, the Foreign Minister held a position 
of primus inter pares among the joint ministers, and would chair the GMRs if the Emperor 
was not present. The two most powerful figures after the Foreign Minister were the two 
Prime Ministers of Austria and of Hungary, though only the Hungarian Prime Minister 
Istvän Tisza exercised his influence on foreign matters extensively. This was due to 
Tisza’s interest in foreign relations as a way of benefiting Hungary, a right which was 
enshrined in the Hungarian Law XII of December 1867 as part of the Equalization
(Ausgleich-Kiegyezes).2 On matters of great importance such as going to war, feeding the 
population, or the future policy, the GMR was convened to confirm the Monarchy’s 
policies. Since it did not meet very frequently, however, foreign policy and with it the 
setting of war aims lay mainly in the purview of the MdA, though the military’s vaguely 
defined but historic political role meant that the MdA’s primacy would constantly be 
questioned.
This thesis concerns itself with the decision-making process by which the 
Monarchy’s war aims were set. Since war aims were only decided by the highest echelons 
of power in Austria-Hungary, it is at this level that the thesis focuses its analysis. At the 
core of decision-making stood ostensibly the Emperor Franz Joseph, but, given his old age 
and serious illness,3 he generally did not take effective decisions and instead left his 
ministers and generals to determine policy. This led to near-endless conflict between the 
Foreign Minister and his MdA, the AOK Chief of the General Staff, and usually the 
Hungarian Prime Minister, with involvement by many other parties such as internal and 
external high ranking government or military officials. The diagram below (Fig. 3) aims to 
clarify the involvement and influence of the various parties in the setting of Austro- 
Hungarian war aims.
2 Bridge, F.R., The Habshurg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918, Leamington Spa, 1990, 8.
3 Williamson, S.R. Jr., in Stevenson, D., and Afllerbach, U. (eds), An Improbable War? The Outbreak of 
World War 1 and European Political Culture before 1914, New York/Oxford, 200?, 62.
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Fig. 3. Drivers and Influences on the War Aims Setting Process
© M B F2010
If we consider the setting o f war aims the red nexus, certain elements were closer to 
this than others. In the inner core o f  decision-making stood, in order o f influence as will be 
demonstrated in this thesis, © the Foreign Minister, © the AOK, © the Hungarian Prime 
Minister Tisza, and finally © the Emperor through his MK.SM. Three o f these four entities 
had allegiance to the Gesamtmonarchie (demonstrated by the Habsburg flag), while the last 
acted mainly in the interest o f Hungary. These four individuals discussed and set Austria- 
Hungary’s war aims. In doing so, they were influenced extensively by domestic (1°) 
forces, split between military factors on the left and political factors on the right. Despite 
their equality with Tisza, the Common War and Finance Ministers and the Austrian Prime 
Minister never possessed such leverage as their Hungarian counterpart, though they did 
influence GMR decisions.
The greatest influence on the Foreign M inister was the bureaucracy which 
supported him, in the form o f internal MdA officials and MdA Ambassadors and Ministers
24
posted abroad. The blue line therefore indicates the strongest linkage which informed the 
most important war aims policymaker of the details he needed to know before setting 
policy. On the military side, despite having no official mandate to set Austro-Hungarian 
war aims, the AOK used its historic role as protector of the Monarchy4 and its influence 
with the Emperor to become heavily involved, usually in direct confrontation with the 
MdA. Since the Chief of the General Staff usually took it upon himself to push his 
conception of war aims, the influence of the various hierarchical military elements were 
less significant than the corresponding bureaucracy was on the Foreign Minister. 
Nevertheless, the AOK’s occupation administrations mirrored the roles of the MdA’s 
Ambassadors in influencing AOK policy.
Despite war aims setting being an inherently domestic task, the military and 
political decision-makers in Austria-Hungary were also influenced by (2°) their Central 
Power allies. The governments of Germany, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire influenced 
the MdA via the Ambassadors to direct Austro-Hungarian war aims one way or another. 
On the military side, it was usually the actions of the German High Command (OIIL), 
Bulgarian High Command, and Bulgarian occupation zone in Serbia which influenced the 
AOK to respond by pressing for a set of usually expansionist war aims over the current 
ones entertained by the MdA.
Finally, the last and weakest (3°) level of influence came from external political and 
military developments. For the military, developments on the various relevant fronts 
dictated to what extent the AOK pursued war aims. On the diplomatic side, the pressures 
were often greater, for war aims setting would have an effect on the neutrals on whose 
passiveness the Monarchy depended and on the international and neutral press. Under 
Karl, the role of the Entente governments became increasingly important, as expansive war 
aims had to be reined in to conform to the opposing coalition’s willingness to make peace. 
Yet, despite foreign official and public opinion being relevant factors to the Monarchy’s 
decision-making, the documents reveal that domestic public opinion carried virtually no 
weight in the minds of the policymakers until after Franz Joseph’s death. The role of 
domestic public opinion is addressed in detail in the literature review.
4 See Gumz, J.E.. The Resurrection and Collapse o f Empire In Hahsburg Serbia, 1914-1918, Cambridge, 
2009, 12.
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Central Characters and their Bureaucracies
Individual policymakers (Berchtold/Burian, Conrad, Tisza) carry enormous weight 
in this narrative. However, they were each supported by a large institutional apparatus 
which assisted their decision-making. For this reason, it is likely that some of the 
documents signed, particularly by the Foreign Minister, represented the original work of 
assistants. After reading thousands of typed and hand-written memoranda, letters, 
instructions, and essays, one develops an intuitive feel for which are the Foreign Minister’s 
own words and which are not. However, it would be amiss to try to tease out the 
differences, for they ultimately carried the same weight with his counterparts 
(Ambassadors, Ministers) once he signed them.5
The relationship between the Foreign Minister and his representatives abroad was a 
very close one, despite existing mainly in the realm of formal dispatches. Each legation 
sent almost daily reports, which were read by the Foreign Minister and collected into 
summaries by his assistants. His responses formed the basis of Austro-Hungarian foreign 
policy. Generally, the representatives’ reports were factual, and contained little by way of 
predictions or even suggestions for Austro-Hungarian policy. There were, however, some 
notable exceptions. With the withdrawal of diplomatic representation from the Entente 
powers at the outbreak of war in 1914, the most senior Ambassadors left were Prince 
Gottfried von Hohenlohe in Berlin and Markgraf Johann Pallavicini in Pera 
(Constantinople). Along with Czemin in Bucharest, these Ambassadors were unusual in 
their willingness to provide not only fact and opinion, but also extensive recommendations 
on what Austro-Hungarian foreign policy should be. In Czemin’s and Pallavicini’s cases, 
the ideas tended to be groundbreaking or radical -  much more so than the policies Czernin 
would implement upon becoming Foreign Minister. The most level headed of all the 
representatives was Hohenlohe, who gracefully handled the at times fraught relations 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary by toning down the various dogmatic positions and 
helping reach consensus.
When official channels failed to bring the desired result one way or another, more 
personal and therefore more candid communication took place by way of private letters. 
The Foreign Minister would, for example, routinely send private correspondence to the 
Ambassadors, Ministers, and other colleagues (and they to him), since many maintained
5 For more on the MdÂ institutional structure and operations, see Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt.
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personal, friendly relations outside the realm of rigid hierarchy. Given his informal role in 
foreign policymaking, the Hungarian Prime Minister made extensive use of personal letters 
to influence the MdÄ’s Ambassadors without being too obvious or explicitly undermining 
the Foreign Minister. At least in part for this reason, he was more successful in effecting 
change than Conrad, who would issue protests, complaints, or recommendations almost 
exclusively through formal dispatches.
At the center of analysis of this thesis stands the man with the greatest influence on 
Austro-Hungarian war aims setting, namely the Foreign Minister. For most of the war, this 
man was Istvän Buriän, a close confidant of the powerful Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan 
Tisza and involved, in one way or another, with the highest level of decision-making from 
the beginning until the end of the war. Yet he is the only Austro-Hungarian wartime 
Foreign Minister of whom a biography has not been written. Buriän’s prominent role in 
this thesis serves as a first step to correct this omission.
Baron Istvan Buriän von Rajecz (1852-1922) was a Hungarian career diplomat, 
which like in most other such careers required nobility as a prerequisite. He began his 
career in the consular section in Moscow, and switched to the diplomatic corps by way of a 
Minister post in Sofia between 1887 and 1895. After a brief stint as Minister to the 
German state of Württemberg in 1896, he took the important role of Minister in Athens 
from 1897 to 1903. His strong credentials in Balkan affairs made him the ideal candidate 
for his first domestic political post as Common Finance Minister, which post he held from 
1903 to 1912. Apart from handling the finances of the army and the Foreign Ministry, 
through this role Buriän held overall responsibility for the administration of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, the Balkan province administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878 and 
annexed formally in 1908. Due to disagreements between the two halves of the Monarchy, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was never attached to either and existed in limbo under the joint 
Finance Ministry’s auspices. In 1913 Buriän was given the role as minister a latere, which 
as liaison between Tisza’s Hungarian government and the Emperor’s MdÄ offered him 
access to and influence on all important developments. Buriän was present from the 
outbreak of the war and, thanks to his close relationship with Tisza, was elevated to the post 
of Common Foreign Minister in January 1915, which he held until Franz Joseph’s death. 
The new Emperor Karl replaced him with Ottakar Graf Czernin von und zu Chudenitz in 
December 1916, at which point Buriän returned to the post of Common Finance Minister. 
He was recalled to the country’s highest office in April 1918 following the discrediting of
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the Czemin government as a result of the Sixte affair, and he held it until a few days before 
the Austro-Hungarian armistice.
Burian had both the appearance and the demeanor of a stem university professor, 
offering dogma in the form of lectures rather than compromise in the form of discussion. 
For this reason, the Germans found him impossible to negotiate with, and blamed him for 
the loss of Italian neutrality. He behaved similarly towards the AOK, keeping Conrad at 
bay and pursuing his own issues by simply reiterating his position. Within the MdA, his 
subordinates considered his “strong convictions and doctrinaire self-confidence” extremely 
dangerous and were unable to exercise meaningful influence on him.6 Despite his being 
attacked from almost all sides, this thesis demonstrates that precisely this unyielding 
attitude was necessary to set MdA-centric war aims and pursue them in the face of AOK, 
German, and Bulgarian opposition. Protecting Austro-Hungarian prestige was of 
paramount importance to Burian, and he complained that the Monarchy wanted to be 
Germany’s “allies, not its fiefdom.”7
Methodology
As the literature review will explain, this thesis does indeed fill a very large gap in 
our understanding of Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans during the First World 
War. While all Entente as well as German war aims have been extensively researched, the 
literature often limits Austro-Hungarian involvement to the outbreak and a losing battle to 
maintain national integrity. The Balkans, which is where the Monarchy’s interests initiated 
a global conflict, is relegated to a secondary front compared to the enormous major fronts 
in east and west. What historians have tended to forget is that the continued efforts to resist 
the enormous onslaught of the Russian army in the north, or defend Austro-Hungarian 
territory against Italian and Rumanian intervention, had as much to do with the need to 
maintain the Monarchy’s independence and sovereignty as it had to do with political, 
territorial, and economic ambitions in the Balkans. The literature has so far all but ignored 
the independent Austro-Hungarian goals, and generally subsumed them within German 
ones. For this reason, Poland takes an important place in the traditional account o f the 
Monarchy’s ambitions, but does so by obscuring the role of the Balkans (beyond simply 
Serbia) in the thinking of the Austro-Hungarian policymakers. A gap exists in our
4 Forgdch-Tisza, 26-Feb-1915, REZL-44b 154-155,44a 27.
7 Burian Naplo, 186,26-Dec-1916.
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understanding of the reasons why the war needed to be continued beyond simply survival, 
which could have been assured through a separate peace.
Much of this gap stems from the types of sources consulted. This thesis is 
distinctive in that it consults an unusually broad array of sources in German, Hungarian, 
and English. Both diplomatic and military sources in Vienna have been extensively 
consulted, offering a strong foundation from which to support the arguments made about 
the Foreign Ministry and AOK’s interests, and at times obsession with the Balkans in the 
face of other, seemingly more pressing issues. Thanks to the Entente seizure and 
microfilming of German Foreign Ministry materials following World War II, Wilhelmine 
materials located in Washington, London, and Berlin could also be consulted.
But this thesis takes the analysis a step further by including Hungarian sources, 
hitherto virtually unknown to foreign but also domestic historians. This source contains 
official as well as private material in both Hungarian and German from two of the highest- 
ranking and longest-serving members of the policymaking elite, Foreign Minister Burian 
and Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza. The private, clerical Magyarorszdgi Reformdtus 
Egyhaz Zsinati Leveltar (Hungarian Reformed Church Synodal Archives) offers those who 
can read Hungarian a veritable treasure trove of original source material written by these 
two influential men. The materials include original hand-written and typed letters, notes, 
and drafts, as well as copies of all official diplomatic correspondence executed by these 
men during their time in office. Hidden in a church cellar during the Second World War 
and the years of the People’s Republic of Hungary, these documents have only become 
available thanks to the Reformed Church of Hungary, following the 1989 revolution. They 
represent a unique view behind the official documentation available in Vienna or even in 
the Budapest National Archives and provide unparalleled access to the thinking of these 
two protestant individuals who were so central between 1914 and 1917.
Language
The thesis is written in the native language of the author, namely American English. 
In line with efforts to stay as close as possible to the documents, Austro-Hungarian terms 
and proper names are listed in German or Hungarian. Cisleithanian cities, towns, and 
villages all had German names, while Transleithanian ones had Hungarian names. The 
only exceptions are capital cities, for which the common English name is used.
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For foreign countries, the method of following the source documents continues. 
Often, particularly for Balkan places, the Austro-Hungarians themselves used Turkish 
names (e.g. Üsküb instead of Skopje), while in Albania and Montenegro in particular 
Italian names (Valona instead of Avlona or Vlore) were used. Only seldom was the 
vernacular used in the documents, and so the maps and references of this thesis retain their 
original German, Hungarian, or foreign formats. Examples of foreign names used in the 
vernacular also by Austro-Hungarian sources are the Lovcen, Ma£va, or Ia§i. At times 
when alternative spellings were used in the sources, the most common usage has been 
reproduced in the thesis. At all times the contemporary term, rather than any modem one, 
has been employed, such as using Rumania instead of Romania. To use the latter was 
neither common practice at the time nor is historically accurate, which is what this thesis 
aims to be at all times. For foreign individuals, again the Austro-Hungarian terminology is 
used (as in Bratiano). The original map above lists the most important or commonly cited 
places as they appear in the documents and therefore in the thesis.
Regarding the names of the opposing alliances, the Central Powers initially refer to 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. When Bulgaria joined the Central 
Powers in 1915 the term remained, though at times it was also referred to as the Quadruple 
Alliance. On the opposing side, despite the Triple-Entente formally becoming the ‘Allies’ 
in September 1914, the term Entente will be used in this text when referring to the Allied 
and Associated Powers. The purpose of this is to avoid confusion with the allies of 
Austria-Hungary, which is also why the original wartime Austro-Hungarian documents also 
refer to the Entente.
Chapter Structural Overview and Sub-Arguments
The thesis follows the four overarching arguments outlined above, namely (l)  the 
Balkans contained the principal objectives of Austria-Hungary', (2) the Foreign Ministry 
retained overall control over the war aims formation process, (3) the Monarchy’s core war 
aims remained consistent over the course of the war, and (4) the Monarchy’s Balkan aims 
kept it in the war, thereby prolonging the conflict.
Each Chapter additionally addresses a variety of sub-arguments whose supportive 
evidence serves to further strengthen the four core arguments. An outline of each section 
and the corresponding sub-arguments is produced below.
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Chapter J; July 1914 -  December 1914
Chapter 3 analyzes Berchtold’s approach to war aims during his tenure from the 
outbreak of the war until his replacement by Buriàn. Berchtold’s policy pursued three 
goals: to extend the Monarchy’s control in the Western Balkans, to achieve victory in 
Serbia, and to contain the Rumanian threat. The chapter demonstrates that although 
Berchtold established the defeat of Serbia and the benefits of expanded influence in the 
Balkans as the Monarchy’s principal war aim even after the Russian invasion of Galicia, 
Conrad was unable to deliver the military victory necessary to achieve it. Despite 
formulating positive war aims in Serbia against Belgrade, Maòva, and the Negotin Circle, 
these could not be achieved due to Serbia’s successful defense and the Russian onslaught 
which tied down the majority of the k.u.k. army. Berchtold was therefore limited to using 
diplomacy vis-à-vis Rome to secure his negative war aims of keeping Italy out of 
Montenegro and Albania on the eastern Adriatic coast. In the Eastern Balkans, Berchtold 
also attempted to pursue negative war aims of securing Rumanian neutrality through 
Bulgarian deterrence, but also by offering Austrian territory to Bucharest, incurring Tisza's 
ire. All these efforts served to keep the neutrals from siding with the Entente and thereby 
improved Austria-Hungary’s prospects of Balkan domination. The section demonstrates 
that the MdÀ set war aims early on, generally had Tisza’s support, and was in control of the 
process due to the AOK’s battlefield defeats.
Chapter 4: January 1915 -  September 1915
Chapter 4 analyzes the Monarchy’s war aims during the first phase of Buriàn’s 
tenure. His career had made him a Balkanist capable of understanding the complexities of 
the region and implementing a vision for hegemony over the peninsula. Launching a new 
phase of forceful and at times even intransigent diplomacy towards allies and neutrals alike, 
Buriàn maintained Berchtold’s emphasis on the Balkans. He did so despite serious military 
and diplomatic setbacks in the form of the Przemysl surrender, the Gallipoli landings, and 
Italy’s intervention against its former Austro-Hungarian ally. Given these difficulties, 
Buriàn initially pursued negative war aims of keeping the neutrals at bay. The chapter 
demonstrates the critical importance Buriàn placed on establishing a protectorate in Albania 
as a barrier to Italian encroachment in the Western Balkans and his desire to keep Rumania 
and even Bulgaria neutral so as to secure Balkan hegemony for Austria-Hungary, Buriàn’s 
appointment at the behest of Tisza paid off, for the new Foreign Minister strengthened the 
Monarchy’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Germany and resisted setting the dangerous
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precedent of making territorial cessions to Rumania and Italy for merely the hope of their 
continued neutrality. Despite the ultimate failure to keep Italy out of the war, the chapter 
demonstrates that Burian’s diplomacy was designed to protect the Monarchy’s Great Power 
status, prestige, and influence in the Balkans. At the same time, he moderated Tisza’s 
wilder policies, kept AOK annexationist pressure at bay, and even developed positive war 
aims in anticipation of a favorable turn of events.
32
Chapter 5: October 1915 - June 1916
Chapter 5 analyzes Austro-Hungarian war aims during Burian’s tenure from the 
onset of the Bulgarian intervention which finally helped defeat Serbia until the onset of the 
devastating Brusilov Offensive. During this period, Austria-Hungary’s establishment of 
military occupation zones in Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania meant that final post-war 
Balkan aims had to be debated, agreed, and implemented. It argues that military success 
led to more ambitious war aims, making reaching agreement particularly with the AOK but 
also with the meddling Germans extremely difficult. Due to these disagreements, the Joint 
Ministerial Council’s inability to reach far-reaching conclusions beyond general support for 
the MdA, and the Emperor’s passivity, many issues remained unsolved. While the MdA- 
AOK disputes continued, the power vacuum led to Bulgarian hostility against its Austrian 
ally, leading to an Austro-Bulgarian clash almost ignored in the literature which threatened 
to unravel the entire Central Alliance. Once the threat of conflict with Bulgaria had been 
temporarily ironed out, Burian and Tisza had to work even harder to hold AOK 
annexationism at bay. This chapter demonstrates that during times of military victory, the 
AOK’s hand was significantly strengthened and the MdA’s war aims decision-making 
power had lessened, despite its remaining in overall control. What the MdA was able to do 
was maintain a consistent, Balkan-centric war aims policy, protect the dualist nature of the 
Monarchy against excessive annexations, and meet its principal war aims in the Balkans 
without threatening its image among neutrals. In spite of strong pressure, Buridn pursued 
an independent, MdA-centric, and GMR-backed policy against both the internal wishes of 
the military and external pressures from Germany and especially Bulgaria. Although MdA 
war aims seemed moderate in comparison to the opponents of this policy, they represented 
a program of limited annexation and informal expansion of Balkan influence beyond the 
territories directly controlled by k.u.k. forces. At times, these war aims were kept secret 
from all but the highest echelons, rendering the true nature and extent of MdA war aims 
opaque until now.
Chapter 6: June 1916- May 1917
The final core chapter of the thesis analyzes the Austro-Hungarian war aims from 
the onset of the overw helming Brusilov Offensive until the departure of Franz Joseph’s last 
‘old guard’ personality, Istvan Tisza. It covers Rumanian intervention and subsequent 
defeat, the death of Franz Joseph, and the fall of Burian and Conrad, as Ottokar Czemin 
and Arz von Straussenburg took over under Karl’s leadership. Despite existential danger to
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the Monarchy during the sunset days of Franz Joseph’s reign, both Burian and Conrad 
continued to treat the Balkans as the central issue of war aims policy, and Burian 
successfully fended olT AOK and German involvement. Following Rumania’s intervention 
and subsequent defeat, the chapter argues that Burian used German pressure to marginalize 
Conrad, while at the same time expanding Austro-Hungarian war aims to achieve parity 
with Berlin and maintain the Monarchy’s prestige. Burian’s efforts failed as the Germans 
lost confidence in Austria-Hungary as an ally, resulting in Berlin’s intrusion into the 
Monarchy’s core Balkan interests. The death of Franz Joseph slowly ushered in a new era, 
during which the new Foreign Minister Czemin retained much of Burian’s Balkan war aims 
planning but attempted its execution in a more clandestine fashion. With Conrad’s 
replacement, Czemin had a nearly free hand domestically to seek expansion in Montenegro 
or Rumania in order to keep Serbia intact for eventual peace negotiations with Russia. The 
greatest threat to Czemin’s war aims policies came from an expansionist Germany and 
Bulgaria. Although his ensuing ‘desperado’ policy of trying to scare Germany into a quick 
peace failed, he did manage to slow Bulgarian advances in the Balkans and obtained 
recognition of continued Austro-Hungarian primacy in some o f the Monarchy’s Balkan 
areas of interest. Only due to the overwhelming dangers of hunger and revolution did the 
consistent Balkan-centric MdA policy begin its irreversible decline, a process which was 
accelerated by the dismissal of its last champion, Istvan Tisza.
Chapter 7: Epilogue (May 1917-November 1918)
The Epilogue charts the path of the war aims set by the MdA in the previous years 
and the AOK’s efforts to change them from the departure of Tisza until the final defeat of 
the Central Powers. The final phase of the war still saw MdA primacy in war aims 
planning and consistency in Austro-Hungarian Balkan objectives. However, it cannot be 
included with the core evidence and arguments because conflict continued not as a result of 
the leadership’s goals in the Balkans, but in spite of the leadership’s efforts to reach an 
immediate peace by giving up some (though not all) of its Balkan war aims. Nevertheless, 
the chapter demonstrates that Austro-Hungarian war aims remained generally intact until 
the end of the war. It gives examples o f Czemin’s policies that were consistent with 
previous MdA war aims thinking and contrary to his multiple statements in favor of a status 
quo ante helium. It also gives examples of Karl’s meddling and inconsistent war aims 
statements, through which he publicly undermined Czemin’s secretive approach. 
Following the failure o f the Karl-Czemin peace efforts, the chapter provides some striking
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examples of Hungarian and AOK expansionism, which tended to become more pronounced 
rather than reserved as the military situation deteriorated. Finally, the chapter shows how 
Burian’s return in 1918 as caretaker did not result in the abandonment of all war aims, 
seeking as he did territorial adjustment against Montenegro and Rumania until the last few 
days of the war.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of war aims is one of ideas, opinions, and hopes, and their influence on 
foreign policy. H.W. Gatzke refers to his work on Germany’s war aims as the “study of 
unfulfilled ambitions.”8 Indeed, the full scope of a country’s aims during war are generally 
not put into practice, but the understanding of how far leaders wanted to go gives us an idea 
of how much they compromised prior to peace. Although the literature on Austria-Hungary 
during the Great War is extensive, only in the 1970s, following the appearance of the 
Fischer thesis, did war aims specifically become widely discussed in the scholarship.9 
There has, however, been a surprisingly limited or vague conception of Austria-Hungary’s 
goals in the Balkans for the years 1914-1918. Given that Austria-Hungary was more 
flexible on Poland than it was on the Balkans, it is curious that no systematic account of the 
Monarchy’s aims in this region of principal interest has ever been undertaken. This 
dissertation seeks to rectify this omission by analyzing Austria-Hungary’s independent war 
aims and the mechanisms employed to achieve them.
The literature review is divided into four sections. The first section assesses the 
contribution by Fischer on German war aims which started an intensive scholarly debate. 
This debate on Germany inspired works on the war aims of Entente and other Central 
Powers, which are also described here. The second section describes the state of 
specifically Austro-Hungarian war aims research. The third section discusses the literature 
on decision-making in Austria-Hungary and its effect on war aims formation. The final 
section discusses the collapse of the Monarchy from the perspective of its offensive war 
aims.
The Fischer Contribution and the Broader War Aims Literature
The logical place to begin a review of the war aims debate is with Fritz Fischer, 
who in 1961 set forth his controversial thesis in Griff Nach tier Weltmacht that Germany 
had knowingly instigated the war and pursued it with determination in order to obtain 
continental domination and world-power status at the end. In contrast to his predecessor 
H.W. Gatzke, who believed that Germany had no specific war aims and left the question
'  Gatzke, H.W., Germany's Drive to the liest, Baltimore, 1966, 288.
9 Stevenson, D., French War Aims Against Germany, ¡914-1919, Oxford, 1982, v.
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vague and undecided,10 Fischer argued that Germany “wanted and covered for the Austro- 
Serbian war”11 and had an aggressive and monolithic policy towards expansion that was 
continuous from pre-war times.
One of Fischer’s pillars of support for this interpretation is the famous September 
Program of 1914, in which the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg sketched out 
Germany’s territorial aspirations at the height of the Battle of the Mame. Chief among 
these aspirations was Belgium, which the Bavarian king also recommended in November 
1914 should be “incorporated within a German federal state,” 12 either Bavaria or Prussia. 
In Vienna, where crushing Serbia was without a doubt the chief war aim, Hungarian 
officials acted as a brake on annexationist tendencies similar to those that the component 
parts of Germany were exhibiting. While the OHL managed to secure the fall of Bethmann 
Hollweg and implement a policy of extensive annexations, the AOK by contrast had little 
influence over the Hungarians and was successfully kept in check by the MdÄ. Fischer 
also argued that dominating Austria-Hungary itself became a war aim of Germany, through 
the Mitteleuropa program.
Through his work, Fischer pursued two themes which proved to be controversial. 
The first was continuity, connecting the September Program of 1914 to the aggressive war 
aims pursued by the military establishment at the end of the war, as well as linking pre-war 
Weltpolitik to German attempts at conquest in two World Wars. His second point is that 
there was a consensus between the military and civilian decision-makers in Germany, 
arguing that they were equally expansionist. His subsequent work, War o f Illusions,13 built 
on the first by arguing that the War Council of late 1912 demonstrated Wilhelm and his 
military apparatus’s preparation for a war in the near future.
The response to Fischer was powerful and in many ways continues to this day, with 
plenty of criticism. One author particularly critical of Fischer was Gerhard Ritter.14 In the 
sections on Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor in The Sword and the Scepter, Ritter 
argued that Fischer distorted and even doctored documents, knowingly disregarding some 
to support his case. He further did not agree that the German Foreign Ministry was in
10 Gat/ke, Drive, 289.
11 Fischer, F., Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-18, 
Düsseldorf, 1967,97.
12 Fischer, Griff, 212.
13 Fischer, F., Krieg der Illusionen: die Deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914, Düsseldorf, 1969.
14 Ritter, G„ The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem o f  Militarism in Germany, vol. 3: The Trageify o f  
Statesmanship — Bethmann llollweg as li ar Chancellor, Florida, 1972.
37
complete agreement with the OHL. Rather, Ritter argues, the Foreign Ministry had its own 
policy, and the OHL had its independent, albeit militarist, one. Ritter and conservative 
German historians continued to insist that no one country’s offensive aims could be held 
accountable for the outbreak of the First World War, and that there was no connection 
between Germany’s expansionist aims of the two World Wars. Georges-Henri Soutou 
attacked Fischer’s belief that the German Mitteleuropa plan, developed in Fischer’s view 
for European domination, was met enthusiastically by industrial leaders. In fact, Soutou 
argues that Mitteleuropa never constituted a paramount German war aim, and became only 
a subsidiary objective by the end of the war. Lancelot Farrar disagrees with the central 
Fischer thesis that the civilian and military sides pursued the same expansionist goals, 
stressing instead civil-military disagreements.15 6 He agrees with Ritter that, prior to his 
dismissal, Bethmann Hollweg desired a separate peace with one or more of the Entente 
even if it meant abandoning territorial objectives, while Holger Afflerbach says the same in 
his biography of the German Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn.17
Mainly due to Fischer’s challenge that Germany’s war aims were typical of 
imperialist states of the time, his work thus laid the foundation for authors to compare other 
Great and lesser powers’ war aims to Germany’s, in an effort to discern whether there 
existed a desire for starting or indeed continuing the war. These works, as described below, 
suggest that Fischer’s model is not applicable to other countries, where aims tended to be 
more ambiguous and lacking in the continuity and consensus Fischer describes in Germany.
The extensive literature on Austria-Hungary’s aims during the outbreak of war in 
July 1914 usually fades following the poor military performance of that fall and winter. 
This shortcoming is not mirrored in the research on other belligerents’ war aims, on which 
there is more extensive and specific literature. France’s war aims against its German 
adversary shows many parallels with Austria-Hungary. David Stevenson in French War 
Aims Against Germany defines war aims not as private aspirations but as official policy, 
though also admits that the dividing lines were often unclear.18 Stevenson argues that the 
French leaders, in their refusal to jettison their war aims, mirrored the stalemate which was
15 Soutou, G.-H., L 'Or et le sang: les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre Mondiale, Paris, 
1989.
16 Farrar, L.L., Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918, Boulder,
Col., 1978.
17 Afflerbach, H., Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich, München, 1994.
18 Stevenson, French War Aims, v.
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taking place on the battlefield. As in Vienna, the first war aim in Paris was to achieve 
security and re-establish territorial integrity, and France fought Germany’s allies only as a 
means to achieve this end. Yet, because France was not an aggressor in 1914, basic French 
war aims were easier to justify than those of other belligerents. These aims consisted of 
winning the war for the purpose of preventing any future German expansion through the 
use of force. To achieve this, Stevenson argues that French leaders took a firm decision 
that the war must be continued to the bitter end, and that the price of victory was worth
19paying.
Thus, both Austria-Hungary and France saw their war aims as a mechanism for 
survival, with their politicians and diplomats believing that defeat or a separate peace 
would be so devastating that the war had to be continued. To achieve such goals in defense 
against Germany, specific French territorial aims included the return of Alsace-Lorraine, 
the reinstatement of Belgium and security arrangements on its border, and a strong ally on 
the other side of Germany.19 20 Of these aims, only Alsace-Lorraine was absolute, but the 
flexibility allowed France to expand its war aims at any time if victorious conditions 
permitted. Under the guise of security, France could even pursue the destruction of 
German unity and the annexation of the left Rhine bank. Many of Stevenson’s conclusions 
on France are also applicable to Austria-Hungary. Contrary to what occurred in Germany, 
the civilian leadership in both Paris and Vienna remained in control of the war aims setting 
process despite involving the military for specialist advice. Both countries kept fighting 
because their leaders believed that their adversary’s peace terms were so severe that defeat 
could not have yielded a worse result.21 This did not, however, prevent them from 
formulating offensive, annexationist war aims to ensure their post-war status and security.
Probably not surprisingly for English-language scholars, British war aims have been 
analyzed in great detail. Victor Rothwell argues that the First World War was not an 
incomprehensible catastrophe which continued of its own momentum, but that Germany as 
well as its opponents had “extensive annexationist ambitions.”22 Even the British 
Government, which had no territorial interests on the continent, still discussed territorial 
issues ad museum. This was because its own goals, which were to defeat a renegade 
nation (Germany), prevent any Great Power from becoming too powerful on the continent,
19 Ibid, 198.
20 Ibid,200.
" ¡ b id ,  210.
22 Rothwell, V.H., British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, ¡914-1918, Oxford, 1971, 8.
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divide Turkey, smash Germany’s position in the Balkans and Middle East, and obtain 
German colonies,23 required a detailed discussion of the fate of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. The alternative to shattering German power and creating a Germany not hostile 
to the status quo was a separate peace, but one which the British leaders believed would be 
on such terms that Britain would become a German client state.24 Publicly, however, 
Britain kept its war aims “reasonable and just” in large part because Germany was proving 
too strong to overcome for much of the war.
David French frames British war aims as a “limited liability” strategy aimed at 
retaining Britain’s international dominance and exhausting the reserves of its allies to 
increase its power relative to foes and friends alike.25 Britain initially framed its war aims 
in terms not achievable with the resources it wanted to allocate. London pursued far- 
reaching aims -  the destruction of Prussian militarism, requiring a crushing defeat of the 
Central Powers -  by paradoxically only conducting a limited war. It soon became clear, 
therefore, that despite remaining rivals with France and Russia, the German threat and its 
own war aims required Britain simultaneously to control the world’s oceans, act as 
paymaster for its Entente, persuade neutrals to join, and raise a continental-scale army.26 
This proved an overpowering strain for Britain, which was why a policy of attrition was 
implemented and why by November 1916 the country was becoming dependent on US 
credit.
French argues that, throughout this period, the Foreign Office upheld a “sharp 
dividing line”27 between soldiers and statesmen, and vigorously pursued British war aims. 
This was true in Austria-Hungary and France as well, as each sought to hold their alliance 
intact and acquire new allies to meet their larger goals without becoming military 
dictatorships. By contrast, Victor Rothwell takes the view that the British General Staff 
had “extraordinary control over national policy,” and that even a coup was not 
unthinkable.28 French concludes that the additional requirements of meeting its war aims, 
namely supporting a large army in addition to providing naval protection and money, was 
beyond the Exchequer’s capacity, meaning Britain could not afford to win the war. Brock
31 Ibid., 282,285-286.
34 Ibid., 283.
25 French, D., British Strategy and ¡far Jims, 1914-1916, London, 1986, 244.
26 Ibid,, 246.
37 Ibid., 248. Sec also French, D., The Strategy o f  the Lloyd George Coalition, ¡916-1918, Oxford, 1995.
38 Rothwell, V.M., British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-¡9¡8, Oxford, 1971, 8.
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Millman29 30criticizes both authors, stating that French did not distinguish between the 
changing war aims and their definitions during the war, while Rothwell did not formalize 
the distinctions. Millman instead emphasizes the role of pessimism and defeatism on 
British policy, arguing that London had basically accepted German invincibility on the 
continent and had intended to use gains in the East to offset German ones.
Unlike France and Britain, whose expansionist and annexationist aims were 
subordinate to the principal goals of territorial integrity, security, and the overarching need 
to discipline Germany, Italian and Russian war aims were of a more aggressive nature. 
Horst Linke’s book Das Zarische Russland und der Erste Weltkrieg, is the key work on 
Russian war aims during the First World War, though its emphasis lies on St. Petersburg’s 
goals against Germany. Like Italy, Russia was not treaty bound to go to war, but did so for 
its own prestige and the security of its Balkan protégé Serbia. Once it entered the war, 
Russia’s goals became territorial, namely to increase its influence in the Balkans, encourage 
pan-Slavism, and drive towards its ultimate goal, namely the control of Constantinople. 
Austria-Hungary stood in the way of these war aims, making its defeat (though not 
elimination) necessary. Other works which emphasize Russian war aims at the outbreak 
include an article on Sazonov’s Thirteen Points by W.A. Renzi31 and the work by C.J. 
Smith on Russia’s foreign policy.32
Similarly, the Italian entry was driven by territorial desires against southern Tyrol, 
the Adriatic coast, and Anatolia. As outlined by H.J. Burgwyn in The Legend o f the 
Mutilated Victory, Italy refused the limited offers made by Austria-Hungary and signed the 
Treaty of London to secure these territories in exchange for its assistance. Later, Rome 
refused all overtures from the Central Powers, fearing that they would undermine the 
promises it had received in London. Even during Italy’s darkest hour, namely the 
catastrophic defeat at Caporetto, the Italian government “never gave the pursuit of a 
separate peace a serious thought.” The Italians sought “an extensive empire,” beginning
29 Millman, B., Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918, London, 2001.
30 Linke, H., Das zarische Russland und der Erste Weltkrieg. Diplomatie und Kriegsziele 1914 bis 1917, 
München,1982,237.
31 Renzi, W.A., “Who Composed ‘Sazonov’s Thirteen Points’? A Re-examination o f Russia's War Aims of 
1914,'n American Historical Review, Vol. 88/2, April 1983, 347-357.
32 Smith, C.J. Jr., The Russian Struggle fo r  Power, 1914-1917; a Study o f Russian Foreign Policy During the 
First World War, New York, 1956.
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with Austrian and ending with Ottoman territory, in exchange for Italy’s assistance, and 
insisted on parity within the alliance throughout the war.33
Italian aims clashed extensively with Serbia’s, as described in a work by Andrej 
Mitrovic. Despite fighting a war for survival which resulted in casualties of 40% of its 
mobilized men, Serbia pursued goals to realize its Greater Serbian ideals. Since the 
territory it wanted to acquire (Bosnia, the Adriatic Coast, Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia) all 
lay in Austria-Hungary, only the defeat of its arch-rival and its allies would secure such war 
aims.34 Similarly intransigent to Sonnino, Nikola PaSic pursued war aims designed to re­
establish and expand Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary.
Bulgaria resisted these Serbian goals and pursued the country’s destruction when it 
joined the Central Powers in 1915. Although no work exists on Bulgaria’s war aims, they 
are described generally in Richard Crampton’s text Bulgaria 1878-1918: a History. 
Bulgaria, which Churchill called “the dominant factor in the Balkans in 1914 and 1915,”3S 
joined the Central Powers because they could offer much more in Macedonia than the 
Entente, who could not cede Serbian territory. According to Crampton, Bulgaria sought to 
annex Macedonia and dominate the eastern Balkans. Sofia was also promised Eastern 
Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line from Turkey, would be given full control of the Maritza 
valley with its railway to Dedeagach, and was ceded half of Serbia up to the Morava.36 By 
joining when it did, Bulgaria was able relatively easily to meet almost all its initial, clearly 
defined war aims, but frustrated mainly in later negotiations with Austria-Hungary over 
Kosovo and the Quadruple Alliance over Northern Dobrudja.
The best sources for Ottoman foreign policy, including war aims, are Mustafa 
Aksakal’s The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World 
War37 38and, from a German perspective, Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire?* Ottoman war aims research suffers from the lack of historians able to read the 
antiquated Ottoman script, as does Austro-Hungarian scholarship from the lack of 
historians able to read Hungarian.
33 Burgwyn, H.J., The Legend o f the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 
1915-1919, Westport, Conn., 1993,191. On Italy, see also Bosworth, R.J.B., Italy and the Approach o f the 
First World War, New York, 1983.
34 Mltrovid, A., Serbia's Great War, 1914-1918, London, 2007.
35 Churchill, W.S., The World Crisis 1911-1918, London, 1960,317.
36 Crampton, R.J., Bulgaria 1878-1918: a History, New York, 1983,207.
37 Aksakal, M., The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the f  irst World War, 
Cambridge, 2008.
38 Trumpener, U., Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, Princeton, 1968.
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Austro-Hungarian War Aims Literature
Of all the major belligerents of the Great War, Austria-Hungary’s war aims have 
been overlooked because they have been eclipsed almost entirely by those of Germany. As 
the war dragged on and Vienna came increasingly under Berlin’s shadow and ultimately 
under its informal control, historians have generally relegated the Monarchy’s own wishes 
to secondary importance. Additionally, much of the literature regarding Germany has 
shrouded or distorted our understanding of Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy, as its actions 
were often perceived through the frequently critical or even downright disparaging German 
lens of the time. In consequence, Austro-Hungarian war aims have been treated as 
secondary to Germany’s and have not been given their own place in the literature.
Taking at face value what his German decision-maker subjects had believed in 
1914-1918, Fischer began a trend of marginalization of Austro-Hungarian war aims by 
downplaying their importance.39 Although he writes in detail of the Austro-German 
conversations where the Central Powers’ war aims were discussed, he does so in a very 
Berlin-centric fashion, ignoring Austria-Hungary’s own wishes on the basis that the 
German government did as well and that the Austrians were exhibiting inexcusable 
intransigence. Despite citing the annexationist treaties of the Entente, Fischer devotes only 
four pages to independent Austro-Hungarian war aims. In what Helmut Rumpler called a 
“short, unsystematic account”40 of Austro-Hungarian war aims, Fischer briefly focuses on 
Vienna’s goals such as Serbia, the Adriatic, the Lovcen, Negotin circle, and Montenegro. 
He refers to Albania as Foreign Minister Burián’s “pet project [Lieblingsprojekt]," which is 
an example of Fischer’s gross understatement of the importance various key Balkan 
territories had for Austria-Hungary.
Despite Vienna’s weakening position, the German diplomats were astounded when 
in October 1917 Austria-Hungary began extending its ambitions to Rumania and Poland as 
well, and even trying to set German aims. Although the Germans were able to repel these 
demands, which Fischer attributes to delusions of grandeur in Vienna, he does correctly 
identify the “continuity of Austria-Hungary’s war aims policy”41 as that of a Great Power 
interested in maintaining its integrity and defending its interests abroad, Perhaps because
39 Williamson, S.R. Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins ofthe First World H'ar, Macmillan: 1991.
40 Rumpler, H„ “Die Kriegsziele Österreich-Ungams auf den Balkan,” in Österreich und Europa, Festgabe 
fü r  Hugo Hantschzum 70. Geburtstag, Graz-Wien-Köln, 1965,396-398 and 465-482.
41 Fischer, Griff, 399.
: 43
Fischer did not see the importance such conflicting Austrian aims had for the Centra! 
Powers, or more likely because he was focusing on Germany rather than its ally, he 
generally dismisses these aims as no more than daydreaming. Although Fischer discusses 
the various war aims talks held with Vienna, he simply rejects any notion that Austria- 
Hungary had influence, let alone power, to implement its war aims over German demands.
Most authors, particularly those influenced by the Fischer thesis, have said very 
little about Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans, and have focused on the arena 
where Austrian and German interests collided, namely Poland. Because of the clash of 
interests between the major Central Power allies there, historians have erroneously 
concluded that Poland must have been the principal war aim of Austria-Hungary, given its 
attempts at achieving the Austro-Polish so-called ‘sub-Dualist’ solution and insistence that 
Poland should be a Habsburg crownland. From a position of military, economic, and 
political weakness, Austria-Hungary even by 1916 was pressing Germany not only to 
recognize its aims in the Balkans but also to accept the Austro-Polish solution.42
Austria-Hungary’s interests in Rumania would also be threatened as Germany 
insisted on a large and friendly country there (losing only western Wallachia) whose oil 
fields it could exploit, rather than weakening it as Austria-Hungary desired. The Germans 
consistently thought it appropriate to compensate Austria-Hungary in the western Balkans 
in exchange for German expansion in Rumania, Poland, and Russia. Yet by October 1917, 
the OHL’s aims had expanded even to the point of demanding Valona or Cattaro (an 
Austro-Hungarian port), and Hindenburg and Ludendorff both began to perceive Austria- 
Hungary as a potential future threat. With such attitudes in Berlin, Austria-Hungary was 
concerned not only about Germany’s competition in its backyard, but also about threats to 
its own territory. Since Fischer’s principal concern was to establish German guilt, the 
Austrian reaction to such demands was of little interest to him. However, it is strange that, 
given Fischer’s highlighting of these issues with regard to Germany, no historian has tried 
to look at Austria-Hungary’s war aims with equal focus.
Ritter, also focusing on Germany’s war aims, made the same mistake as Fischer in 
downplaying the importance and impact of Austro-Hungarian war aims. Like Fischer, he 
fell into the trap of believing German assessments of the Austrians rather than trying to 
understand the Austrian position, arguing for example that “Buri&n’s pigheadedness
42 Ibid., 288.
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brought the German diplomats to the verge of despair.”43 Although Ritter argued that 
Burian and Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza’s changing positions on Serbia and 
Montenegro showed “continuing uncertainty about Austrian war aims,”44 this thesis argues 
that Vienna stepped up its ambitions in line with the successive military victories, the 
resulting rise in AOK pressure, and the MdA’s internal war aims development. The result 
was therefore incremental growth, rather than any sort of confusion, and was similar to 
what the Germans experienced over the course of the war, except that the AOK was held at 
bay.
Unlike Fischer, Ritter accepts that the Austro-Hungarian negotiating position bore 
some fruit. For example, in mid-January 1916, following the fall of Montenegro and an 
Austro-Hungarian cabinet decision to completely carve up Serbia between Austria-Hungary 
and Bulgaria, Germany had to accept Austria-Hungary’s position for the time being. Thus, 
Ritter implicitly accepts that the Austrian position regarding the Balkans was an 
outstandingly important factor in the German negotiations with Austria-Hungary. He stops 
short of realizing the Balkans’ true value to Vienna, though he readily admits that “next to 
the Polish issue, the question of Serbia was the most complex of all, as well as the most 
urgent.”45 Importantly, however, Ritter makes the very accurate claim that the plans, which 
were never put into practice, “are of real historical importance,” as they show that the 
“Prusso-German camp was not the only one where certain forces were unhesitatingly ready 
to exploit military victory for aggrandizement, heedless of world opinion and the possibility 
of lengthening the war.”46 Sneering that the Austrians went even further because their 
goals would be implemented “largely on the anned achievements of others,”47 Ritter 
nevertheless identifies an important point about Austro-Hungarian militarism. Given the 
scope of his work, however, there remains much to be said about the development of 
Austro-Hungarian war aims, the internal bureaucratic battles that produced them, and the 
goals of their implementation, which only a work dedicated to the topic can do justice to.
To date, no monograph exists designed to discuss Austro-Hungarian war aims in the 
Balkans as a whole. John Leslie’s unpublished 1977 Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation is the
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only example of a lengthy work dedicated exclusively to Austro-Hungarian war aims.48 
However, it deals chiefly with the Eastern Front, covers only the period 1914-1915, and 
focuses on the Ruthenian/Polish/Ukrainian issues, treating the Balkans only tangentially. 
Still, it is a significant work in the meager scholarship on Austro-Hungarian war aims in 
general, and says some important things about the Balkans as well. Pointing to the 
“continuity between war aims and the goals of pre-war diplomacy,”49 Leslie hints that 
Austria-Hungary’s aspirations in wartime were as large as, if not larger, than its peacetime 
objectives. Although Leslie writes about the north, he readily admits that the south “was a 
constant feature of all but the most pessimistic conceptions of war aims: even Tisza insisted 
on peace terms which would firmly establish Austro-Hungarian primacy in the Balkans.”50 
Leslie states that even if no specific war aims were set in the same fashion as the 
notorious September Program, the basic aims were well understood, even if they were not 
discussed at the GMRs until January 1916. However, he overlooks the MdA’s internal war 
aims development for the Balkans before that time, primarily because his analysis is of the 
northern front, where Austria-Hungary was fighting an existential battle. Leslie, like the 
other authors, also falls in line with the German view of the Austro-Hungarian negotiating 
style, which, for example, he suggests led to continued war with Serbia and a Balkan peace 
foundering mainly on the “unilateral particularist objections raised in Vienna.”51 He writes 
that “the Monarchy’s leaders accepted in principle the idea of a deal with Serbia, but 
attached conditions which destroyed all chances of its being acceptable to the Serbs.”52 
Unfortunately, Leslie does not appreciate the fact that Austria-Hungary’s leaders used such 
negotiating tactics because they had no other way to prevent a stronger Germany from 
impinging on a central war aim such as Serbia. Overall, despite covering only one year, 
Leslie provides a very useful structural framework, which will also be employed in this 
thesis.
In what is a dated and short account of Vienna’s war aims in the Balkans, Helmut 
Rumpler has briefly looked at the crucial period of the conquest of Serbia and Montenegro 
September 1915 -  April 1916 and the ensuing border problems with Bulgaria. Arguing that 
the Foreign Ministry had no concrete plans for the Balkans until this critical juncture,
48 Leslie, J., “Austria-Hungary’s Eastern War Aims, August 1914 to August 1915,” Cambridge University 
Ph.D. Dissertation, unpublished, 1975.
49 Ibid., 16.
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Rumpler in this concise article describes some of the highlights of Austro-Hungarian 
attempts at securing the areas of vital interest, and their development over this time. 
However, he does not go into greater detail as to why these Austro-Hungarian aims 
mattered, what they meant for the German alliance, and what became of them. Rumpler 
admits that Burian’s goals, reiterated in his memoirs, were to “secure the vested rights of 
the Monarchy.”53 However, he sees the lack of the Monarchy’s expansion of war aims 
between 1914 and 1916 as “ominous,” particularly when compared with the thoroughness 
of the German aims, leading him to believe that the Monarchy’s “wise moderation” was in 
fact due to Burian’s “perplexity.” However, this thesis will show that the Foreign 
Ministry’s policy in general and Burian’s behavior in particular were designed to balance 
between the competing conceptions of the AOK on the one hand and the German Foreign 
Ministry and the OI IL on the other. This line of reasoning puts the war aims of Austria- 
Hungary into a new perspective, showing not only that Vienna knew what it wanted from 
the war, but after initial uncertainty had developed a coherent war aims plan.
Gary Shanafelt views the war aims question from the perspective of the Austro- 
German alliance. He analyzes the Dual Alliance in vivid detail, hitting the high and low 
points of the relationship. However, Shanafelt also places the emphasis of Austria- 
Hungary’s war aims in Poland, which he called the “central war aim”S4 for both Germany 
and its most important ally. He is of this opinion mainly because of Vienna’s hesitation 
regarding Serbia, but overlooks the fact that the initial military failures in Serbia did not 
automatically mean that Austria-Hungary had given up on its goals there. As the failures in 
the north grew too, however, Austria-Hungary put its expansive war aims aside, hoping for 
German reinforcements that did not arrive in the hoped-for numbers. As the war went on 
into 1915, Austria-Hungary was looking for ways of ending the war, with even Chief of the 
General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf admitting that the Monarchy would be lucky to get 
out with nothing more than a “black eye.”55 Although Shanafelt identities correctly that 
even for Tisza, ‘moderate’ war aims meant “the virtual disappearance o f Serbia,”56 he 
seems to buy into the German position, supported by Austrian Ambassador in Berlin 
Hohenlohe, that Burian did not know what he wanted, which is why he spoke of not
53 Rumpler, “Kriegsziele,” Conclusion.
54 Shanafelt, G., The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, ¡914-1918, New York, 1984, 
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showing weakness. Even Shanafelt, who focuses on inter-allied relations, much of which 
revolved around Austro-IIungarian war aims, fails to perceive the Austro-Hungarian 
negotiating position as being motivated not by insecurity or weakness, but by intransigence 
for the purpose of obtaining concessions.
Albeit focusing on the pre-war period, one work which does manage to address both 
sides of the Austro-German conversations plus a third (Italy) is Holger Afflerbach’s book 
on the Triple Alliance.57 Afflerbach demonstrates a continuity of Austro-Hungarian 
interests towards the Balkans which this thesis picks up on and brings into the wartime 
period. The book points out that Austria-Hungary’s principal goal was to “force” the 
“recognition of the Monarchy’s pre-eminent role in the Balkans.”58 As a result, Italy 
resisted Austro-Hungarian expansion on the peninsula to the same degree that the 
Monarchy resisted Rome’s extension towards Albania.59 The war came because for 
Austria-Hungary this expansion was pivotal for maintaining its Great Power status and 
indeed its survival60 -  a point which Berchtold argued even after the war.
An author who provides a new approach to the study of war aims, and uses the First 
World War to provide his case studies, is Hein Goemans, a political scientist.61 He argues 
that semi-repressive, moderately exclusionary regimes such as Germany increase their war 
aims even when they discover that they will most likely lose. Goemans ignores the Austro- 
Hungarian case because it seems to be almost the reverse of what he argues,62 for unlike in 
Germany the Monarchy did not desire territorial aggrandizement to buy off the public for 
their sacrifices and to stay in power, but rather for military, economic, and irredentist 
reasons. Nevertheless, the Goemans model is the only example of a holistic view of war 
aims covering multiple Great Powers.
Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary
Perhaps the best overall history of Austria-Hungary is the multi-volume series 
entitled Die Habsburgermonarchie, a project directed by Adam Wandruszka and Peter 
Urbanitsch. Books VI/1 and VI/2, on the Habsburg Monarchy in the system of
57 Afflerbach, H., Der Dreibund: Europäische Grossmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. 
Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 2002.
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international relations,63 represent an excellent starting point for understanding 
Ballhausplatz dynamics and the Ministry’s relationship with other institutional structures of 
the complex Monarchy. The section written by Helmut Rumpler describes the importance 
of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister as primus inter pares, given his position as 
advisor to the crown. In the absence of a Prime Minister or Chancellor, the Foreign 
Minister was the Emperor’s “first Minister” and wielded extraordinary influence. Yet, as a 
minister above the everyday politics of the Austrian Reichsrat or Hungarian Orszäggyüles, 
the Foreign Minister “did not have the duty or the right to take part in its deliberations.”64 
By understanding the Foreign Minister and the ministry he headed, one can begin to 
understand how ‘above the fray’ the most important politician was. More importantly for 
our purposes, one can begin to understand how the Foreign Ministry could wield enough 
power to retain control of the development of Austro-Hungarian war aims, which is a key 
argument in this thesis. One of the most interesting questions in the Austro-Hungarian 
decision-making process is why tire military was unable to take control of foreign policy­
making as the OHL had done in Germany. No doubt, AOK influence ran deep in wartime, 
and even superseded that of the War Ministry, to which it was subordinated in peacetime. 
Yet, while the AOK’s power in wartime was almost overbearing, the MdÄ still retained its 
independence and led the war aims development process until the end.
On the diplomatic side, although Rumpler points to a unique situation whereby 
Austro-Hungarian ambassadors only had to report and showed no initiative other than those 
in St. Petersburg and possibly Czemin in Bucharest,65 he is overstating his case. The 
Monarchy’s ambassadors in all three allied countries (Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria) 
worked hard to convince the Foreign Minister to follow their recommendations and, though 
their influence was limited, to state that they were only “intermediaries”66 is simply 
inaccurate. Rumpler does give an excellent account of the Ballhausplatz stmcture, in which 
the Balkan Department (which at various times included Russia) was the most important 
“at all times -  in accordance with the problem set of Austria-Hungary.”67 Rumpler 
documents the ‘bread and butter’ of the internal workings of the Ballhausplatz and the
w Wandruszka, A. and Urbanitsch, P. (eds), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Band VI; 1, Die 
Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen, Verlag der österreichischen Akademie 
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conflict and alliances between the various sections, departments, and counselors. He also 
correctly identifies Hungary as the “pinching shoe [i.e. stumbling block, Hemmschuh]'' 
which feared victory (for this meant trialism) as well as defeat (for this meant the end of 
Great-Hungary). Another important work on the inner functioning of the Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry is William Godsey’s Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Office on the Eve o f the First World War, Godsey argues that the landed 
aristocrats who led Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic corps pursued parochial, often anti- 
Serbian goals of their own. Critically for this thesis, where German-Austrian or Magyar 
national allegiance could influence war aims setting by the Austro-Hungarian elite, Godsey 
confirms that for the most part tine diplomats “directed their allegiance, both emotional and
ASpolitical, towards the dynasty and a united monarchy.”
In a later article of the Habsburgermonarchie series, Francis Roy Bridge makes a 
point that most German-centric authors like Fischer and Ritter have ignored or simply not 
engaged with; that the cohesion of the Dual Alliance was “not so much an expression of 
German [i.e. Teutonic] solidarity, but rather of a lack of trust.”68 9 German-centric works 
insisted that Austria-Hungary had basically become an appendage of Germany, yet Bridge 
hints that there was something that forced Austria-Hungary into maintaining the alliance 
and prevented it from withdrawing from it, even once Czemin took office. I extend this 
line of thinking by arguing that Austria-Hungary’s coherent set of war aims led not only to 
the continuation of the dangerous alliance with the ‘secret enemy’ Germany, but also to the 
ultimate collapse of the Monarchy. And these were far more specific than murky goals 
about re-establishing Austro-Hungarian authority over the Balkans. Bridge also perceives 
that “although the war since December 1914 had become a fight for survival, the Austrians 
still had large goals.”70 This thesis demonstrates that these specific goals were of such 
importance that the Monarchy continued fighting until its ultimate collapse. Czemin, who 
seemed to desire peace above all else, wanted to fight on for Alsace not because he saw ‘no 
difference between Strasbourg and Trieste,’ but rather because Austria-Hungary had to at 
least secure its vital interests and territorial integrity if Germany was going to obtain 
Poland, Belgium, and large parts of Russia. Bridge also examines some country-specific 
relationships, though he keeps his treatment of Austria-Hungary’s aims against the Balkan
68 Godsey, W.D., Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve o f the First World 
War, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1999,204, emphasis added.
69 Bridge, F.R., in Wandruszka et al, Vol. VI/1, Habsburgermonarchie. 337.
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states to a minimum, rather than developing on it further. This thesis builds on his work by 
emphasizing key turning points in the Balkans, such as the Austro-Bulgarian clashes over 
Serbia. This point is entirely lost on Milco Lalkov, whose contribution to the 
Habsburgermonarchie series covers Austro-Bulgarian relations before and during the war. 
In it, Lalkov ignores the clashes which nearly unraveled the alliance, and simply mentions 
the “positive environment”71 and good relations, apart from the small problem of 
condominium rule over the Dobrudja.
In his seminal work on Austria-Hungary, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the 
Great Powers, 1815-1918, Bridge outlines the Monarchy’s vicissitudes until its final 
demise at the end of the First World War. He confirms that, due to the threats it faced in 
the Balkans and from an overbearing German ally, Austria-Hungary faced a decision in 
1914 on whether to fight for its Great Power status or willingly abdicate it in favor of 
becoming a kind of “super-Switzerland.” The decision fell in favor of war, with the 
fundamental goal of maintaining Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status, chiefly through the 
subjugation of the Serbs.72 Regarding consistency in war aims planning, Bridge makes the 
point that, as the war progressed, Vienna replicated Berlin in its diplomatic “lack of realism 
and excessive self-confidence.”73 This was particularly true of Conrad’s and more 
generally of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan aims. Bridge rightly argues that a division existed 
between the Hungarians, who sought the best possible relations with Germany, and the 
Austrians who “felt that the Balkans should be the Monarchy’s first priority.”74 However, 
since the text treats more of Austria-Hungary’s history than its 1914-1918 experience, it is 
unable to offer the depth of detail needed to prove that Austria-Hungary sought integrity, 
independence, and the maintenance of its Great Power status chiefly through expansionist 
war aims directed primarily against the Balkans.
Foreign policymaking in Austria-Hungary was centered on the Emperor, whose 
decisions were binding on the military and the common ministers. The Foreign Minister 
held a special role, given the absence of an overarching Chancellor for the Monarchy. 
However, Emperor Franz Joseph’s influence has been questioned, given that he tended to 
be more interested in minute details such as officer promotions and newspaper clippings 
than in controlling his army and his foreign minister. His most recent biographer, Steven
71 Lalkov, M., in Wandruszka el al, Vol. VI/2,1  tabs burger monarchic, 435.
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Beller,75 devotes only one chapter to his wartime activities (1914-1916), indicating that the 
Emperor’s relative importance lay more in his earlier years rather than at the end of his life, 
Beller argues that, with the outbreak of the war, Franz Joseph “ceased to be the effective 
ruler of the Monarchy,”76 7and was unable to take an active part in the direction of the war at 
the age of eighty-four. Francis Roy Bridge is more circumspect, suggesting that there 
exists insufficient evidence about the role played by Franz Joseph, given that his 
instructions were verbal and nothing was recorded. Since Franz Joseph was too old to 
take active part in the foreign policy decision-making process, the reins were fought over 
between the MdA and the AOK. By focusing on the military situation rather than the 
foreign policy context, Beller sees the AOK, rather than the MdA, as the leadership that 
replaced the Emperor. Although Beller does attribute Franz Joseph some power to 
influence the diplomatic front,78 here too the emperor was generally fatalistic and trusted 
his advisors. The role of honor was central for him, exemplified by his statement during 
the 1915 negotiations with Italy that “I prefer to lose everything and to go down with 
honor; rather than to allow myself to enter into this commerce of thieves.”79 Obstinate like 
Burian, Franz Joseph nevertheless read the signs correctly. Shortly before his death, he 
remarked: “I mean to end the war next spring whatever happens. I can’t let my Empire go 
to hopeless ruin!”80
His successor, Karl, took a much more active part in foreign policy-making, both 
within the context of the GMR and via independent efforts climaxing with the Sixte affair 
and other peace feelers. Biographies were written of him by his assistant Ludwig Polzer- 
Hoditz, and more recently by Peter Broucek81 and Heinz von Lichem.82 Karl’s legacy was 
one of attempting peacemaking, and he had a braking effect on Austria-Hungary’s 
expansionist war aims policy, exemplified in the dismissal of Conrad. Thus, his role can be 
seen more in the light of formulating peace conditions rather than of war aims. Still, his 
role in war aims development has never been extensively researched, for under him
75 Beller, S.( Francis Joseph, London, 1999.
76 Ibid,, 219.
77 Ibid., 4.
78 Ibid., 220.
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Austria-Hungary still pursued control of Poland, Rumania, and extensive territorial 
acquisitions in the Balkans.
Foreign Minister Leopold Graf Berchtold, though he worked on exhaustive 
memoirs of which a manuscript survives, did not publish them prior to his death in 1942. 
In 1963, a biography of Berchtold by Hugo Hantsch83 became the first and best effort to 
incorporate the manuscript into a holistic picture of a man who had been essentially ignored 
or treated superficially by historians. Hantsch in this two-volume work deals particularly 
with the ultimatum to Serbia and Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war. His foreign policy 
focus revolves around Berchtold’s efforts to win over the neutrals to the cause of the 
Central Powers, but provides very few clues as to Berchtold’s offensive war aims in the 
Balkans.
Foreign Minister Buriän’s memoirs are particularly pertinent, mainly for what they 
ignore when compared to his wartime papers. Published in 1923, the memoirs are, as one 
would expect, an attempt to justify his actions and decisions during the war. Although 
there is no chapter on war aims per se, Buriän integrates these issues thematically and 
chronologically with regard to Italy, Rumania, and then Poland. Interestingly, his chapter 
on Austria-Hungary’s “Balkanpolitik”84 is mainly about antecedents and views Vienna’s 
Balkan aims largely as a way of solving Serb aspirations against the Monarchy. Only with 
regard to the other Great Powers does Buriän treat the Balkans as a foreign policy issue. 
He argues that Italy had “aspirations for the Adriatic’s eastern coast,” in particular in 
Albania, and that Italy became the “third player” next to “Austro-Hungarian and Russian 
Balkan interests,”85 86 However, he does not provide any extensive thoughts as to what 
Austria-Hungary’s wartime and post-war Balkan interests were. In his chapter on 
Yugoslavia, Buriän does not mention Montenegro at all, and focuses instead on resisting 
the “free from Hungary [los-von-Ungarn]”*6 efforts of the South Slav agitators. Thus, a 
dissonance exists between Buriän’s very focused Balkan efforts and aspirations evident 
from the archives, on the one hand, and his superficial treatment of the Balkans in his 
memoirs, on the other. This is probably because Buriän did not want to feed the notion that 
Austria-Hungary bore responsibility for the war or its prolongation. To discuss war aims 
would be to accept that Austria-Hungaty had them, and to do so would have been
831 Iantsch, H., Leopold, Graf Berchtold, Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, Graz, 1963.
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incompatible with the former leaders’ conceptions of victimhood in the interwar years. 
Foreign Minister Czemin’s memoirs87 *for similar reasons provide little insight into Balkan 
war aims, given his preoccupation with negotiating a way for Austria-Hungary to leave the 
war.
The most recent work on Conrad is Lawrence Sondhaus’ biography entitled Franz 
Conrad von Hotzendorf: Architect o f the Apocalypse.** Building on Conrad’s memoirs, 
which he never completed due to his death in 1925, Sondhaus uses the general’s second 
wife’s memoirs and letters to paint a vivid picture of the Chief of the General Staff. 
Although Sondhaus brings us closer to Conrad than anyone has done before by explaining 
how personal and professional issues influenced one another, we remain uncertain about 
Conrad’s Balkan policy. At times, Sondhaus seems to think that he simply reacted to 
battlefield events and diplomatic bargaining in Vienna, though the archives in contrast are 
full of his strident recommendations and influence. To illustrate this, one need only look at 
the climax of the campaign in the Balkans, namely the fall of Serbia and Montenegro in 
winter of 1915-1916, to which Sondhaus devotes only a few pages. Even the GMR of 7 
January 1916, which took place at the insistence of Conrad for the express purpose of 
discussing war aims, Sondhaus discusses only in general terms, determining that it was 
“inconclusive.”89 We do not get a sense o f how Conrad’s own war aims conception 
developed at the AOK and how they were presented to the MdA, a question that is critical 
for the purposes of this thesis and our understanding of Austro-Hungarian war aims in the 
Balkans.
Finally, the role of public debate on Austro-Hungarian policy remains disputed, 
because the normal political debate was suspended. Even in countries with relative press 
freedom such as France and Britain, authors such as Stevenson and Rothwell have argued 
that public opinion was “less important than the preconceptions of the leaders and their 
response to the military situation and to the policies of their allies.”90 Throughout the 
Monarchy, by contrast, the war meant strict press censorship, further limiting the role of 
public opinion. In Vienna, the Austrian Parliament was not brought back into session until 
1917 and its government ruled by decree. Meanwhile, in Budapest, the Hungarian 
Parliament did sit in session but, due to extremely limited suffrage laws, can not be
87 Czernin von und zu Chudenitz, O., Im Weltbiege, Berlin, 1919.
M Sondhaus, L., Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf: Architect o f  the Apocalypse, Boston, 2000.
89 ¡hid., 183.
90 Ibid, vi, 204.
r 54
considered to represent the Hungarian population, merely its elites. The fact that the 
population had virtually no say in the government’s actions is clear. What remains 
uncertain is the degree to which public opinion or even informal political or industrial 
networks had the kind of influence in Austria-Hungary that they did in Germany.
Public opinion was therefore nurtured by limited or official news, propaganda, and 
rumor. Mark Cornwall has noted that there has been little scholarly attention on the topic 
of military intelligence, censorship, and battle for public opinion.91 Only one work 
connects the limited public debate to war aims. A dense but ultimately important recent 
book by Patronilla Ehrenpreis92 discusses the war aims and peace conditions as discussed in 
the German-speaking public realm. She analyzes German-language newspapers from the 
whole empire and for the entire war, describing the attitudes of the various press circles to 
Austro-Hungarian war aims.
Although for the purposes of understanding political culture and counter­
propaganda in Austria-Hungary during the war this is an important work, it attributes far 
too great importance to the role of public opinion on war aims development, insisting on a 
causal relationship where there may not have been one. Ehrenpreis’ main argument is that 
Czemin worked very hard to bring together the fragmented public political sectors, but 
ultimately failed as Austria-Hungary’s military situation worsened. She argues that it was 
Vienna’s lack of understanding of how to employ modem propaganda to manipulate public 
opinion that led it to put the cart before the horse and react to a bellicose press by declaring 
war on Serbia. As the war progressed, discussion groups began to consider war aims and 
territorial annexations, providing concrete alternatives to the “vague conceptions”93 of war 
and peace disseminated in official government circles.
Although it is accurate that the popular Czemin professed to follow a moderate war 
aims plan, including one of peace without annexations, Ehrenpreis does not adequately 
question his sincerity, probably because the public press did not either. It was only the 
shock of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 -  the evidence that Austria-Hungary’s share of 
the spoils lacked even the semblance of parity with Germany -  that led to disillusionment 
with Czemin’s goals and his ability to obtain an honorable and perhaps even favorable
91 Cornwall, M., “News, Rumour and the Control oflnformation in Austria-Hungary 1914-1918,” History, 
vol.77no.249,1992.
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93 Ehrenpreis, Kriegs- und Friedensziele im Diskurs, 184.
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peace for the Monarchy. Not only on the Sixte issue, therefore, does Ehrenpreis overstate 
the importance of public opinion, but the central argument of this lengthy work implies that 
public opinion had a powerful bearing on foreign policy making, despite censorship for 
most of the war.
To argue that there were only imprecise conceptions of government war aims solely 
on the basis of a survey of publicly accessible literature is to ignore the internal workings of 
the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy. The Ballhausplatz, whose role was to develop the 
foreign policy of the Monarchy and which jealously guarded this crown-given right in the 
person of the Foreign Minister, his Ambassadors, and his bureaucrats, had a striking 
indifference to public opinion. Although clearly aware of the problems Austria-Hungary 
faced which could lead to internal revolution -  such as food shortages and socialist 
propaganda, as Czemin wrote to Emperor Karl -  in the written record one hardly finds any 
evidence in the ministry’s archives of domestic opinion being linked to territorial 
aspirations. This is not to say that the Foreign Ministry and AOK were completely 
detached or unaware of public opinion. However, they were more aware of the importance 
offoreign public opinion (such as in Greece or Rumania, whose publics they were trying to 
sway through financial support and intrigue), but largely uninterested in domestic public 
opinion when developing Austria-Hungary’s own territorial aims. Thus, it would be more 
appropriate for Ehrenpreis to discuss the effect of Czemin’s efforts to create a consensus in 
support of his moderate, albeit deceptive, peace condition plans, rather than try to draw a 
link between unofficial and diverse discussion groups and newspapers on the one hand and 
the development of official Austro-Hungarian war aims on the other.
Other historians have criticized Ehrenpreis for failing to demonstrate that the 
German-speaking Cisleithanian public discourse on war aims had “any concrete influence 
on the leadership.”94 Although the materials consulted for this project support this 
criticism, it does not attempt to prove the hypothesis that public opinion had no or only 
limited influence on war aims formation. Rather, this thesis will show that internally and in 
secret, official Austro-Hungarian war aims were neither vague nor malleable, and that it 
was these official aims, even under Czemin, that kept Austria-Hungary wedded to the Dual 
Alliance.
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Austro-Hungarian Collapse as a Result of W ar Aims
No author that I am aware of has directly linked the collapse of the Austro- 
IIungarian Monarchy to its independent war aims after 1914. Various interpretations exist, 
however. For AJP Taylor, Austria-Hungary was brought down from the outside because it 
was “rotten within.”95 He felt that Vienna was the capital most bent on war in 1914, though 
it had “no idea what it wanted to achieve.”96 These perspectives seem contradictory in that 
he simultaneously insists that it was “degrading”97 *that countries like Albania should be 
treated as vital. Taylor writes in very sweeping terms about Austria-Hungary, which is 
understandable given the dated nature of his work. It is important, however, to see where
no
his view that the Austrians “were no more than German auxiliaries” comes from and why 
it persists. The confusion over the true nature of Buriân’s negotiating style and 
independence is also perpetuated by Taylor, who felt that he was “receiving instructions 
from his real master” Tisza after taking over the Foreign Ministry. Tisza, Taylor argues, 
became the “virtual ruler of Austria-Hungary” with German support. Although Tisza’s 
influence is unquestionable, his wartime powers were much more limited -  often by Buriân 
himself -  in a manner not consistent with Taylor’s arguments. Looking extensively at the 
nationalities questions, Taylor does pick up on something that is vital for understanding of 
Austro-Hungarian war aims. He states that, even under Karl, “Habsburg diplomacy clung 
to its senile plans of aggrandizement, which still included hegemony over Serbia in its 
peace terms.”99 Although Taylor argues that Germany and Hungary were, in the end, 
responsible for the destruction of the Monarchy, he overlooks the importance Vienna’s 
drive for annexations had for keeping Austria-Hungary in the war. It seems strange that 
such lines of inquiry have not been explored further,
Alan Sked, in The Decline and Fall o f  the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918, argues 
instead that Austria-Hungary collapsed simply because it lost a major war, and that the 
nationality problem was not the main factor. In fact, Sked argues that the nationality 
problem was abating in 1914, that Austria-Hungary was not in decline in 1914, and that 
Vienna had had a habit of starting wars in the Nineteenth Century. Perceived as a
95 Taylor, A.J.P., The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918, Penguin, London, 1990,228.
96 ¡bid., 231.
97 Ibid., 229.
9* Ibid., 234.
99 Ibid., 241.
' ■. 57
European necessity, Austria-Hungary had become accustomed to being bailed out by other 
Great Powers, this time by Germany. This is critical insofar as war aims go, for it means 
that Austria-Hungary, certain of some form of guarantee for its status quo, wanted not only 
expansion, but was willing to have others fight for that expansion. Beyond that, its 
weakened position on its own did not justify giving in to its blackmailing neighbors such as 
Rumania and Italy, despite pressure from the Germans. Thus, ‘Austrian intransigence’ was 
possible because the Ballhausplatz put principle and precedent ahead of real military 
danger. It had the luxuiy to do so, and thereafter to continue to seek expansive war aims, 
because it considered the status quo eternal and this, as Polzer-Hoditz points out, “made an 
explosion inevitable.”100 10 Had Austro-Hungarian leaders not thought of the Monarchy as 
ever-lasting due simply to its long history and had they not had such expansive war aims, 
perhaps they could have broken free from Germany and made a separate peace. Thus, the 
Monarchy collapsed because it lost a major war, a war it persisted in because it wanted to 
either acquire or hold on to occupied territory in order to justify its enormous sacrifices.
Der Tod des Doppeladlers by Manfred Rauchensteiner is another very good account 
of the fall of Austria-Hungary over the course of the Great War. The author deftly 
describes the relationship between military factors and the development of policy in 
Vienna. From the very beginning, and even before the war, the Dual Alliance’s militaries 
were out of step with one another, contributing to the initial defeats which crippled the 
Monarchy. Building on Norman Stone’s The Eastern Front 1914-1917,101 Rauchensteiner 
provides an excellent overview of military developments, though he seems unsure of where 
Austria-Hungary put its emphasis -  the Balkans or Russia. In terms of Austria-Hungary’s 
war aims, Rauchensteiner’s perspective is that they were “vague,”102 involving only 
stopping Serbia from being the South Slav ‘Piedmont’ and eliminating Russian influence in 
the Balkans. Although he does present differing opinions within the Ballhausplatz in the 
forms of ‘Denkschriften ’ by Andrian and Forgäch, he does not follow this theme through to 
a conclusion, focusing instead on the decline in Austrian power and the resulting 
impossibility of implementing Austro-Hungarian war aims. However, what mattered was 
not whether Vienna could implement its plans, but rather how far it would try to do so, for 
this was what kept it in the war. Rauchensteiner argues that the final push which made
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Austria-Hungary collapse was not the Italian front, the hunger, or the economy at home. 
Rather, it was the Entente offensive in September 1918 in the Balkans.103
Of course, there are many more interpretations of the reasons for the collapse. Mark 
Cornwall, for example, in The Undermining o f Austria-Hungary, looks at the frontline 
propaganda, particularly with regard to the Italian campaign. Cornwall argues that this 
frontline propaganda led to a “steady weakening of the troops,”104 thereby playing its part 
in bringing down the Monarchy, just like any “other weapon in the armory.”105 There were, 
no doubt, countless factors that contributed to the eventual defeat and elimination of the 
Habsburg Empire. Yet, no previous author has adequately discussed Austria-Hungary’s 
independent and extensive war aims as a direct cause of Vienna’s decision to remain in the 
war, remain loyal to the German alliance, and the Monarchy’s eventual collapse as a result 
of the major war it helped prolong.
Conclusion: Thesis Contribution
When surveying the literature on Austria-Hungary in wartime, there is an evident 
gap as regards its war aims. More often than not, they are lumped mistakenly with 
Germany’s, or cast aside as irrelevant all together. To rectify this problem, this thesis has 
undertaken a systematic assessment of the Monarchy’s war aims in the Balkans for most of 
the war, rebalancing the emphasis normally put on Poland and focusing on the future 
desired by the military and political leaders of Austria-Hungary in its region of vital 
interest.
The topic of Austro-Hungarian war aims is significant because it shows that Vienna 
and Budapest mattered greatly, and that decisions reached in these capitals not only began 
the Great War but prolonged it as well. With Austria-Hungary pursuing independent 
objectives, and not merely being Germany’s vassal as some authors have portrayed it, the 
Entente’ failure to achieve a separate armistice with Austria-Hungary and force an end to 
the war were the result of Austria-Hungary’s own decisions. Although Fischer and others 
have marginalized the role of Austria-Hungary on the basis of its obvious weaknesses, its 
importance as the most reliable and vital ally to Germany can hardly be overstated. Vienna
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was the lynchpin without which continuation of the war would have been nearly impossible 
for Berlin.
Even more important than the obvious tangible benefits of the alliance in terms of 
allocated manpower and materiel were the perceptions in the various capitals of the Central 
Powers. Berlin felt it had to engage with Austro-Hungarian war aims on relatively equal 
terms or risk the loss of its most important ally. On the other side, a very real Great Power 
complex among Austro-Hungarian leaders prevented them from accepting a separate peace 
which, though it would have maintained the Monarchy, would also likely have destroyed 
the country’s already faltering Great Power status. Thus, understanding Vienna’s war aims 
in the Balkans helps to explain the prolonging of the war and the eventual destruction of the 
Monarchy.
S.R. Williamson, whose text is one of the standards on Austria-Hungary before the 
First World War, argues that the Monarchy’s contribution to the outbreak of the war was 
essential.106 This thesis intends to build on the works cited above by asserting Austria- 
Hungary’s continuing importance during wartime as well, through a focus on how its war 
aims developed and fundamentally shaped its foreign policy.
106 Williamson, S.R. Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins o f  the First World War, Macmillan: 1991.
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CHAPTER 3
July 1914-December 1914
INTRODUCTION
During the first stage of the war, Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans focused 
on three concerns: the Adriatic question, the defeat of Serbia, and maintaining Rumanian 
neutrality through deterrence by Bulgaria. Military failure against Serbia made it difficult 
both to defeat Montenegro and maintain influence in Albania. As we shall see, Foreign 
Minister Berchtold and General Conrad agreed that, although dominance of the Western 
Balkans was a vital war aim, circumstances forced the AOK to focus on the Russian and 
Serbian fronts, both of which were menacing. Berchtold was left trying to deal with an 
expansionist Italy and a not very understanding ally in Berlin, which pressed him into 
granting territorial and other concessions in order to prevent Rome from joining the 
Entente. Although Berchtold espoused the war aims in the Balkans as his priority, he was 
unable to secure them militarily and had no choice but to use diplomacy to restrain Italy. 
He was unable to count on the Monarchy’s own military victories in the Balkans to secure 
his voice in Albania, and because German pressure to keep Italy neutral escalated, 
Berchtold was unable to prevent Italian involvement in the western Balkans which 
threatened his and future Foreign Ministers’ war aims in the region. The Western Balkans 
section will argue that the MdA’s principal objectives lay in the Balkans, that it remained in 
control of decision-making within the Austro-Hungarian political structure, and that its core 
aims were consistent with previous policy and were only abandoned when it was 
unavoidable.
A preoccupation with so-called ‘negative war aims’ dominated the thinking in 
Austria-Hungary regarding the Eastern Balkans as well, where Hungarian Premier Istvan 
Tisza highlighted the threat posed by Rumania’s wavering and then openly hostile attitude 
towards the Monarchy. Berchtold and Tisza worked together to obtain assistance from its 
perpetual adversary Bulgaria in deterring an invasion by Rumania against Austria-Hungary. 
Differences arose over the extent of pressure to be applied to Bulgaria; Tisza feared no 
neighbor more than Rumania whereas the MdA became increasingly concerned about 
Bulgaria as the new, large, and also South-Slav adversary which might be lured by Entente 
promises. With the Germans, the MdA, and the AOK agreeing that Rumania was the key
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to securing the region, differences erupted about policy towards Bucharest, analogous to the 
debate surrounding Italy. Berchtold’s eventual decision to side with the AOK and 
Germany to offer territory for Rumanian neutrality incurred Tisza’s hostility. Although 
Tisza’s and the Foreign Ministry had similar objectives around key trans-Danubian border 
areas such as Belgrade, Macva, and Negotin, the disagreements about which Balkan states 
to include when dividing the Serbian pie made it impossible to obtain any Rumanian or 
Bulgarian assistance. Furthermore, Tisza’s willingness to communicate directly with the 
Germans and k.u.k. representatives in the Balkans demonstrates his continued and 
increasing influence over foreign policymaking. Given the military defeats Austria- 
Hungary faced on all fronts, the AOK’s influence on war aims, particularly in the eastern 
Balkans, was minimal during this time, while the MdA and Tisza repeatedly emphasized 
that an honorable peace was dependent on victory in the Balkans rather than against Russia.
This chapter supports the four overall arguments of the thesis. The Austro- 
Hungarian leadership -  both military and diplomatic -  perceived the Balkans as the 
principal objective, even though the crushing might of Russian intervention forced a troop 
deployment directed towards survival instead of offensive war aims. As a result of AOK 
failures to deliver victory on either front, the MdA was less constrained than it would be at 
any later stage to set positive war aims in the Balkans, even if these remained theoretical 
for the time being. These plans would lay the framework for a consistent war aims 
planning by the MdA, modified in the future by the AOK’s excessive and by Tisza’s 
minimalist demands, but continually housed under the roof of Austria-Hungary’s foreign 
policy-making establishment. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the Vienna elite’s 
conviction, even after three failed invasions of Serbia, that an honorable peace could only 
be achieved once its Balkan war aims were met.
SECTION I 
WESTERN BALKANS
The following section argues that, as demonstrated by the MdA’s responses to 
Italian encroachment on Albania, the Austro-Hungarian principal objectives lay in the 
Balkans. The Foreign Ministry, at the helm of the decision-making process when setting 
war aims, initially sought not to conquer or subjugate territory in the western Balkans, but 
rather pursued ‘negative war aims’ designed to prevent Albania and Montenegro falling 
into Entente or Italian hands. The section demonstrates that an independent, unified, and
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stable Albania was crucial for Austro-Hungarian policymakers as it secured their influence 
in the country, extended their reach beyond the Adriatic, and gave Montenegro and Serbia 
another hostile country with which to contend in their rear. These efforts failed as a result 
of military defeat in Serbia and encroachment by Italy, but they demonstrate Berchtold’s 
view of the “great political importance” of the Balkans. In his view, from a “political 
perspective the prostration of Serbia” and the ancillary benefits on the Adriatic were “far 
more important”107 than advancing further in Russia or even recapturing occupied Austrian 
territory in Galicia.
Austria-Hungary, having been the only European Great Power without a sizeable 
navy, was dependent on the narrow straits of Otranto in the Adriatic Sea as its outlet to 
world trade. Much like the Dardanelles for Russia, control of at least one Adriatic coast 
was a vital interest of the Monarchy’s, without which the Italians could turn the sea into an 
Italian lake at will. Since the unification of Italy, Vienna had no influence on the western 
Adriatic, and was forced to seek control of the eastern Adriatic, namely the western 
Balkans, to protect its nautical lifeline. Until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Ottoman 
Empire ruled the western Balkans and Italy was a power allied to Austria-Hungary by 
means of the Triple Alliance, along with Germany. Never very trusting of Italy, Austria- 
Hungary wanted to expand its influence into the two western Balkan states which 
controlled the southern Adriatic coast following the Ottoman retreat from Europe, namely 
Montenegro and Albania. The largest problem for Austria-Hungary was that Montenegro 
was a state comprised mainly of Slavs, and therefore generally hostile to Austria-Hungary 
due to the south Slav irredentist movements in Montenegro and Serbia. Albania, on the 
other hand, was a predominantly Muslim state established by the Great Powers only in 
1913 and assisted by an international commission. However, due to tribal and factional 
fighting, as well as neighboring power interference from Italy, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, 
and Austria-Hungary, it was unstable, impoverished, and decentralized. It was over these 
two difficult neighbors that Austria-Hungary needed to establish (and after the Balkan wars 
re-establish) a modicum of influence and status.
Austro-Hungarian foreign policy after the turn of the century revolved mainly 
around supporting Muslim elements against south Slav unification and irredentist goals, as
107 Berchtold-Giesl(AOK), 26-Nov-1914, HHStA-PA-I-500.
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well as keeping external Great Power (meaning Italian) influence at a minimum. During 
the 1908 annexation crisis, Foreign Minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal attempted to exert 
decisive influence over Montenegro even in peacetime, urging the construction of Austrian 
rail networks in the strategic Lovcen mountains (overlooking the Austrian naval base at 
Cattaro) and another over the Muslim-inhabited strategic plateau of the Sandjak of 
Novipazar.108 Though these efforts came to naught, Aehrenthal implemented policies 
which called for an Austro-Hungarian connection to the austrophile Muslims of the 
Ottoman Empire (later Albania and Serbia), while at the same time physically separating 
the ethnically related and ideologically allied states of Montenegro and Serbia. It was 
therefore no surprise that the Second Balkan War proved a “near total disaster”109 for the 
“surprised and angry”110 Austria-Hungary as Serbia doubled in size and split the Sandjak 
with Montenegro, further boosting South Slav irredentism.
As Montenegro slipped from Austria-Hungary’s grasp, the situation in Albania 
became precarious as well. After Albania was established in 1913, Austria-Hungary 
worked with other Great Powers including Italy to aid Albania against Montenegrin, Serb, 
and Greek claims to its territory. After the Balkan wars, the Principality of Albania under 
the German-bom Prince Wilhelm von Wied was formed in February 1914 and existed until 
September 1914 when he was deposed by a revolt. Even by June 1914, shortly before the 
outbreak of the First World War, Albania was effectively in a state of civil war, with 
Austria-Hungary supporting the government of Prince von Wied and Italy supporting the 
rebels.111 It was clear early on that Italy and Austria-Hungary would be the main rivals for 
the domination of Albania and Montenegro.
Thus, with the First World War, Austro-Hungarian war aims in the western Balkans 
began not with goals of how to conquer or subjugate these territories, but rather with 
aspirations to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and propping up Albania. 
Although these attempts would ultimately fail, Foreign Minister Berchtold practiced 
containment of any threats to Austria-Hungary’s naval lifeline until he was replaced in 
January of 1915. The next Foreign Minister, Istvan Burian, pursued similar policies until 
war with Italy came, except that he chose a hard rather than conciliatory approach. The
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goals of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans for the first ten months were jockeying for 
position, an emphasis on ‘negative war aims’ (because Vienna was still at peace with 
Rome), and a critical prelude to the formulation of extensive Austro-Hungarian war aims in 
the region. During this time, Albania went from becoming a bartering tool to a key 
objective. Understanding the Austro-Italian rivalry even during peacetime, coupled with 
the Italian blackmail over the Trentino and how far Vienna was willing to go to appease 
Rome in the Balkans, is essential in comprehending the extent of Austro-Hungarian 
positive war aims in the region after war came.
Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, Austria- 
Hungary went to war with Serbia ostensibly as a punitive action but in fact to re-establish 
its authority in the Balkans. However, when the powerful Russian Empire joined the war, 
the Chief of the High Command Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf aptly informed Foreign 
Minister Berchtold, who pressed for a prestige victory against Serbia, that the continued 
existence of the Monarchy would be “decided at Lemberg”112 in Galicia, rather than on 
what Conrad still considered a secondary front in the Balkans. Though Berchtold no doubt 
agreed with the need to halt the Russian steamroller, he insisted on allowing the k.u.k. 
Second Army to continue operations in the Balkans, for a loss here would be disastrous 
with regard to other Balkan states and Italy.113 While the battles raged across Europe, the 
Austro-Hungarians never lost sight of their principal goals in the Balkans, where Italy had 
gone from being an unreliable ally to an outright adversary. Conrad, whose favorite 
pastime was loathing Italy, implicitly agreed with this by arguing that the diplomats had 
fumbled, causing the Rumanians, Italians, and Japanese to remain neutral and making 
Galicia the main theater of war,114 rather than the Balkan and Italian one which he so often 
advocated. As the war unraveled, it was clear that while both the MdA and the AOK had 
hoped for a limited war in the Balkans to achieve certain war aims, Berchtold remained 
more interested in the peninsula, even at the cost of achieving advances in Galicia and 
Russia.
The greatest external threat to Austro-Hungarian interests in the western Balkans 
was the influence of Italy. Beginning Austro-Italian rivalry in earnest, Rome began
m  Rauchensteiner, Tod, 134.
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pursuing a policy of incremental destabilization in Albania in an apparent effort to find an 
excuse for intervention. According to the well-informed and highly respected Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador to Turkey Johann Markgraf von Pallavicini on 20 July, it was Italy 
which fuelled the revolt against the Prince in Albania by sending funds and emissaries in 
the hopes that it could justify military intervention.115 Playing a duplicitous game from the 
beginning of the war, Italy insisted that it “in no way sought to obtain an advantage in 
Albania”116 as long as Austria-Hungary was engaged elsewhere. It reaffirmed this on 27 
August, claiming to want to uphold the London Agreements which had established 
Albania, by not occupying part of the country.117 The MdÀ, sensing its own weakness 
even before the great military defeats by Serbia, tried to work with Italy to maintain some 
sort of status quo between them as well as stability in Albania. This even meant 
withdrawing support for the formerly Austrian-backed Prince Wied of Albania, whom 
Berchtold wanted deposed in order to secure centralized government, fearing a crumbling 
of Epirus and other border areas.118 Some may interpret this wavering attitude towards 
Wied as showing the uncertainties of Austria-Hungary’s designs for Albania. However, 
this position actually had more to do with Vienna’s prioritization of stability and unity in 
Albania and its resulting ability to resist Serbian expansion119 rather than promoting the 
new and powerless government under Wied.
An independent, neutral, unified, and above all stable Albania was crucial for 
Austro-Hungarian policymakers who hoped thereby to secure their influence in the country, 
extend their reach beyond the Adriatic, and give Montenegro and Serbia another hostile 
country with which to contend in their rear.120 This was a continuation of peacetime policy 
whereby the Foreign Ministry believed Austria-Hungary’s interests could best be secured 
through a stable and peaceful Albania. Hence, Austro-Hungarian leaders abstained from 
direct involvement in the hopes of securing Italian désintéressement as well. To their 
horror, Austrian non-intervention proved to be no precedent for Italy.
Concerned still with Italy’s decision to abandon its Triple Alliance partners and 
remain neutral in the Great War, Germany and Austria-Hungary grew increasingly anxious
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about Italian goals, most of which were directed against Austria-Hungary itself or against 
Austria-Hungary’s main sphere of interest and influence, the Balkans. Italian 
encroachment in Albania was incremental and hesitant. It began with a request to occupy 
the tiny island of Saseno in the Bay of Valona, a formerly Ottoman and then Albanian 
possession. German Undersecretary of State Arthur Zimmermann on 5 September prodded 
Berchtold to accept this occupation, even if it became coupled with the Italian intentions of 
usurping the strategic port of Valona, for the need to “keep Italy in a good mood” and 
display (even if falsely) Triple Alliance unity should take precedence.121 12 Besides, 
Zimmermann saw an added bonus in the potential for Greco-Italian conflict, given Greece’s 
declared interest in northern Epirus (located in southern Albania) an idea Berchtold had 
also considered. Worried but still in agreement with the German position, Berchtold on 
6 September accepted the provisional Italian occupation of Saseno, on the basis that this 
move would offer a guarantee that the warring powers (meaning the “Triple-Entente”123) 
would not establish themselves on Albania’s coast or build a naval base.124
It was soon clear to Vienna, however, that accepting such moderate moves would 
not satisfy Italy. Italian pressure for further Austrian concessions in both Albania and the 
Tyrol steadily increased, as did German pressure to give in to Rome. For their own military 
considerations, the Germans prodded a hesitant Austria to grant Italy Saseno and Valona. 
By October 1914, Italy’s sights were set on Valona, the most important Albanian port with 
an Italian minority, on the basis that Epirus Greeks threatened to attack it125; a scenario 
which was actually greatly hoped for in Rome.126 Count Johann Graf Forgach, the 
influential Balkan Section Chief at MdA, informed the German Ambassador in Vienna 
Heinrich von Tschirschky that if Valona were taken, it by no means could be considered a 
“gift,” but possibly could be used as the “compensation item”127 which Italy had been 
demanding under Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Apparently Berchtold agreed, arguing 
that an Italian digression to Valona would be desirable, since it distracted them from 
Trentino, and Vienna could “close an eye” over this issue.128 Ambassador Karl von 
Macchio even reported that the confidence for moving towards Valona likely came at the
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impetus of his German counterpart in Rome, who perceived designs against Albania “as a 
panacea against all other aspirations” of the Italian leadership,129 and Rome even began to 
talk of Valona as its “vital interest.”130 For Austria-Hungary, however, allowing these 
Italian moves was a very significant concession.131 The Foreign Ministry was forced to 
make the best it could out of the Italian actions, which it had no power or influence to 
oppose. Even though a move by Italy would be a “flagrant breach” of the agreements made 
over Albania, Berchtold believed that it would at least allow Austria-Hungary to demand 
parity after the war, or consider Valona as Italy’s chosen compensation object in the event 
of Austro-Hungarian territorial expansion in the Balkans.132 Though these hopes would 
later turn out to be misplaced, Berchtold’s aim of isolating the South Slavs by keeping them 
away from the Adriatic coast would be maintained even in the context of Italian control of 
Valona.
Thus, Austria-Hungary embarked on an appeasement and diversion policy, designed 
to keep Italy happy and possibly even get it entrenched in Albania. On 22 October the 
Austrian Ambassador told Rome that in other circumstances Vienna would join the Italian 
efforts to secure Valona but that it supported the independent move,133 though he neglected 
to say that this was largely because it had no choice. Sir Edward Grey had already 
suggested humanitarian intervention by Italy, while the French Ambassador in Rome, 
recognizing Austria-Hungary’s diversionary tactics, expressed dissatisfaction about Italy’s 
digression in Albania, because it was getting distracted from the Trentino.134 
Simultaneously, Austria-Hungary had to contend with a Greek stabilization expedition in 
autonomous Epirus, from which Athens claimed it had the full intention to retreat when 
order had been re-established. Berchtold had no power to resist but reiterated his support 
for the London Agreements and indicated his hope that the Greek occupation would be 
provisional.135 By the end of October, Austria-Hungary had already failed in its efforts to 
maintain an independent Albania, though it had as its consolation prize the brewing Italian 
and Greek conflict over Valona, Berat, and Epirus as well as Italy’s momentary diversion 
from its insatiable thirst for the Trentino and Trieste.
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Though the Italian landing in Valona was endorsed by Germany and tacitly 
accepted by an Austria-Hungary weakened by consecutive defeats in Serbia and Galicia, 
the Italians continued to move slowly, albeit with greater confidence. On 28 October the 
German military attaché in Rome reported that the Italians did not seem adventurous and 
that the occupation of Valona was “no counterevidence.”136 Yet, while the OHL was 
prodding the German government to find ways to get Italy on the side of the Central 
Powers, the AOK was pressuring its government to prevent the Italian move in Valona, or 
at least achieve parity. Arguing that the seizure of Valona would equal a significant 
increase of Italy’s military might to Austria-Hungary’s disadvantage by enabling it to even 
more easily cut off access to the Mediterranean than it could from Taranto or Brindisi, the 
Austro-Hungarian Imperial Navy felt that the only way out was to limit the number of 
Italian ships (or allow quantitative parity for Austrian vessels) and to prevent the 
fortification of Valona as a naval base.137 However, Austria-Hungary had no basis for 
making, let alone implementing, such a wide-ranging demand.
As fall turned to winter in 1914, Austria-Hungary’s weakening position only 
worsened, leading it to seek alternatives to a war it seemed to be losing. As early as 10 
November 1914, Berchtold turned to Germany following a mediation request by Colonel 
House on behalf of US President Woodrow Wilson. Although Berchtold did not think it 
was likely to succeed, he opposed rejecting such a proposal a limine because it offered the 
opportunity to reiterate the Central Powers’ argument that this was a “defensive war” for 
the safety of their “important vital interests.”138 Informing the world of their “relatively 
modest aims” 139 would positively influence particularly American public opinion. To do 
this, Berchtold requested a discussion of war aims between the Dual Alliance members, and 
even sought to limit the more excessive goals.140 In response, the Germans offered only 
assurances of allied victory. This event -  Austria-Hungary’s prodding and Germany’s 
eloquent refusal -  to define and publish war aims and to consider a mediated settlement 
would become the leitmotif of Austro-German relations for the duration of the war, 
repeated countless times for all theaters.
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Early in December, Pallavicini asked the Foreign Ministry why Austria-Hungary 
should “bleed itself white because Germany wants to annex Belgium?”14' In fact, 
Berchtold had already expounded the reasons to the AOK a few days earlier, emphasizing 
the “great political importance” of the Balkans, since from a “political perspective the 
prostration of Serbia is far more important than a continued advance in Russia or even the 
recapture of Galicia.”142 It was clear, therefore, that Berchtold was not fighting in Poland 
and Galicia for the sake of those regions and certainly not for the German annexation of 
Belgium, but rather for the Foreign Ministry’s own designs in Serbia and the other Balkan 
states. This proves that the MdÀ pressured the military hard for a victory which would 
allow it to meet its offensive war aims in the Balkans, even if this came at the expense of 
advances against Russia or even at the cost of occupied Austrian territory.
Although it tried, the AOK. could not deliver such a victory for Austria-Hungary. 
By 15 December Belgrade, which had been taken for the fourth time, was again vacated. 
At the end of the year, after losing 273,000 of the 450,000 men put into action143 (61% 
casualties), Austria-Hungary’s armies in tire Balkans stood where they had begun in July, 
namely at the Monarchy’s own borders. Thus, of the total Austro-Hungarian casualties by 
the end of 1914 (957,000),144 almost 30% came from the fighting in the Balkans. Such 
commitment is hardly reflective of what the AOK itself at times termed a ‘secondary front.’
To further damage the Monarchy’s prestige, Italy moved troops into Valona on 25 
December 1914,145 and attempted to convince the MdÂ that this move was merely a 
provisional measure.146 The German Ambassador in Rome informed Berlin that Sonnino 
intended to support the London agreements.147 So much had the Monarchy’s power 
dwindled that both Macchio and Berchtold told Tschirschky that they had no objections to 
the Italian occupation of Valona and only meekly complained that the Italians, who held 
Saseno and Valona still wanted compensation, while Austria-Hungary had “no advantages 
in the Balkans whatsoever” to show for its efforts.148
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This section has demonstrated that the development of Austro-Hungarian war aims 
in the western Balkan states at the outbreak of the war was dominated by fears o f Italy. 
The critical coastal states of Albania and Montenegro were slipping out of the Monarchy’s 
control, as it lost influence in the former to Italy and was already fighting a war against the 
latter. The negative war aim of denying Italy influence in these two regions, as espoused 
by both the AOK and the MdA, could not be achieved, not least because of the defeats 
Austria-Hungary faced against Serbia. Positive war aims were therefore impossible to 
frame, and it was Berchtold’s weak response to Italy’s advances that influenced his 
downfall at the hands of the Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in early 1915.
SECTION II
EASTERN BALKANS
Ila. Serbia
The following section on Serbia aims to demonstrate the overall argument that the 
Balkans represented Austria-Hungary’s principal war aims in the first six months of the 
conflict. The most powerful official throughout this time period was the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, who indirectly led the MdA in its efforts to formulate war aims in the Balkans. 
Because Hungarian policies were generally aligned with internal MdA goals and Berchtold 
was susceptible to Tisza’s influence, the MdA remained in overall institutional control of 
war aims planning. Far from being the decisive voice, Conrad’s AOK was too busy 
ensuring the Monarchy’s survival to take much part in the war aims discussions. Apart 
from showing the Tisza-Berchtold development and congruence in war aims planning, this 
section aims to further demonstrate the argument that the MdA and Hungarians were not 
willing to make peace until their Serbian objectives were met, even after three consecutive 
failures to defeat Serbia and impose Austria-Hungary’s will. To prove these arguments, the 
section will analyze Tisza’s war aims against Serbia and why they fluctuated, how closely 
the Hungarian goals matched the MdA’s policy direction, and what influence external 
factors, such as Berlin, Bucharest, and the AOK had on Austro-Hungarian war aims
planning between July and December 1914.
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Tisza’s position against an offensive war at the Common Ministerial Council 
(GMR) of 7 July 1914 which decided on a response towards Serbia is well documented.149 
To his Emperor, Tisza insisted that Serbia should not be “destroyed, much less annexed,”150 
a position he would insist upon throughout his term in office. Instead, Serbia was to cede 
territory to Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, along with a few “strategically important border 
corrections” in favor of Austria-Hungary, as well as reparations. All this, Tisza argued, 
would be designed to keep Serbia under the Monarchy’s control.
This “middle road”151 and non-annexationist approach was aimed at keeping Russia 
out of the war as much as it was designed to protect Hungarian power in the dualist system. 
The policy’s implications, however, were unacceptable to Russia, and demonstrate that 
Tisza espoused the shrinking of Serbia as a war aim from the beginning despite being the 
most moderate member of the GMR. Thus, cession of Serbian territory was present as a 
war aim before the need to obtain Bulgarian assistance after the Monarchy’s Balkan defeats 
in late 1914 was even a consideration. Although Tisza secured the promise of non­
annexation against Serbia at the subsequent GMR on 19 July 1914,152 it was done with the 
understanding that the war would remain localized as a result of the defensive language 
used by Vienna.
With the delay in Vienna over these Balkan questions came an increasing 
impatience in Berlin, because German goals were tied to a harsh response against Serbia. 
The A A instructed its representatives to push hard for an unacceptable Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum which would make war inevitable. Germany wanted Austria-Hungary to act in 
order to achieve a “complete victory over Serbia,”153 and to eliminate the greater Serbia 
idea.154 Otherwise, even a partial success would have to be viewed as a defeat for Austria- 
Hungary, and would shift the power relations in the Balkans permanently to Vienna’s 
disadvantage.155 If this occurred, the Dual Alliance itself would be threatened, because this 
would bind all of Austria-Hungary’s forces to the south-east in a future war, leaving 
Germany on its own in the event of a Franco-Russian invasion. This would mean the
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principal purpose of the Dual Alliance would not be met, forcing Germany to look 
elsewhere to secure its interests, possibly through a rapprochement with Russia.156
This threat may have been a bluff to get Austria-Hungary moving on Serbia, but it 
demonstrates that, while Germany needed Austria-Hungary in the northeast, Vienna’s 
interests lay squarely and exclusively in the Balkans. A northern front was not in anyone’s 
interest at the MdA or AOK. Three days later Vienna nevertheless issued the ultimatum 
and the mobilization crisis began, which ended in the -  for Vienna -  devastating Russian 
decision to intervene.
Although Conrad was eventually forced by the circumstance of Russia’s 
involvement to deploy the majority of his forces northwards, the Serbian front remained 
principal in the thinking of the policymakers. Even before live Austrians suffered their first 
defeat against the Serbs at the Battle of Cer on 19 August 1914, the MdA had already been 
developing various political and economic plans for Serbia’s future. One such plan, written 
on 10 August 1914 for Berchtold by MdA Section I (Balkans), expounded several ways in 
which Serbia could be subjugated and exploited. One such method, albeit the most 
“radical” and contrary to the GMR decision, was Serbia’s complete disappearance, 
involving annexation and integration.157 Another method would be independence for 
Serbia, limited by a customs union or similar tool. The MdA officials who penned this 
report were well aware of the Hungarian government’s position at the GMR which favored 
the latter method, but were also concerned about being criticized in Hungarian agricultural 
circles for recommending a customs union.1S8 The final MdA position, the report 
suggested, should be to resist these internal pressures against a customs union with Serbia, 
since Austro-Hungarian markets would not suffer. In order to achieve this, however, the 
MdA official believed a mere customs union with a “sovereign Serbia could not be 
implemented”, and Austria-Hungary needed control of a wider portion of the country’s 
internal administration, such as customs and finances. If the country was to be released 
after the war, the official recommended merely a commercial treaty similar to those prior to 
1908.159 It was on this question that the MdA Section I/Serbia asked the government to 
make a decision. This document proves how advanced the MdA’s thinking was on the
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future of Serbia as early as August 1914, and how confident it was in the AOK’s ability to 
deliver victory over this neighbor. It also showed how the MdA’s decision-making process 
with Berchtold at its helm meant that resistance to Tisza was a viable option, albeit one that 
would not be exercised.
The MdA’s early recommendations of annexation, direct control, or customs union 
as options for Serbia ran squarely counter to the GMR decision which had acquiesced in 
Tisza’s plans. Although discussions over the future of Serbia were put on hold as the AOK 
failed to deliver the anticipated victory in Serbia, Tisza would for the first but not last time 
during the war spearhead Austro-Hungarian foreign policymaking and war aims planning. 
His habit of conducting foreign policy would be resisted by future Foreign Ministers, but 
continued through the Berchtold period. Following two unsuccessful AOK attempts to take 
Serbia and at the beginning of their third operation on 16 November, Tisza visited Berlin 
and set out -  at least partially on his own authority -  Austria-Hungary’s war aims against 
Serbia. Anticipating victory, the Hungarian Prime Minister wanted to ensure that the sums 
obtained in a reparations settlement would be divided between the Dual Alliance partners 
based on efforts in the war. Geographically, Tisza Finally began seeing a need for territorial 
growth for the Monarchy, but differentiated between direct annexation and spheres of 
influence. In the Balkans, Tisza wanted to punish Serbia for its greater Serbian idea and 
create a future balance of power which could ensure a peaceful development of the region.
Although he still professed a desire for “as little territorial growth as possible,” he 
nevertheless stated that some regions needed to be annexed due to “very important strategic 
concerns,” including the north-west comer of Serbia, the Negotin circle, and Belgrade.160 
These were by no means small border rectifications, and demonstrate an incremental 
growth in Tisza’s war aims planning which brought it closer to the MdA’s. However, Tisza 
stuck to his GMR position that most of Serbia should be distributed between Bulgaria, 
Albania, and possibly even Greece rather than be seized by Austria-Hungary.161 Although 
Tisza was cautious and military developments were not on Austria-Hungary’s side, he was 
determined to secure victory against Serbia. His increased willingness to expand the 
Monarchy’s influence directly into the country stemmed from an understanding that 
Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status -  and the reason she went to war in the first place -  
depended on a positive outcome against Serbia. Elsewhere in the Balkans, Tisza envisaged
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giving the southern portion of Albania to Greece and Italy to satisfy their interests and 
create a conflict between them. While central Albania would form a Muslim principality, 
the Hungarian Premier envisaged northern Albania, Kosovo, and southern Montenegro 
would form a friendly, viable, Catholic-led state which would be in Austria-Hungary’s 
sphere of interest.162 163 Tisza recommended the annexation of the geostrategic Lovcen 
plateau to Austria-Hungary and wanted to seize Serbian territory to increase Montenegro’s 
size and create a lasting contradiction between the former allies. He hoped to compensate a 
peaceful Greece in southern Serbia and southern Albania for its willingness to cede Kavalla 
to Bulgaria. Both the German Kaiser and his Chancellor were impressed, with only 
Jagow -  who was more “detail oriented” -  remaining unconvinced.164 Tisza himself was 
also positive on the talks, which he deemed favorable from every point of view.165
That the Balkans were also Berchtold’s principal focus is demonstrated by his 
remarkable requests to Conrad on 25 November. In this correspondence, Conrad expressed 
“dismay” at an MdA promise to Berlin that troops would be pulled away from the northern 
front to be deployed against north-east Serbia.166 Although Berchtold admitted telling the 
Germans this in principle, he insisted to Conrad that it merely had the purpose of obtaining 
further German reinforcements on the Eastern Front.167 Whereas Conrad saw the Russian 
front as primary and warned that Austria-Hungary was fighting there against superior 
numbers,168 Berchtold could have tolerated a stalemate in Poland in order to pursue his 
political goals in the Balkans with the pretext o f opening up a Danubian connection to 
Turkey, which had just entered the war on the Central Powers’ side on 22 October. The 
Foreign Minister felt Austria-Hungary finally needed a prestige victory in Serbia in the 
hopes of freeing up their forces against a potential Rumanian intervention and the Russian 
menace. This MdA-AOK chicken-and-egg debate demonstrated that although Berchtold 
deferred to Conrad on military matters, in one of his few moments of strength he insisted 
that it would be his duty to emphasize the “large political importance” of the Balkan 
front.169
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Berchtold went even further, stating that the “prostration” of Serbia was “more 
important” than a continued advance into Russia or even the recapture of eastern Galicia.170 
This stance was remarkable, for it showed that Berchtold was willing to pursue further 
conquest against Serbia rather than liberate Austro-IIungarian occupied territory or defeat 
Russia. In Berchtold’s view, a peace without victory was not considered as long as the 
Serbian army was still intact. While his aim was ostensibly to assure the supply lines to 
Turkey remained open as the Germans wanted, bringing Serbia to its knees was “an 
absolute imperative.”171 Berchtold feared leaving Serbia unvanquished because of the 
effect it may have on the Balkan neutrals. By stating that a Rumanian march over the 
Carpathians would be a “walk in the park”172 without the availability of the southern k.u.k. 
army in the Monarchy’s defense, Berchtold used valid strategic explanations to set Serbia 
for the first time as Austria-Hungary’s principal political and military target.
Berchtold elaborated on the wider Balkan implications of a ‘Serbia-first’ policy in a 
second note to Conrad. If Serbia could be successfully defeated and a connection 
established with the Ottomans, the pressure of the Islamic movement in the Balkans would 
become the decisive factor in improving Austria-Hungary’s position and achieving a 
beneficial peace.173 Anticipating correctly that Italy would remain quiet through the winter, 
Berchtold considered the situation in Rumania urgent, and that the country must be 
“forced” to maintain its neutrality, by quickly defeating Serbia and freeing up o f the 
southern k.u.k. army as a “threat” against Rumania.174
Tisza supported Berchtold’s thinking entirely. The Hungarians aligned themselves 
with the MdA in pressuring the AOK to defeat Serbia quickly. Tisza believed that the way 
Sofia could be brought into the war on Vienna’s side was through Austro-Hungarian 
occupation of the Negotin district175 in north-east Serbia. This would indeed have served to 
open the Danube, but Negotin also represented a major Hungarian war aim because of its 
Majdanpek lead, copper, and coal mines176 and control of the Iron Gate approaches around 
Tum-Severin, over which Zimmermann had pressured Tisza in Berlin.177 To achieve this 
goal, Tisza said the relevant military men had to be “properly and continually influenced,”
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meaning getting Conrad to listen to the political goals of the MdA.178 Berchtold responded 
that on the Negotin question there was an uninterrupted exchange of ideas with Berlin, 
heading in the direction of a “joint occupation.”179
Although Tisza perceived Austro-Hungarian war aims against Serbia to be central 
for the Monarchy’s Great Power status, his role as Hungarian Prime Minister meant that he 
needed to ensure Hungary’s security first. This was shown in early December when 
developments in Poland caused him to waver. As the Russian forces besieged the Galician 
fortress at Przemysl and the AOK’s forces were pushed back to the Carpathian mountains 
and the Hungarian border, Tisza began fearing for the very life of the Monarchy. Barely a 
week after wanting to pressure the AOK to take northern Serbia at all costs, these military 
developments meant that on 2 December Tisza switched course and began to push for a 
Russia-first policy, if this meant keeping the enemy away from Hungary. The Hungarian 
Prime Minister informed Archduke Friedrich that, in his opinion, a penetration of Hungary 
by the Russians would certainly lead to an incursion by Rumania into Transylvania.180 He 
asked the AOK to reinforce the positions in the northern Carpathians, but urged Friedrich to 
consider, should these measures be inadequate, to bring in troops already deployed 
elsewhere.181 Tisza effectively recommended that in order to prevent the “catastrophe” of 
an invasion and the potential for an “imminent” Rumanian intervention, the AOK should 
withdraw troops from the Serbian front.182 * This recommendation arose principally from a 
fear of Rumanian intervention if Russian troops entered Hungary, but also from the reports 
that Serbia was on its last legs and nearing utter defeat. Disputing the veracity o f the 
Serbian victory reports as a result of the Austro-Hungarian retreat in north-west Serbia, 
Tisza -  who was remarkably well-informed about military operations -  believed albeit 
incorrectly that the “completely exhausted” Serbs stood no chance against Austria-Hungary 
m the following “few weeks.” However, Archduke Friedrich managed to allay Tisza’s 
concerns about Russia, stating that he and the Germans were “confident,” now that the 
OHL had for the time being provided the necessary reinforcements to the eastern 
campaign.184
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The Foreign Minister also hoped for victory in Serbia despite the bad news. 
Berchtold gave his approval in principle to funding half of the required 3.75m Marks which 
the Bulgarians were asking to begin an insurrection in Macedonia, indicating the extent to 
which the Austro-Hungarians were hoping to be assured of military success at least against 
the north of Serbia.185 The fact that it was ultimately unsuccessful did not lessen his 
commitment to defeating Serbia. Berchtold and Conrad wanted to see victory over Serbia, 
while Tisza was only on board as long as a victory protected Hungary from the Rumanian 
threat.
As hopes were raised of a successful southern campaign, the issue of general peace 
began to loom large, particularly for Tisza. Should the advance against Serbia be 
successful, Austria-Hungary’s initial war aim (punishing Serbia) would be fulfilled, leaving 
only Russia as an immediate adversary. Widespread annexations were not in Tisza’s 
program, for he wanted to ensure Austria-Hungary did not succumb to ‘mission creep’ and 
continue fighting longer than absolutely necessary. Stopping Russia and defeating Serbia 
were all that would be required for a peace in Austria-Hungary’s favor, and Tisza’s 
discussions in Berlin in early December showed that there was agreement of opinion on 
“peace conditions.”186 Tisza’s second visit in only a few weeks explicitly for the purpose 
of discussing war aims shows not only the importance the Austro-Hungarians placed on the 
Balkan front, but also Tisza’s unique relationship with the MdA. The Germans agreed with 
Tisza that peace conditions needed to be sorted out between the Central Powers first, before 
a general peace conference convened.187 Although Tisza and the Germans “abhorred” the 
idea of such a conference, or indeed any kind of “Areopag” of the Great Powers,188 they 
were in full agreement that if such an event should take place following an Austro-German 
victory, their war aims might be met and a “joint program”189 prepared for the conference 
in advance. The Germans claimed only “smaller annexations” including in the west and 
“very little” in the east.190 This plan also included an economic “connection” with 
Belgium, but Bethmann Hollweg insisted that he did not have any additional European 
territorial ambitions.
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Understanding German plans was crucial for Austria-Hungary to meet its own 
goals, which in the Balkans included as much of a reduction and weakening of Serbia as 
possible without actually annexing much. Only “smaller, strategically vital” mainly 
northern territory would be annexed with an obvious emphasis on the Negotin and 
Belgrade, rather than the traditional Austro-Hungarian aim of the Sandjak. Tisza claimed 
to be unsure about MdA policy towards the Sandjak, though from his Hungarian 
perspective he admitted that it did “not carry much weight.”191 Contrary to what would 
become the next Foreign Minister Burian’s clear policy aim of dividing Serbia from 
Montenegro by annexing the Sandjak -  a plan which the German Chancellor understood 
and supported -  Tisza followed an independent line by stating that a Serbia which was 
weaker than the other Balkan states, bordering or even united with Montenegro, was 
preferable to seizure of the Sandjak or a categorical Austro-Hungarian refusal to ever 
accept unification. Where Tisza did agree with Burian’s future policy as Foreign Minister 
was that Albanian-inhabited lands should be taken from both Montenegro and Serbia, 
strengthening Albania and simultaneously keeping Serbia from the Adriatic.192 Tisza’s 
mention of a territorial reshuffle designed to strengthen Albania demonstrates that Burian’s 
future focus on it was not his own brainchild, and that initially the two Hungarians agreed 
with this approach. Tisza, in his second visit to Berlin, reasserted his limited annexation 
plan, but the visit also demonstrated his independent approach and the undermining of key 
MdA goals such as the Sandjak.
Unfortunately for the Austrians, the battlefield situation did not allow for these aims 
to be implemented immediately. The Germans were “displeased”193 that Negotin had not 
yet been occupied, though they were assured that this was simply a delay. For Germany, a 
swift end to the Balkan campaign would mean access to the Ottoman ally and enough 
security for Bulgaria to consider joining the Central Powers. It was willing to support 
Tisza and Berchtold’s insistence on a military priority for Serbia to achieve that end. Since 
Serbia had not yet been defeated, Tisza felt a specific discussion over peace conditions and 
the joint war aims program would be premature. As Buridn would claim when he became 
Foreign Minister, more dangerous than not setting a war aims program was setting one too
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early and making policy statements which could cause problems in the future.194 In the 
Balkans, Austria-Hungary was in a weak position, but it did not want to sell itself short 
with minimalist war aims if it could achieve greater ones later on following a German 
victory. German Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmerman outlined 
the “colossal” reparations levels Germany intended to obtain from Russia, making it clear 
that financial instruments would be insufficient. For this reason, Germany would be 
demanding valuable (territorial) concessions and tangible physical objects (such as 
railroads), sparking similar requests by Tisza regarding Asiatic Turkey.195 There, as in the 
Balkans, Vienna desired a strong economic position, made possible by acquiring French 
and British property.
Tisza had the greatest interest in a Serbian occupation that would safeguard not only 
the Monarchy’s, but also specifically Hungary’s future economic and political aims in 
Belgrade. The AOK attempted to set up the first Militargeneralgouvernment occupation 
(MGG/Serbia) under General Oskar Potiorek on 25 November, after the third and final 
1914 offensive in Serbia seemed to be succeeding. Tisza, however, had concerns about 
how this MGG would be manned. In a message to Berchtold on 2 December, he put 
forward a rather unorthodox recommendation. With the excuse that a “triple allocation” of 
civilian occupation personnel in Serbia (Austrian, Hungarian, and Imperial Austro- 
Hungarian) was wasteful and would lead to “completely superfluous tensions,” Tisza 
recommended an almost ‘competitive advantage’ approach.196 By employing “Hungarian 
officials in Serbia and Austrian officials in Russian Poland,” Tisza thought a “natural” 
division of labor would strengthen the Monarchy’s occupational strength in each o f these 
regions.197 The Hungarian Premier would know that, with Hungarian officials exclusively 
engaged in civilian matters in Serbia, the annexationist AOK under Conrad could be 
restrained from an overly harsh occupation or from ruling its MGG/Serbia as a de facto 
annexation. Although this idea put Tisza and the AOK on opposite sides, the contentious 
nature of this recommendation meant Conrad could count on Austrian civilian resistance to 
ensure that it failed.
This idea was not a passing fancy of Tisza’s, and he had weighed the benefits of 
such a move against the possible backlash very carefully. He decided to push ahead, and
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forwarded this request to several other leaders in the Monarchy, while asking Berchtold to 
push this line among his circle. Tisza wrote directly to Potiorek to bypass the AOK, and 
put forward the same recommendations on the day Austria-Hungary captured Belgrade. 
Suggesting Potiorek draw the majority of his staff from the lands of St. Stephen, Tisza 
suggested using Magyars, (Hungarian) Germans, and Roman-Catholic Croats.198 However, 
Potiorek’s third offensive began to unravel when, on 3 December, Serbia began a 
counteroffensive which eventually freed Belgrade. Austria-Hungary was forced to retreat 
and Potiorek would, as a result, be relieved from duty on 1 January 1915.
Even if the k.u.k. army had not been forced to retreat in the last weeks of 1914, 
Tisza should have known better than to make so obviously divisive a request. As early as 
19 November, the Austrian Prime Minister Graf Karl von Sturgkh had gained wind of 
efforts by the Hungarians, as reported in the Budapest newspaper Magyarorszag, to install 
a “Hungarian administration” in the Ma£va area designed to control postage, 
administration, finance, and customs.199 Though accurate, the newspaper article was 
something Stiirgkh simply could not believe, since such unilateral control by Hungary 
would be a flagrant violation of Austria’s rights, against which StUrgkh understandably 
“most resolutely protested.”200 This reaction, transmitted to Tisza via Berchtold, should 
have warned the Hungarians of the dangers of any (perceived) unilateral move in an 
occupied country. Because Tisza made his semi-official and widely distributed suggestion 
to Berchtold and Potiorek along similar lines, it was not surprising that Stiirgkh’s hand was 
forced. Sturgkh insisted on the rights of his half of the Dual Monarchy in war aims 
questions. Potiorek sided with StUrgkh, and the Austrian Prime Minister authorized the 
dispatch of Austrian functionaries to Serbia, under Potiorek’s MGG/Serbia.201 Tisza’s 
suggestion, which the Austrian Prime Minister easily circumvented, was dropped. Stiirgkh 
informed Berchtold that Tisza’s ‘administrative division formula,’ whereby the 
MGG/Serbia would be manned entirely by Hungarians, was something he simply “could 
not accept.”202
Tisza had counted on Berchtold’s assistance, or at least inaction, with regard to this 
request, as he had so many times before in the questions surrounding Austro-Hungarian
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foreign policy in the Eastern Balkans in the closing months of 1914. The ‘division’ 
suggestion was an attempt at compromise with Cisleithania, but the manner in which it was 
put forward ruined any hopes Tisza might have had that this formula would be acceptable 
to the MdÀ, the Austrians, or the AOK. The episode showed how confident Tisza felt in 
setting foreign policy, even if this was beneficial only to his half of the Monarchy. The 
Foreign Minister also had no choice but to resist him on this point, and it was at least 
partially due to Berchtold’s lack of total subservience to Tisza which led to his replacement 
by Buriàn, a fellow Magyar and close friend and ally of Tisza’s, on 13 January 1915.
When the strength of the Serbian counteroffensive on 3 December became clear, the 
Army was the first to abandon some of its Serbian war aims. Whereas Tisza had proposed 
that all of occupied Serbia go to Hungarian administrative control -  although importantly 
not annexation -  Potiorek had other plans, namely to let Rumania take parts of north-east 
Serbia. He suggested Austria-Hungary allow Rumania to occupy the Verciorova-Timok 
estuary, which the Monarchy “even in the best case did not want to permanently 
possess.”203 Although he had opposed bargaining with the Rumanians in the face of 
blackmail, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bucharest Ottokar Graf Czemin also 
supported the compensation idea.204 His reason was ostensibly to pacify Rumania, which 
the military attaché in Bucharest believed feared an imminent Austro-Hungarian attack, but 
more likely he hoped to use a bait to lure Rumania into Serbia and obtain assistance against 
the so far invincible Serbs. As the region in question surrounded the Hungarian objective 
of Negotin and other regions of north-east Serbia which the Germans and Austro- 
Hungarians had been arguing about, suddenly it was Tisza who found himself on the 
defensive.
Tisza without hesitation rejected this suggestion as “out of the question,”205 because 
it meant the voluntary cession of Negotin and with it the Majdanpek mines. He also went 
further, informing Berchtold of the dangers of this suggestion, because it undermined the 
Monarchy’s “mission” of convincing the Rumanians that Serbia was now entirely 
“dominated” by Austria-Hungaiy.206 Tisza knew that with the very real fear Berchtold and 
others felt towards Rumania, anything that could be perceived in Bucharest as weakness by
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Austria-Hungary had to be avoided, leaving the Rumanians believing that Potiorek’s army 
would be turned against them if they joined the Entente. Tisza could not think of anything 
more amiss than “surrendering” the Negotin to Rumania, leaving the Monarchy weak, its 
prestige damaged, and opening itself to further blackmail from Bucharest.207 Not least, this 
struck a deep chord with the Hungarian government, whose war aims in Serbia time and 
again led it towards the Negotin.
Whereas he agreed with Stiirgkh against Tisza on administration, now Berchtold 
arbitrated in favor of the Hungarian Prime Minister against the Army. On 5 December, 
Berchtold informed Potiorek that, although it was true that the Monarchy had offered the 
Negotin circle to Rumania during King Carol’s reign in exchange for active cooperation,208 
the situation was now very unfavorable and Rumania was not likely to assist under any 
circumstance. An offer of the Negotin, as Potiorek envisaged, would in no way serve to 
satisfy Rumanian aspirations, but rather strengthen them.209 Additionally, since opening 
the Danube had become a hard and fast Austro-Hungarian war aim, handing any Danubian 
stretches to Rumania would be “highly problematic.”210 Putting the Army under pressure, 
Berchtold argued that if the Monarchy managed to convey the impression that the action in 
Serbia was “essentially finished,”211 then Rumania wrould be prevented from intervening 
against Austria-Hungary thanks to the threat of the southern army fully capable of resisting 
an advance. For the MdA, therefore, defeat o f Serbia -  not its premature dismemberment -  
was the way to secure the Monarchy against Bucharest and establish a link with the 
Ottomans. This ended for the time being the Army’s suggestions of buying off Rumania 
with Serbian territory.
While the Army-MdA internal differences were ironed out, Hohenlohe had his 
hands full keeping the Germans out of the Negotin question. On 7 December Bethmann 
Hollweg already wished to discuss post-victory “peace modalities” with regard to Serbia, 
though Hohenlohe attempted to keep him away from a full-fledged war aims discussion.212 
Nevertheless, Hohenlohe agreed that certain peace conditions needed to be discussed 
between them, particularly if they wanted to avoid a peace conference or congress and
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thereby improve their bargaining position.213 The Chancellor concurred, for internally the 
Germans were reassessing war aims and were moving away from the September Program. 
Hohenlohe informed the Chancellor of Vienna’s official Serbia policy, which was to 
“weaken” the country without “desiring all too much itself.”214 Austria-Hungary needed 
“border corrections,” including the Schabatz (Sabac) district in north-west Serbia as well as 
the Negotin district, and Hohenlohe added, as his personal view, that the Monarchy needed 
to hold on to the militarily vital capital Belgrade as a bridgehead.215 This was the 
beginning of a conversation about war aims which lasted the entire war because Austria- 
Hungary and Germany never seemed to find each other’s proposals appropriate. At the end 
of 1914, Vienna had been weakened in Serbia without hopes of success against Russia, 
while most in Berlin remained confident that, over time, the French lines would be 
breached and Paris taken.
The MdA was also discussing internally its future policy towards Serbia. Leopold 
von Andrian zu Werburg, an MdA official and future Lcmdeszixilkommissar in Lublin 
(Poland), wrote a piece for Berchtold on Austro-Hungarian peace alternatives in mid- 
December 1914, before the full scale of the Austro-Hungarian defeat became known. He 
postulated that Vienna’s goals in this war must be to remain “independent and 
strengthened,” without resorting to wholesale annexations.216 His minimum solution 
agreed with what Hohenlohe had told the Germans about Belgrade and Schabatz, and the 
need to seize the Negotin along with the Iron Gate and form a connection with Bulgaria.217 
The maximum peace conditions, to be obtained if Germany managed to be victorious in the 
west, were to make Austria-Hungary truly a “European Great Power of the first order” 
through widespread annexations in Poland against a cornered Russia in the east.218 In the 
Balkans, Austria-Hungary would take the Sandjak back, seize all of western Serbia, and 
colonize the northern portion of Serbia with Germans, Hungarians, and possibly Croats. 
Any rump Serbia would be a satellite of Austria-Hungary’s. Having been the Consul 
General in Warsaw, Andrian naturally looked northwards for Austro-Hungarian expansion, 
but here it was dependent on German victory. The southern goals were achievable by
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victory in the Balkans alone, which is why they were included in the minimal and more 
realistic plans, while the maximum plans merely painted a picture of Austro-Hungarian 
expansionist dreams. But Andrian was also aware of the dangers to the Monarchy if 
Rumania and Italy attacked, thereby entirely surrounding the Monarchy. In such a case, 
Andrian believed a fast peace with “timely, large sacrifices” would need to be made to 
avoid a “greater catastrophe,” such as the country’s dismemberment.219
Andrian’s grand plans could not be put into action, because by mid-December the 
Austro-Hungarians had for the third time been defeated by the Serb army, which 
impressively managed to push the Monarchy entirely out of its territory. Given the Russian 
threat from the north and failure in the south, Austria-Hungary faced a bleak and desperate 
winter in 1914-1915. Having lost Belgrade and the Schabatz on the night of 14-15 
December 1914, Tisza wrote to Berchtold and the Emperor to point out the “full 
seriousness of the situation.”220 He feared Serbian attacks invading Hungarian territory in 
the Banat if Austria-Hungary had to fully retreat, causing untold damage to the Monarchy’s 
prestige. Although Tisza’s biggest practical concern was the danger of Rumanian 
intervention, he considered the possibility of Serbian forces on Hungarian territory as 
nothing short of a “catastrophe.” The Monarchy had to quickly guard against this danger 
and no matter what was happening on the northern front, the solving o f the Serbian 
question was the “most important principal duty” of the Monarchy, which would have to be 
“solved by all means.”221
The intensity of Tisza’s subsequent message to Franz Joseph betrayed his fear of 
not only the defeat of the southern k.u.k. army, but also the possible invasion of Hungary. 
Tisza reiterated his earlier request for reinforcements and a strengthening of the southern 
front at all costs. Asking the Emperor to “avoid unnecessary blood sacrifices” and to 
prevent a Serbian offensive against Hungarian territory, Tisza went a step further by 
requesting the replacement of Potiorek with one of Austria-Hungary’s “most efficient 
military leaders.”222 Tisza believed that the propaganda and prestige defeat a Serbian attack 
on Hungary would mean for the Monarchy would be almost irrevocable, and at worst result 
in the defeat of the Dual Monarchy at the hands of the Rumanian army, against which 
Austria-Hungary was in no position to throw any defensive units. He therefore turned to
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the Emperor in the hopes that Franz Joseph would reposition northern units southwards to 
ensure that this nightmare scenario did not happen, and focused his forces on holding back 
a Serbian advance.
From the outbreak of war until the new year, Tisza’s position on Serbia was the 
decisive factor in Austro-Hungarian war aims planning for the Balkans. During the July 
Crisis, his goal was to prevent Russian involvement by assuring the world of Austria- 
Hungary’s defensive intentions. After this effort failed, Tisza began to incrementally 
support and then spearhead the MdÀ’s policy of limited annexations, particularly vis-à-vis 
the Germans. The Hungarian Prime Minister and the MdÀ agreed that, although the AOK 
was suffering heavy losses on the Russian front, success on the Balkan front remained the 
principal goal. The alignment between the two grew out of German pressure to open transit 
routes to the Ottomans, Tisza’s extreme fear of Rumania as well as his aspirations for 
Negotin, and the MdÀ’s internal war aims planning to uphold prestige and secure benefits 
for Austria-Hungary following Serbia’s expected defeat. This period marked the only time 
when Conrad’s voice on Serbia was neither extreme nor decisive, and allowed a powerful 
Tisza to influence MdÀ policy. In fact, AOK efforts to transfer Serbian territory to 
Rumania to entice Bucharest to help were rejected by both the MdÀ and the Hungarians, 
neither of which were prepared to part with their hopes of securing key Austro-Hungarian 
war aims. It further demonstrates that, although Berchtold and Tisza had some differences 
in approach, their goals were the same, allowing the MdÀ to retain overall policymaking 
control and formulate Austro-Hungarian war aims. For the MdÀ as for Tisza, a victory in 
the Balkans represented the only basis on which a peace with Russia could be negotiated.
lib. Rumania
The following section on Rumania aims to demonstrate that the Austro-Hungarian 
ruling echelon’s principal objectives in the Balkans could be achieved only if certain 
‘negative war aims’ were met. For the powerful Hungarian Prime Minister, the most 
critical negative war aim was the prevention of Rumanian intervention on the side of the 
Entente. This question was fundamentally linked to the success of the Serbian campaign, 
the prevention of a Russian victory in the north, and the alignment o f Bulgaria with 
Austria-Hungary. Berchtold, eventually siding with Tisza, led an MdÀ hoping to ensure its
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principal Balkan objectives meshed with the Hungarians’ and Germans’ to prevent 
Rumanian intervention against the Monarchy.
Although the AOK agreed with the German analysis that Rumania was an 
existential threat if it positioned itself against the Monarchy, Austria’s defeats in Serbia 
reduced its influence over the matter. Even so, the AOK supported the strong German 
pressure to buy off Rumania with territorial, political, and cultural concessions by Austria- 
Hungary. At first, Tisza rejected territorial offers to Rumania, but as the military situation 
worsened, the proposed sacrifices increased. Germany even went so far as to recommend 
Austria-Hungary not resist if Rumania invaded, a suggestion that not even the AOK could 
support. Although Tisza eventually offered a political amnesty and cultural rights to 
Hungarian Rumanians, as well as cession of (Austrian) territory to Rumania, the proposals 
Were sufficiently watered down to ensure that they would be rejected, preventing Austro- 
Hungarian concessions to Rumania. Realizing that Tisza had tried to secure Rumanian 
help, even by going so far as recommending an expansion of the war to satisfy Bulgarian 
territorial ambitions, Berchtold (who had so far arbitrated between Berlin and Budapest), 
finally decided to throw the MdA’s weight behind the Hungarians and opposed further 
offers to Bucharest.
For the Army, the negative geostrategic consequences of Rumania siding with the 
Entente were pivotal. On 2 July 1914 and only four days after the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Conrad provided at Berchtold’s request a top secret analysis of 
^hat would happen if Rumania remained neutral or joined the Entente in an Austro-Serbian 
clash. Thus the MdA and AOK were already considering the possible military balance if 
the Triple Alliance (including Italy) had to face the Franco-Russian Entente and its client 
states Montenegro and Serbia, as well as (potentially) Rumania. The Chief of the General 
Staff provided estimates that showed the Triple Alliance’s ‘front line’ 122 divisions were 
°utnumbered by the opposing coalition’s 133 divisions, o f which 10 came from 
Rumania.223 This Rumanian presence could therefore tip the balance. Conrad stated that 
the Central Powers would be “entirely unable to equalize”224 the advantage which 
Rumania’s defection would give the Entente. Even mere neutrality on the part of Bucharest
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concerned him, since it meant strong Russian forces225 would be freed to operate along the 
Austrian border. Despite the secret 1883 Austro-Hungarian-Rumanian alliance, Conrad 
feared Rumania would occupy Transylvania, the subject of its national aspirations, and 
demanded “immediate precautions” against an invasion by getting them on-side.226 
Rumania’s defection to neutrality from what Vienna perceived as allied treaty obligations 
in 1914 was met with dismay at the MdA. Italy and Rumania’s irredentist motivations 
represented an existential threat to the Dual Monarchy, whose leaders feared that as one 
went, so would the other.
As the July Crisis unfolded, the concern over Rumania’s reactions carried much 
weight, particularly in the minds of the Hungarian leadership. On 8 July 1914, following 
the GMR discussing the possibility of “provoking”227 a war with Serbia over the 
assassination, Tisza wrote a memorandum to Emperor Franz Joseph. In it, the Hungarian 
Prime Minister expressed reservations about the plan, initially due to the fear of Russian 
intervention, but primarily regarding Rumania’s “questionable”228 *neutrality. While the 
Austrians and Germans believed Rumanian neutrality was a given, and the AOK was 
concerned about which way it would sway, the Hungarians were convinced that their 
unhappy allies in Bucharest must, “by all human estimation be counted as enemies,” which 
would imply “adverse chances”“  for the Monarchy in a coming war. Tisza was concerned 
that if the “decisive battle”230 *were fought today, the constellation against Austria-Hungary 
would be overwhelming. Although he did not recommend passivity towards a country as 
dangerous as Serbia,232 it was clear that for the Hungarian Prime Minister the threat of 
Rumanian intervention was the greatest source of anxiety.
Ottokar Czemin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bucharest and future Foreign 
Minister, confirmed on 1 August that he considered Rumania’s assistance doubtful,233 and 
was proven correct by its statement of neutrality two days later. Anxious to give Rumania 
no pretext for intervention, Conrad assured the MdA that the military had strict orders to
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avoid anything that could be considered a hostile posture.234 Rumania represented Austria- 
Hungary’s largest immediate concern among non-aligned states, with Bulgaria the biggest 
opportunity, and the two questions were closely linked. An intervention by Bucharest 
against Austria-Hungary in this war would allow Sofia to reconquer lost territory following 
the Second Balkan War (specifically in the Dobrudja and Macedonia), if it teamed up with 
Vienna. The trick would be to get Rumania to stay friendly while obtaining Bulgarian 
intervention against Serbia. It quickly became clear in the eastern Balkan triangle that 
Bucharest would be the more difficult neighbor,235 and ensuring even the negative Austro- 
Hungarian war aim of preventing Rumanian involvement would be challenging. Rumanian 
intervention against the Monarchy became more likely as successive attempts to conquer 
Serbia failed, and Austria-Hungary’s weakness became embarrassing. Berchtold on 20 
August expressed concern about the possibility of the Monarchy being halted in Serbia 
altogether following the defeat at Cer. Should this occur, he argued, the Monarchy would 
be extremely threatened by hostile Balkan (especially Rumanian) intervention, as well as 
by Italy.236
During September 1914, the question of Rumanian intervention weighed heavily on 
the minds of both the diplomats and the generals. For all, the war aim remained a swift 
defeat of Serbia while repelling the Russians, so as to ensure Rumanian neutrality at least, 
or intervention on the side of the Central Powers at best. But the latter remained highly 
unlikely. The Germans nevertheless pursued a policy similar to that towards Italy, by 
suggesting offering Austro-Hungarian territory. Far from rejecting Rumanian demands for 
Transylvania to be ceded or granted autonomy, the Germans embarrassed Berchtold by 
being willing to consider them.237 The Foreign Minister told the German Ambassador 
Tschirschky that he questioned why Austria-Hungary should fight on when the promised 
German assistance failed to materialize and instead it was pressured to give in to demands 
for cession of its sovereign territory. Germany’s position concerned Tisza as well,238 but 
the Germans stuck to their guns, demanding Austro-Hungarian sacrifices, although they 
had ambitious demands of their own. On the same day as Bethmann Hollweg approved the
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infamous ‘September Program’ at the height of the Battle of the Marne, 9 September 1914, 
his Ambassador in Vienna stated that the overall military situation required a “high cost to 
be paid” (by Austria-Hungary) to make Rumania join the Central Powers.239 The German 
Chancellor believed that Rumanian assistance against Russia would “eliminate” the danger 
and prepare for a “fortunate outcome” of the entire war.240
The German suggestions sparked outrage in some political quarters in the 
Monarchy, but they struck a chord with the army. Tisza was infuriated, and wrote to 
Czemin to vent his indignation. Like Berchtold, Tisza believed that any territorial 
concession to Rumania would have the opposite effect: rather than getting Bucharest to join 
the Central Powers, it would be perceived as weakness in Vienna.241 In a more collected 
telephone call to Berchtold, Tisza asked the Foreign Minister to approach the Germans with 
a serious, yet calm and dignified tone.242 Berchtold seems to have been more level-headed 
about Rumania’s influence than either the Germans or Conrad’s early assessment, arguing 
that while two Rumanian army corps could be sent against Russia or Austria-Hungary, 
three would remain for defense against Bulgaria, implying that the military contribution 
would be minimal. Either way, territorial cession would only embolden Italy, which would 
make analogous claims and Austria-Hungary would prove its “powerlessness” by giving up 
two provinces in the Bukowina even before the decisive battles were fought.243 In what 
appeared to be an indicator of why Tisza had relented in his opposition to the Serbian 
ultimatum back in July, the Hungarian Prime Minister now insisted that Austria-Hungary 
had “decided upon war” based on the “clear as daylight statement” of support by Kaiser 
Wilhelm and Bethmann Hollweg.244 To now expect Austria-Hungary to cede territory to 
Rumania when it was, according to Tisza, the German invasion of Belgium which had 
caused England’s intervention and Italian and Rumanian neutrality,245 was unacceptable.
Conrad, on the other hand, who was reeling from a bungled opening gambit and 
defeats at Cer and Lemberg, had a different approach. Given the poor overall military 
situation, Conrad and Archduke Friedrich on 12 September were “absolutely” prepared to
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concede the “cession of Suczawa”246 in the Bukowina in order to achieve Rumanian entry. 
In a policy shift also based on the difficult military situation, Berchtold supported the idea. 
Berchtold believed Rumanian intervention would be of “high military value”247 as well as 
political benefit with regard to the other Balkan neutrals. Although in favor of the plan, the 
Germans remained unhelpful in the Rumanian question. Asking for Austro-Hungarian 
concessions before Rumania joined (rather than after, as Tisza had urged), they argued that 
the dangers of Rumania joining the enemy were greater than the risk of giving up some 
territory.248 Berchtold responded that such sacrifices had already been made, in exchange 
for which Vienna expected “solidarity”249 from Berlin during peacemaking.
Unfortunately for Berchtold, the next day, both Tisza and the Rumanian Prime 
Minister Ionel Bratiano shot down the Foreign Minister’s optimistic plan. Bratiano made 
clear that it was “entirely impossible” for him to move against Russia at a time when he 
claimed -  contrary to Tisza’s insistence250 -  that the Hungarian Rumanians were greeting 
the Russians as liberators.251 Though Tisza claimed to be prepared -  with German backing 
and pressure on Rumania -  to go to the “limit of what was possible,”252 he did not really 
believe that Bucharest would budge. Besides, Tisza rejected any kind of special status for 
Transylvania as impossible, given that 40% of the population was Hungarian or German.253 
For the Hungarian Premier, the Turkish-Bulgarian non-aggression pact of 21 August 1914 
would keep the Rumanians in check, and he even opposed Bulgarian intervention in Serbia 
-  which would have meant a swifter victory there -  if it risked easing pressure on 
Rumania’s flank.254 Tisza was not keen to offer Rumania any territory or other 
concessions, and believed instead that only a more tangible deterrent emanating from 
Bulgaria could keep Bucharest neutral.
The MdA on the other hand was prepared to make concessions to Rumania, and had 
the backing of an increasingly desperate AOK. The Germans were pressuring Austria- 
Hungary in favor of Bucharest. The German High Command now also believed with
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certainty that with Rumanian assistance the Russians could be defeated.255 According to 
Jagow, the survival and “predominance” of the two Great Powers required sacrifices, such 
as Germany’s willingness to tolerate Russian occupation of part of East Prussia.256 With 
these comments Jagow put the ball squarely in Tisza’s and Berchtold’s court, asking them 
to leave nothing untried to win over Rumania.257 The question was just how this could be 
achieved. Tisza defended himself against Jagow’s “unjustified accusations,” but reiterated 
that too much eagerness on the part of the MdA could be interpreted as weakness.258 
Berchtold was more willing to follow the German line on this than Tisza. Attempting to 
employ the fear of the Balkan-directed Russian-backed pan-Slav threat, Berchtold again 
instructed Czemin to charm the Rumanians and point out the “fruits of victory”259 which 
they could achieve only alongside the Dual Alliance.260 What Berchtold could not do 
without Tisza’s backing was to offer territory, even if it was to come from Austria rather 
than Hungary.
The efforts to move Rumania failed. As the results of the Marne and news of the 
failures in Galicia and Serbia began to spread in Austria-Hungary, its leaders stepped up 
their diplomacy. Berchtold still entertained hopes that the Rumanian situation could 
improve, and the MdA had not yet given up hope regarding relations with Bucharest,261 26
even though the Hohenzollem Rumanian King Carol fell gravely ill on 24 September. 
His son Ferdinand would align himself closer to Bratiano’s government, and Pallavicini 
argued that it had been the mobilization o f the Ottoman army on 25 September which 
intimidated the Rumanians, rather than any “extensive accommodation” by Vienna.263
Failing to get Rumania on side gravely concerned Berlin as well. Berchtold’s 
Cabinet Secretary Alexander Graf Hoyos argued to Zimmerman that the offer of “extensive 
concessions” and even territorial adjustment in the Bukowina showed that criticism of the 
MdA’s handling of the issue was unjustified.264 But the Germans were uninterested in 
excuses, and feared for their own safety should Rumania join the Entente. Kaiser Wilhelm
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himself repeated often to Hohenlohe what the AOK had long stated and which Franz 
Joseph had also agreed with, which was that “the key to the successful campaign” in the 
east lay in Bucharest.265 So much had the Germans lost their nerve that the German 
Emperor, Bethmann Hollweg, and Zimmermann actually all recommended in mid- 
September that the Monarchy should under no circumstances declare war on Rumania, 
even if its territory were violated.266 If Rumania marched into Transylvania, the German 
leaders pleaded, Austria-Hungary should “only protest” and depict the situation as though 
Rumania were protecting the province from the Russians.267 Although Zimmerman 
softened the blow of this suggestion by stating Bucharest would face German troops 
defending Transylvania if it invaded,268 this suggestion demonstrated a deep insecurity in 
Berlin. Fearing an Italian entry against the Dual Alliance, the Germans believed any 
conflict with Bucharest would spark Rome’s hostility and that the combined assault would 
mean “the inevitable end” of Austria-Hungary and Germany.269 These concerns were no 
small matter in Berlin, where Rumania was (as for the AOK) seen as a cornerstone of 
Balkan security, without which the Dual Alliance defenses would crumble.
This time the Austro-Hungarian reaction was emphatic. Concerned that the 
Germans might have already divulged something similar to the Rumanians directly, at 
Tisza’s request on 26 September Berchtold supported a warning whereby any invasion of 
Austro-Hungarian territory, be it Transylvania or the Bukowina, would be treated as a 
“hostile act, equivalent to a declaration of war” which k.u.k. forces would resist.270 
Emperor Franz Joseph confirmed this position on 1 October, stating that any violation of 
territory, irrespective of pretext, would be considered the opening of hostilities.271 There 
were limits as to how far Austria-Hungary would accommodate German requests. This 
tough talk notwithstanding, Conrad stated that the weak forces in the region could do little 
more than delay the Rumanians, should they decide to invade.272
The desire to obtain the assistance of Rumania was shared by all relevant Austro- 
Hungarian quarters right from the outbreak o f conflict. By early October, however, it 
seemed that merely the implicit threat from Bulgaria and Ottoman intervention (rather than
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any concessions on Austria-Hungary’s part) had sufficed to keep Rumania out of the war. 
Still, Berlin pushed for ever-greater concessions to the Rumanians -  as it had done and 
would continue to do with Italy -  in order to buy them off. In response, Tisza agreed on 1 
November to offer an amnesty to Hungarian-Rumanian political prisoners as well as allow 
the display of Rumanian colors within Hungary. Painting these two concessions as a “last 
step,” Tisza insisted that they were acts of accommodation towards Berlin. Tisza 
admitted that Rumanian assistance would be a benefit, but that this cooperation could only 
be obtained after Russia was defeated.274 *To expect it beforehand was “an illusion,” which 
only faded faster the more the Monarchy ran after the statesmen in Bucharest.
By his own admission, Tisza was unwilling to grant further concessions, even 
though Berchtold supported the German position. Emphasizing Berlin’s position to Tisza 
to no avail, Berchtold disappointedly had to agree with the Germans that such minimal 
concessions would not obtain Bucharest’s cooperation.276 Perhaps Tisza’s limited efforts 
would make maintaining Rumania’s neutrality marginally easier, but Berchtold thought that 
overall they were likely to have “no effect at all.”277 * Tisza admitted this himself, stating 
that he was not prone to any illusions about the success of his initiatives. The Hungarian 
concessions were announced on 9 November, and Berlin tried to take credit for them.279 *
The Germans simply wanted to do whatever they could to achieve Rumania’s assistance, or 
at least the country’s neutrality.
After the Rumanian-Italian neutrality treaty of 23 September 1914, the Austro- 
Hungarian military began to fear a joint strike by the two neutral erstwhile allies. In such a 
case, argued Conrad, the “military resistance capability” of Austria-Hungary would “cave 
in.”281 Yet even if only one attacked, Conrad feared catastrophic effects, and highlighted 
his concerns in Vienna and Budapest. But Tisza was not prepared to take responsibility for 
this danger. He argued to the nominal head of the Austro-Hungarian military Archduke
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Friedrich that he had made “all imaginable concessions.”282 These concessions had had 
little influence on Bucharest, because Rumania did not want to improve life for Hungarian 
Rumanians, but rather annex Transylvania and the Bukowina.283 Tisza treated this as an 
internal matter and did not want to set a precedent which could be exploited by Italy. 
Probably exaggerating, Tisza claimed to be willing to “promise all sorts of territory”284 to 
Rumania, but was convinced that Rumania would not join Austria-Hungary unless it was 
on the verge of defeating the Russians.
With the failure of Tisza’s efforts, backed by both Vienna and Berlin, Berchtold 
also became convinced that Rumania was a hopeless cause and began to side with the 
Hungarians in refusing further concessions. The Foreign Minister also wrote to Archduke 
Friedrich on 14 November, stating that Rumania had not taken the bait of Russian territory 
in Bessarabia or the concessions of the Hungarian government. Although the Germans 
seemed to mistakenly put much faith in these efforts, Berchtold reiterated his stance of 
having anticipated that they would have “no political effect whatsoever.”285 Attempting to 
turn the blame for the threat of Rumanian intervention from the MdÁ back onto the AOK, 
Berchtold informed Friedrich that a Russian attack in Transylvania could lead to the 
intervention of Rumania against the Monarchy.286 Aligning himself now entirely with 
Tisza’s position, Berchtold concluded that Rumania’s future actions would depend 
“exclusively on the war’s progress.”287
Czernin in Bucharest agreed with this assessment as well. From his informed 
perspective, no more could be done within Rumania to sway the opinion of the public, the 
opposition, or even the government at this time.288 There were only two other sure ways to 
keep Rumania quiet, apart from Austro-Hungarian military successes, and they involved 
Bulgaria and Turkey.289 If Rumania felt threatened by Bulgaria, or if Constantinople 
vowed to turn Rumania’s main port at Constanza into a “pile of rubble”290 a day after 
Bucharest declared war on Vienna, then there was hope Rumanian neutrality could be 
maintained. Czernin believed that the final determinant of Rumanian neutrality would be
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the battlefields of Europe.291 A strong and self-confident diplomatic and military 
disposition might still preserve Rumanian neutrality.292 According to Czemin, Rumania 
did not want war with either Bulgaria or Turkey, and only had its eyes on Transylvania 
because it perceived Austria-Hungary as “broken” and hoped for an easy prize.293 Czemin 
vowed that any betrayal would lead to Rumania being “wiped off the map.”294
Tisza’s concerns about Rumania were apparent in his meeting with German leaders 
in Berlin. He made clear to both Kaiser Wilhelm and Bethmann Hollweg that there could 
be no question of a voluntary cession of any Austro-Hungarian territory whatsoever.295 
Tisza’s “self-confident, calm, and exceedingly clever” speech served to make an 
“extraordinary impression.”296 Isolating Jagow, who emphasized territorial concessions, 
Tisza convinced the Germans that only diplomatic and military pressure would keep 
Rumania quiet.297 Tisza assured the AOK in a letter to Archduke Friedrich that the 
Germans had been convinced that promises and concessions towards Bucharest would be 
seen as a “sign of weakness” which would simply multiply the danger.298 Although Tisza, 
unlike Berchtold, did not believe that a Rumanian attack was imminent, he did receive 
German military assurances that the chances of military success in the Balkans, even with a 
potential Rumanian attack, were high.299 Buoyed up by this assurance, Tisza even 
proposed an attack on Greece in order to compensate Bulgaria, all so that Rumania would 
stay out of the fray and not threaten Hungary. The “principal point” of Austria-Hungary’s 
eastern Balkans policy would have to be to obtain Bulgarian assistance,300 for defense 
against a hostile Rumania. Compared to this goal, “everything else had to take a 
backseat.”301
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The last phase of 1914 saw the third Austro-Hungarian offensive launched against 
Serbia on 16 November. Great hopes were pinned on this attack, but after the seizure of 
Belgrade and victories on the Russian front which elated the diplomats and generals, the 
Serbs’ counterattack threw the Monarchy’s troops out of Belgrade and then Serbia entirely. 
As the military situation worsened and even “maintaining the status quo”302 with the use of 
threats against Rumania became untenable, Tisza also began to believe that the situation 
had become critical. The Hungarian Prime Minister informed Archduke Friedrich that, in 
his opinion, a penetration into Hungary by the Russians would “most certainly” lead to an 
“incursion” by Rumania into Transylvania.303 Even if this did not occur, the retreat by 
Austria-Hungary had a politically adverse effect on Balkan neutrals.304 Czemin and Tisza 
agreed that overtures would only worsen the already bad situation; only if Rumania faced a 
“paralyzing grouping” in the Balkans -  or indeed an unlikely victory by Austria-Hungary in 
Serbia -  would it hold them back.305 Although the Germans convinced themselves that 
there were signs that Rumania would join the Central Powers,306 *Czemin assured Berchtold 
that this would “certainly happen” if Austria-Hungary were victorious in the Great War, 
and “certainly not happen.” if it were defeated.
Germany and Austria-Hungary were at odds in their Rumanian policies. Berlin 
thought Rumanian non-aggression could be bought with territorial sacrifices, for which 
Bethmann Hoilweg pressed, insisting that in this “life or death” struggle, “no price would 
be too high” if it secured Rumania’s assistance and led to a “decisive victory.”30* Tisza 
absolutely rejected this position, on the basis of Austria-Hungary’s prestige, the “deplorable 
impression” it would leave with domestic and foreign public opinion as well as the army, 
and finally because the dangers created if its neighbor’s expansionist “cravings” were 
encouraged.309 Tisza still considered Bucharest’s desire to help Hungarian Rumanians a 
pretext to justify its expansionism and desire to annex Transylvania, and believed Rumania 
had abandoned the Monarchy, its erstwhile ally, because it considered the Austro- 
Hungarians the weaker party.310 For him, concessions towards Bucharest were out of the
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question, and the only way to keep it neutral was by forming a political constellation, which 
would put Bucharest in a “tight spot.”3"  Tisza banked on prodding Bulgaria out of 
neutrality, a position W'hich the Germans in turn rejected.312 Eventually, Kaiser Wilhelm 
and Bethmann Hollweg agreed not to try and win over Rumania with Austro-Hungarian
• . 313territory or concessions.
This section has demonstrated that Rumania was an integral part of Austro- 
Hungarian negative war aims planning, for its involvement would have by all estimates 
meant a successful outcome on both the Russian and the Serbian fronts, but its intervention 
against the Monarchy would have spelled disaster. Although Tisza spearheaded the effort 
to prevent a Rumanian attack, he was required to go through Berchtold, whose role as an 
arbiter between Tisza’s hard stance and the AOK and Germany’s insistence on concessions 
to Bucharest put the MdA squarely in the middle of policymaking. Budapest and Berlin 
were in disagreement on the Rumanian question, making Berchtold’s voice on this vital 
question crucial. Given the only weak support the AOK could offer to German proposals, 
Tisza’s hand was much stronger and more closely aligned with Berchtold’s policy, giving 
the civilian officials greater confidence. Despite Rumania’s military significance, Austro- 
Hungarian leaders were prepared to make only very limited concessions, and rejected 
territorial compensation or non-resistance.
He. Bulgaria
The following section on Bulgaria will demonstrate that encouraging Bulgaria’s 
intervention represented a principal war aim of Austria-Hungary’s in the Balkans in late 
1914. Because of Bulgaria’s role in any future victory over Serbia and protection against a 
hostile Rumania, its future direction was hotly debated at the highest echelons of the 
Monarchy.
Although Berchtold’s initial desire was to keep Bulgaria neutral so as to obtain all 
the Serbian spoils for Austria-Hungary alone, tire involvement of Russia meant that the 
Foreign Minister needed to obtain Sofia’s assistance. This led to a split within the MdA,
where many officials perceived Berchtold’s overtures towards Sofia as unbecoming of a 
Great Power. Additionally, Berchtold was thrust into a mediating role between the 
Hungarians, the Foreign Ministry, and the Germans. Berlin did not have time to wait for 
Austria-Hungary to deal with Serbia on its own, particularly following the initial defeats, 
and wanted Balkan matters settled quickly so that all the Monarchy’s forces could be turned 
against Russia. Due to his dread of a Rumanian invasion of Transylvania, Tisza sided with 
the German approach of pushing Bulgaria to intervene on the Central Powers’ side as 
quickly as possible. Bulgarian hesitation led Tisza to concoct convoluted but ultimately 
unsuccessful schemes to force Bulgaria into the war by expanding the conflict to include 
Greece and employing Turkish pressure. Successive Austro-Hungarian defeats meant that 
Bulgarian defection to the Entente was possible as well. While all concerned wanted 
Bulgarian intervention, the Germans and the AOK were willing to sacrifice significantly 
more to obtain it than were either Berchtold or Tisza. Berchtold remained constrained by a 
divided MdÀ, while Tisza’s Hungarian war aims around Negotin clashed with the overall 
need to create a Danubian connection with the Monarchy’s new Ottoman ally by ceding 
Negotin to Bulgaria. Bulgarian neutrality was the best that could be achieved, given such 
policy conflicts.
This section demonstrates Tisza’s dominating influence on foreign policy questions 
and ability to manage Berchtold. However, keeping in mind Tisza’s covert influence, and 
although Berchtold was at times implementing the Hungarian Premier’s recommendations 
verbatim, the MdÀ as an institution remained in control o f the foreign policymaking 
process. The continued diplomatic involvement in Balkans for the purpose of deterring 
Rumania with Bulgarian help demonstrates the importance of the Monarchy’s negative war 
aims vis-à-vis Bucharest. The ensuing disagreements over what territory to offer to Sofia, 
which began in the Foreign Ministry and expanded to include the Hungarians, the Germans, 
and the AOK, would later cause serious conflicts between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.
During the July Crisis, Austro-Hungarian leaders hoped that the Balkan states 
would remain generally neutral whether or not Russia intervened. To ensure this, the MdÀ 
attempted to balance the hostile Rumanians against the Bulgarians, whose “national 
aspirations”314 in the Rumanian Dobrudja and Macedonia made cooperation with Vienna
314 Berchtold-Tarnowski, 23-Jul-1914, HHStA-PA-I-512.
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logical. In part to secure all the expected Serbian spoils for Austria-Hungary, Berchtold 
initially requested that Bulgaria retain its neutrality “for the time being.”315 The other 
reason for this policy was that Bulgarian involvement in the dismemberment of Serbia, as 
Tisza had originally proposed, could mean Rumanian intervention as well, whereas 
Bulgarian neutrality increased the likelihood of Rumanian neutrality. Only if Bucharest 
acted aggressively would the MdÀ seek Bulgarian intervention, in exchange for a 
redistribution of Serbian spoils.
Once Russia intervened, however, the idea of keeping Bulgaria neutral was 
reassessed. Some officials argued that requesting Bulgarian assistance would be a sign 
of weakness; others wanted to press Sofia to intervene. Berchtold took a golden middle 
approach. The Austro-Serbian war, he declared, would “open Bulgaria’s road to 
Macedonia,” but only if it immediately mobilized.317 Such readiness would give the 
Bulgarian forces the élan necessary to march into Serbia and Macedonia.318 Berchtold 
wanted to be the main punisher of Serbia, but if the country was to be dismembered to the 
benefit of Greece and Bulgaria, then he wanted those countries to play a more active role in 
Serbia’s defeat. Furthermore, a swift defeat of Serbia with Bulgaria’s help would mean the 
Austro-Hungarian forces operating there could “withdraw significant contingents” to use in 
“other necessary areas.”319 Since Rumanian neutrality was “pretty much assured” for the 
time being, Berchtold was probably thinking of Russia. The Austro-Hungarian Minister in 
Bulgaria, Adam Graf Tamowski, now had the difficult task of securing the swiftest possible 
intervention against Serbia, without giving the impression of the lessening of Austria- 
Hungary’s strength.320 Berchtold tried to obtain both Bulgarian and Greek intervention, the 
latter of which he still considered possible.321 In the end he hoped a weak and neutral 
Rumania would face a powerful Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece.
But not all officials were on board with this plan, even within the MdÂ. Tarnow'ski 
reported back that Bulgaria was unwilling to move against Serbia without an alliance with 
Rumania or until it was sure of Turkey and Rumania’s intentions.322 An exasperated 
Alexander von Musulin, the powerful Balkan Section Referent and original drafter of the
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Serbian ultimatum, let loose his frustration with Tamowski. Musulin wanted Tamowski to 
halt his “babbling,”323 since Austria-Hungary would have to do all the work itself anyway if 
Bulgaria chose neutrality.324 Chasing after the Bulgarians as Berchtold had instructed and 
Tamowski had attempted would mean losing “all prestige and dignity” for the Monarchy, 
without tangible benefit.325 As late as mid-August, Musulin retained Berchtold’s initial 
policy of having Austria-Hungary be the only one to punish Serbia, and feared the loss of 
Vienna’s prestige if it asked Balkan states such as Bulgaria for assistance. Some of the 
MdA’s ministers felt similarly about Berchtold’s efforts. Szilassy in Greece, like some of 
his colleagues not known for making policy recommendations to his bosses,326 *on 17 
August warned against offering the Bulgarians too much, unless it was militarily vital to do 
so. Szilassy argued that a large Bulgaria as Berchtold envisaged would have a strong 
pull on the Monarchy’s orthodox Slavs -  one of the first to foresee a south Slav problem in 
a Bulgarian context. Whereas Germany wanted a swift war and quick peace, Szilassy 
hoped for a war that ended in durable peace, and therefore supported Greek over Bulgarian 
expansion.
The Hungarians, in contrast to their disagreements with Berlin on Rumania, tended 
to side with the German position on the Bulgarian question. Tisza desired a much firmer 
line than Berchtold. On 16 August, only a few days after battlefield hostilities with Serbia 
began, Tisza asked Berchtold to tell the Bulgarians that their “last hour had struck” to be of 
service, take part in the military operations against Serbia, and thereby lay claim to 
territorial expansion and a commensurate role in the Balkans.328 Berchtold did not comply, 
for this could have meant the permanent alienation of a country that might, at a later date, 
still join the Central Powers. There is no doubt that Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian 
interests were close, but Bulgaria was unprepared, after two years of war, to engage 
immediately against Serbia. Instead, Bulgaria would wait for Austria-Hungary to make a 
written promise of gains in Macedonia. Sofia had no intention of deterring Rumania 
without compensation, and did not want to jump headfirst into conflict.
The Bulgarian approach seems to have been the correct one. By waiting until 
Austria-Hungary failed in its independent offensive against Serbia on 19 August at Cer,
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Sofía hoped that its involvement would be more amply rewarded. This defeat 
“compromised”329 the diplomatic position for Austro-Hungarian diplomats in Sofia, given 
that the Monarchy’s troops had now retreated behind the Save/Drina border. Berchtold 
feared that Sofía would perceive his previous statements via Tamowski as intentional 
deception, leading at best to “baleful political repercussions” and at worst to the formation 
of a new Balkan League aimed at the Monarchy.330 Military failure against Serbia, 
Berchtold now argued, would lead to the “possibility of the enmity of all Balkan states.”331 
But it was not all bad news for the beleaguered Foreign Minister. The Ottoman- 
Bulgarian non-aggression agreement of 21 August ensured that Sofia would be more 
prepared to take part in operations in Macedonia than align itself with Rumania and Serbia 
against the Monarchy.332 Berchtold began referring to a “strategically beneficial moment” 
for intervention, now that Germany had assured Bulgaria of “complete security” against 
Rumania.333 Of course, this was wishful thinking by a politician whose previous attempts 
had already failed, and who faced competing Entente offers to Sofia.334 Although these 
were ultimately rejected, Berchtold still felt the need to remind the Bulgarians that none of 
Bulgaria’s neighbors -  all of which had been its enemies in the Second Balkan War -  
would be prepared to part with any of their territory peacefully.335 Given Bulgaria’s 
military unpreparedness and exhaustion, however, its leaders would be inclined to maintain 
neutrality to the limit, particularly given their fear o f Russia and the possibility of 
compensation for Rumania in the Dobrudja.336 The important question of whether or not 
Bulgaria would honor its previous commitment to come to the Monarchy’s aid if Rumania 
attacked337 remained crucial in the diplomats’ planning, even after the failed Austrian 
overtures. Faced with rumors of Bulgaria’s double-dealing in favor of Rumania, Berchtold
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warned Bulgarian Premier Vasil Radoslavov not to “compromise his calm and secure 
policy.”338
The Germans supported Austro-Hungarian efforts to intimidate Rumania by 
enticing Bulgaria to act. Zimmermann on 21 September advised the Bulgarians to 
immediately occupy Dobrudja should Rumania attack Austria-Hungary,339 a threat 
strengthened by the Ottomans’ subsequent position to do the same.340 Tamowski also 
impressed upon Radoslavov the need to act sooner rather than later, and not let inaction 
“take its revenge.”341 Indeed, the perceived hostile Rumanian position was countered 
definitively in Sofia, where Radoslavov on 28 September informed Bratiano in a clear and 
unequivocal manner that, should Rumania enter Transylvania, Bulgaria would “march into 
Dobrudja.”342 For Radoslavov, only Austro-Hungarian successes in Serbia and an Ottoman 
campaign against Russia would give him the chance to act offensively.343 For now, 
however, Austria-Hungary had secured one diplomatic victory through the by now 
widespread understanding in Balkan capitals that Bulgaria would take Dobrudja if Rumania 
invaded Transylvania.344
Some Bulgarian leaders were concerned about the dangers such a threat entailed, as 
their worries regarding Greece showed. Szilassy, however, reported with satisfaction that 
Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos had given the impression to the Bulgarian 
representative that Athens would theoretically have no objection against an occupation of 
Dobrudja, since it did not represent Bulgarian growth at the expense of Greece.345 Not least 
due to this Greek assurance, Radoslavov apparently definitively made up his mind. On 2 
October he assured Tarnowski that Bulgaria would take Dobrudja if Rumania marched 
against Transylvania, a threat he issued directly to the Rumanian Minister in Sofia.346
But uncertainty about Bulgaria’s seriousness continued in Vienna. Berchtold 
warned Bulgaria that the defeat of the Central Powers, which would give rise to a “greater 
Rumania, greater Serbia, and greater Greece,” were all dangerous prospects for Bulgaria,
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which would obtain no compensation or benefit.347 Radoslavov’s “fumbling and unclear 
policy” caused confusion and frustration in Vienna, and Berchtold wrote of “great 
weakness” on the part of the Bulgarian Premier.348 Despite repeated assurances by 
Radoslavov, the seeds of doubt had been sown. Berchtold now pushed for Bulgaria to 
invade Serbia to demonstrate its intentions, as this would free up Austrian troops to face 
Russia and potentially Rumania.349 But since no such intervention could be forced, 
Berchtold began to rely more on the Ottomans, whose “unequivocal speech,”350 rather than 
Bulgaria’s lax stance, had achieved Rumanian neutrality.
Berchtold knew that there was no way of forcing Bulgaria or Rumania to join the 
Central Powers, even following Turkey’s decision to do so. He nevertheless let his 
ministers know in early November 1914 that active intervention remained his “stalwart 
goal.”351 * Knowing that the acquisition of the majority ethnic Bulgarian-inhabited 
Macedonian region in Serbia was a key foreign policy goal of Sofia, the MdA attempted 
to pull Bulgaria into the war with ever-greater promises of territorial gain in this region. 
Vienna had to be careful not to reawaken fears of Austro-Hungarian expansionism towards 
Salonika, so Tamowski made it known that Austria-Hungary did not seek any territorial 
expansion or annexations in Macedonia.353 The need for some form of relief became 
increasingly important in Vienna, as Rumania’s intransigence regarding Danubian arms 
shipments to Turkey took a turn for the worse.354 Berchtold hoped that Bulgaria would 
both seize Macedonia, its main war aim, and launch attacks on northeast Serbia, so as to 
open the Danube for Austro-Hungarian vessels en route to Turkey.
The third Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia, which all Austrophile 
elements in Europe hoped would end in the final defeat of the Serbs, opened on 16 
November. What was believed to be the imminent defeat of Serbia led to a flurry of 
diplomatic activity centered on Sofia which consumed the latter part of November 1914. 
For the first time since the war had begun, Radoslavov expressed the “need” for Bulgarian
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intervention “very soon.” The fear of “spoiling” its chances was ubiquitous in Sofia, and
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Vienna attempted to tap into this sentiment. Tamowski nourished the rumor mill by 
pressing the Bulgarian Finance Minister to take Macedonia, before Serbia was defeated.356 *
A problem arose here, because Austria-Hungary, needing open Danubian shipping lanes to 
Turkey, wanted Bulgaria to seize northeast Serbia. At this point, the Hungarian aims 
around Negotin were less vital than the Imperial aims of opening the routes to Austria- 
Hungary’s ally. However, these differing positions would make Negotin one of the hotbeds 
of dispute over Serbia between the Imperial government and the Hungarians for years to 
come. To achieve any of these goals, however, Tisza needed the swift defeat of Serbia.
Until 24 November, both the Germans and Austro-Hungarians believed there was a 
chance of immediate Bulgarian intervention. Yet, all Austro-German efforts 
notwithstanding, Radoslavov seemed to have made up his mind against intervention. 
Radoslavov’s speech in the Sobranje (Bulgarian Parliament) confirmed that he did not 
intend to intervene against Rumania or Serbia just yet.358 Tamowski discovered to his 
displeasure that Radoslavov was secretly considering intervention against Rumania in the 
Dobrudja as a policy goal, as opposed to pursuing Bulgaria’s goals in Macedonia.359 
Although Tamowski was well aware of Sofia’s future aims against the Dobrudja, he was 
surprised to discover that it was Radoslavov’s intention to seize the coastline and forgo an 
easy victory in Macedonia for a new war with Rumania.360 An offensive Bulgarian war 
against Rumania was against Austrian interests, for it would have forced Bucharest into the 
Entente’s arms without benefit for Vienna. More importantly, Radoslavov was implying 
that a Rumanian war against anyone other than Bulgaria would give Sofia the free hand in 
the Dobrudja it had waited for. The possibility of an Austro-Rumanian war to satisfy 
Sofia’s war aims was entirely contrary to Vienna’s security requirements, and the 
possibility of a Bulgarian attack against Rumania even if the latter had attacked Russia -  an 
act that would put Bulgaria at war with Turkey and Austria-Hungary -  deeply worried the 
Austrians. Bulgaria’s overestimation of its military effectiveness, coupled with an at times 
megalomaniac foreign policy, would bring Vienna and Sofia close to open conflict, even 
once they had become allies.
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In light of the intransigence he faced, Berchtold refrained from further insisting on 
Bulgaria’s intervention.361 Aware that Austro-German efforts had come to naught, 
Berchtold considered whether “clinching” the languishing Turkish-Bulgarian military 
agreement (to supplement the non-aggression pact of 21 August) would not be a method of 
achieving strong pressure on Sofia.362 Tisza, whose influence in these matters was 
ubiquitous, agreed. In a private letter to Berchtold on 26 November, Tisza noted “how 
colorful” and unpredictable the situation in Bulgaria was,363 and that either Radoslavov had 
lost his head or was playing a “deliberate and dastardly double game” with Vienna.364 
Tisza favored employing Turkish pressure to obtain Bulgarian assistance. In a policy 
recommendation demonstrating the extension of Hungarian designs deep into the Balkans, 
Tisza suggested that with Turkish assistance Bulgaria receive at least Kavalla and at 
maximum Salonika from Greece, in exchange for the Muslim-inhabited regions of western 
Thrace.36S This question would remain relevant for the rest of the war, as Bulgaria 
continually frustrated Turkish attempts to regain parts of western Thrace as compensation 
for Bulgarian expansion in Dobrudja, Macedonia, and Serbia proper. Whereas Pallavicini 
opposed the Turkish western Thrace position, Tisza supported it as a means to obtain active 
Bulgarian assistance, even if this meant war against Greece.
Tisza’s involvement in formulating foreign policy showed Berchtold’s personal 
weakness, as the Foreign Minister was often executing Tisza’s foreign policy by the winter 
of 1914. Berchtold told Czemin that the Bulgarians could “currently” not be budged, but as 
Tisza had requested assured him that Rumania would not act as long as the Turks were 
fighting alongside Austria-Hungary.366 Still, to solve the Rumanian question once and for 
all, Tisza wanted to bring Bulgaria on board with the backing of all the Central Powers, so 
that even if Greece assisted Rumania, Bulgaria would be on the winning side. His main 
reason for wanting this was to protect Hungary from Rumania; Tisza did not think the 
Rumanians would be foolhardy enough to risk a two-front war with Austria-Hungary in 
Transylvania and a Bulgaro-Turkish assault in Dobrudja.367 Tisza’s priority, therefore, was 
to protect Transylvania, whereas Berchtold sought a Bulgarian intervention against Serbia
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to ensure victory. Unfortunately, the Turkish intervention seemed to have deterred 
Bulgaria from doing so. 368 The recent Bulgarian conversations with the Entente also 
meant that Bulgaria had shifted from initially almost joining Austria-Hungary to now 
clearly choosing the peaceful approach369 to secure its aims. However, upon hearing of the 
small extent of Entente compensation offered if Sofia declared war against the Central 
Powers,370 Berchtold declared that he was “not too worried.”371
But Berchtold did warn Tisza that there were limits to the Foreign Ministry’s ability 
to secure Turkish pressure on Bulgaria.372 Any disagreement between Turkey and 
Bulgaria, which already had aims against each other’s territory (Western Thrace for Turkey 
and the Enos-Midia line for Bulgaria), could result in Bulgaria being lured by the 
Entente.373 Tisza agreed with Berchtold374 that threatening Bulgaria would not be a good 
approach,375 but he wanted to clarify in Sofia what neutrality would bring the Bulgarians as 
opposed to intervention.376 Although he clearly wanted Bulgarian assistance, Tisza did not 
want to downplay the benefits of Bulgarian neutrality. What mattered was to seem to 
match the Entente offers of Bulgarian expansion, but remind Bulgaria that a post-war 
weakened Serbia served its interests better.377 By now, Tisza had become so concerned 
about Rumania and the possible failure of the Serbian offensive that he was willing to give 
to Bulgaria for neutrality what so far the MdA had only been willing to give for active 
intervention.
Nevertheless, Tisza made it clear that, even if Bulgaria were to join Austria- 
Hungary, he only intended to actually offer Pirot and Nis in Serbia, and only encourage 
Bulgaria’s “fantasies”378 about Kavalla and Salonika without commitment. Future 
Bulgarian-Turkish conflict in this area could be dealt with later; for now, preventing 
Bulgarian defection was at the top of Tisza’s priority list. Berchtold and Tisza’s treatment 
of Bulgaria showed that they did not have an Austro-Hungarian territorial interest in
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Macedonia or Salonika, but that these two regions were an invaluable tool in implementing 
Vienna’s own war aims, as they were an almost irresistible draw for the Bulgarians.
Still, Tisza believed that Bulgaria could not be won over with “one more try” as the 
Turks were attempting, but rather many more attempts which were not threats and in no 
way weakened Radoslavov.379 Berchtold agreed completely, and instructed his 
representatives to avoid threatening the Bulgarians in any way, reiterating to them only the 
benefits of joining the Central Powers. The extent to which Berchtold implemented all of 
Tisza’s recommendations line by line further demonstrates what a dominant figure the 
Hungarian Prime Minister was, and to what degree he shaped the foreign policy and 
determined the war aims of Austria-Hungary.380 Tisza even micro-managed Berchtold’s 
relationship with his own ambassadors, as he demonstrated in early December. The 
Hungarian Premier vehemently opposed Radoslavov’s suggestion, which Tamowski had 
not protested against, that Austria-Hungary wanted Bulgaria to join because its southern 
army was needed in the north. Rather, as Tisza elaborated, Tamowski should have insisted 
that Bulgaria was needed to help fulfill Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy through an 
“assured victory.”381 Greece and Rumania would, under the “weight of the situation” 
choose peaceful resolutions to their grievances or, if their unlikely attack took place, would 
be repelled.382
Tisza believed the “crucial point” for obtaining Sofia’s assistance was to convince 
Bulgaria that Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policies were much more favorable than anything 
which the Entente could offer.383 This would prove difficult as the Germans were 
apparently pursuing a dual policy in the region. Though claiming to want Bulgarian 
intervention, Zimmermann stated that he was “completely satisfied”384 with Bulgaria’s 
neutrality. According to Tarnowski, in early December the Wilhelmstrasse was nullifying 
his efforts at obtaining Bulgarian intervention,385 even though Jagow was apparently acting 
in good faith by explaining to the Bulgarian Ambassador why both Berlin and Vienna 
expected Sofia’s intervention.386 According to Berchtold, Tisza and Tarnowski’s fears 
were apparently unfounded, as the German Emperor himself authorized the shift towards
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the AA advocating Bulgarian intervention387 and described Tisza’s concerns as an 
“illusion.”388 *
As the Serbians counterattacked and Austria-Hungary was put on the defensive, so 
too the diplomats became morose and somber in their outlook. It was Austro-Hungarian 
failures in Serbia and the final retreat from Belgrade on 15 December which cut short the 
differences with Germany. Regarding Bulgaria, the hope for intervention was muted by the 
mounting losses of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Sofia continued to hesitate. The 
Bulgarians in mid-December asked for written promises of Serbian territory by Austria- 
Hungary before any action against Serbia would be considered. Tamowski, as frustrated 
with the Bulgarians as Czemin was with the Rumanians, used a careless comment by 
Radoslavov to criticize him for the current situation. It was Bulgaria’s “benevolent 
neutrality,” Tamowski said, which allowed Serbia to place militia units on the Bulgarian 
border and give Serbia such a “sense of security” as to be able to throw its entire military 
power against Austria-Hungary.390 This Bulgarian policy was a “disservice” to the 
Monarchy, and the Minister implored the Premier to put at least a few troops on the border 
to form a diversion and force the Serbs to reciprocate. Although Radoslavov assured him 
he would, little changed in Austro-Bulgarian relations for the time being.
Conrad, who had so far been silent on the Bulgarian question, became extremely 
concerned about the Bulgarians as well, believing that a “total deviation” to the Entente 
was possible, given the poor military situation. Acting on Radoslavov’s request for 
territorial offers, Conrad entreated the Foreign Minister to do what was in his power to 
“thwart” the disastrous outcome of Bulgarian defection by offering “as extensive as 
possible” written territorial concessions at the expense of Serbia.391 The Austro-Hungarian 
officials, by contrast, would not be pressured into making such concessions. The 
Hungarian Premier thought Tarnowski should instead employ guilt as a method of 
castigating the Bulgarians for not taking action sooner. Tamowski could, at the proper 
moment, mention to Radoslavov how unfortunate it was that Sofia had not listened to 
Vienna’s advice and failed to give a “mortal blow” against Serbia “at the right moment,”
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when it could have secured for itself a brilliant position in the Balkans.392 The response to 
Conrad’s worries demonstrated the general’s limited influence on MdA policymaking at 
this juncture.
This section has demonstrated that, in an effort to secure Austria-Hungary’s goals 
against Serbia, the Monarchy sought Bulgarian assistance as soon as Russian involvement 
became apparent. Tisza wanted Bulgarian involvement in order to keep Rumania neutral. 
In contrast, for the Germans and the AOK, Bulgaria’s role was vital principally in order to 
quickly and effectively defeat a stronger than expected Serbian army. Since all agreed on 
the need for Bulgarian intervention, the differences among the interested parties lay merely 
in the extent they were willing to threaten and entice Bulgaria to intervene. The Bulgarian 
question put into stark contrast the Austro-Hungarian goal of defeating Serbia with its other 
principal war aim of maintaining its prestige and influence in the Balkans. It became very 
clear that the Monarchy on its own was unable to do the former without at least in part 
sacrificing the latter. In order to secure both victory and prestige, Berchtold and Tisza 
began to consider territorial rearrangements in the southeast Balkans. Thus, instead of 
subjugating and shaping Serbia as they saw fit, the two men were faced with the need to 
territorially satisfy what so far was merely a neutral neighbor in Bulgaria.
This section has shown that Berchtold’s MdA was the decisive institutional voice in 
this debate, though with significant influence wielded by Tisza directly through the Foreign 
Minister and the MdA. For its own reasons, Bulgaria remained neutral for the time being, 
though not for lack of will in Vienna or Budapest.
CONCLUSION
The Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans centered around three themes: 
extending control in the western Balkans, victory in Serbia, and the Rumanian threat. In 
the western Balkans, this chapter has demonstrated that Austria-Hungary sought to 
achieve its negative war aims of preventing Italy from taking both sides of the Adriatic -  
the Monarchy’s naval and Great Power lifeline -  into its possession. Although this 
endeavor ultimately failed, it forced Austro-Hungarian officials to formulate positive war 
aims for a time when the western Balkans did fall to k.u.k. troops. In Serbia, Tisza and
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Berchtold pursued positive war aims aimed at defeating, conquering, and subjugating 
Serbia in spite of the AOK’s emphasis on the northern front. Hungarian interests proved 
decisive in pushing forward Imperial war aims, though Berchtold’s MdA retained final say 
in the matter. It was the fear of Rumania which drove the Hungarians so close to the MdA 
wishes regarding Serbia. German involvement was also an important factor, for Berlin 
pushed for ever greater concessions by Vienna and Budapest which was eventually 
uniformly opposed. Bulgaria was deemed by the Monarchy’s leaders the best guarantor of 
both a Serbian defeat and Rumanian neutrality. With the AOK’s inability to independently 
defeat Serbia and the Rumanian threat growing, Tisza cooperated closely with the Germans 
to try to cajole a reticent Bulgaria into the fray. Eventually, it was clashing Austro- 
Hungarian and Bulgarian war aims around Negotin, an MdA uncertain on how to proceed 
with Sofia, and Bulgaria’s internal policy which led to its continued neutrality.
The chapter supports the four major arguments of this thesis. As Berchtold 
frequently pointed out, (i) victory in the Balkans was the principal objective, superseding 
even the need to liberate occupied parts o f Galicia. For the MdA, the highest foreign 
policymaking organ of the Monarchy, the Russian front was an undesired distraction from 
the need to defeat Serbia and re-establish its hegemony in the Balkans. Although Berchtold 
became politically weaker as the war escalated and then dragged on, (ii) his MdA was in 
overall control of the war aims policy formation. Tisza, whose strong influence was felt 
particularly in the eastern Balkan questions, considered it useful to Hungary for the MdA to 
lead in setting war aims, and supported Berchtold as long as their interests coincided and 
Berchtold was malleable. Of all parties, the AOK was the least involved in the war aims 
development, given its focus on the battles and inability to deliver victory. In this first 
stage of the war, both positive war aims against Serbia and negative ones against the 
neutrals Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania demonstrated (iii) the coherence of the 
evolving Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans. These aims would set the basis on 
which future war aims would grow out of these initial considerations in a consistent 
manner. Finally, (iv) Austria-Hungary’s Balkan goals in the latter part of 1914 prevented it 
from seeking a diplomatic way out of the military impasse, and instead sucked it further 
into war as a means of securing victory and its war aims in the Balkans.
I l l
CHAPTER 4
January 1915 -  September 1915
INTRODUCTION
For most of 1915, adverse military developments dictated the approaches taken by 
the MdÂ and its new chief, Count Istvân Buriân. Although not the first or obvious choice 
for the Foreign Ministry, Buriân immediately took control of the MdÂ with a “ready 
program”393 and implemented his vision of future Balkan expansion, sidelining past 
influential figures like Section Chief Count Johann Forgâch and the Balkanist Dr. 
Alexander Musulin. Being himself a Balkanist, Buriân had been for almost a decade the 
Common Finance Minister responsible for the administration of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
which had a special administrative status and was not incorporated directly into either side 
of the Dual Monarchy. As he had never served in the larger European embassies, his 
experience and approach were enmeshed with Austria-Hungary’s Balkan foreign policy, 
and his appointment demonstrates the Emperor’s emphasis on that region. Forgâch himself 
pointed this out to Tisza in a secret letter complaining about Buriân’s leadership, calling the 
new Foreign Minister a “doctrinaire” diplomat who “has always been in the Balkans and 
conducted a Balkan policy.”394 Certainly, Buriân had strong Balkan credentials and a clear 
vision to protect Austro-Hungarian prestige, integrity, and power, and was determined 
enough to uphold them.
The source of greatest distrust, particularly by Conrad and the AOK, was Buriân’s 
Hungarian nationality and previous credentials as the Hungarian Minister a latere, or 
representative of the Hungarian Cabinet to the joint government and the Emperor. As he 
was a protégé and close friend of Tisza’s, his appointment was seen in some quarters as 
signifying Tisza’s further expansion in foreign policy-making matters beyond his own role 
as Hungarian Prime Minister. This was strengthened by the widely held perception that 
Tisza had engineered Berchtold’s replacement mainly due to the latter’s weakness towards 
Italy.395 Although close to Tisza and communicating with him frequently and in depth via 
letters written in Hungarian, Buriân was no puppet and closely guarded the MdÂ’s 
prerogative in foreign policymaking. On several occasions a turf war erupted not just with
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the AOK, which would become commonplace, but even with Tisza. To judge by his words 
and deeds, Burian’s loyalties lay unquestioningly with the Gesamtmonarchie, for he at no 
time adopted the exclusively Magyar standpoint as his own. In some ways, Burian was less 
malleable than Berchtold, who we have seen would implement Tisza’s recommendations 
verbatim as foreign policy. Burian’s ascent to the Foreign Ministry, therefore, marked a 
new period of strong (at times dogmatic) diplomacy, brinkmanship, and turf war against the 
AOK, Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.
On the international scene, Burian’s first few months in office were turbulent. 
Austria-Hungary in quick succession suffered enormous casualties in the Carpathian 
campaign, lost the fortress of Przemysl to the Russians (March), worried about Rumanian 
intervention, watched as an Entente landing in Gallipoli threatened to push the Ottomans 
out of the war (April), and faced an Italian declaration o f war (May). During this difficult 
time, so-called ‘negative war aims’ dominated Ballhausplatz thinking about the Eastern 
Balkans, where concerns of how to bring Bulgaria and Rumania onto Austria-Hungary’s 
side, or at least prevent them from joining the Entente, featured heavily. Burian fought 
proposals for Austro-Hungarian territorial cessions, an agenda pushed by Germany, to 
pacify Rumania and prevent its involvement, particularly if the Monarchy faced a 
simultaneous attack from Rome and Bucharest. Negative war aims during this period also 
dominated the MdA’s Western Balkans planning, where Burian’s efforts centered on 
Albania and preventing an Italian declaration of war. With the Adriatic being a life or 
death issue for the Monarchy, the Straits o f Otranto and with them the future of Albania 
held a special position in the negotiations, and any concessions made there were extremely 
painful. Burian’s positive war aim of acquiring a territorial link with Albania to ensure the 
survival of his Albanian protectorate idea would not come to fruition until the defeat of 
Serbia. As negotiations progressed with Bulgaria first as a deterrent to Rumania and then 
also as a partner against Serbia, the major AOK-MdA differences and resulting tensions 
surfaced over war aims against Serbia.
Positive war aims planning only began in earnest after the most serious losses were 
reversed. Although the AOK was able to hold back the larger Italian army in the Alps, 
Serbia had still not been defeated and it took German assistance to turn the tide for Austria- 
Hungary in 1915. This assistance came in the form of the Battle o f Gor!ice-Tam6w from 
May to September, which pushed the Russians out o f Congress Poland and allowed for 
almost all Austro-Hungarian territory to be liberated. As the Dual Alliance advanced
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against Russia and an improvement in Bulgarian-Ottoman relations deemed necessary to 
obtain Sofia’s assistance progressed, so did optimism about eventual victory in the Balkans. 
The ensuing march southwards meant that Buriàn began facing a strong adversarial 
challenge in Austria-Hungary’s historic backyard by both Germany and Bulgaria.
The chapter is divided into two general sections on the Western and Eastern 
Balkans. Within the Eastern Balkans section, Austria-Hungary’s war aims towards 
Bulgaria, Rumania, and Serbia will be addressed separately. This chapter demonstrates a 
number of points proving the four overall arguments. It shows that although the fighting 
was fiercest on the northern and then Italian fronts, Buriàn pursued and expanded a similar 
Balkans-first diplomatic policy to Berchtold. Although the direction remained consistent, 
Buriàn was brought in to strengthen Austro-Hungarian prestige and parity with Germany, 
and this section demonstrates that he drove a very hard bargain with Italy and did not cave 
in to pressure from Berlin or anywhere else. Although ultimately failing to prevent Italian 
intervention, his approach only hardened vis-à-vis Rumania, which was the next hostile 
neutral he was tasked with keeping quiet. Given the AOK’s military defeats, its weakness 
meant that the MdÀ was able to set and control the foreign policy agenda for the time 
being.
SECTION I
WESTERN BALKANS
Given the Monarchy’s limited influence in the western Balkans and eastern Adriatic 
region, the MdÀ’s goals were to achieve its so-called ‘negative war aims’ of preventing 
Italian or Serbian encroachment on Albania and Montenegro. The hope was that, with the 
ultimate defeat of Serbia, achieving positive war aims would again become possible.
The first and most serious threat to future success in the Balkans was the possibility 
of Italian intervention. This section argues that despite AOK and German prodding, Buriàn 
maintained a hard negotiating position vis-à-vis Italy and only gave up the MdÀ’s war aims 
in the western Balkans in his final, ultimately unsuccessful efforts to maintain Italian 
neutrality. It demonstrates Buridn’s dogmatic stance and hard negotiating style which he 
implemented to protect the Monarchy’s Great Power status, prestige, and influence in the 
western Balkans. When Italy did join the war against the Central Powers, the mood in 
Vienna became very pessimistic. However, even while Austria-Hungary had no direct 
influence on the western Balkans, Buriàn developed war aims to implement once Serbia
V U4
had been defeated. Although the GMR backed Burian’s more moderate policies in the face 
of AOK-sponsored annexationism, his desire remained for significant influence in Albania 
and Montenegro, a quiet and satisfied Greece, and purging Italy from the eastern Adriatic.
It would become a staple of the Austro-German relationship that Berlin tended to 
insist on its recommendations even though it claimed to respect Austro-Hungarian interests 
in the Balkans. This was most evident in the opposing policies Berlin and Vienna pursued 
with regard to the Italian compensation demands, which Vienna resisted and Berlin wanted 
to give in to. On 9 January 1915, Berchtold went as far as recommending the cession of the 
Trentino, the south Tyrolean territory with an Italian population which Rome had wanted as 
its main compensation package under Article VII. Forgach, Berchtold’s closest advisor, 
put forward a memorandum on 10 January correctly identifying Austria-Hungary’s difficult 
position. He argued that the losses in the Balkans could not be made good, and that Italy 
and Rumania were simply waiting to pounce on an exhausted Austria-Hungary, making it 
prudent to “strive for a conclusion of peace by all means necessary,”396 including by 
territorial cessions to Rumania and Italy, accepting the status quo against Serbia, and 
asking Italy to mediate.
Tisza and Stiirgkh, resisting these defeatist notions, instigated Berchtold’s fall, and 
on 13 January 1915 the Emperor made Count Istvan Burian, a close confidant of Tisza and 
a fellow Hungarian, the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, effectively blocking 
Forgäch’s plea. A confident man, Burian’s perspective on Austria-Hungary’s Great Power 
status was much more robust than Berchtold’s. He interpreted as preposterous any notion 
that Italy and Rumania -  which had been allies of the Monarchy -  should be ceded territory 
simply for remaining neutral. In February he stated that he would rather have war with 
Rumania and Italy than give even a “square meter”397 of Austro-Hungarian soil. However, 
over the course of the spring, even Buriln had to admit that his hard line had been a 
mistake, if its aim was to maintain peace with Italy.
One of Burian’s first acts as Foreign Minister was to visit Berlin on 24 January to 
confer with the OHL and the German Foreign Ministry' (Auswärtiges Amt, abbreviated AA) 
and to convince the Germans to end their support for Italy’s disloyal territorial demands
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against Austria-Hungary. The fear o f a simultaneous attack by Italy and Rumania led the 
German officials to present what seemed to Burián a “recited lesson”398 of requests to hand 
over the Trentino as a means of pacifying Italy. Zimmermann argued that a promise would 
suffice, and that if the war situation improved then promises need not be kept, given that 
the Italian “blackmail-policies, against which we are unfortunately powerless, deserve no 
honesty” from Austria-Hungary.399 Burián countered firstly that in his view the Italians 
were bluffing, given that Italy’s goals in Istria, Dalmatia, and even Albania were entirely 
contrary to Entente plans. Second, he believed minor compensations would suffice, since 
giving in to Italy’s bluff would galvanize Rome into making further demands after having 
read the concessions as Austro-Hungarian weakness and fear. The alarmist attitude of the 
German diplomats, Burián thought, originated with Chief of the German High Command 
Erich von Falkenhayn, who believed that if one million Italians and half a million 
Rumanians attacked at once, “the two Empires will militarily collapse.”400 As a result, 
Burián failed to halt German involvement over the Italian compensation question during 
this and the next meeting in February 1915.401 Germany was not going to simply allow 
Austria-Hungary to take a hard line approach to Italy for, as Bethmann Ilollweg indicated 
to Tschirschky on 6 February, the “entirely understandable objection against a concession 
to the blackmailer has to take second place to our concern for Germany’s existence.”402 
And the Italians knew how to take advantage of this concern in Berlin.
Over the course of February 1915, the tone in Rome began to change. Secret 
information reached the Austrian Consul in Corfu that the Italians were stockpiling 
munitions and provisions in Valona as if the “troops there are not only preparing 
themselves for a very long stay, but also for a potential siege.”403 This was a worrisome 
development, and had to be countered. The German Ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von 
Tschirschky, tried to convince his Italian counterpart Duke Guiseppe de Avama that, 
although Italy was allowed two temporary occupations under Article VII as a compensation 
for Austro-Hungarian (albeit so far unsuccessful) actions in the Balkans, the Dodecanese 
Islands (seized in 1912 during the Italian-Turkish war) and Valona should have sufficed, 
Although Italy had attempted to claim that Valona was a temporary measure, Tschirschky
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sided with Austria in questioning this in his meeting with Avama, citing as evidence Italian 
control of customs and administration which Italy had imposed on the city.404 Burian’s 
meeting on 14 February with Avama proved even more difficult. With Avama claiming 
that Italy was in Valona for the protection of “European interests,” Burian countered with 
the point that Article VII was “exclusively about the fact of occupation, without reference 
to its intent, extent, and duration,”405 and therefore Austria-Hungary should be the one 
entitled to compensation. Italy rejected the notion that the “temporary measure” in Valona 
should be counted under Article VII, and even perceived the Treaty of Lausanne, which had 
given the Dodecanese Islands to Italy two years earlier, as merely “an interim between 
itself and Turkey.”406 Relations began to break down, with Avama threatening “serious 
consequences” if Austria-Hungary tried to elude its responsibility for granting concessions 
to Italy under Article VII.407
Rome’s surprising decision to formally withdraw from talks only served to stiffen 
Burian’s resolve. Biilow, Germany’s Ambassador in Rome, complained that Berlin had 
become “dejected” over Burian’s new “intransigence”408 409on the Italian issue. Trying to use 
the Germans as leverage on the Austro-Hungarians, Italian Ambassador M. R. Bolatti had 
openly threatened war to Jagow in Berlin by stating “Si I'Auiriche-Hongrie s ’oppose, c'esl 
la guerre',m  Burian, who interpreted this first open threat less fearfully than Bethmann 
Hollweg, argued that this was merely “an attempt to scare Germany”410 and viewed it as 
another ploy. Even Falkenhayn’s military argument that an Italian entry on the side of the 
Entente and “as expected, by the Rumanians as well, would decide the entire war to our 
disadvantage”411 and eliminate yet another important market, did not sway Buridn. 
Similarly Conrad, who always saw things in more black-and-white terms than his peers, 
argued that if Italy wanted war, the Trentino would not satisfy it, and if it did not want war, 
a rejection over the Trentino would not cause it to depart from its neutrality. Thus, the 
Austrian diplomatic and military positions were irreconcilably different from their German 
counterparts; while both saw the Italian threat, they did not agree about its imminence and 
therefore differed on the correct corresponding action.
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Burian’s ensuing offer to Italy suggesting the Dodecanese Islands and Albania as 
compensation objects both met with resistance in Rome, where the argument was reiterated 
that the occupation of Dodecanese was a temporary measure and that the move on Valona 
was also temporary, in the interest of stability, and undertaken on behalf of the Great 
Powers party to the London Agreements which had established Albania.412 All Italian 
resistance notwithstanding, Burian made the same offer to Avama again on 2 March.413 It 
was only on 6 March that Italy began to broach the topic which interested Burian enough to 
soften his position, namely the Balkans. Through the Germans, the Italians seemed to offer 
“benevolent neutrality” and a “guarantee of a free hand for the Monarchy in the Balkans” in 
exchange for an early cession of the Trentino and a border rectification on the Isonzo, all of 
which would only have to take place at the end of the war.414 Attempting to sweeten the 
deal, Tschirschky offered German help in obtaining the strategically important and 
currently Russian-owned Sosnowiec coal field for Austria-Hungary in return for the 
Trentino. However, Burian would not blindly accept such offers. He desired guarantees 
from Berlin of the Italian offers, a pledge to exclude Sosnowiec from other territorial 
adjustments, and a gold bond from Germany, for which he would support the Trentino idea, 
though not the Isonzo one.415 Keeping the Italian Ambassador at bay on 6 March,416 Burian 
took part in a GMR on 8 March. During that meeting, probably influenced by the Russian 
threat, the ministers agreed to make concessions in the Trentino417 two months after 
Berchtold was sacked over the same issue. Informing Tschirschky that same day of the 
GMR decision, Burian asked Germany to convey to the Italians Austria-Hungary’s 
readiness to accept the cession of the Trentino as a “basis for discussion,”418 without the 
Isonzo and without going past the Tyrolean language border.
Burian informed Avarna on 9 March of Austria-Hungary’s “willingness in 
principle” to discuss cession of Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis for discussions, 
though not a “concrete obligation.”419 Informing his Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin of 
this decision, Burian explained that although advances had been made following the
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Carpathian campaign which began 23 January against Russia and the danger to Hungary 
was banished for now, Austria-Hungary could still not withstand an Italian attack.420 For 
this reason, coupled with news of a Rumanian-Italian agreement directed against Austria- 
Hungary (actually signed one month earlier, on 6 February 1915), Burian could no longer 
“take responsibility” for his “stalling tactics”421 and had given in to Italian pressure. While 
resisting Italian efforts to obtain an immediate cession of territory rather than at the end of 
the war, Burian attempted to counter with a unilateral offer to Rome of major economic 
concessions in Asia Minor if and when the Central Powers were victorious and Italy 
remained in the Triple Alliance bloc.422 However, the Italian government interpreted 
Burian’s unwillingness to immediately transfer the territory as implying that cession of the 
Trentino would “be made dependent” on Austro-Hungarian gains in the Balkans, a claim 
which Burian rejected.423
On March 22, 1915 the besieged Austrian fortress of Przemyil in Galicia fell, 
causing another blow to Vienna’s ability to maintain some kind of position of strength 
against its many hostile neighbors. This loss was devastating for Austria-Hungary, with 
over 100,000 troops surrendering the huge fortress after six months of siege, which 
Afflerbach has compared in importance to the fall of Stalingrad in World War II.424 As 
Tisza put it, the “Slavic wave which threatens the eastern coast of the Adriatic,”425 had 
become a very real danger as the Russians were not yet beaten back and Serbia was not yet 
defeated. Coupled with information about Italian-Serb discussions on the future of the east 
coast of the Adriatic,426 *the situation began to look precarious indeed. Yet Burian 
inexplicably threw down the gauntlet, telling Zimmermann that Italian designs on Trieste 
and the islands were “out of the question,” with which Zimmermann agreed. * Burton 
stated that if Italy continued with these “exorbitant demands,” then Austria-Hungary would 
be forced to “act in self-defense.”428 On 16 April, Burian provided Avama with an almost
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complete rejection of Italian demands beyond the Trentino.429 The Isonzo was 
“unacceptable”, as was Trieste and its islands, because such demands were “incompatible 
with Austro-Hungarian vital interests.”430 Despite the poor military situation, Buriân made 
only minor counter-offers in the Tyrol which were curiously similar to the German offers 
later on to exchange a few villages in Alsace for the Longwy-Briey iron ore. Not only did 
he categorically reject the demand for Austro-Hungarian désintéressement in Albania, but 
claimed that the Italian monetary compensation sum was “far too low.”431 This rather harsh 
message was followed less than an hour later by instructions for Macchio to maintain 
nevertheless a “friendly and warm tone” in Rome. Buriân hoped to convince the Italian 
Prime and Foreign Ministers that Austria-Hungary only rejected certain demands based on 
the “vital interests” of the country and had gone to “the utmost limit to accommodate” 
Italian desires.432 Nevertheless, the time had come for the AOK and OHL to begin 
discussing contingency planning.433 Buriân himself was playing for time, seeking either to 
pacify Italy with German cooperation or engage it in long drawn-out discussions. He came 
to realize, however, that both methods would soon fail, and was forced to moderate his 
position.
For Buriân and the Foreign Ministry, the issue was now less one of further 
concessions on the Isonzo and over Trieste, cession of which remained out of the question, 
and more on compensation for Italy elsewhere. Outside these irredentist territories, Italy’s 
main foreign policy goals were in Albania, and it was here that Buriân went to the utmost to 
try to compensate Italy not for Austria-Hungary’s advances and gains in Serbia (which 
were still non-existent) but for not receiving as much in the Tyrol as Sonnino demanded. 
Such behavior was hardly that of a Great Power, but with the existential threat continuing 
in Galicia and the lack of movement in the Balkans, Buriân had little prestige left with 
which to bargain. Italian-Serb talks had progressed to the point where Serbia was 
demanding Albania and south Dalmatia,434 and Buriân was faced with the threat o f Serbia, 
rather than Austria-Hungary, being the power broker in Albania. Austria-Hungary, Buriân 
knew, would have to offer something Rome wanted and he was in a position to give, or
419
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face war with Italy. As things became more desperate, he began to offer in the western 
Balkans what it perceived as crucial to both itself and Italy, but he was mistaken in 
believing that Albania featured higher on Italy’s priority list than other Austro-Hungarian 
areas beyond the Trentino.
On 24 April, a conversation between Buriân and Conrad on the one hand and 
Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn on the other focused on the now absolutely critical 
Italian problem. Buriân insisted that Austria-Hungary “could not voluntarily abdicate its 
Great Power status.” Nevertheless, the Chancellor was pleased that Buriân -  “without 
declaring désintéressement in Albania” -  had agreed to widely accommodate Italy’s 
interests in Valona, but he pushed Austria for border rectifications on the Isonzo as well. 
With Falkenhayn unable (or unwilling) to send adequate reinforcements in the event of a 
war with Italy, Conrad and Falkenhayn agreed that “an Italian attack within the next four 
weeks would be a catastrophe for Austria-Hungary and Germany all along the line.”435 As 
it turned out, war would come in less than a month. Personally, Bethmann Hollweg 
interpreted this threat as being even greater, as Conrad and Falkenhayn were in agreement 
that an Italian entry into the war simply meant the “defeat of the allied Empires in the 
war.”436 Austria-Hungary’s position had changed drastically since Berchtold in September 
1914 had instructed Ilohenlohe to hint that Vienna would conclude a separate peace if 
Germany continued to propose giving away Habsburg provinces instead of offering 
military assistance.437 Time was short and fear set in at both the Ballhausplatz and the 
Wilhelmstrasse. What the two did not know was that all their efforts would fail from here 
on out, since on 20 April Italy had signed the Treaty of London committing it to the 
Entente war effort.
Buriân pinned his hopes of keeping Italy out on the May 1915 Gorlice-Tamow 
offensive, and on the fantasy that Italy could be bought off with Albania. On the same day 
as the offensive began against Russia, Buriân told Rome that he had shown “considerable 
accommodation” on Albania by not only refraining from protesting against Italy’s 
“ownership” of Valona, but also by being prepared to concede an Italian sphere of interest,
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the center of which would be Valona.438 At three in the morning on 4 May, Buriân hinted 
that concessions at the Isonzo might be possible,439 and he followed this up at 7pm with 
concrete proposals. He instructed Macchio to agree to certain modifications on the Isonzo, 
to an Italian university in Trieste and, at the utmost, Austrian désintéressement in Albania, 
with the reservation that guarantees must be given that no third power would establish itself 
there.440 In the early hours of 5 May, Buriân went a step further, certainly prodded by 
Italy’s announcement of 4 May it would formally leave the Triple Alliance. While his 
“ultimate offer” on the Isonzo (rectifications) and Trieste (university) remained unchanged, 
Buriân instructed Macchio to “drop all reservations and limitations” and state that Vienna 
“was prepared to grant complete désintéressement in Albania.”441 This was a major 
concession for Buriân, because it seemed to amount to the abdication of Austro-Hungarian 
power in the Adriatic and possibly even the whole western Balkans. Such a drastic step 
was comparable to the embarrassment Vienna would have faced if it had capitulated in the 
Trentino question merely in exchange for Italy’s neutrality. However, this offer was not an 
abandonment of Vienna’s Adriatic goals, but rather designed to secure its territorial 
integrity (which still entailed possession of a sizeable portion of the eastern Adriatic coast) 
and to ensure its “free hand in the Balkans with the exception of Albania.”442 This implied 
unhindered access to Montenegro and Serbia, the former to separate the Slavs from the 
Adriatic, and the latter to eliminate the powerful irredentist threat to its Empire.
Buriân requested and received guarantees for this plan at a high-level meeting on 8 
May at Teschen, when the Austro-Hungarian leadership met with Kaiser Wilhelm, 
Bethmann Hollweg, and Falkenhayn. But the final abdication of all major Austro- 
Hungarian interests came a day later, on 9 May, when Buriân instructed Macchio on how to 
react if Sonnino declined the Austro-Hungarian offer without counterproposals. Macchio 
was then authorized to offer more of the Italian-speaking Isonzo, a free city status for 
Trieste, a handover of Pelagosa (an uninhabited island in Adriatic belonging to Croatian 
Dalmatia), and the immediate implementation of the Trieste, Pelagosa, and Albanian 
suggestions.443 These last, desperate ideas came to naught as well. On tire 13 May, Buriân
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resigned himself to Italian belligerency and instructed Macchio not to make any new 
offers.444
Austria-Hungary had lost the bidding contest with the Entente, according to 
Afflerbach due to Burian’s “clumsy” handling of the situation.445 Vienna believed that 
Italy’s interests in the Balkans were as great as its own, and therefore tried to make major 
concessions only there, in an effort to save its own territory. Not realizing that Italy’s 
claims against the Monarchy could not be bought off with Albania or with Bizerta446 in 
French Tunisia, Burian had missed the mark. Italy favored Entente proposals over Burian’s 
hard line, and never lost sight of the Trentino as its principal goal.447 Now Conrad was 
wondering even in the presence of the Emperor whether Austria-Hungary would be able to 
“successfully conduct the war” in the event of an Italian attack which, if coupled with the 
expected Rumanian invasion, would be “catastrophic.”448
On May 23, Italy ended its peaceful relations with Vienna and for king, country, 
and Entente promises of Austro-Hungarian territory marched into the crucible that was the 
First World War. As Italy and Austria-Hungary opened a new front in the European theater 
of war, the distraction of the Great Powers in Gallipoli, on the Isonzo, and at Gorlice 
brought fluidity and change to the Balkan states before the Great Powers could again turn 
their attention fully to their subjugation.
Faced with the need to pull together forces on the Isonzo in order to resist Italy, 
Burian postponed his Balkan ambitions for the time being and allowed his representatives 
there to function on their own.449 As Italian intervention became imminent, Austro- 
Hungarian foreign policy shifted to containing the threat as much as possible. One key 
concern was to keep Rumania out of the war. The other was to keep the neutrals in the 
southern Balkans (Greece and Bulgaria) out of Entente hands and as a counterweight to the 
Serbian-Montenegrin enemy. Greece was the less reliable of the two southern Balkan 
states, and both Germany and Austria-Hungary had to work hard to maintain its neutrality. 
Employing similar tactics to those that had failed to win over Italy, Burian seemed ready to 
give up Austria-Hungary’s pressing interests in the southern Balkans. On May 22, Austria-
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Hungary’s Minister in Athens, Szilassy, was authorized to make an offer to the Greeks in 
concert with his German counterpart requesting “benevolent neutrality”450 in exchange for 
all of southern Albania up to Durazzo. However, even Burian’s carte blanche offer to 
Athens on the following day, giving Greece, merely in exchange for its neutrality, “a free 
hand in Albania as far as its sphere of interests extends”451 did not go far enough.
Having attempted to secure the neutrality of one neutral neighbor of Albania 
(Athens) and being at war with the rest, Vienna witnessed a four-pronged invasion of the 
country by Serbia, Montenegro, Italy, and even Greece. On 30 May, the Serbs launched 
their offensive.452 On 8 June Kwiatowski, Vienna’s Consul in Salonika, reported that 
Serbia had taken Prizren with the goal of taking Skutari,453 and Greek and Serbian forces, 
ostensibly allied, had clashed at Pogradez following Greek intervention in the south.454 The 
existence of a Greek-Serbian deal became clear when the Germans intercepted messages to 
the Greek Consul in Nis (Serbia) referring to a “secret supplement” to the alliance and an 
agreed-upon “boundary” between them, which should not be crossed.455 The Serbs 
managed to overcome strong Albanian resistance in Elbassan and moved on Tirana in an 
effort to install their Albanian ally, Essad Pascha, as leader (which succeeded on 29 June), 
while the Italians moved on Valona and Durazzo.456 The Austro-Hungarian Consul in 
Corfu secretly obtained the text of the agreement between Pasic, the Serbian Prime 
Minister, and Essad Pascha.457 In it, Serbia committed itself to actively supporting Essad to 
become ruler of Albania and returning Dibra which it had annexed in 1912, in exchange for 
Essad’s commitment to ally himself with Serbia, give Serbia unhindered access to an 
Albanian port town, allow Serbia to police Albania, and to make a customs agreement with 
Belgrade.458 In this form, the agreement seems very similar to what would become the late 
1915/earIy 1916 Austro-Hungarian efforts at creating an ‘effective protectorate’ in Albania, 
only it would be Belgrade’s protectorate, not Vienna’s.
This disastrous situation in Albania was coupled with Austro-Hungarian shock at 
the behavior of German troops on the Austrian lines on the Isonzo, who “in a very striking
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manner avoided an encounter with the common enemy,”459 Italy. Germany had refused to 
declare war on Italy, on the grounds that Rumania would be obliged to attack Austria- 
Hungary if it did so. After Vienna expressed indignation over the German behavior on the 
Isonzo,460 Falkenhayn eventually admitted to Conrad on 16 June 1915 that if Germany 
officially entered the war against Italy, Rome might be required by an agreement to send 
troops to the Western Front.461 This behavior showcased the parochial positions of the two 
capitals. Berlin felt it was in both sides’ interest to delay Italian troops being sent to the 
Western Front, Burian would have preferred it as a relief to the Monarchy.462 Following 
Austro-German victories at Przemysl (3 June) and Lemberg (22 June), each side desired the 
other to take on the greater burdens of the war so as to pursue its own, vital interests. As 
victories in the Balkans followed the victories against Russia, these differences between the 
allies would only be exacerbated. For the moment, however, the outlook on the southern 
front was bleakest. On 26 June, Jagow worried that if the Entente managed to knock out 
Turkey and develop a “continuous preponderance” in the Balkans, this would mean a 
“bankruptcy of the German orient and Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy.”463 Jagow 
understood well that, for Vienna, the “primary war aim,” namely the “re-establishment and 
strengthening” would be “thwarted” if the Balkans fell into a different sphere of 
influence.464
The shift of power relations and territorial demands in the Balkans did not change 
Austro-Hungarian war aims. With regard to Serbia and Montenegro, whose offensive 
capabilities Conrad wanted to “limit or delay until the current actions against Russia are 
completed,” the Chief of the General Staff recommended that the Foreign Ministry support 
Bulgaria’s claims to Albania in addition to those of Greece.465 Despite Austria’s long­
standing tradition of pitting the smaller Balkan states against each other for Vienna’s own 
parochial interests, it was not something the MdA had in mind for Albania. However, 
given Rome’s intervention, Burian now saw some advantage in Serbia’s and Montenegro’s 
Push into Albania, which would put them in a “certain opposition to Italy.” Serbia was
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now fighting on two fronts, and even had enough forces available to launch an offensive 
against the Monarchy too.466 From these lines we can see that Burian was seriously 
considering the AOK recommendation to abandon Albania.
The Germans reached out to please Greece more than any other Balkan state during 
this period. On 19 August, the Germans learned that the Greek-Serb alliance actually 
“limited Greek expansion northwards” in Albania, and Italian occupation of Valona and its 
hinterland “reached directly into Greece’s interests.”467 As such, Greece’s neutrality policy 
counted on the defeat of Serbia and Italy as a means to expand its own interests far further 
north into Albania. This successful policy notwithstanding, the Greek king desired not to 
“expand too far into Albania,” though he did “by all means want to get Berat and 
Valona.”468
Buridn, despite supporting Greek involvement in Albania, did not go so far as 
Germany to encourage these plans. For him, the situation in the Balkans in late August was 
“far too much in flux to think of concrete arrangements for Austria-Hungary’s relations to 
the individual Balkan states.”469 By August 1915 the Austro-Hungarian officials had 
become extremely pessimistic. The current Minister in Rumania and future Foreign 
Minister, Ottokar Czernin, argued that a victory “in the sense that we will be able to dictate 
to a beaten Europe the conditions we want” was not possible, and thus “whether Austria- 
Hungary gets a sizeable extension of territory as well seems practically inconsequential.”470 
Furthermore, the Austro-Hungarian Schwarz-Gelb offensive, which began on 26 August, 
failed to bring the desired breakthrough in Russia, and 234,000 of the half a million put into 
action became casualties.471
Only when Bulgaria joined the Central Powers on 6 September did Balkan matters 
begin to look more promising. Despite this, Tisza pleasantly surprised everyone in Berlin 
when on 26 September he told the German Consul General in Budapest that the Central 
Powers should be “accommodating”472 if the Serbs asked for peace. The Consul seized 
upon this and recommended the German line of giving northern Albania to Serbia, which 
Tisza had to decline for the time being. Although Tisza was going it alone here, the
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Germans began to play with the idea of giving Montenegro and a portion of Albania to 
Serbia, and it was only through neutral parties that Austria-Hungary learned of these 
ideas.473 Germany’s plan would become the dominant Berlin position on the western 
Balkans throughout the ensuing offensive and victory against Serbia in an effort, as 
Falkenhayn later explained, to “pacify”474 the Balkans and use its forces on more important 
fronts. Burian did not go so far as to recommend peace with Serbia, denying Tisza’s 
position was Austria-Hungary’s own on 30 September.475 In light of the reported Serb- 
Italian agreement in which Dalmatia was promised to Italy in exchange for Italian troops 
for Serbia and the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina between Cetinje and Belgrade,476 the 
desire at the Ballhausplatz to eliminate Serbia when the chance arose seemed the most 
pressing consideration.
However, Burian for the time being ceased to press for a large and unified Albania. 
In a curious development for a state with a multi-ethnic character, Austria-Hungary desired 
an ethnographically homogenous and therefore, it was thought, strong Albania. In 
opposition to German skepticism, Burian felt that an independent Albania would “not be a 
bad solution” and that “naturally giving south Albania to Greece” would in “no way be a 
disadvantage”477 for Albania. Rather, the loss o f the south Burian perceived as a 
“strengthening” of the countiy, by removing the unreliable Christian Orthodox element that 
“anyway gravitates towards Greece,” and making Albania a “majority Muslim” and 
therefore advantageous a “non-Slav” entity.478
The only time Austria-Hungary supported the homogenization and unification, 
rather than the diversification, of Balkan irredentist groups was in the Albanian context. 
This was particularly interesting given that, while Austria-Hungary wanted the 
consolidation of die Albanian element in an Albanian state, it attempted precisely the 
opposite with its Slav neighbors. Even with regard to Muslims of neighboring states, 
whom the Ballhausplatz looked very benevolently upon as non-Slavs, Vienna had an 
interest in maintaining their inferior positions in Slav nation-states, rather than accepting 
their departure479 or assimilation. This is understandable, for as Albania continued to be the
473 Szilassy-Burian,28-Sep-1915, REZL-45/17.
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only, albeit crumbling, bulwark against Slav dominance of the eastern Adriatic, the Muslim 
minorities were the only way of destabilizing Serbia and Montenegro and putting a 
stumbling block in the way of the powerful pan-Slav and south-Slav ideas. It was therefore 
better to have a Slav state weakened with Muslim irredentism than an Albanian state 
weakened with Slav or Orthodox irredentism.
In another blow to the AOK’s annexationist tendencies, a GMR held on 6 October 
determined that the structure of Austria-Hungary could not incorporate further territorial 
enlargement. Held on the same day as the offensive against Serbia was to begin, the hopes 
for a final victory over Serbia were muted by the news of the Anglo-French landing in 
Salonika and the feeble Greek protests. Unable to incite Greece to use force against the 
invaders, Buridn had little influence on Athens, though he did issue a veiled threat of 
consequences if Greece “facilitated or eased” the Entente.480 Germany, on the other hand, 
was able to offer significantly more support. “Protesting energetically,” the German 
Minister was authorized on 8 October to offer German U-boat assistance and guarantees of 
Greece’s territorial integrity if Athens decided to “defend itself with force.”481 Not to be 
outdone, Burian then authorized Szilassy on 12 October to offer Austro-Hungarian support 
if Greece “sees itself forced to the defense against the insufferable violation of its territorial 
sovereignty, neutrality, and independence.”482 These offers notwithstanding, Austro- 
German attention was now focused on the fall of Serbia, and both empires were powerless 
to oppose the threat posed to Greece’s neutrality by the Anglo-French forces and their 
advance in the Balkans.
Despite limited influence in the western Balkans, Burian and his MdA sought to 
implement its negative war aims of restricting foreign involvement in Austria-Hungary’s 
sphere of influence. These efforts failed due to Burian’s dogmatic foreign policy 
brinkmanship and Italy’s unwillingness to remain neutral for what it viewed as minor 
concessions. The episode demonstrates the MdA’s dominance in setting foreign policy and 
with it positive future war aims and current negative ones. Eventually, whether Burian 
could implement his positive war aims for the entire Balkans would depend on the defeat of 
Serbia, for which Austria-Hungary needed both German and Bulgarian assistance.
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SECTION II
EASTERN BALKANS
Ha. Serbia
The purpose of this section is to discuss Austria-Hungary’s positive war aims 
planning in Serbia and its effects on the wider Balkans. It argues that the vital nature of 
Austria-Hungary’s Balkan war aims was also reflected in the Monarchy’s non-Balkan 
policy. The threat to the Straits, Italian intervention, and the continued Russian peril all 
featured heavily in the minds of its leaders as obstacles to implementing Austria-Hungary’s 
Balkan war aims. The Germans agreed, believing that the Monarchy needed to implement 
its goals to recapture its prestige and Great Power status. Although this section shows that 
Burian was setting war aims in Serbia, the only way to achieve the MdA’s goals there was 
to help Turkey survive and get Russia out of the war. A failure of these two aims would 
inevitably result in the hostile intervention of at least some of the Balkan neutrals (notably 
Rumania) and the defeat of Austria-Hungary’s ambitions.
This section demonstrates not only that the Balkans were the principal focus of 
Austro-Hungarian war aims, but that the Foreign Ministry set policy and determined which 
suggestions were realistic. Since the Russian and Serbian peace options were rejected by 
Burian, the emphasis lay on neutralizing and securing transit rights from Austria-Hungary’s 
eastern Balkans neighbors. This would in turn help Turkey survive the Straits assault, 
giving it a better chance to fight Italy and Russia, which in turn kept Austria-Hungary’s 
goals in the Balkans realistic and Germany’s two allies intact.
In late 1914 Austria-Hungary faced military disaster and increasing dependence on 
Germany. The German military leaders visited Teschen on 31 December to set aims and 
discuss realistic goals. Conrad was unsure whether the Germans were even in a position to 
send reinforcements to the eastern front, which the Austro-Hungarian military still rightly 
considered their most important front, despite Tisza’s emphasis elsewhere. Holding back 
the Russian onslaught remained the AOK’s primary task, and until it was accomplished any 
planning for the Balkans remained superfluous. It was in Russian Poland that Conrad 
believed “the decision of this campaign depended,” and Hohenlohe agreed that the situation 
was “so serious” that close cooperation between the Germans and Austro-Hungarians was 
essential. The idea was to come up with a joint plan, which would turn out to be the first
. . 1 2 9 '
step towards a joint overall command. Conrad needed the Germans, for he considered the 
west stalemated and believed that, with Germany’s help, defeating Russia was more likely 
than defeating France and England. Only if Russia were beaten, he argued, could Serbia be 
dealt with next, indicating how contrastingly the MdA and AOK viewed the relative 
political value of the differing theaters of operation. Where the two did entirely agree, 
however, was that all of these considerations served one overall purpose, which was to keep 
the neighboring neutrals neutral, as their intervention would be “catastrophic” for the 
Monarchy.483
Berchtold’s resolve, however, began to buckle in the face of overwhelming odds 
and serious tactical defeats. Influenced by a memorandum written on 10 January 1915 by 
his closest advisor Johann Forgach von Ghymes-Gacs, former Minister in Belgrade and 
current Section Chief at the MdA, Berchtold began to consider immediate peace on all 
fronts as vital. In unrestrained language, Forgach reminded Berchtold of the “catastrophic” 
losses against Serbia,484 and the danger which Italy and Rumania presented. Forgdch 
believed, as did many in the Austro-Hungarian hierarchy, that for both sides the Rumanian 
question was the key to victory in the east. Even if Italy could be bought off with territorial 
sacrifices, the intervention of Rumania alone would result in a “catastrophic” development 
of the already “disadvantageous^ tilting military balance,” Naturally, Forgach blamed the 
Germans for this, but his reasons were what counted. The Balkan front was the principal 
war aim of Austria-Hungary’s, and only the “most forceful German pressure” had made the 
Monarchy “throw everything northwards” against Russia. Forgach insisted that Austria- 
Hungary was engaged in Galicia because of German pressure which resulted in the 
Monarchy “politically and militarily misjudging the importance of the Balkan front.” This 
was an important assertion, demonstrating that the dominant thinking at the MdA was that 
the Germans were to blame for pushing Austria-Hungary into “pyrrhic victories” and 
“costly retreats” against Russia. Instead, some kind of defensive posture would have had a 
similar result, but would have allowed Austria-Hungary to use its overwhelming might to 
defeat Serbia in “6-8 weeks,” and thus radically alter the Balkan configuration. The 
German recommendations, he concluded, were therefore responsible for the “humiliating 
failure” in Serbia.485
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Forgach’s memorandum was clearly exaggerating his point, for it would have been 
impossible for Austria-Hungary to withstand the Russian blow without adequate forces or 
claim to be meeting its alliance obligations if Russia, seeing Austro-Hungarian hesitation to 
engage northwards, had thrown its might instead against a Germany engaged on the Marne. 
Still, Forgach insisted that only an immediate peace could save Austria-Hungary’s Great 
Power status, keeping in mind that the Monarchy was “not a world power hitherto 
either.”486 A peace, according to Forgach, could lead to a swift economic recovery and 
warned that any other path would have “catastrophic results.” In this apocalyptic vision, 
Forgdch predicted “devastation, misery, and famine,” as well as an economic collapse. 
Politically, the results of a total defeat would mean the loss of Bohemia, Transylvania, and 
all the South Slav territories, rendering the future of the Monarchy an open question. Given 
that on all fronts Austria-Hungary was Fighting a losing battle, Forgach asked Berchtold 
rhetorically whether a “peace should not be pursued with all available means.”487 Forgdch 
suggested Austria-Hungary part with the Trentino (though not the South Tyrol) and employ 
Rome as a mediator. Given the nature and progress of this war, Forgach believed Vienna 
had to pursue the lesser evil.
But in fact Berchtold did not do this. He identified with the overall pessimism of 
the piece, but on 12 January still asked Conrad to treat the northern front as primary to keep 
the neutrals out,488 contrary to his own position on Balkan primacy a few months prior. 
With the feeling that he had won in his arguments with Berchtold, Conrad stated that it was 
the diplomats who were responsible for Austria-Hungary’s current situation of a war 
without new allies.489 He also stated categorically that pushing the Russians out of 
Bukowina and Transylvania would not prevent Italian or Rumanian intervention, but that 
Austria-Hungary needed a “great victory”490 to turn the war in its favor. Conrad was 
undoubtedly hoping for success with his Carpathian attacks, which would begin on 23 
January, and went on until March with major losses for Austria-Hungary.
Berchtold’s replacement by Burian, engineered by Tisza, led to a stronger MdA say 
and an emphasis on holding on, but not necessarily to a dramatic shift in overall wartime 
policy. The Balkans remained the principal political focus of the MdA’s war aims, which
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were to be achieved through victory on the Russian front and the attempted maintenance of 
Italian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian neutrality. In order to also keep Greece out of the war 
and ensure that others did not perceive the Monarchy as aggressive and expansionist, 
Burian twice stated in February 1915 that Austria-Hungary had “no selfish aspirations,”* 491 
and that, contrary to rumor, Vienna did not want any “change in ownership” of Salonika.492 
But the situation did not improve on any of Austria-Hungary’s fronts. With Rumania 
intransigent, Bulgaria hesitant and therefore partially ignored by Burian, the Serbian front 
stagnant and the Carpathian front buckling, Burian found himself in a very difficult 
diplomatic position which would only get worse.
The first critical threat to Burian’s Balkan policies came at the Straits. The day 
before Anglo-French vessels launched their attack on the Dardanelles to break through to 
Russia, on 18 February Austria-Hungary’s experienced Ambassador in Constantinople 
Johann Markgraf Pallavicini assessed the situation in the bleakest possible terms. He wrote 
that any success in Russia’s perpetual efforts to seize the Straits would spell Austria- 
Hungary's “defeat” in this war, even if Vienna managed to obtain territorial compensation 
elsewhere, such as in Poland. The Straits representing the lynchpin between Europe and 
Anatolia, and more critically a natural connection between the Central Powers and the 
otherwise isolated Turks. Pallavicini stated that the territorial questions in the Trentino, 
Belgium, and Galicia all paled in comparison to the Straits question, rendering everything 
else “of secondary importance.”493 Given the Balkans’ central importance to Vienna’s 
foreign policy, the Straits’ capture could completely short-circuit Austro-Hungarian plans 
in the region, rendering “all Balkan states vassals of Russia.”494 These states, joined in 
some form of new Balkan League which Austria-Hungary so feared and linked to Russia, 
would be able, on their own, to “paralyze” the Monarchy’s military and diplomatic power. 
Preventing such a political configuration was what had “forced” the Monarchy to “reach for 
the sword” in the first place in 19 1 4.495 Bottling up Russia in the Black Sea represented 
part of Vienna’s Balkan war aims.
After the naval assault on the Straits on 19 February, Pallavicini reiterated that its 
loss would also mean Russian “dominance in the entire Balkans,” which was an
Burian-Szilassy. 4-Fcb-1915, IlIISiA-PA-XVI-66.
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unacceptable outcome for the war and for Austro-Hungarian foreign policy.446 With 
Rumania and Bulgaria cowed before the “almighty Russia,” the Monarchy would become 
paralyzed vis-à-vis the Balkan states which would by then have definitively abandoned 
Vienna.497 German interests were at stake here too, for a defeat at Constantinople would 
mean the elimination of the Ottomans and a paralysis of Austria-Hungary, on whose 
“stalwart support” Germany was dependent, as this war had shown. Isolated against the 
Entente, particularly the powerful Russian-Balkan hegemon, Germany would lose its 
“world power status,” according to Pallavicini.498 An Entente victory at Constantinople 
would mean, according to this expert, the “inevitable collapse” of Turkey, and the Entente 
would have “won the war.”499 This w'as not mere alarm ism; Pallavicini’s very accurate 
assessments showed Austria-Hungary was dependent on Constantinople for its own Balkan 
influence. The Germans agreed, and Jagow argued to his old friend Kajetan Mérey on 26 
June that, given Russia’s size, it was “essentially undefeatable.” For this reason, the AA 
believed that the Turkish alliance was crucial, and Constantinople must be prevented from 
falling. A defeat there would, in the opinion of the German State Secretary, mean a 
“predominance” of the Entente in the Balkans and a commensurate “bankruptcy” of the 
Austro-Hungarian and German Balkan policy.500 Specifically for Austria-Hungary, argued 
Jagow, the country’s “primary war aim,” namely the re-establishment and strengthening of 
the Monarchy’s prestige, would be thwarted.501 The purpose of this conversation was to 
impress upon the Austro-Hungarians the critical value of Constantinople, for w hich a major 
sacrifice was needed by Vienna regarding Serbia and the neutrals.
Although the Ottomans managed to withstand the Anglo-French assault on 
Gallipoli, the MdÀ and AOK both realized that the only way to achieve Austria-Hungary’s 
Balkan war aims would be to assist Turkey. By extension, assisting Turkey required the 
help and non-belligerence of Rumania and Bulgaria. If Rumania attacked the Monarchy, 
Bulgaria would be needed to attack from the rear. If Bulgaria attacked Serbia, Rumania 
might attack from the rear. Vienna needed both at least to stay neutral, but also needed 
both to solve the Serbian question, particularly Bulgarian intervention. It was an almost 
•^surmountable dilemma, particularly because both neutrals remained unhelpful. *
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The second serious complication came from the Italian declaration of war on 23 
May. Tisza had become confident that Italy would not be able to have “quick successes“502 
against the Monarchy, but the concern was how this development would further adversely 
affect the Monarchy’s Balkan aims. The Italian attack threatened the Turks even more, on 
whom Austro-Hungarian Balkan aims depended and who had been defeated by the Italians 
only three years earlier.503 With Turkey nearing defeat and Austria-Hungary not much 
better off, Tisza warned that the first role of the MdA would be to prevent the Balkan 
people turning against Austria-Hungary immediately upon hearing Italy’s declaration of 
war.504 This concern demonstrates that Tisza believed that the existential threat came not 
from a combined Russo-Italian land attack on the Monarchy, but rather from the 
opportunity it gave to other Balkan states which had so far been neutral or quietly hostile. 
The Germans told Burian the same thing at a conference in Pless to discuss Italy, held on 
25 May. Bethmann Hollweg pointed out that, given the current circumstances, the Dual 
Alliance’s “main focus” had to be on the Balkan states, particularly Rumania and Bulgaria, 
which needed to be “prevented by all means” from joining the Entente.505 Additionally 
Greece, facing a Bulgarian-Turkish agreement to its northeast, could be kept neutral if 
territory in southern Albania were offered as well, a plan Burian had entertained for some 
time. Bethmann Hollweg even recommended a settlement w ith Serbia to be able to use 
Austrian and German troops elsew here.506
Regarding Serbia, Burian was somewhat hesitant, admitting that although he was, 
as Bethmann Hollweg had said, prepared to consider a “separate peace” with Serbia, an 
accommodation with Belgrade had certain limits.507 He ruled out a return to the status quo 
ante, and Austria-Hungary had to insist on Serbia’s “humiliation,” though Burian would 
then be prepared to be magnanimous. His demands concealed precisely where the 
generosity would be, for they included border corrections, the cession of Macedonia to 
Bulgaria, and obtaining guarantees against Greater Serbian “machinations.” But Buriin 
was concerned how this settlement with Serbia would affect Bulgaria, for Sofia would not 
enter the war if it was going to obtain Macedonia anyw ay. Bethmann Hollw eg complained 
that Burian did not offer any “tangible benefits" to Serbia in return for a separate peace, and
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instead “highlighted” Serbia’s “humiliation and diminution” as Austria-Hungary’s war 
aims.508 Similarly, the German Kaiser wrote to Franz Joseph that a defeat in Serbia would 
lead to a “loss of the entire Balkans,” which would make a “beneficial” peace impossible to 
achieve.509
Meanwhile, the AOK had bigger problems, its successes in Russia notwithstanding. 
The opening of the Italian front put enormous pressure on the Gorlice-Tarnow advance. In 
July 1915, while the operations on two fronts were in full swing, Conrad became 
increasingly worried that Serbia would launch an attack, and requested Burian to do what 
he could to “prevent” or “delay” Serbia and Montenegro’s offensives -  preferably 
redirected towards Albania -  until Austria’s operations against Russia were completed.510 
As part of his w ider view, Conrad also recommended building “golden bridges”5’1 to St. 
Petersburg to relieve his most difficult front. He hoped that getting the Russians out of the 
war by means of a separate peace would force Rumania to remain neutral. To this end, 
Conrad wanted to do everything to avoid a humiliation of Russia, including the 
renunciation of any “territorial cession”512 in Poland. He repeated these requests on 6 
August following the fall of Warsaw to the Central Powers, insisting on a Russian peace 
and advising Burian that Austria-Hungary only had enough manpower to fight on until the 
summer of 1916.513
Conrad was therefore more interested in pursuing, if possible, Austria-Hungary's 
prestige and territorial goals in Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans rather than continuing 
exhaustive progress against Russia or costly advances into indefensible lowland in Italy. 
He had, therefore, come round to Berchtold’s original policies on the Balkans. However, 
on 8 August Burian informed Conrad that attempting a separate peace with Russia was 
“hopeless." Informing the general that Austria-Hungary would have to fight on, Burian 
stated that an “honorable peace” could only be achieved following further successful 
battles, and that negotiations had yielded nothing, even with great accommodation shown 
by Vienna.514
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On 14 August, Burian visited Bethmann Hollweg and Falkenhayn in Berlin to 
clarify allied policy in the Balkans. The AOK wanted to attack Serbia as soon as its forces 
were freed from Poland, and the Chancellor agreed that it was high time to “resolve the 
Balkan matter in Austria-Hungary and Germany’s favor”5' 5 before a neutral declared war 
on the Monarchy or another amphibious assault took place. Burian agreed, believing as the 
Germans did that in the current climate peace could only be achieved through further 
military successes such as those in Russia.516 Although the situation was improving, 
Burian was very clear in wanting to bring an end to the conflict, “without allowing 
ancillary, albeit tempting war aims” to get in the way. War aims that did not “affect 
Austria-Hungary’s indispensible security requirements” should be cast aside, he felt, so as 
not to risk prolonging the war.517 Though he did not clarify what these were, Burian was 
wavering between the possible territorial benefits of a successful offensive against Serbia, 
the Monarchy’s policy of not annexing Serbian territory, and the need to swiftly end the 
war against Russia as Conrad was pressing.
In all scenarios, maintaining Rumanian and Bulgarian neutrality was vital, 
particularly for the MdA to set positive war aims against Serbia and Russia. Czemin in 
Bucharest offered the opinion that the war aims had to include the defeat of Russia, which 
W'ould significantly diminish its influence in the Balkans, a close alliance with Turkey and 
Bulgaria, and the “annihilation of Serbia.” Russia’s enormous prestige in the Balkans had 
to be “destroyed” so that Rumania would be “isolated.” Only this, argued the Minister, 
would force Rumania to bow to overwhelming pressure and join the Central Powers.5"1 
Czemin did not believe that a total victory' by the Central Powers was possible in the sense 
that they could “dictate terms” to the other Great Powers, but did hope for an “honorable 
peace” in which the Monarchy remained “unshaken.” Achieving even a moderate victory 
would be such an “immeasurable gain in power and prestige” that the need for a significant 
territorial enlargement would be “secondary.”519 By placing territorial conquest as a 
secondary goal, Czemin argued that mere survival was enough to secure the Monarchy's 
Great Power position in Europe. This was a perspective he would continue to hold as 
Foreign Minister in 1917, and work towards a swift and honorable peace on the best
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possible terms. His perspective regarding territorial conquest would change, however, for 
he felt that the Monarchy had to be rewarded in more than just prestige and economic terms 
for the sacrifices it had made. For the moment, however, Czemin’s view s were not shared 
by Burian, who was intent on defeating Serbia and achieving greater benefits for the 
sacrifices made.
The Balkans were of critical importance to all Austro-Hungarian policymakers, 
including Forgach, Burian, Conrad, and Tisza. As under Berchtold, MdA policy 
consistently put Serbia at the forefront, and subordinated all other goals to achieving that 
vital one. From January to October 1915 no offensive action was undertaken to secure 
Austria-Hungary’s positive war aims against Serbia, due to the serious military situations it 
faced elsewhere. Thus, in spring 1915 survival of its Ottoman ally was vital to achieving 
its aims in the Balkans, while after May 1915 Italy proved another threat. During this time, 
Turkish surv ival and success against Italy depended on the negative war aims of keeping 
Rumania and Bulgarian neutralized. The Monarchy’s leaders agreed that victories in 
Russia were not sustainable, and even the Germans agreed that Austria-1 lungary’s war aims 
and prestige had to be satisfied in the Balkans. With Russian or Italian peace a distant 
hope, the MdA led a foreign policy directed at the defeat of Serbia and preventing further 
hostile involvement by its Balkan neighbors. During this time, war aims against Serbia 
remained fluid. Burian was prepared to make accommodating gestures in line with German 
demands, but in fact still intended to impose harsh terms on Serbia when the opportunity 
arose.
The subsequent two sections will demonstrate that, with regard to the Eastern 
Balkans, Burian and his MdA retained overall foreign policymaking control and set war 
aims often in the face of direct resistance from the AOK, the Hungarians, and the Germans,
11b. Bulgaria
The purpose of this section is to analyze Austria-Hungary 's foreign policy tow ards 
Bulgaria in order to demonstrate its importance for the Monarchy’s wider Balkan war aims. 
The need to secure Bulgarian neutrality and obtain some form of Bulgarian assistance 
increased dramatically over the course o f 1915, following a further Austro-Hungarian 
defeat at Przemysl, the threat from the Gallipoli landings, and the declaration of war by 
Italy. Due to these developments, the MdA pursued a dual-track approach towards
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Bulgaria after Burian replaced Berchtold. On the one hand Burian offered limited Serbian 
territory to Bulgaria in exchange for the latter’s neutrality, while on the other he worked 
with Germany to achieve an Ottoman-Bulgarian alliance which would tie Sofia to the 
Central Powers.
Both these efforts w'ere pivotal in shaping Austro-Hungarian war aims in the 
Balkans. With Serbia remaining undefeated and Rumania a looming threat, Austro- 
Hungarian forces were stretched in Galicia and the Tyrol. The Monarchy depended on 
Sofia’s animosity against Belgrade and Bucharest to keep its own southern and eastern 
borders safe. Due to Entente promises and a worsening military situation, the MdA was 
forced to acquiesce in pressures from all sides to increase its offers to Bulgaria. The debate 
that ensued among the AOK, MdA, the Hungarians, and the Germans about the limits of 
these offers to Bulgaria forced a clarification of Austria-Hungary’s most vital Balkan war 
aims.
Bulgaria’s traditional aims lay in the Bulgarian-inhabited areas of Macedonia, 
Dobrudja, and European Turkey, but in 1915 it demanded territory well beyond its 
ethnographic borders. Conrad, whose first priority was military survival, wanted to offer 
Bulgaria anything it wanted in Serbia so as to achieve Bulgaria’s active assistance against 
Serbia or at least give the Ottomans and Austria-Hungary' a free hand against Italy. The 
Germans -  particularly the OHL -  had a similar view', and pushed the Turks and Austro- 
Hungarians hard to give Bulgaria what it wanted in the Morava valley and Adrianople, 
Due to his extreme fear of Rumania, Tisza pushed the hardest for an agreement at any cost, 
including abandoning Burian’s Albanian project and Kosovo, and was even willing to 
jettison key Hungarian aims such as the Negotin.
Burian acted as a brake on all of these internal and external pressures. He was 
unwilling to part with the Monarchy’s goals around Negotin or offer Bulgaria Serbian- 
inhabited territory in exchange merely for its neutrality'. For Burian, the considerations 
were longer-term; he was not prepared to sacrifice Austria-Hungary’s Great Power prestige 
and future role in the Balkans only to face a large post-war Bulgarian power on the 
peninsula. Due in part to his intransigence and desire to protect w ider and post-war Austro- 
Hungarian war aims, the alliance agreement with Bulgaria was eventually negotiated in 
Berlin, with difficult questions like the Dobrudja and Negotin being left for future 
discussion.
13S
Apart from demonstrating the importance of Austria-Hungary’s war aims in the 
Balkans, this section on Bulgaria shows that the MdA remained in control of the foreign 
policymaking and set its own war aims often in opposition to Hungarian, German, and 
AOK pressure. While the AOK and the Hungarians were understandably concerned about 
the Monarchy’s integrity and chances of surv ival, the MdA seemed to view the Italian and 
potential Rumanian invasions mainly as a threat to its Balkan aspirations and acted with 
less haste than other k.u.k. organs.
Following laborious diplomatic efforts by the Central Powers, Bulgaria began a 
partial mobilization in January 1915. In exchange, Austria-Hungary and Germany needed 
to offer Radoslavov at least some of the territory he demanded. On 31 December 1914, in 
utmost secrecy, Austria-Hungary and Germany “guaranteed” Sofia Serbian territories 
which for “historic and ethnographic reasons” were Bulgarian.520 This was the last success 
of the Berchtold era, for after Burian’s appointment relations w ith Sofia cooled. He did not 
ask Bulgaria to attack as soon as possible but rather strike at the “right moment.”521 * It 
seemed as though Burian did not even look for the need to get Bulgarian assistance against 
Serbia, and rather needed it in place against a potential Rumanian invasion of Hungary.
Bulgaria only returned to the MdA radar in March 1915, when the Gallipoli siege 
and landing threatened Central Power supply lines. Although the Turks expected that an 
Entente attack would fail in the face of 300,000 defending soldiers, the Ottomans 
nevertheless required help. "  The new threat to Constantinople prompted Burian to focus 
his efforts on re-involving Bulgaria in discussions. He hoped Bulgaria would be easier to 
deal with now that Sofia was “alarmed” by the Straits assault and realized that a Russian- 
controlled Bosporus would lead to the same outcome for Bulgaria as it would for Austria- 
Hungary.523 On 19 March, the Foreign Minister therefore assured the Bulgarians that 
Austria-Hungary would, upon victory', work to build a “large and strong” Bulgaria,524 an 
assurance Berchlold had also given. Implied in this offer was the expectation that Bulgaria 
would allow at least munitions transports, if not give its full assistance.
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Bulgaria, however, was headed in a different direction, and the attack on the 
Dardanelles even made Bulgarian belligerence against the Ottoman Empire, its enemy in 
the Second Balkan War, a possibility. The fear in Vienna was that Bulgaria would retake 
by force its losses along the common border, at a time when Serbia was no threat, Rumania 
was looking towards Austria-Hungary for expansion, and Greece was hesitant. Szilassv 
feared that this would mean the entry of Rumania and Italy, and would also open an 
Entente front in the southern Balkans.525 For this reason, Burian felt the need to join w ith 
the Germans in offering Sofia territory just to keep its benevolent neutrality. On 13 April, 
he informed Jagow' that he was prepared to offer Bulgaria “limited territorial gains at the 
cost of Serbia" in exchange for benevolent neutrality.526 Burian excluded territory in Old 
Serbia which was not ethnographically or historically Bulgarian. He explained that he was 
thinking primarily of the Negotin circle which -  given its location and valuable mines -  
entailed “such vital interests of the Monarchy" that Vienna needed to have a say in its 
fate.527 Burian was clearly looking to control, directly or indirectly, the Austro-Hungarian 
war aim of Negotin. He also supported the idea of a military convention to govern the 
relationship between the Central Powers and Bulgaria, because he did not feel an alliance 
Was necessary' or feasible. Although the Monarchy needed Bulgaria for its survival and to 
Prevent the neutrals from turning to the Entente, Burian would still approach an agreement 
with Sofia only w ith the “greatest care.” ' K
Conrad and Tisza, for their own reasons, were far less hesitant than Burian. In the 
light of the heavy losses suffered during his Carpathian campaign, Conrad wrote to Burian 
requesting that Bulgaria be made a definite and favorable offer to assist his southern flank. 
Conrad realized that his forces tied down against Serbia could not aid against the crushing 
might of Russia or even act as a deterrent against Rumania. He therefore agreed w ith the 
Germans that a joint proposal to Sofia was “necessary and urgent."524 On 17 May Conrad 
a5>ked that the MdA achieve a right of passage for Turkish troops across Bulgaria, a request 
which Burian rejected on the basis that Bulgarian belligerence against Turkey remained a 
Possibility. Given the pressures on Constantinople following the Gallipoli landing of 25 
April 1915, coupled with the expected intervention by Rumania against the Central Powers
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in conjunction with the impending Italian attack, Bulgaria might yet march against Turkish 
Adrianople and therefore against the Monarchy rather than alongside it into the 
Dobrudja.530 Besides, the Bulgarians had ruffled MdA feathers on 13 May when 
demanding sweeping territorial guarantees in exchange merely for neutrality. Even though 
Burian would have been satisfied with Bulgarian neutrality, he was only prepared to grant 
the territory it demanded in exchange for active assistance.531
Still, Burian agreed that Turkish survival was of “utmost importance."532 The only 
way to ensure an attack by Sofia did not occur was to form an Ottoman-Bulgarian alliance, 
which would also deter Rumania. To achieve such an agreement, Sofia had to be 
persuaded that a “destruction” of Turkey did not mean the analogous strengthening of 
Bulgaria. Rather, Russia’s seizure of the Bosporus and the Entente positions in the 
Dardanelles and Anatolia would mean its “eternal gagging.” The same was true, argued 
Burian, if Rumania successfully conquered Transylvania. Such an eventuality would 
reduce Bulgaria to a “second-rate” Balkan state, since Serbia and Greece would grow at the 
expense of the Central Powers.533 Burian therefore asked the Germans to apply pressure on 
Bulgaria to sign the Ottoman treaty to prepare for Austria's upcoming conflict with Italy 
and possibly also Rumania,534 a request to which Jagow agreed on 21 May.535
Together with the Berlin cabinet and in view of the imminent Italian declaration of 
war, Burian finally agreed to give written promises of even w ider territorial expansion in 
Serbia than before provided it was under Central Power control, merely for the sake of 
benevolent Bulgarian neutrality.5’6 Burian hoped that a neutrality pact would lay the 
framework for a Bulgarian-Ottoman understanding, and ensure that Bulgaria’s forces could 
keep Rumania neutral. The Foreign Minister also intended to create an incentive for 
Bulgaria to act and seize the desired territory itself.5 ’7
The concerns regarding Turkey and the need for a Bulgarian-Ottoman alliance were 
not unfounded. Conrad on 22 May 1915 expressed to Burian a concern that the Ottomans 
would not declare w'ar if Italy attacked Austria-Hungary. The general feared that neutrality 
or even a “passive warfare” by Turkey against Italy would “severely damage” the Central
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Powers.538 On 23 May, the day Italy declared war, the Foreign Minister highlighted the 
issue to Tamowski and Pallavicini, and asked them to pursue a Bulgarian-Ottoman 
defensive alliance with the right Maritza bank as compensation to Bulgaria.5351 This 
alliance, Burian hoped, would prevent a Rumanian-Bulgarian-Greek Balkan League aimed 
at Turkey and secure Austria-Hungary against Rumania, allowing both to concentrate on 
Italy. Compared to defeat, Burian argued, the Maritza border was a relatively small price to 
pay.
Tisza was equally worried that an Italian intervention would spell the end of Austro- 
Hungarian diplomatic efforts in the Balkans and lead to a hyena-like dismemberment of the 
Monarchy and Turkey. On 18 May he wrote to Conrad hoping that a spirited and 
successful defense in the Tyrol would help keep Bulgaria in Austria-Hungary’s “sphere of 
interest” and Bulgaria's armies, together with the northern k.u.k. forces stationed in south­
east Galicia and Bukowina, would be enough to deter Rumania from an immediate 
attack.540 Tisza included Burian in this communication, to ensure the “decisive 
importance” of the w ider Balkan “political considerations” not be ignored by the generals. 
According to Tisza, the AOK and MdA needed to pursue the same line with Berlin, since 
the “only way to prevent the collapse in the Balkans” was to convince Sofia that Vienna 
could cope with the Italian attack and get it to continue exercising pressure on Rumania.541 
Tisza wanted to impress upon the Bulgarians that Entente offers of Macedonian territory 
would be meaningless if after the war it faced a “Greater Serbia and Greater Rumania,” 
enlarged through their acquisition of Bosnia, Croatia, and Transylvania.54"
In Berlin, Bethmann HoIKveg also agreed with Tisza’s and Burian's position that 
the Balkans had to be the “current main focus,” and that preventing Balkan states from 
joining the Entente was the “most urgent task” o f both powers.543 The Chancellor, 
however, pointed out that the possibility of a military convention with Bulgaria remained 
doubtful as long as Sofia considered the Central Powers near to defeat, but Burian argued 
that at least a Bulgarian-Turkish agreement was a necessity.544 For both Burian and Tisza, 
such an alliance or at least non-aggression pact could be the difference between a
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Rumanian attack and a collapse of the Monarchy on the one hand, or successful defense on 
all fronts on the other. By making the sacrifices around Maritza which Bulgaria wanted, 
Turkey would have assured for the Central Powers that Bulgaria was given rear cover 
against Rumania and would not go after Constantinople. But as long as Bulgaria did not 
reach an agreement with either the Turks or the Dual Alliance, it remained a potential 
threat. Although getting Bulgaria on side was preferable, the Austro-llungarians also 
considered offering Serbia a separate peace if Bulgaria refused to move. Since no Central 
Power troops stood in Serbia, and Conrad confirmed that a military action against Serbia 
was impossible without Bulgarian assistance, Buriàn was considering a compromise, lie 
was initially prepared to part with northern Albania as compensation to Serbia for losing 
Macedonia, but the idea was quickly dropped because of the danger Sofia would find 
out.545
While the generals argued for economic concessions to the Balkan neutrals and the 
diplomats even considered separate peace with Serbia, the Hungarian position centered on 
the fear of Rumania. Tisza informed Buriàn that Bulgaria was the key to victory or at least 
stalemate in the Balkans, so much so that he was prepared to part with a key Hungarian as 
well as Imperial w ar aim if necessary, to make peace with Serbia. Tisza w as convinced that 
the “entire future depended” on holding the Balkan situation, mainly by using the Bulgarian 
link.546 The Rumanian danger could be “circumvented” by making peace with Belgrade in 
Sofia’s favor. This could be done by handing over the Negotin to Bulgaria -  an erstwhile 
crucial Austro-I lungarian war aim -  together w ith the Kosovo region (Djakova and Prizren) 
to Albania and for Austria-Hungary nothing.547 Tisza had become so pessimistic about the 
Italian campaign’s effects on the Balkans that he was prepared to drop any and all Austro- 
Hungarian territorial war aims against Serbia, only claiming certain “economic” benefits 
for the Monarchy in terms of transport and customs. Since this fitted nicely w ith his non­
annexationist program vis-à-vis Belgrade, it was easier for him to suggest than for any 
other statesman or general. The Italian entry had scared Tisza so much that he forgot all 
about his late 1914 annexationism.
However, Buriàn and Conrad would never agree to the loss of Negotin, while other 
statesmen would have cringed at such a humiliating defeat for Austria-Hungary. This idea
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was finally dropped after Burian's Pless talks at the end of May, probably because Tisza 
rediscovered his fighting spirit after receiving German assurances and because Burian 
wanted to find another means of securing Bulgarian assistance. The most important 
decision to come out of the German talks was a confirmation of Burian’s policy direction 
on the need for a Bulgarian-Turkish agreement. But the Germans seemed to have drawn a 
different conclusion, or were so frustrated with Burian that they simply pursued an 
independent policy. Although the Germans had “promised”548 their support, Burian on 28 
May complained that while Austria-Hungary was try ing to achieve Bulgarian assistance in 
exchange for the Maritza border, the German representative in Sofia Gustav Michahelles 
had apparently weakened Tarnowski’s efforts. Michahelles had intimated to Radoslavov 
that Bulgaria would receive the Maritza border including Adrianople from Turkey in 
exchange for “benevolent neutrality,” a proposal which Tamowski argued in their presence
S<49would never be accepted by the Ottomans.'
Burian was also becoming exasperated by Bulgaria’s greed. In a cable to 
Tamowski on 29 May he accused Radoslavov of “derision” for expecting Turkey’s cession 
of the “valuable” Maritza line just for Bulgaria’s continued neutrality, noting that Austria- 
Hungary would never advise such a disadvantageous deal.550 Although he was willing to 
offer Turkish or Serbian territory in exchange for intervention or a non-aggression pact, 
Burian treated Sofia’s neutrality as a given which did not have to be paid for. He therefore 
recommended to Radoslavov that Bulgaria act with the Central Powers, for he framed the 
Greek, Rumanian, and Serbian threat as an “imaginary” one to Bulgaria and argued that 
with a Bulgarian-Turkish alliance these concerns would entirely disappear.551 Only the 
Central Powers could help realize Bulgarian aims, argued Burian, for accepting any Entente 
offers would mean the “renunciation of Macedonia.”55* * In this manner, the Foreign 
Minister desperately attempted to convince Radoslavov that Bulgarian action was 
necessary, so as to ensure Austria-Hungary’s vital negative war aim of preventing a 
Rumanian hostile intervention.
Although Burian well understood the need for Bulgaria's assistance, he was 
annoyed that he faced the same sort of blackmail from Sofia as he had from Rome and
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Bucharest, albeit to a lesser degree and not directed against the Monarchy. Jagow on 31 
May was also concerned with this blackmail against Turkey, but agreed with Burian that 
offering Bulgaria territory in exchange for mere neutrality would be a “big mistake.”553 1 le 
nevertheless speculated to llohenlohe whether it would be useful to offer Bulgaria “certain 
border rectifications” along the Maritza line not to necessarily obtain their full support but 
rather tie them to an agreement that would commit it to preventing a Rumanian attack on 
Austria-Hungary.554 In line with older German policy, the AA was prepared to prioritize 
the benefit of keeping Rumania out of the war in exchange for the disadvantage of 
continued Bulgarian neutrality. Berlin thought this middle of the road approach, whereby 
Radoslavov would obtain the Maritza region without declaring war on the Entente, would 
be a way to bait the Bulgarians. Burian considered this idea, as it did not represent the 
feared German approach to a neutralized Bulgaria and offered some security in the event 
that efforts to achieve Bulgarian direct assistance failed.555 But Burian was not currently 
prepared to do this, given Radoslavov's haughtiness and the difficulties the MdA faced in 
getting Turkey to agree. The Ottomans had signed a neutrality pact with Bulgaria earlier in 
the war, giving them adequate guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality against them, so there was 
little incentive for them to make territorial sacrifices. It was for this reason that Germany 
or Austria-I lungary had to mediate to reach a new agreement.55*’
Unfortunately for the Central Powers, the Entente were strongly templing Bulgaria 
with their latest propaganda “onslaught.” Burian felt it necessary' that, in order to 
achieve the Monarchy’s aims, Radoslavov be supported by the Central Powers. Although a 
written agreement was in the works, Burian kept reminding his representatives to bring up 
the topic of Bulgarian assistance against Serbia, for which they would be offered “ethnic 
Bulgarian Old Serbian territory” outside of Macedonia.5' 8 Since this did include significant 
concessions beyond Macedonia (“New Serbia”), Burian was even prepared to discuss 
Bulgaria’s “ambitions against the north-east comer of Serbia”5’9 around Negotin. This 
ofier was an expansion on the last oiler by the MdA, and represented a major shift in the 
Austro-Hungarian emphasis on Negotin, which so far had been a sine qua non of peace for
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all except Tisza. At least one of the reasons Burian acquiesced in Tisz.a's request on 
Negotin was that even the Germans believed that Bulgaria was about to side with the 
Entente. But on 4 June Burian refused to go further, arguing that anything more would 
eliminate the incentive for cooperation, and be interpreted as a symptom of weakness and 
helplessness of the Central Powers.560 Burian rejected this plan for the same reason as he 
insisted on strength in the face of Rumanian requests, namely for prestige and because 
Austria-Hungary’s war aims were incompatible with such extensive territorial sacrifices 
w ithout tangible benefits. The expanded offer was therefore one of continued Bulgarian 
neutrality, mutual defense against Greece and Rumania, and the option of Turkish 
assistance if Bulgaria took Macedonia.561
These new plans notwithstanding, Sofia remained unconvinced and the negotiations 
wobbled under Bulgaria’s extremely expansionist attitudes. These included a request made 
in Vienna for the Turkish Enos-Midia line, which Burian rejected on the basis that they did 
not contain a quid pro quo for Turkey and were a “drastic sacrifice” of its “vital 
interests.”562 Only when the Rumanians were issued their final offers by Burian in June 
1915 did it become clear that the lingering Bulgarian-Turkish talks seemed like the last 
possible alternative for assistance from a Balkan neutral. But there remained major 
obstacles to overcome. Austria-Hungary’s independent efforts with Radoslavov had failed 
earlier in the year, and differences remained over the key concessions. For example, 
Bulgaria demanded with Austria-Hungary’s backing the right Marit/a bank from Turkey in 
exchange for an agreement, while the Germans wanted Turkey to retain control of the 
important Adrianople fortress and its hinterland.563
These sorts of differences w'ould have to be resolved first, since a premature 
agreement was in the interest of neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Both allies w ere at 
the moment “militarily unable” to attack Serbia, but needed to keep the issue alive for when 
troops could be taken from the Russian front for an offensive south.564 Yet, an irritated 
Burian was not pressing Bulgaria as hard as Germany was. Although Bulgaria was vital for 
eventually defeating Serbia and keeping Rumania in check, as he had admitted many times 
before, Burian now stated that a “wish or need for an alliance did not exist” on the pail of *5412
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Austria-Hungary.565 Desiring a military convention rather than a German-backed 
alliance,566 Burian swayed between a ‘wait-and-see’ approach and the need to “take 
control” of the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations567 and thereby secure the Monarchy’s 
interests. When on 20 July Conrad learned, as it turned out erroneously,568 that the 
Germans intended to slow the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations by treating them 
“dilatorily,”569 Burian also became concerned. Although Conrad again admitted that an 
offensive against Serbia was impossible for the time being, he did highlight that a 
Bulgarian agreement would force Serbia to reposition its forces east and would make it
$70unable to undertake an offensive against the Monarchy.
These concerns were unfounded, for on 28 July Radoslavov sent a representative to 
the OHL to discuss the military convention.57' Yet Austria-Hungary remained very much 
at the fringes of these talks. On 3 August Burian was satisfied that the Germans had 
managed to convince the Turks to give up the right Maritza bank.577 Problems arose when 
Germany began offering Serbian territory as “loot” for Bulgaria joining the Central Pow ers. 
Although the Austro-Hungarians had previously offered all sorts of territory' to Radoslavov, 
the Germans went further because they had no direct interest in territorial acquisition in 
Serbia. Thus, they offered Negotin and a large portion of the Morava above and beyond the 
original Austrian Macedonian offer.573 Although Burian claimed to have previously made 
similar offers to Bulgaria, the Negotin question, control of the Iron Gate, and Bulgarian 
penetration so far west were certainly a cause for concern for the MdA and the Hungarians. 
For this reason, Burian began trying to tie Bulgaria’s territorial rewards to its military 
achievements.574 That way, if Bulgaria’s assistance were helpful but not decisive, Austria- 
Hungary could retain significant influence in Serbia.
Germany therefore drew Austria-Hungary indirectly into the negotiations, asking 
Vienna to confirm various points of the agreement. Burian was able to influence the 
Bulgarians not to provoke Greece, whose continued neutrality was valuable for Vienna and *3
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conflict with which would only distract Bulgaria from the important Serbian and Rumanian 
fronts.57* One of Bulgaria’s key demands -  a land connection with Hungary -  was not 
possible without Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Iron Gate and Negotin. This, 
however, was not desired by Sofia, which demanded the Negotin circle for itself along with 
the “largest possible piece of territory up to the Morava” in addition to Macedonia.576 
Although Burian agreed that Bulgaria would be given direct contiguity with Hungary, he 
remained non-committal about Negotin.577 For Burian, the agreement between Turkey and 
Bulgaria was more useful because it promised to bring Bulgaria on board without 
threatening the Austro-Hungarian aims in Negotin, which is why he urged Radosiavov not 
to let an agreement fail on account of the Bulgarian demands on Turkish territory. Yet as 
late as August 1915, the Bulgarians still would not budge. In these “fluid times,”579 Burian 
framed the issue as a choice between a Serbia grown fat on ceded Austro-Hungarian 
territory580 or a Bulgaria successfully defeating Serbia and taking Macedonia.581 Vienna 
also ensured that any agreement would be reciprocal, meaning that while any foreign forces
C M
remained on the Monarchy’s territory, Bulgaria would be treaty bound to fight on.
The negotiations with Bulgaria demonstrated to what extent Vienna had developed 
clear war aims in the regions desired by Sofia. Territorial expansion, which was the reason 
for Bulgaria’s intervention in the first place, would prove pivotal in Austria-Hungary' 
developing its own territorial goals. At this early stage, Burian was more interested in 
securing Bulgaria’s assistance to subdue Serbia rather than furthering his own aims which 
might alienate Bulgaria. Burian therefore limited Radoslavov’s more extravagant goals 
which conflicted with Austria-Hungary’s own, such as requesting the left bank of the 
Maritza as well as the right bank which it had been promised by Turkey,583 the Morava, 
Kosovo, or Negotin. Although on the one hand Burian needed Bulgaria, on the other he did 
not want to see it grow too far beyond manageable size, and used the Turks for this 
purpose. The Bulgarians were aware of this lactic, which is why they presented
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“considerably reduced” treaty recommendations to Vienna compared to Berlin.584 This 
approach would be used by Sofia throughout the w ar to play Germany o il against Austria- 
Hungary.
Bulgaria’s tactics rested on a very real difference between Vienna and Berlin; 
whereas Germany did not have any territorial interests and only wanted to win in the 
Balkans so as to focus on the wider war, Austria-Hungary had very important war aims 
there. The fact that Germany was “generally more distant from Balkan matters”585 *meant 
that it was much more willing to promise even Serb-inhabited territory to Bulgaria, which 
would have created a Serbian irredenta. Although Burian claimed to oppose this because 
Vienna only supported Sofia’s true national interests in Macedonia,587 it is also likely that 
the Foreign Minister’s strong opposition to ’Old Serbia’ falling to Sofia had to do with a 
desire to limit post-war Bulgarian strength and influence. Burian hinted as much to Conrad 
on 4 September, stating that Bulgaria would become the strongest state in the Balkans, 
which is why its German-backed request for purely Serbian territory was so 
controversial.588 This made no sense to Conrad or the German military’. If Austria- 
Hungary had renounced any annexations as was widely believed, Conrad was perfectly 
happy to allow Bulgaria to take ethnic Serbian territory' if it meant obtaining much needed 
help and fresh forces. Burian therefore acted as a brake on both the AOK and OHL, and 
was able to secure the longer-term needs of the Monarchy by not offering Bulgaria too 
much.589 The very ambiguous term “approval”5*1 for Bulgaria’s territorial demands would 
prevent resolution of the Dobrudja and Negotin questions until the closing stages of the 
war.
On 5 September the final Austro-Hungarian recommendations were accepted,591 and 
a day later Buridn congratulated Radoslavov and welcomed Bulgaria into what was now the 
Quadruple Alliance.59* After lengthy negotiation and pressure, Austria-Hungary had 
secured what Conrad so desperately needed, which was an ally against Serbia and, more 
importantly for Tisza, a strong Balkan state capable o f keeping Rumania in check and
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deterring it from joining the Entente. It came, however, at the cost of putting the Prussian 
general August von Mackensen in charge of Central Power operations on the peninsula, 
which Conrad argued would “severely damage the Monarchy’s position in the Balkans.”593
Keeping Bulgaria neutral or achieving its assistance was a vital war aim of Austria- 
Hungary's, albeit not one to be bought at all costs. The MdA successfully fought 
increasing Hungarian, German, and AOK pressure to give in to Bulgarian demands. 
Although Burian compromised on some areas of lesser significance, he remained steadfast 
in his determination to protect Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status and some key war 
aims against Serbia. Particularly following the Italian declaration of war in May 1915, 
Burian was willing to allow Bulgaria to take Kosovo, Macedonia, and the Morava valley, 
but he successfully prevented Sofia from expanding its influence to include Negotin, the 
Iron Gate, or Albania. By redirecting Bulgarian attention towards Ottoman territory to be 
sacrificed in order to reach an agreement, Austria-Hungary protected its ow n interests.
Burian’s brinkmanship prevented an earlier agreement being reached with Sofia, but 
it powerfully demonstrated the extent of Austro-Hungarian war aims against an as yet 
undefeated Serbia. It also demonstrated the MdA’s ability to retain control over foreign 
policymaking and the war aims debate. The war aims championed by Burian were 
consistent with many of Berchtold’s policies, but were defended far more intransigent!)- 
and dogmatically by the new Foreign Minister. Thus Burian maintained continuity in 
Austro-Hungarian war aims discussion and planning, though the need for Bulgarian 
assistance forced a narrowing in order to more precisely delineate where each party’s 
interests lay.
The greatest cost for Austria-Hungary was that, due to Burian’s staunch defense of 
his interests, he lost control of the international alliance discussions. Thus, although 
Germany respected the Monarchy’s terms in the final agreement, Sofia would inevitably 
clash with Vienna once Serbia was defeated, perceiving there to be a split between German 
and Austro-I lungarian interests and exploiting this difference.
5>i3 Rauchcnsidner, Tod, 298.
lie. Rumania
The following section on Rumania is divided into two parts; Austro-Hungarian 
foreign policy and war aims against Bucharest before and after Italy’s declaration of war. 
In the first pail, the importance of Rumania will be demonstrated, along with Burian’s shift 
away from Berchtold’s uncertain policies in favor of a harder stance. Burian’s steadfast 
approach will be demonstrated by the offers he put forward. As the Italian declaration of 
war became unavoidable, Rumania’s importance increased dramatically, and this will be 
analyzed in the second part. In light of this importance, several factors increased their 
pressure on the MdA, and will be considered in turn. The actors who attempted to mould 
Burian’s policy towards Rumania were, in order of increasing importance, the AOK, the 
Germans, and his mentor Tisza. Each section will demonstrate how Burian rejected most 
of the recommendations he received in favor of his own vision, mainly because the 
suggestions were not compatible with Austria-Hungary's prestige and Great Power status. 
Finally, Burian’s few actual offers to Bucharest will be explored, which failed to bring 
Rumania into the war on Austria-Hungary’s side or keep it perpetually neutral.
Hc(.)
Although the partial Bulgarian mobilization was a small success, the overall 
military situation remained poor at the beginning of 1915. A day before being relieved of 
his post, Berchtold expressed a concern to Conrad that, with the Russian presence in the 
entire Bukovvina, the danger of the Rumanians’ intervening was imminent, particularly if 
the Russians reached Transylvania.594 Even their remaining in Bukowina would, according 
to the Foreign Minister, have a “most unfavorable repercussion” on the entire European 
situation, which was why the ousting of at least a portion of the Russian army became 
Berchtold’s first priority.595
Maintaining Rumanian neutrality therefore became a key Austro-Hungarian 
negative war aim in the eastern Balkans. The greatest concern in Vienna was that Rumania 
would attack, most likely in conjunction with the Italians. Since Conrad had confirmed in 
January' 1915 that a joint Rumanian-Italian attack on Austria-Hungary could not be 
rebuffed, MdA efforts focused on preventing an Italian declaration of war. The 
Monarchy’s minister in Bucharest and future Foreign Minister Ottokar Czemin insisted that
Berdilold-Conrad, 12-Jan-l 915,111 IStA-PA-I-409.
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the Monarchy would have to be prepared to pay “any price”596 to keep Italy out so that 
Rumania could not take advantage of the opportunity. Since Austria-Hungary was engaged 
on two and soon possibly three fronts, Rumanian non-belligerence became crucial to the 
Monarchy’s survival, while its assistance could even be decisive. Conrad indicated that “an 
intervention by Rumania would decide not only the Russian but probably also the European 
campaign” in Austria-Hungary’s favor.597 This expectation was due less to Rumania’s 
400,000-strong army, and more due to its geographical and tactical position behind Russian 
lines. Conversely, Conrad was concerned that losing Austria-Hungary’s neutral eastern 
border could mean an unstoppable Russian invasion through Rumania.598
Berchtold’s inability to cope with Italian blackmail threatened Hungarian policy 
towards Bucharest as well. He was replaced on 13 January by Count Istvan Burian, at the 
behest of Tisza and for reasons mainly relating to Berchtold’s weakening resolve. Given 
Tisza’s hand in his appointment, Burian propelled the Rumania issue to the top of his 
agenda, almost entirely sidelining the Bulgarian question until the Rumanian one had been 
addressed. On 22 January, Burian set forth his policy program on Rumania, which was for 
Austria to be more self-confident and thereby assure Rumanian neutrality or even obtain its 
assistance.599 But since Burian did not consider either of these likely, he shifted MdA 
policy towards securing Rumanian neutrality rather than simply expecting it. This was not 
an insignificant shift in policy; it implied that Vienna had, under the Tisza-Burian axis, 
departed from any expectation that Rumania would come around. Henceforth, the 
Monarchy would work towards preserving Rumanian neutrality as its stated goal. But 
differences arose over what to demand for any territory offered. Burian dropped 
Berchtold’s policy of offering border corrections in Bukowina merely for Rumania’s 
neutrality,600 while Tisza would push Burian hard to make the necessary' concessions 
anywhere outside of Hungary'. Thus, Burian’s representative offered the Rumanians 
Bessarabia only in exchange for active assistance, and Czemin agreed that Austria-Hungary 
would not “give away even a village,” or any of the Bukowina, merely for neutrality.601 By 
offering border corrections in the Bukowina, Burian thought, Austria-Hungary’s would
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appear “weak and in need of assistance,”602 which was similar to his view of territorial 
blackmail by Italy and Bulgaria.
Prior to late May 1915, Burian’s attention was focused on preventing an Italian 
invasion, in order to avert the ancillary Rumanian attack which would be the factor 
crippling the Monarchy’s defenses. During the intense negotiations with Italy, certain 
offers were also made to Rumania. These offers help identify which war aims were critical 
to which Austro-Hungarian leaders. Their w illingness to part with some of the most vital 
Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans can also be employed as a barometer of the 
seriousness of the situation.
Austria-Hungary had failed, under Berchtold, to push Rumania towards Bessarabia, 
but Rumania still felt itself too weak to take action against Transylvania directly. Titus, it 
apparently set its sights on the Negotin (which the Austro-Hungarians coveted603) 
according to AOK intelligence on 31 January', even if this meant intervention “against 
Austria-I lunparv.”604 With the AOK as yet uninformed of MdA and Hungarian designs 
against Negotin, Archduke Eugen -  w ho had replaced Potiorek as commander of the k.u.k. 
Balkan forces -  wanted to buy Rumanian neutrality with Negotin and thereby close down 
Russian shipping.605 Conrad supported this notion, but suggested in contrast to his Balkans 
commander that Austria-Hungary only offer Negotin in exchange for Rumanian active 
assistance, rather than mere neutrality.606 Conrad, who was not generally to be had for 
cession of Austro-Hungarian or coveted foreign territory in any circumstances, was 
desperate enough in early 1915 to twice recommend to Burian on the same day that, in 
exchange for “active intervention” by Rumania, the north-east comer of Serbia be offered 
as a territorial compensation.607
Burian and the leading Austro-Hungarian statesmen did not expect Rumanian 
assistance, how ever, though they all went through the motions of try ing to obtain it. In the 
case of Rumania as in Italy, the Foreign Minister sought alternative and dilatory' methods to 
keep them neutral, but refused to give up Austro-Hungarian territory' or even anticipated 
Serbian spoils just for neutrality, C/emin even recommended more insidious methods,
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such as offering Bessarabia and Bukowina and then simply not honoring the agreement 
after the war,608 though this was a suggestion Burian could not consider either.
Rumania’s importance increased dramatically when the Ottomans were threatened 
by the Entente landings and Constantinople was running low on armaments. Austria- 
Hungary could not sit idly by and watch its Great Power status be threatened by the 
collapse of the ally it needed to continue exercising a dominant role in the Balkans. 
Although Rumania remained intransigent on land, Burian hoped that Bratiano would 
“tolerate” secret Danubian shipments.609 Burian asked for Rumanian terms on this issue, 
hoping that he would be able to pay the price Rumania requested.610 Burian was now 
treating Rumania as a business partner whose benevolence could be bought, as buying 
Rumanian neutrality became a priority “of eminent importance.”611
Notwithstanding AOK, MdA, and German612 pressure, Burian had, with Tisza’s 
backing, resisted making any offers to Rumania w hich stood any chance of success. In his 
thinking, if on the one hand he offered too much, Rumania w as bound to attack, w hile if it 
did not offer as much, the Monarchy’s self-confidence would deter Rumania. It was a false 
assumption that only intensified as Italian interv ention became imminent, and did not solve 
the fundamental problem of a potential Rumanian intervention at the same time as Italy’s. 
As the Italian pressure grew, so did the “high probability” of Rumania’s “hostile 
positioning.”613
Tisza’s hope for a peaceful solution by May 1915 was all but lost, and he urged 
fiurian and anyone who would listen to prepare the Monarchy for the worst. He argued that 
the Monarchy must take immediate defensive military and diplomatic measures. Tisza 
believed that a Rumanian attack would “automatically” follow an Italian one, resulting in 
Italian, Rumanian, and Serbian troops deep in Alpine Austrian and Hungarian territory, 
rendering any advantageous situation on the main fronts useless. This scenario would mean 
the “complete collapse" of the Monarchy, leading to its “dissolution.”014 Tisza could not 
have painted a bleaker picture.
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To deal with this impending doom, the Hungarian Premier put forward an idea 
which would earlier have seemed outrageous. He recommended a defensive posture 
against Italy, and that forces near Rumania be immediately used for a “surprise attack” into 
Rumanian territory to disrupt the mobilization and possibly also galvanize the Bulgarians 
into action. He even wanted to bring “significant numbers” of troops from the Russian 
front for this purpose.615 Tisza, playing the strategist, urged Burian to advocate a totally 
defensive posture not only on the Italian front, but also on the Russian and even the 
Flanders front, all to put adequate forces aside to deal with the Monarchy’s Balkan front. It 
was an extraordinary plan, contrary to all AOK thinking and well outside the realm of the 
realistic. It vividly demonstrated that Tisza did not believe in overall victory anymore, or 
in the hope of a sustainable defense of the Monarchy. What he wanted to do w as place the 
enemies of Austria-Hungary before the decision whether to w in total victory by means of 
“tremendous blood sacrifices,” or to accept an Austro-Hungarian peace offer which would 
be favorable for them.616
This was a desperate plan, penned by a man unable to see a chance in victory but 
unwilling to give up the lands of St. Stephen w ithout a costly fight. Gone were the hopes 
of victory', the faith in the Dual Alliance, or even the w ish for a compromise peace; Tisza 
with this plan demonstrated his fear of total collapse of the Monarchy. Only in this 
defensive posture could he save the Monarchy “from a complete defeat,” and robbing 
Germany of its most important ally. The Monarchy needed to be prepared for Italian 
intervention and its consequences, which could only result in either “getting away with a 
severe damaging of the Central Powers” or the “annihilation” of both Empires.617
The Germans were not yet thinking in such apocalyptic terms about Rumania, and 
represented the opposite end of the spectrum from Tisza. Since all previous offers (e.g. 
Suceava, Bukowina, Bessarabia) had failed, on 6 May the German Ambassador in Turkey 
utused about Vienna being more accommodating regarding Transylvania, since this would 
‘‘decide the war.”618 This was a matter which no German official had yet dared to suggest, 
and Pallavieini responded that cession of Transylvania was impossible to separate from 
Hungary because it was a “life and death question” for the entire Monarchy.619 Pallavicini
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also reprimanded his German opposite for such “dangerous” comments, as it might give 
Bucharest the impression of support.620
For the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy, it was clearly too late to entertain fantastic 
German ideas about further cession of territory to Rumania, since Berlin was already 
pressing Vienna to buy continued Italian neutrality at all costs. May proved to be the 
pivotal month, when Austro-Hungarian efforts to keep Italy out of the war were failing 
following the London Treaty of 26 April and Italy’s departure front the Triple Alliance on 4 
May. Conrad and Tisza met with Falkenhayn and Bethmann Hollweg in Teschen on 7 May 
to discuss the Italian problem and its influence on Rumania, and agreed to do everything 
possible to prevent or delay an attack.621 After talks with the generals, Tisza became more 
relaxed, confident that everything was being prepared for an attack by Italy, and hoped, 
given the successes on the Russian front, that Austria-Hungary would be able “to beat both 
Italy and Rumania.”622 The generals did agree to one of Tisza’s key requests, which was 
that if Italy and Rumania attacked, the Austro-Hungarian armed forces would “transition” 
to a “defensive posture” against Russia and throw themselves “with all vehemence against 
the robbers.”623
Hc(ii)
As the Austro-Hungarians had anticipated throughout May, Italy abandoned its 
neutrality and declared war on the Monarchy on 23 May, after thirty-three years of alliance. 
Whether Austria-Hungary' could pursue any of its war aims on any front now rested entirely 
°n Rumania. Conrad stated that now “everything depended” on Rumania not also 
attacking.624 Although the MdA and Tisza had repeatedly pressed him on this, Conrad said 
that military preparations against a Rumanian attack were “entirely outside the realm of the 
Possible.”625 Conrad, in no uncertain terms, w as telling Burian that if the diplomats failed 
to prevent a Rumanian intervention, there was nothing the military' could do to stop an 
Invasion.
Although an immediate intervention by Rumania was not expected, given Austria’s 
accurate intelligence regarding its military unpreparedness, what Conrad did expect was a
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large-scale Italian-style blackmail from Bucharest.626 Since the AOK was helpless, he 
advised Burian that preventing Rumanian intervention was necessary “at all costs,” or else 
Austria-Hungary faced “doom all along the line,”627 implying that all fronts would collapse 
if Rumania entered the heart of the Monarchy. The Germans had a similar perspective to 
Conrad. Dietrich von Bethmann Hollweg628 worried that an intervention by Rumania 
“would lead to a loss of the war” for the two Central Powers which, while severely 
damaging to Germany, would be “a dow nright catastrophe”629 for Austria-Hungary'. Like 
Conrad, he therefore urged Austria-Hungary to secure Rumanian neutrality “at all costs.”630
The importance of keeping Rumania neutral cannot be overstated, but suddenly the 
diplomats seemed less concerned than the generals. Tisza recovered from his earlier 
pessimism, comforted by German assurances that Rome would not be able to make large or 
quick gains, which could in turn prevent the Balkan nations turning against following 
Italy’s declaration of war.631 Tisza believed that the existential threat to the Monarchy 
came not from a combined Russo-Italian attack, which could be held off, but from the other 
Balkan states intervening. For his part, Burian continued to consider Rumanian 
intervention against Rumania’s own short-term interests and long-term security, and hoped 
the Rumanian leaders would not make the “ruinous” choice of fighting Austria-Hungary.632
Over the ensuing months prior to Bulgaria joining the Central Powers, the 
traditional sources of pressure (AOK, the Germans, Tisza, and even MdA officials) went 
into overdrive to influence Burian’s foreign policymaking towards Rumania. The factor 
which had so far wielded only marginal political influence, while it concentrated on 
averting military disaster, was the AOK. Conrad and Friedrich now recommended that the 
diplomats pursue all available avenues to secure Rumanian neutrality -  including by 
offering Austro-Hungarian territory -  but were overruled by Burian. Backed by Tisza, the 
Foreign Minister argued that such an offer would simply evoke the impression of 
“wretched weakness” and “virtually invite” a Rumanian attack.633 Following the Italian 
declaration of war and the realization that any additional opponent would mean almost 
certain disaster, Conrad began pushing harder for an MdA policy which would “purchase”
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Rumanian neutrality.634 Even after the victories in Galicia in June 1915, Conrad continued 
to believe that Rumanian intervention had to be “prevented at all costs,” for if it took place 
it would mean the “war would be lost” for Austria-Hungary.635 Even Rumanian neutrality, 
he argued, would “paralyze” all Austro-Hungarian successes and would mean the 
Monarchy’s defeat.636 His frantic requests, if turned down, would reinforce his belief that 
the Hungarians were intransigent and selfish, thinking only of their own interests rather 
than the Monarchy as a whole.
Burian rejected this, along with most of the AOK’s other suggestions.637 Just as 
Conrad’s ideas were rejected, so too the diplomats were prevented from dictating military 
policy, for the general’s hand was strengthened by the victories during the Gorlice-Tamow 
Offensive. He therefore rejected a Tisza-Burian plan for a military demonstration to obtain 
munitions transport rights to Turkey, on the basis that as long as troops were needed in 
Russia he did not have the men available to concentrate on the Rumanian border.638 
Although the Russians had been driven from most of Galicia and Congress Poland with 
heavy losses, Conrad insisted that there had not yet been a “decisive, general defeat” of the 
Russian empire, rendering the use of troops for diplomatic efforts currently unfeasible.639 
Besides, Conrad pointed out, conflicting Entente interests, specifically in Albania, had 
helped Austria-Hungary hold out against Italy.640 Any attempt to bluff the use of force, 
warned the general, could very well bring on yet another armed conflict. Conrad 
nevertheless still perceived Rumanian help as “vital,” as it would provide enough military 
force to hold Russia back while Austria-Hungary pursued the “total defeat” of its “second 
most dangerous opponent,” Italy.641 Conrad’s concerns and the need to defuse the 
Rumanian time bomb continued well into the autumn, even as Bulgaria’s assistance became 
more and more likely. He stated to Burian on 4 September, 20 September, and 14 October 
that even with Bulgarian help, should Rumania attack, the Monarchy would be unable to 
resist.642 The AOK did not have even nearly adequate forces available,643 given the
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imminent attack upon Serbia. Burian, however, dismissed these concerns, for he banked 
entirely on Bulgaria and had given up pursuing Rumania.
Throughout 1915, the AOK perceived Rumania as an existential threat and wanted 
the MdA to use any diplomatic means -  including cession of Austro-Hungarian territory -  
to prevent its military hostility. Conrad's approach towards Rumania was less dogmatic 
and self-confident than Burian’s, for even when Austria-Hungary was winning on the 
Russian and Italian fronts Conrad urged concessions and resisted attempts to siphon off 
forces to threaten against Rumania. He therefore had no choice but to leave the task of 
ensuring Rumania’s continued neutrality squarely with the MdA. Although he was more 
successful than the Germans in putting forward his ideas, the AOK and MdA were blocking 
each other’s policies at every turn.
Conrad’s limited influence over Burian’s Rumania policy was mirrored in the 
German case. Given the number of suggestions and constant communication over the 
course of 1915, the German AA and OHL certainly attempted to exercise significant 
influence on the MdA policy of keeping Rumania neutral. This was because the 
declaration of war by Italy sparked intense anxiety in Berlin. With Turkey and Austria- 
Hungary under so much pressure, the Germans wanted to find a way to prevent Rumania 
from being the ‘last straw'.’ Jagow and the Turks both requested Burian to secure 
Rumania’s neutrality through “concessions in Transylvania.*’644 Although he assured 
Jagow that he was doing everything he could to win over Rumania or at least ensure its 
neutrality, Burian was irritated by the suggestion.645 Seeing no way of influencing Burian 
over Transylvania, Jagow became desperate and even suggested issuing an ultimatum to 
Rumania to allow munitions transit to supply Turkey.646 Since this was the pretext 
Rumania could have been waiting for, C/ernin cautioned that it certainly would mean 
war.647
During the Pless talks which followed, the Germans wisely dropped the 
Transylvania and ultimatum ideas, and Bethmann Hollvveg did not repeat his suggestion at 
feschen for direct concessions to Rumania (as a result of the failure of these efforts 
regarding Italy). He did, however, suggest that Austria-Hungary' describe the benefits of
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cooperation to Rumania.648 Burian nevertheless repeated that offering significant Austro- 
Hungarian territory would be a mistake, as this would both seem “derisory” compared to 
what the Entente was offering, and would demonstrate Austria-Hungary’s weakness. To 
offer Rumania territory would be tantamount to admitting that Austria-Hungary 
“considered itself beaten without Rumanian help” (which strictly speaking was actually 
close to how the AOK perceived the military situation). Still, prestige required firmness 
and a “brusque language,” and that Rumania be offered “economic benefits” for 
cooperation, in addition to small territorial gains.649
The Foreign Minister stated in no uncertain terms that, follow ing the Italian debacle, 
Austria-Hungary was finished with offering territory' for mere neutrality. But should 
Rumania make a proposal as the price for its military help, Vienna would consider i t650 
Although Jagow grudgingly accepted tins approach, he would have preferred to make 
recommendations to Rumania first. In fact, the chasm between Burian and Jagow was 
enormous, for Jagow wanted Austria-Hungary to make new offers to Rumania after the 
“next few days”, while Burian was banking on the Bulgarian-Ottoman agreement as a more 
effective deterrence and effectively had little to offer Rumania.
Although the diplomats dominated the conversation at Pless, the generals attempted 
to narrow the focus. Falkenhayn stated that the Italian negotiations had failed because 
Rome believed the territorial concessions were inadequate and also because post-war 
benefits were not assured. Hence Falkenhayn recommended that current and future 
economic and military safeguards be offered to Rumania against die Russians, and that this 
could be the first step in the formation of a “new Balkan League” on the side of the Central 
Powers. The diplomats, however, rejected this idea out o f hand, since in their opinion 
economic concessions could never match territorial demands and because post-war 
alliances were not at the top of the agenda in neutral capitals.651
At the end of the conference, Bethmann Hollweg wanted to ensure that the 
Bukowina offer was still on the table, which it was 652 In German thinking, Bukowina 
would be lost anyway if Rumania attacked, whereas it could either be nudged into action by 
this concession or, if it remained neutral, would help protect Austria-Hungary’s right flank.
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But Burian countered that only the autonomy of Transylvania could possibly satisfy the 
Rumanians.653
Frustrated by Burian’s continued intransigence, the Germans had Wilhelm write to 
Franz Joseph to highlight that “all necessary measures” were needed to be taken to save 
Constantinople by means of a munitions transfer. A defeat there, Wilhelm argued, would 
lead to a “loss of the entire Balkans,” which would make a beneficial peace impossible to 
achieve.654 Bethmann Hollweg reinforced this when he and Jagow visited Vienna on 25 
June 1915, giving the munitions issue priority over Rumanian neutrality.655 Whereas 
previously they wanted to achieve Rumanian assistance “at all costs,” now the Germans 
stated that they “placed no value” on Rumania’s help and even that they did not “even 
particularly desire it.”656 This policy was probably just a response to the Rumanian and 
Austrian intransigence. Berlin now considered the Turkish question pivotal in this war -  as 
the fall of Constantinople would mean a “catastrophe” and “defeat” for the Central 
Powers657 -  which was why munitions transports to Constantinople would be the only way 
to prevent the Balkan neutrals from joining the Entente. While they continued to ask for 
Austro-Hungarian territorial concessions to achieve this, Burian stubbornly insisted that he 
wanted a comprehensive package of assistance for territorial concessions. This was at odds 
with the Germans’ position, which preferred to ensnare Rumania into compromising its
a
neutrality in favor of the Central Powers. Either way, Burian was unwilling to offer the 
“disproportionate” sacrifice of territorial cession in exchange for the “minute” benefit of 
munitions transport, as this would unacceptably damage the Monarchy’s prestige.659 
Burian wrote to Czemin the same day as the visit by the Germans, instructing him to hint at 
a timeframe of a month, after which Rumanian cooperation would neither be desired nor 
rewarded.660
The Germans eventually acquiesced in Burian’s policy of only offering territory if 
Rumania intervened. Burian was clearly less pessimistic about Rumania than the Germans 
were, and correctly anticipated rejection from Bucharest of any moderate suggestion.661 1 le *4579
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did not accept Bethmann Hollweg’s bleak “far reaching predictions”662 of an impending 
defeat in the Balkans. Burian claimed Austria-Hungary had made extensive offers to 
Rumania and that it was the latter’s obstruction, rather than reticence on Vienna’s part, 
which was preventing assistance being sent to Turkey.663 After Rumania’s rejection of the 
request for munitions transport on 29 June,664 Austria-Hungary began a covert operation to 
smuggle munitions contraband through Rumania.665
Burian had to walk a fine line between helping the Germans assist Turkey and not 
pushing Rumania even further from the Central Powers. Vienna was unwilling to cede 
Hungarian territory to Rumania,666 while the Germans continued to engage in wishful 
thinking that Rumania would come round. By autumn 1915, German pressure for 
concessions to Rumania eased, due to Burian’s intransigence and the hope of a Bulgarian 
alliance. The extent of German pressure during 1915 and the corresponding resistance by 
Burian had been remarkable. The Foreign Minister successfully parried German requests 
to offer the Rumanians Transylvania, an ultimatum, land-for-neutrality, land-for-munitions, 
and even post-war guarantees. Since all these concessions were contrary to securing 
Austria-Hungary’s prestige in the Balkans and national integrity, Burian worked hard to 
resist or redirect the pressure. He successfully argued against each German idea, causing 
exasperation in Berlin and effectively ending any hope of bringing Rumania on board, or 
even definitively securing its neutrality. The Germans realized that sacrificing Austro- 
Hungarian interests, war aims, or territory would never be accepted in Vienna, and that 
Burian had given up hope of active Rumanian assistance.
The person who undoubtedly had the most influence on setting MdA war aims and 
influencing Burian’s Rumanian policy was Tisza. As a fellow Hungarian, Burian was as 
concerned as Tisza about the impact of Rumanian belligerence on the Hungarian state and 
the Monarchy as a whole. This did not mean, however, that the two men saw eye-to-eye on 
every point, and their disagreements demonstrated that it was Burian, rather than Tisza, 
who retained control of the foreign policymaking process. This represented a change from 
the situation under Berchlold; though Burian was closer to Tisza than Berchtold, he acted
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far more independently than his predecessor. Even on an issue as touchy as Rumania, 
Burian supported the Hungarian Premier only when he agreed with the recommendation 
from an MdA perspective as well.
Initially, the two men’s policies seemed well aligned. Tisza and Burian felt that the 
best hope lay in maintaining Rumania’s neutrality' through a “determined defense against 
Italy.”667 Since he knew that the Monarchy was unable to defend its Hungarian border 
against Rumania, Tisza attempted to bluff and intimidate Rumania. On 21 May he wanted 
Czemin to give the Rumanians the impression that the Dual Entente still had units 
available.668 Shortly after the Italian declaration of war, Tisza informed Burian that he 
supported the Foreign Minister’s plan to offer Rumania territorial concessions if Bucharest 
entered on Austria-Hungary’s side.669 By 25 May Tisza and Burian had further agreed to 
Find out the terms under which Rumania would be prepared to take up arms alongside 
Austria-Hungary.670 The fact that the Rumanians were getting dangerous w'as demonstrated 
by Tisza’s attempts to set up a rudimentary defensive position in Transylvania of up to 
80,000 men armed with modem weapons and artillery to act as a deterrent to Bucharest’s 
intentions.671
Before Bucharest could state its terms, however, Tisza clarified what was not on 
offer. He was unwilling to consider territorial sacrifices for anything other than Rumanian 
entry into war. Furthermore, negotiating over Transylvania, where one million Magyars 
lived, was out of the question, for it would represent a “geographic and strategic 
amputation” of the Monarchy, that would be fatal to its “role as a Great Power in the 
Orient.” 672 Tisza also silenced Czemin’s musings over the Banat, for its loss would also 
lead to a “destruction” of Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status,673 given its position near 
the Iron Gate. Indeed, for Tisza, the loss of the Banat w'ould be commensurate with the loss 
of the much larger Transylvania. On 10 June Burian ruled out Bratiano’s request for the 
Banat, for it represented a “naturally formed mountain bulw ark” o f the Monarchy.674 The 
Hungarian Premier also rejected Rumanian claims to the Banat, with the backing of
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Stiirgkh and the Germans, who had so far pushed hard for a compromise with Rumania.675 
Tisza instructed Czemin to treat any Rumanian claims in the Banat as “laughable 
nonsense.”676 *
Tisza would only consider concessions in Bukowina, and even here he was 
prepared to part only with five Rumanian-majority districts, in an offer that was as limited
A7Ras the Isonzo offer had been to Italy. Burian confirmed this foreign policy direction. 
This exchange demonstrated two things. First, it showed that Austria-Hungary refused to 
barter despite the threat to its own survival because its war aims centered on securing its 
own Balkan territory rather than achieving territorial conquest elsewhere. Second, it 
showed that, after Burian, Tisza was in the driver’s seat regarding the Monarchy’s foreign 
policy aims relating to Rumania, and was therefore able to deflect attention away from the 
Iron Gate and the Hungarian Banat and towards Bukowina, which was Austrian territory. 
Tisza was happy to discuss foreign territorial compensation for Rumania (such as in 
Bessarabia), but as far as Austro-Hungarian territory was concerned only the Austrian 
Bukowina was on offer.
Holding on to vital strategic Hungarian territory in the Banat and Transylvania in 
exchange for recently acquired Austrian territory in the Bukowina was Tisza’s preferred 
policy, with Burian interestingly being even more hesitant about ceding the Monarchy’s 
territory than the Hungarian Premier. Tisza on 12 June admitted as much, telling Czemin 
that although he considered Rumanian demands for any Hungarian territory a “full-fledged 
absurdity,” he had taken great pains to convince Burian to agree to a Bukowina cession, 
since the Foreign Minister “less easily agreed to sacrifices” than did Tisza.679 Czemin was 
in a difficult spot, having to follow Burian’s instructions to obtain a list of claims from 
Bucharest680 but being subject to Tisza’s constant interference as it involved Hungarian 
questions, which would soon come to a head w ith the MdA.
Tisza’s talks in Berlin on 17 June proved that he was indeed willing to go further 
than Buridn in his concessions, and how desperate the Germans were to achieve Turkish 
munitions transfer. Since the Germans believed this would be the last chance to obtain 
Rumanian benevolent neutrality, they came to an agreement with Tisza which would
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benefit Austria-Hungary as well, and was in line with Burian’s hesitant policy. In exchange 
for three districts in the Austrian Bukowina and German money, if  the Rumanian 
government chose to side with the Central Powers, the Germans would offer Austria- 
Hungary compensation in the Sosnowiec coalfields, an offer they had made for the Trentino 
as well during the Italian discussions.681 Tisza was acting as a mediator between the 
German plans and Burian’s intransigence, and saw himself as the decisive voice of reason. 
Unfortunately for Tisza and the Germans, Burian had serious reservations about the 
suggested policy Tisza had brought back from Berlin.682 Angered by the Germans’ 
discussions with Tisza, who was not authorized to but gladly conducted substantive foreign 
policy negotiations,683 Burian stood up to his mentor. The Foreign Minister had serious 
concerns about Tisza’s plan, as he was fundamentally against offering territory in exchange 
for Rumanian help, whereas Tisza was prepared to give Austrian though not Hungarian 
territory for it.684 This difference needed to be ironed out First of all, Tisza insisted that 
he had authority to speak on foreign policy matters.68S Burian responded unequivocally 
that while the Hungarian and Austrian Premiers helped to formulate the Monarchy’s 
foreign policy, its “technical treatment and execution” was the MdAY domain.686 Tisza 
argued that these three elements were “codetermining factors,” and that division was 
impossible. The Germans were also angry because they considered Tisza’s conversations 
with them authoritative, while Burian could do no more than accept the results of the Berlin 
talks as an “important recommendation.”687
Tisza never held any serious hope dial the German suggestions would work, and 
indeed believed that further insistence on the munitions issue would only ruin everything, 
because Bucharest would either retrench or expand its demands beyond Bukowina.688 His 
anger at Rumanian intransigence led him down an even more aggressive path than 
Previously. Rebuffed by Burian, the Hungarian Premier was now contemplating a 
“military-supported diplomatic step” in Bucharest should the Dardanelles fall and Rumania 
be tempted to join the Entente. Tisza wanted Rumania to “decide” whether it wanted 
Austria-Hungary as an ally or an enemy, and in the former case remain a “cornerstone” of
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the Monarchy’s Balkan policy.”689 The recapture of Przemysl and Lemberg and the 
victorious battles against the Russians strengthened Vienna’s position and it was this 
situation which Tisza wanted to exploit. He was no longer willing to tolerate Rumania’s 
ambiguous attitude. Essentially, Tisza admitted that this would be a “threat,” which 
Rumania could yield to without losing face as it would all be done in private. If the 
Monarchy were capable of pulling together 200-300,000 troops, a Rumanian rejection 
would result in a swift invasion which would interrupt their mobilization and lead to a 
“swift and complete military success.”690
This proves that Austria-Hungary was threatened enough by Rumania that, if the 
troops could be found, a pre-emptive strike or a Serbian-style ultimatum was certainly not 
out of the question. Tisza believed that, in all likelihood, the Rumanians would accept the 
ultimatum -  a “9/10 chance” -  and hoped no war would result.691 Even if war did come, 
Tisza had had enough of waiting for a decision and hoped that a successful invasion of 
Rumania would lead to Bulgaria’s joining as w ell. Why was Tisza willing to take this risk? 
Because he understood that a defeat in Turkey meant defeat in the Balkans coupled with an 
end to Austro-Hungarian influence there. To end up in a war with Rumania now and 
worsen Austria-Hungary’s already poor military situation, therefore, was according to Tisza 
a “lesser evil” than seeing the Straits fall. Advancing on the south-west front, a prestige 
goal of Conrad’s, was far less important than “deciding in Austria-Hungary’s favor the 
entire Balkan situation.”692
The Hungarian Premier had now backed the Germans in their fears about Turkey, 
but went to the other extreme. And so began Burian’s more aggressive approach as he 
expanded his own ultimatum option, stemming from the support he received from 
Budapest. On 1 July Burian wanted to know where the Germans stood on his troop 
concentration suggestion he had discussed with Bethmann Hollweg,695 while at the same 
time he pressed a distracted Conrad for a harder stance vis-à-vis Rumania, The AOK 
confirmed Tisza’s belief that Rumania was still unprepared to strike against Austria- 
Hungary, in part due to the successes in Galicia which had so galvanized the Hungarian
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Premier.694 But this was not enough to bring the army on board with the ultimatum-or- 
invasion plan. Conrad on 4 July rejected the idea of offering the entire Bukowina to 
Rumania simply for munitions transport and, more importantly, considered 
“unthinkable” any plans the MdA was hatching with Hungarian backing to issue an 
ultimatum to Bucharest. Burian confirmed that Austria-Hungary would only offer part of 
the Bukowina for active cooperation by Rumania, and distanced himself from the 
ultimatum idea which he was in reality considering with Tisza. Instead, Burian framed the 
issue as a possible troop concentration of 150-200,000 men on the border, simply to make 
an impression in Rumania.696 On the same day, however, he informed Czemin that he was 
still considering an ultimatum, but that this depended on whether adequate troops could be 
pulled together.697 Burian was watering down Tisza’s aggressive ultimatum approach, 
while, on the other hand, he was denying to Conrad that he needed troops to issue an 
ultimatum to Rumania. Burian’s tactic was designed to obtain troops from Conrad and 
keep Tisza on board, though his intended outcome was likely merely to be a 
‘demonstration’ on the Rumanian border designed to make the Rumanians cautions.
A decision on the matter took a week to arrive, demonstrating the limited military 
support the AOK currently could offer in the eastern Balkans. On 10 July Buridn again 
requested Conrad to “consider” the troop concentration plan and elaborated on the scheme. 
According to Burian, a friendly request, coupled with the troop positions, would perhaps 
entice the Rumanians to come around. Burian told Conrad that this would hopefully 
result in an agreement to allow Turkish munitions through the country' w ithout the need for 
territorial sacrifices which the AOK, MdA, and Tisza so vehemently opposed. Tisza sent a 
message to Conrad with a recommendation of his own, dated 11 July, showing the growing 
differences between Tisza and Burian on the Rumanian question. Whereas Burian wanted 
to get a Rumanian right of passage agreement through a troop demonstration, Tisza for the 
first time suggested his more aggressive plan to Conrad, possibly because he identified 
Burian’s moderated approach and wanted to nip it in the bud. Tisza repeated his estimation 
that there was “at least a 9/10 chance” that a peaceful agreement would be reached with 
Rumania if his more aggressive approach were taken, freeing the troops up for use against *
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France or Italy.699 Even if Rumania did not fold, the benefits of a war with Rumania which 
would secure the Dardanelles, solve the Balkan situation in Austria-Hungary’s favor, and 
lead to the possibility of an “decent peace” were all more important to Tisza than a 
reinforcement of the western and southwestern fronts.700 This proposal, and Tisza’s 
unusually strong independent foreign policy and military recommendation, stemmed from 
the “main question” of w hether the Monarchy’s leaders wanted to save the Dardanelles and 
control the Balkans, or relinquish these two war aims. Tisza truly believed that this action 
could be the “decisive turning point” of the war.701
Conrad’s response to Tisza’s idea, which Burian was obliged to forward, was a 
polite but clear rejection. As long as Russia was not beaten, the AOK did not have “a 
single man” available for the move which Tisza had in mind. Although he would normally 
have sided with Tisza in such an aggressive approach, Conrad did not see a need to 
jeopardize the relatively good position in Russia for a questionable outcome in Rumania. 
Only after Austria-Hungary had used “all of its strength” against Russia could the AOK 
discuss future operations, such as against Rumania, Serbia, or Italy.702 Although he 
realized that the Russian front took precedence, Tisza responded that the Rumanian 
problem was second to it.703 Tisza told Czemin privately that he believed this step to be 
necessary to lay the foundation for a “successful, long-term Balkan policy” without 
territorial sacrifices.704
Faced with Conrad’s lack of interest and Burian’s self-confidence, Tisza needed to 
work hard to get his way, He warned Burian on 29 July that although currently tilings 
looked positive on the battlefields, Austria-Hungary needed to set the preconditions for 
peace before exhaustion overtook it.705 To do so, Tisza insisted that Rumania not be 
dropped, for its help would guarantee the Straits, decide the Bulgarian stance, and solve the 
Balkan situation. With no options left, Tisza therefore petitioned Burian to extend the 
Bukowina offer.706 Although Burian identified with Tisza's aims, he disagreed with the 
Proposed methods. Burian did not believe that extending the offer would yield success, for *
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7 f t 7it was “German pigheadedness,” rather than Rumanian requests, which resulted in the 
Bukowina offer. Extending it would not satisfy Bucharest, and only lead to a fatal decline 
in Austria-Hungary’s standing as a Great Power and remove Austria-Ilungary’s 
inviolability. With his characteristic ‘hard line’ showing through, Burian hinted that the 
new policy would be to make foreign and military policy irrespective of Rumanian 
interests, and that if Rumania did not act to secure Bessarabia for itself it would “sink into 
insignificance”70 08 in the Balkans, which would be an equally good result for Vienna.
With the Bulgarian option now taking precedence in Vienna and Berlin, Tisza was 
the only leader still understandably focused on the Rumanian problem.709 Having been 
unable to get his way, the Hungarian Premier blamed the Germans for their 
counterproductive influence in Bucharest, using their role as benefactor against the 
Hungarian “oppressor” without realizing the dangers this caused for both of the Central 
Powers.710
Tisza’s recommendations had been even more plentiful than the Germans’. He had 
suggested Austria-Hungary employ a bluff, offer land-for-alliance, issue an ultimatum, 
make a military demonstration, and even launch a surprise attack on Rumania. Despite his 
influence with Burian, the Foreign Minister was by no means his puppet as some authors 
have suggested,711 Burian rebuffed Tisza on nearly every point, or deferred to Conrad to 
reject the Premier’s military proposals. Agreement was only reached when their interests 
coincided, such as regarding Tisza’s unyielding resistance to even discussing Transylvanian 
or Banat cession with Rumania. Both men were adamant about retaining Austria- 
Hungary’s Great Power status and prestige, although Tisza actually proved more creative 
and flexible than Buriin, provided Hungarian territory was not on offer. Tisza attempted to 
conduct an independent foreign policy as under Berchtold, but Burian felt undermined and 
began a turf war to control his department. What Tisza’s suggestions to Burian and the 
Foreign Minister’s reactions demonstrate is that the MdA was the decisive, final voice in 
setting Austro-Hungarian foreign policy towards Rumania.
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The previous paragraphs demonstrated the limited power the AOK, AA, OHL, and 
even his mentor Tisza had on Burian’s foreign policy making and the setting of offensive 
war aims. Their role helps us understand the weakening Central Power position on the one 
hand, and the effect of Austria-Hungary’s prestige and Great Power self-confidence in 
limiting room for negotiation on the other. Ultimately, it was Burian’s consistent refusal to 
sacrifice either Hungarian interests or Austro-Hungarian prestige to obtain Rumania’s 
assistance or secure its neutrality that was the decisive factor. In drawing a line in the sand 
which the various bodies wanted to move in their favor, Burian set conditions beyond 
which the Monarchy would not negotiate. This final section will demonstrate that only 
offers Buri&n agreed with were made to Rumania in 1915, that his actions had a very 
limited chance of success due to the limitations he himself placed on the policies, and 
finally that his stance hardened over the course of the year. Burian, and no one else, would 
set MdA war aims, including the extent to which negative war aims such as Rumania’s 
neutrality, should be pursued.
As war with Italy loomed, Burian agreed w ith Tisza that a Rumanian intervention 
on behalf of the Monarchy, as Archduke Friedrich had been advocating, was “almost 
excluded,”712 and that achieving Rumania’s continued neutrality would also be difficult.713 
This perspective severely limited his options. Unlike in the Bulgarian case, where 
Bulgarian expansion did not affect the Monarchy’s integrity, the fact that so many ethnic 
Rumanians lived in Austria-Hungary meant that it could not compete with Entente offers. 
The Monarchy was unwilling to offer the vast territories Bucharest would have liked, and 
Burian resisted offering any new, small territorial concessions because these would be 
interpreted as signs of weakness.714 Following the German assurances, Burian hoped that 
Rumania would postpone its attack and that the Monarchy’s best hope lay in maintaining 
Rumania’s neutrality through a “determined defense against Italy.”715
Unlike with Italy, Burian remained steadfast with regard to Rumania, and warned 
Bucharest that action against Austria-Hungary would be against its national interests. In a 
world where Rumania joined the Entente and seized territory' at the cost o f the Monarchy, 
Russia would hardly accept a laterally placed Rumania that blocked its land route to the 
Straits and gained a “dominant position” in Bulgaria from where it could exercise its
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“decisive predominance” vis-à-vis the Slavic Balkan states. The Foreign Minister argued 
that the defeat of Russia was necessary for Rumania’s survival, while aiding St. Petersburg 
in its victory would be tantamount to “suicide.”716 What they Central Powers did not
717realize, however, is how far the Entente conversations had progressed.
At the same time as drawing Rumania’s attention to a dangerous Russia, Burian 
rejected Czemin’s request for offers in exchange for mere neutrality, and wanted Rumanian 
neutrality treated as a given. He did not want to lose prestige by turning to Rumania with 
an offer laced with fear.718 Buriàn’s main goal remained obtaining Rumanian armed 
assistance, to be paid with the offer o f Rumanian-inhabited Russian territory in Bessarabia. 
Despite both blocs’ interests in obtaining Rumanian assistance to “win the war more 
quickly,” it did not occur to mighty Russia to offer its own territory.719 The reason, Burian 
thought, was the same as for Austria-Hungary’s own intransigence, namely that such an 
offer would be tantamount to Russia’s “realization o f its distress.” Burian therefore 
withdrew the previous offer in the Bukowina.720
The Italian declaration o f war brought about a new, much harder thinking in Vienna 
with regard to Bucharest. Although Buriàn’s hard line vis-à-vis Italy failed, he pursued 
some of the same tactics with Rumania in the hope that this smaller and weaker state would 
succumb. Although still open to talks with Rumania, Burian wanted Bucharest to look to 
Russia for expansion, not the Monarchy. He still wavered as to whether to invite Rumanian 
requests or not; copies of the same instructions to Czemin differ on whether, if Rumania 
found the Bessarabia offer “insufficient,” it should “state its wishes.”721 In the end, he 
agreed with Tisza and invited offers from Rumania.722 Upon his return from Pless and after 
discussing matters with Tisza, Burian asked what it would cost to obtain Rumanian 
assistance.723 Burian was not expecting to receive an answer, and most likely acted on this 
one request by Tisza and the Germans to avoid rejecting every one of their suggestions. 
Still, Burian was not as optimistic as Tisza, as the offer of Bessarabia was already on the *730
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table and Bukowina could also be added once the war was won. His writing style indicates 
that he did not believe that an agreement could be reached, for if Rumania refused to accept 
right away then it would simply issue supplementary demands, which the Monarchy could
724not accept.
Faced with Rumanian intransigence, Burian’s offers were scaled back, and his 
position further hardened. On 27 May Czemin pointed out that discussions with Rumania 
which involved potential territorial sacrifices were only useful if the overall military 
chances of the Monarchy were “advantageous.”* 725 Although the Dardanelles were holding, 
Italy did not yet have any victories, and the Austro-Hungarians were advancing in Russia, 
according to Czemin a lot more would have to be given to Rumania than what Burian had 
so far been offering. Czemin did not expect the limited offers to work, and instead was just 
trying to buy time for the Monarchy.726 He continued to reject any Rumanian requests to 
receive Bukowina and would give nothing for Rumania’s neutrality alone.727 Although 
Czemin considered the talks stalled, Burian still hoped that, in exchange for Bukowina, 
Rumania would issue a declaration of war against Russia within a fortnight,728 *but even he 
knew this was a far-fetched prospect. By 30 May Burian had dropped the idea o f partial 
concessions and looked for a means to secure Rumanian neutrality without making 
territorial or other sacrifices. However, the Foreign Minister did not reject out of hand 
the idea of concessions in exchange for a full alliance with Rumania; he simply did not 
want to make any more offers of his own for fear of appearing weak.730
After rejecting a wide range of suggestions from all parties, Buri&n merely pursued 
two with which he agreed, namely Bessarabia-for-neutrality and Bukovvina-for-alliance 
with Rumania. Although neither was likely to satisfy Bucharest, Burian refused to go any 
further as he navigated between the various contending ideas of the Germans, the AOK, 
and the Hungarians. In the end, Burian’s actions were meant to pacify the various parties, 
secure the MdA’s policy position towards Rumania, and play for time. This did not sit well 
with anyone, and even led to a rift within his own bureaucracy. According to Szilassy, a 
war with Austria-Hungary’s “step-child” Rumania was to be avoided for “psychologicaf-
714 ¡bid
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political” reasons.731 * This was because an Austro-Rumanian war, even if the AOK 
achieved victory, could not be prosecuted without German assistance. This pivotal German 
role would then make Austria-Hungary an “âme damnée forever” and Vienna would also 
lose one of its principal war aims, which was to remain dominant in “its own backyard.” 
For this reason, argued Szilâssy to Buriân, a war with Rumania had to be “avoided at all 
costs,” by way of widespread concessions or a separate peace with Russia.733
As Entente offers to Rumania expanded,734 *so did the pressure on the MdÂ to find a 
solution. On the one hand, Buriân knew full well that in the current situation Rumanian 
assistance to Austria-Hungary seemed “unattainable,” but on the other hand any 
discussions of territory beyond the Bukowina remained “impossible,”736 even if this was for 
the “high value”737 of purchasing Rumanian neutrality. The Foreign Minister therefore 
employed a dilatory, middle-way approach, engaging the Rumanians in discussions of 
military assistance but trying to avoid requests for further Hungarian territory which the 
Monarchy would be forced to reject.738 * Buriân believed he still had time to play this game 
with Rumania. The Foreign Minister also firmly believed that a strong Rumania was not in 
the interest of Russia, as this would separate it from the Balkans and Constantinople. For 
these reasons, Buriân could play a dangerous game and insist on his policy of not offering 
Rumania anything more than the Bukowina for its assistance.740
Due to the lack of movement, however, the Bukowina offer fell by the wayside. The 
advances against Russia kept morale high in Vienna,741 while Rumania’s intransigence 
meant that another way had to be found. Economic incentives were tried but failed as 
well.742 Whereas later the hunger issue would require Austria-Hungary' to extract grain 
from wherever it could, in late 1915 the monetary sacrifices entailed in purchasing 
Rumanian grain served mainly to achieve influence in a country deemed vital for achieving
731
732
733
734
735
7 3 6
73 7  
71 »  
71 9
74 0
741
74 2
Szilassy-Buriân, 31-May-I915, HIISlA-PA-1-519.
Ibid
Ibid
Buriân-Czemin, 2-Jun-1915, REZL-45/13; also Buridn-Czemm, 4-Jun-1915, REZL-45/I3.
Burian-Czemin, 7-Jun-19l5, REZL-45/13.
Buridn-Czemin, 7-Jun-1915, HHStA-PA-I-518.
Buridn-Czernin, 7-Jun-19l5, REZL-45/13.
Buridn-Czemin, 7-Jun-19IS, HHStA-PA-I-518,
Buridn-Czernin, 10-Jun-19l5, REZL-45/13.
Buridn-Czemin, 25-Jun-1915, REZL-45/13.
Buridn-llohenlohe, 2-Aug-1915, UHStA-PA-1-519.
Ibid.
173
the Monarchy’s Balkan war aims. One of these aims was the Negotin circle.743 Czernin 
had been authorized before, on 3 December 1914, to assure Bucharest that the Negotin was 
not to be sealed off from Rumanian trade. If pressed on the issue again, Czernin was to 
simply state that Rumanian intransigence regarding the munitions issue was the reason for a 
potential destruction of Serbia.744 By not actually addressing the Negotin question, Buriàn 
revealed that Negotin had become a clear Austro-Hungarian war aim, and Rumania had 
only itself to blame for an Austro-Hungarian occupation of such a vital approach to the Iron 
Gate. The Germans agreed with Buriàn’s approach to the Negotin issue, stating that it 
would be “completely inappropriate” to give Rumania any kind of assurances745 at a time 
when the fronts were going well and Rumania had rejected so many Central Power 
advances.
By September 1915, with nothing achieved in the lengthy negotiations, both the 
Rumanians and Austro-Hungarians were now extremely suspicious of each other. 
According to Austro-Hungarian military sources in Bucharest, it was now an “open secret” 
that the Rumanians were siding with the Entente.746 Apart from a growing agitation, fear 
over Negotin and Austria-Hungary “cutting o ff’ Rumania from the Adriatic Sea747 proved a 
potent combination to stir up public and official opinion. Yet the MdA’s hard stance 
seemed to have paid off, unlike vis-à-vis Italy. By September, Rumania’s stance did not 
gravely concern Buriàn,748 and he did not intend to accommodate Bucharest in any way. 
The Bulgarian agreement and impending attack on Serbia meant that Buriàn, who had no 
designs on Salonika itself, could still prevent Bucharest from moving southwards, and 
therefore bottle Rumania up in the north-east Balkans was a means of applying pressure. 
Even though Buriàn understood that the Rumanian population was resolutely against 
Austria-Hungary, he did not believe that they would join the Entente while these positive 
developments continued for the Central Powers.749
Yet so bad were relations that Buriàn felt compelled to state to Bucharest that the 
Monarchy had “certainly no intention to attack Rumania.”750 Buriàn asked the AOK to 
avoid giving Rumania any “reason or pretext” to be provoked by Austria-Hungary.
743 Leslie, Ausiria-ffungary's Eastern War Aims, 223.
744 Buriàn-Czcmin/Hohenlohe, 30-Aug-1915, REZL-43/13.
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Whether it was a matter of Rumanian troop movements,751 *754Rumanian press campaigns 
against the Monarchy, or the harassment of Austro-Hungarian rail workers, Burian did not 
want the AOK to protest without going through the MdA. ‘ Such matters had to be 
handled delicately and through diplomatic channels, or else a misunderstanding could 
easily lead to conflict and threaten Austria-Hungary’s current goals of keeping Rumania at 
bay while subjugating Serbia.
Even in the face of these suspicions, Austria-Hungary kept the general offer of 
cooperation alive. On 25 September, Czemin was ordered to remind the Rumanians that 
they, like the Monarchy, had the common goal to prevent Russia’s “penetration of 
Mitteleuropa and the Balkans.” Burian pursued here a dual track policy; on the one hand 
he intended to deter Bratiano, while on the other assuring Bucharest that his “door was still 
open.” For the time being, Czemin believed he could keep Rumania neutral.
As a Balkanist, Burian understood Rumanian mentality well. He did not believe 
any of the insufficient offers would have the intended effect, and in attempting them 
Austria-Hungary would lose what little influence its remaining prestige and Great Power 
status still afforded it. The Foreign Minister resisted any and all internal and external 
pressures to offer Rumania what was beyond what he deemed acceptable, demonstrating 
that his MdA was in control of setting the Monarchy’s war aims. Burian placed Austria- 
Hungary’s prestige and Great Power status far above the need to maintain Rumanian 
neutrality or even support, which is why he refused to lower himself to offering the 
concessions Bucharest wanted. He also began to draw lines against Rumania to indicate 
which Austro-Hungarian territory (Banat, Transylvania) and which of the Monarchy’s 
positive war aims (Negotin, Iron Gate approaches) could not be discussed. Austrian 
Bukowina therefore became the only area where Burian would even entertain Rumanian 
wishes, though his price for Rumanian participation in the war was too high.
The Foreign Minister helped prevent Tisza’s more aggressive policies, kept the 
Germans out of having a say, and rejected AOK ideas as well. Burian retained the same 
consistently hard-line and dogmatic policy towards Rumania which had failed against Italy,
7,1 Burian-Thurn, I5-Scp-I9l5, REZL-45/13.
7,: Buridn-Conrad. 12-Sep-1915 at 11.15pm, REZL-4S/t3.
75J Burian-Thurn, 27-Sep-1915, HlIStA-PA-1-1064.
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demonstrating further that the Italian intervention did not fundamentally undermine the 
MdA’s ability to set war aims. In the end, all offers which the MdA did make to Rumania 
were a failure, but it is important to note that this did not mean that the policy itself was a 
failure. Burian did not expect the offers to succeed, and prioritized other Austro-Hungarian 
war aims (both positive and negative ones) above the need to pay Rumania’s high price for 
its assistance.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has analyzed Austro-Hungarian war aims between January and 
September 1915, showing that the new Foreign Minister Burian pursued and expanded a 
similar Balkan-first diplomatic policy to Berchtold, but that his approach was more 
forceful. His dogmatic stance and hard negotiating style towards both allies and neutrals 
was designed to protect the Monarchy’s Great Power status, prestige, and influence in the 
Balkans. Although he could not avert an Italian intervention, the lessons he learned from 
this episode led him to become even less flexible towards Rumania.
Burian’s aims in the western Balkans were designed to prevent Serbian or Italian 
encroachment on the Monarchy’s spheres of interest in Albania and Montenegro. Despite 
having to temporarily shelve his policies following Rome’s intervention, the period helped 
develop MdA war aims to be implemented once Serbia was defeated. In the eastern 
Balkans, Austria-Hungary’s war aims towards Serbia could only be implemented by 
ensuring Russia did not crush the Monarchy and the Turkish ally was not defeated. Since 
long-term victory in Russia were unlikely, dominance in Serbia and the re-establishment of 
prestige in the Balkans was consistently at the forefront of the officials’ thinking. Hence, 
Burian had to prevent hostile intervention by Bulgaria and Rumania. He offered both states 
only very little for mere neutrality, and effectively resisted strong pressure from Tisza, the 
Germans, and the AOK to part with important Austro-Hungarian war aims in order to 
obtain these states’ active assistance, Burian let the Bulgarian alliance be negotiated in 
Berlin without mentioning Negotin and Dobrudja. As for Rumania, despite it being the far 
more dangerous neutral, Burian rejected offering territory or sacrificing his own war aims 
simply to maintain its neutrality.
Burian’s foreign policy in this period demonstrated the four key arguments of the 
thesis. He viewed the Balkans as principal and thus subordinated many other questions -  
such as Turkish survival, Rumanian or Italian intervention, and Bulgarian assistance -  to
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whether or not they would help him achieve his Balkan war aims. He pursued a consistent 
policy here, aimed at protecting the Monarchy’s interests and influence on the peninsula, 
and in so doing, demonstrated the MdA’s dominance in foreign policymaking and defining 
war aims setting, despite enormous pressure from the Germans, Hungarians, and the AOK. 
Finally, despite flirting with the idea o f a Serbian separate peace, Burian's intentions were 
to punish the country and re-establish Austro-Hungarian influence in the Balkans, even at 
the cost of prolonging the war.
17?
CHAPTER 5
October 1915 -  June 1916
INTRODUCTION
With the breakthrough of the Gorlice-Tamow offensive and die Monarchy’s success 
in holding back the Italians on the Isonzo, securing the Balkan front and subduing Serbia 
and Montenegro finally became possible. Achievement of Austro-Hungarian war aims in 
the Balkans hinged on the Central Powers’ ability to defeat Serbia in particular. Yet only 
on 6 September 1915, when the Bulgarian government signed a military agreement 
establishing the Quadruple Alliance, did the necessary forces become available to defeat 
Serbia through a pincer invasion. This moment of triumph, when the Serbs were expelled 
through Albania and the Montenegrins surrendered, was marred by a new and more 
dangerous enemy arriving on the Balkan front. One day prior to the onset of the ultimately 
successful invasion of Serbia on 6 October 1915, Entente forces violated Greek neutrality 
and opened a new front in Salonika, a position which would hold back Austria-Hungary 
and its allies from total Balkan domination even after the landing troops were withdrawn in 
from Gallipoli January 1916. Furthermore, the survival of a portion of the Serbian armed 
forces meant that they would be employed against the Monarchy in the future.
Nevertheless, the Balkan advance was a success, and established a vital territorial 
link between the Central Powers that would last until the end of the war. As Austro- 
Hungarian units marched deeper into the Balkans and divided the occupied Serbian 
territory between themselves and Bulgaria, intense external and internal disagreements 
began. In these circumstances, the Austro-Hungarians were forced by a variety of factors 
to discuss and agree on definitive war aims. These aims w-ere finally set at the GMR on 7 
January 1916, which represents the climax of this chapter and indeed of Austro-Hungarian 
war aims planning under Burian.
The following chapter covering October 1915 to June 1916 is arranged 
chronologically, because Rumania remained out o f the fray while Bulgaria became heavily 
involved in the central and western Balkans. The chapter is divided into eight sections. 
The first four concern themselves with the antecedents of the 7 January 1916 GMR, while 
the last four address the issues left unresolved by that meeting. Section 1 analyzes the 
successful military situation and the impact of the opening of the Salonika front. It argues
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that military successes led to more ambitious aims by all Austro-Hungarian organs, but 
particularly strengthened the AOK’s hand. Although the principal goals (defeat and 
occupation of Serbia and Montenegro) had been met, new problems arose in deciding how 
to deal with these territories. Section IT looks at the territorial disputes with Germany. 
Berlin, with no apparent direct interest in the Balkans, nevertheless used its overarching 
role in the defeat of Serbia to set its own wrar aims agenda. Using its relative 
deswteressement in Serbia as a basis, Germany advanced its Mitteleuropa plans756 and 
territorial aims in Poland which, coupled with Austro-Hungarian resentment against 
German ‘interference,’ resulted in intense discord. Section Hi analyzes the resulting 
Austro-Hungarian internal discussions on territorial war aims prior to the GMR, which is 
then discussed in Section IV. Sections II-IV argue that the Austro-Hungarians clashed 
bitterly with the Germans over their Balkan war aims, and that the occupation o f most of 
the Balkans forced interim decisions to be taken on the future administration of the 
territories.
Following the decisions taken at the GMR, the latter four sections revolve around 
the unresolved Balkan issues, culminating with an Austro-Bulgarian military clash over 
their respective spheres. Section V analyzes the origins of this clash, which lay in the 
unresolved issues surrounding Albania and Montenegro. Section VI examines the failure 
of German mediation attempts and Austria-Hungary’s open clash with Bulgaria in defense 
of its Kosovo interests. Sections V and VI argue that the GMR did not manage to settle the 
outstanding war aims in the Balkans, allowing Bulgaria to seize the initiative and threaten 
the Monarchy’s interests. After resolving (or rather postponing) their differences with 
Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarians returned to their internal debates to set war aims in the 
occupied regions. Section VII investigates Tisza’s battle against the AOK’s annexationism 
towards Serbia, while Section VIII examines Burian’s attempts to prevent AOK 
annexations in Albania and instead establish a protectorate there. Sections VII and VIII 
argue that the AOK’s hand was strengthened by its wartime occupation o f Serbia 
irrespective of GMR policy, meaning that Tisza and Buri&n had to fight much harder than 
before to avert an annexationist line. Ultimately, however, Conrad was unable to overcome 
Tisza’s and Burian’s united front against annexation, demonstrating the MdA’s continued, 
albeit weakened control over the foreign policymaking process.
756 Shanafeli, Secret Enemy, 72.
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This chapter furthers the argument that Buriàn’s foreign policy remained consistent 
and Balkan-centric even in times of victory on the southern front and the resulting pressures 
from within and without. While maintaining overall control of the foreign policy direction 
with backing from the GMR, the MdÀ had to fight hard to ensure that its principal 
objectives in the Balkans were met, its (imagined) external image as a non-aggressor was 
protected, and the Dualist nature o f the Monarchy maintained. With GMR backing for only 
limited annexations in Serbia, Buriàn was able to resist or at least contain strong AOK 
pressure, and used his intransigent approach to foreign policymaking as a means to
fS f
maintain parity with Germany. As this chapter demonstrates, in spite of strong pressure, 
Buriàn pursued an independent, MdÀ-centric, and GMR-backed policy against both the 
internal wishes of the military and the external pressures from Germany and especially 
Bulgaria. Although MdÀ war aims seemed moderate in comparison to the opponents of his 
policy, they represented a program of limited annexation and informal expansion of Balkan 
influence beyond the territories directly controlled by k.u.k, forces. At times, these war 
aims were kept secret from all but the highest echelons, rendering the true nature and extent 
of MdÀ war aims opaque until now.
SECTION I
Bulgaria’s decision to join the Central Powers at a time when Germany could also 
assist changed the alliance’s military fortunes in the Balkans and allowed Austria-Hungary 
to finally meet its objectives. But with Serbia’s defeat came the need to discuss and settle 
the difficult matter of Austria-Hungary’s territorial, political, and economic war aims in the 
peninsula. The AOK, w hich had so far remained somewhat aloof from the question of war 
aims, saw the victorious advance as an opportunity to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis the 
MdÀ. At the beginning, the AOK was relatively moderate, seeking annexations as a means 
of limiting future Italian or Russian influence. To counter the AOK’s growing say and 
avert Berlin’s incessant probing over the war aims issue, Buriàn and Tisza systematically 
hid their policies while formulating their own goals. This section argues that the MdÀ 
expanded its Balkan aspirations as a result o f AOK pressure and the thrill o f victory, but 
also due to its own internal debate. It also argues that the Bulgarians’ and Germans’ say in
Shanafeit refers to a Tisza-Burian-StQrgkh “triumviralc monopolizing power" in Ausiria-I lungary, hut
ignores the strong pressure on foreign policy from the AOK, 58.
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Austro-Hungarian war aims formulation grew commensurately with their involvement in 
the Balkans.
Thanks to the Bulgarian agreement, Vienna hoped that Serbia would be swiftly 
crushed. The MdA portrayed the upcoming attack as a necessity for Austria-Hungary and 
Germany’s “joint prestige.” Tire reality was that this “lesson” to Serbia had to be 
administered for “Austria-Hungary’s prestige,” but which the Monarchy was not strong 
enough to do without German and Bulgarian assistance.758 Yet this was not acknowledged 
by the Austro-Hungarian leadership. The success of Gorlice-Tamow and the imminent fall 
of a Serbia engulfed by a three-pronged pincer movement created widespread optimism in 
Vienna and Budapest. Burian at the October 1915 GMR made plain that the “conquest of 
Poland had not been a war aim,” and although the Central Powers wanted to draw the
•fCQ
territory into their sphere of influence, the Monarchy’s more vital goals lay in the 
Balkans.
With the Central Power offensive imminent, Austria-Hungary rejected out of hand 
any notion of a peace settlement with Serbia.760 With the launching of the north Serbian 
offensive on 6 October and the capture o f Belgrade two days later, an AOK enquiry' 
allowed Tisza to re-table his year-old and rejected recommendation that Hungarian officials 
should administer Serbia, while the Austrians administered Poland. With a new Foreign 
Minister in place who was more likely to support this idea, Tisza emphasized it on the basis 
that it would be more “unified and harmonious” if the “more qualified” Hungarian officials 
were used in Serbia and likewise the better suited Austrians were stationed in Russian 
Poland,761 Tisza’s insistence demonstrated his very tangible desire to exercise Hungarian 
influence over parts of conquered Serbia, over the heads o f the k.u.k. AOK and MdA. 
These efforts would, as the previous year, fail on account of Stbrgkh’s expected resistance.
Yet before the issue of administration could be decided or Serbia was defeated, the 
Central Powers were faced with an unexpected Entente landing in Salonika on 5 October, 
throwing another obstacle in the way of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan dreams. Such a flagrant 
violation of Greece’s neutrality could have raised hopes in Vienna of obtaining another 
Balkan ally. Naturally, any resistance to the Entente by Athens would come as a benefit to
Ifohenlohe-Burian, 6-Oct-19IS, llHSiA.PA.1-952.
59 Komjathy, Protokolle, 290.
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the Central Powers, as it would mean a de facto alliance or at least the obstruction of an 
Entente expedition to assist Serbia or threaten Bulgaria. It became clear very quickly, 
however, that Greece had no intention of taking action.762 Despite the Venizelos 
government being overthrown, King Constantine merely sought neutrality, not to resist the 
invaders. All Burian could do was hope Greece would uphold its responsibilities as a 
neutral in areas outside of Salonika.763
Tisza was even more concerned than Burian about the new development and its 
threat to Austria-Hungary’s Balkan aspirations. On 10 October, Tisza was prepared to 
sacrifice Albania (relatively unimportant for Hungary) by offering Greece a free hand there. 
In exchange, he implored Greece to defend its independence by force o f arms.764 He hoped 
that if Athens sided with the Central Powers the threat to Bulgaria would cease, allowing 
Bulgaria in turn to continue to threaten Rumania, Tisza’s predominant concern. To his 
regret, however, Burian rejected the recommendation,765 which had been aimed at 
strengthening the anti-Venizelist (royalist) forces,766 because o f its implications for the 
MdA’s Albania project. Instead of sacrificing Albania as Tisza had hoped, Buridn merely 
offered support should the Greek government resist by force.767 This more careful 
approach stood in stark contrast to Germany’s threats against Greece should no resistance 
be put up.768
As the Dual Alliance successfully marched on Serbia, Belgrade fell on 8 October, 
but a swift collapse and a halt to the Entente advance could only come following the 
promised Bulgarian intervention.769 The value of Bulgaria as an ally thus grew by the day. 
Conrad was initially worried that Sofia was “not wholeheartedly committed,”770 and the 
Salonika landings only increased its importance.771 Bulgaria was not only the lynchpin in 
the anti-Serbian campaign, but also vital for its wider role in the Balkans such as keeping 
Rumania neutral772 or impeding Entente troop transports in Macedonia.773 Bulgaria
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promptly declared war on the pretext of a border clash on 14 October,774 giving the Central 
Powers their first new co-belligerent since Turkey had joined the war. As the victorious 
armies from the north crossed the Drina on 22 October and Bulgaria prevented a French 
advance in the Vardar Valley,77S Serbia’s final defeat symbolically came at the Amselfeld 
(Kosovo Polje) on 19-24 November.776
With Serbia’s defeat and the retreat of its forces across Albania, the new military 
realities began to give the AOK a disproportionate voice in discussions on the future of the 
Balkans. In anticipation of his role, Conrad began an aggressive foray into determining 
Austro-Hungarian war aims, as demonstrated by one of the few available discussions 
between the MdA, AOK, and the Emperor via the MKSM. In one of the earliest wartime 
examples of Conrad’s annexationist views, he recommended “potential territorial growth in 
Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Italy.”777 * Conrad supported a Miitekuropa concept of a 
continental economic union under German and Austrian leadership, which the Balkan states 
were to join. Although Russia remained the “most dangerous enemy” o f Austria-Hungary, 
due to its expansionist urge and desire to “smash” the Monarchy, victory over Russia 
simply meant pushing it back rather than territorial conquest. Italy, the “most invidious and 
hated” enemy of Austria-Hungary, had to be forced to end its opposition to Austria- 
Hungary’s “Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Balkan interests.” Principal among these interests 
were Montenegro and Serbia, whose subjugation by Austria-Hungary would end their pan- 
Slavist Russian orientation. Conrad’s biggest concern, however, was that Austria- 
Hungary would not obtain significant Serbian (Macedonian) territory, simply because the 
Monarchy had failed to act sooner. Identifying Montenegro’s coast as a principal war aim, 
he envisaged a resource-poor, thinly populated Montenegro economically dependent on the 
Monarchy (even if it were allowed to keep Antivari). However, Conrad preferred a simple 
annexation of the entire country. In Italy itself, Conrad had no wish to annex Italian- 
inhabited lands as such, but the military protection of Trieste and the Tyrol required an 
annexation of territory to the “Piave, or at least the Tagliamento.”779
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Probably due to the delicate timing of Conrad’s message to the MKSM and to avoid 
being tied down when formulating policy, Burian gave a very short and unusual response. 
Betraying his own hopes for the region in direct opposition to the October 1915 CiMR 
agreement that territorial expansion was a threat to Austria-Hungary’s state structure, 
Burian agreed with many of Conrad’s points, albeit not regarding Italy or Serbia.780 The 
Foreign Minister refused to comment or elaborate further. Citing a lack of information 
because Conrad had only initially approached the MKSM with his recommendations, 
Burian let the issue remain dormant until the success o f the Serbian offensive became 
apparent and the war aims question became too pressing to ignore.
Burian’s other problem was Germany. Conrad grumbled on 4 October that Austria- 
Hungary’s “war with Serbia, whereto all Austro-Hungarian traditions point” and which he 
had advocated for a decade, was now being led by the Germans. Not only on the ground 
were the Germans exhibiting their leadership, but also in policymaking. Berlin repeatedly 
inquired about the Austrian position on various Balkan issues, and when they Germans 
disagreed -  which was common -  they prodded Vienna to behave differently. Although 
Jagow accepted that Burian had the right to solve the Albanian question according to 
Austria-Hungary’s interests,”781 the Ballhausplatz was still unwilling to disclose its 
Albanian or Balkan goals. Tschirschky nevertheless prodded Burian over Austro- 
Hungarian aims, particularly with regard to Montenegro and Serbia, which Burian refused 
to go into other than by stating that he desired an unconditional capitulation -  on this 
breaking definitively with Tisza.782 * Shortly thereafter, Burian’s position changed from not 
having annexations to a separated and shrunken Serbia and Montenegro.781 Yet Tisza’s 
position was to change as well. Whereas in September he had surprised the Germans with 
his suggestions of a mild peace for Serbia, by late October he was openly discussing the 
carving up of the country. Although Ritter argues that Burian and Tisza’s changing 
positions on Serbia and Montenegro showed a “continuing uncertainty about Austrian war 
aims,”785 it is argued here that the rise in demands on the part o f Vienna w'as incremental 
with the successive military victories, the resulting rise in AOK pressure, and the MdA’s
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internai war aims development. The result was therefore not a fluctuation, but rather 
incremental growth, similar to what the Germans experienced over the course of 1916- 
1918, with the difference that the AOK was held at bay while the OIIL was not. Thus, in 
one month following the outset of the campaign, Austria-Hungary developed plans that 
would be fought over in Berlin on 10-11 November 1915. This is comparable to Bethmann 
Hollweg’s September Program, which was developed during the German advance into 
Belgium (4 August 1914) and written during the Battle of the Mame (5-9 September 1914). 
The difference is that whereas Bethmann Hollweg’s September Program wras an internal 
memorandum, Austria-Hungary’s policies developed far enough for it to argue for specific 
demands vis-à-vis its allies.
Jagow said he agreed with Buriàn’s policy towards Serbia,786 but on the condition 
that “no difficult problems had to be solved in the Balkans.”787 *He offered Buriàn support, 
particularly with regard to the majority Muslim-inhabited Sandjak of Novipazar, the 
occupation of which Jagow agreed was desirable. In order to not allow both sides of the 
Adriatic to fall into Italian hands, Jagow supported the re-establishment of Albania. By 
making these verbal agreements with Jagow, Buriàn had thus ignored Tisza’s multiple 
requests to buy Greek friendship with a free hand in Albania,789 which was entirely 
contrary to Buriàn’s own goals.
This was the first time that Buriàn discussed his goals for the western Balkans, 
independent of the Italian threat, at any great length with a German diplomat. Later, each 
side would accuse the other of not knowing what it wanted in the Balkans,790 but Jagow 
displayed some stunning inconsistencies in this early conversation. While agreeing to an 
Austrian demand for the Sandjak in order to connect the Monarchy to Albania and also 
supporting the re-establishment o f Albania, Jagow simultaneously recommended to Buriàn 
that a dependent Serbia be unified with Montenegro. Austrian control of the Sandjak and 
Serbian-Montenegrin unification were geographically mutually exclusive, and therefore 
this recommendation simply masked the true German policy, which ran squarely counter to 
the Monarchy’s own dreams of expansion in the area.791 This w as demonstrated w hen, on 
1 November, one day after this Jagow-Buriàn conversation, Czemin in Bucharest informed
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the Foreign Minister of a report from Bulgaria that, in the event of a peace treaty with 
Serbia, “the Central Powers would be prepared to grant Serbia access to the Adriatic,” 
possibly via Durazzo (Albania).792 Speaking on behalf of its allies and in complete 
opposition to Burian’s wishes, Germany was pursuing an independent policy in the 
Balkans, all friendliness towards Austria-Hungary and its assurances of the “unconditional 
prostration of Serbia”793 notwithstanding. Underestimating the importance this question 
had for the MdA, however, the Germans had to contend with Austro-Hungarian opposition 
to Serb access to the Adriatic right up to the closing stages of the war.
The favorable turn of events on the ground meant that Bulgarian and German 
involvement in Austro-Hungarian war aims planning would only grow. The MdA started 
facing serious annexationist pressure from the AOK, whose hand had been strengthened by 
victory. Although the principal goals of conquering Serbia and Montenegro were being 
met, this section has demonstrated that rather than pacifying the Balkan war aims question 
the victories merely served to inflame it. Burian and Tisza’s strategy was therefore to 
jealously guard their say in war aims setting, and were vague on the specifics. The 
Bulgarian intervention put Austria-Hungary on the path to Balkan victory, but w ith it began 
the debate on war aims and the territorial disputes which were to follow.
SECTION II
As Austro-Hungarian forces crossed the Drina and Bulgarian forces halted the 
French advance from Salonika towards the Vardar, Burian was optimistic that in the 
Balkans an outright victory by the Entente was becoming increasingly unlikely.794 On the 
contrary, Vienna was now in the advantageous position o f facing two defeated enemies 
(Montenegro and Serbia) which bordered three neutral neighbors (Rumania, Greece, and 
Albania), and had only to worry seriously about territorial division with its own ally, 
Bulgaria. But since the defeat of Serbia was achieved w ith extensive German assistance, a 
future German role in Serbia would also become a headache. Although the extent of 
Germany’s involvement was limited by its lack of clear independent objectives in the 
Balkans, this did not prevent increased interference from Berlin. Entente differences arose *
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over a possible German occupation zone in Serbia, the future of the new ly occupied 
territories, and over Bulgarian intentions towards Macedonia.
Ha. German Occupation Zone
As per the agreement with Sofia, the south and east of Serbia (Macedonia, east of 
Morava) would be occupied by Sofia while the north-west (Ma£va, Belgrade, Sandjak) 
would be seized by Austria-Hungary and incorporated into the
MMtargeneralgoimrnmentlSerbien (MGG/Serbia). Now Vienna feared a German
occupation zone within its portion of Serbia, which all elements in the Austro-Hungarian 
establishment opposed. Tisza was concerned for Austria-Hungary’s Great Power prestige, 
while Conrad and Burian feared Germany’s economic exploitation of the area. Austro- 
Hungarian control over Serbian territory was a war aim which warranted defending, but 
faced the Germans acting in accordance w ith their own interests. The AA eventually sided 
with the OHL in an effort to secure Serbia as a supply region in opposition to Austro- 
Hungarian washes. Although Austrian pressure eventually meant the handing over of all 
Serbian occupied territory, this episode demonstrates how jealously the Monarchy’s 
officials guarded their perceived prerogative in Serbia.
Tisza’s biggest concern in early November 1915 was the possibility o f an 
independent German occupation zone. He wrote to the AOK to highlight his misgivings 
about tliis, and indicated that he preferred a solely Austro-Hungarian occupation.795 Any 
German zone should be under the overall command of an Austro-Hungarian general and an 
Austro-Hungarian civil administration. He did not want to see German encroachment on 
the Monarchy’s most pivotal prestige goal, given Berlin’s “vast advantages” over Vienna in 
occupying foreign territory.796 He pleaded for the AOK to push for Austro-Hungarian 
administration of this “politically and economically close territory," so that it did not get 
exploited by Berlin.797 Tisza wanted Austria-Hungary to exploit Serbia itself while keeping 
Germany ou t Burian supported Tisza’s position for much the same reasons. Serbia 
^presented a “border land” which was in the “most immediate sphere o f interest” o f the 
Monarchy, and therefore its occupied regions had to be exclusiv ely under the control o f an
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Austro-Hungarian military and civilian administration.798 No one in the Monarchy wanted 
to share the Austrian half of the Austro-Bulgarian division of Serbia with Germany.
Conrad acted on Burian’s and Tisza’s requests, and in a meeting on 8 November at 
Pless was informed by Falkenhayn that the OHL did “not lay claim to an occupation 
administration in Serbia.”799 Due to a misunderstanding (or more likely duplicity), Conrad 
believed he had received an explicit declaration that the OHL only needed control of its 
military hinterland for as long as the war raged and that thereafter the matter of occupation 
would be left to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. Once back in Teschen, however, Conrad 
learned that Falkenhayn claimed not to have given a binding declaration but rather was 
merely vaguely recommending what would take place after the current operations.800 *
Eventually, such inter-allied tensions caused Conrad to break with the OHL in joint 
operations and pursue independent gains in Montenegro in the new year.
The issue of occupation zones continued to crop up in Serbia, partly because of the 
difficulties between two militaries in Poland. Burian made very clear on 18 November that, 
as far as he was concerned, Serbia was in the Monarchy’s “immediate sphere of interest” 
and all territory not taken by Bulgaria had to be administered by Austria-Hungary, Such 
a presence would not only allow a significant Austro-Hungarian influence on the future of 
the country, but also have a strong effect on the Monarchy’s South Slavs.802 * Jagow on 21 
November supported Burian’s position, though only in principle. He stated that the A A 
“did not place any value at all"802 on having a Serbian occupation zone, but he had no 
intention of cooperating with Vienna against the OHL until the German army had achieved 
its aims in Serbia, including securing vital mine, forestry, rail resources.
With Jagow issuing nothing more than a few weak protests to the OHL, Falkenhayn 
used the technicality that he was still in charge of his military hinterland before it had been 
converted to an Austrian occupation zone in order to exploit the region. Burian on 11 
December highlighted this fact to Conrad, arguing that the Germans were unnecessarily 
prolonging their military hinterland administration in order to delay an agreement on rail 
and mine questions.804 Clearly, the Austro-Hungarians were concerned about Germany’s
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exploitation of Serbian resources. Conrad wrote to Falkenhayn on 20 December to settle 
the issue by establishing an MGG/Serbia, and allowing the OHL’s military hinterland to 
continue, on the condition as the “exploitation of the military hinterland only be allowed to 
go so far that the supplies suffice for the troops and the population.” With Austria- 
Hungary in Burian’s words “barely able to feed itself,”806 let alone the Serbs as well, it was 
vital that Germany not suck its region in Serbia dry before the occupation could be 
centralized and rationing coordinated.
The Germans, however, continued to be obstinate. Burian grew increasingly 
concerned about the endless reports of such exploitation of the German occupation zones in 
Russian Poland and Serbia that “it risked the future permanent economic pauperization of 
the population.”807 Germany was employing a “ruthless sucking dry system” in all of its 
occupation zones, with the military requisitioning cattle, grain, flour, wine, salt, and 
petroleum in large quantities.808 The result was “famine” and a “violent pauperization of 
the population” which threatened Austro-Hungarian post-war interests by undermining the 
potential for good economic relations with Serbia. Pointing out the disadvantage of this for 
the Monarchy in future, Burhin asked the Germans to “limit their widespread economic 
exploitation.”809 Although Jagow still claimed to be uninterested in having any part of 
Serbia controlled by Germany, he began to side with the OHL, arguing that Serbia was vital 
to Germany as a “supply and transit territory.” As such, Germany had to insist on 
guarantees of free transit.810 Jagow’s carelessly indiscreet comment that Serbia was needed 
as a “German supply region for raw materials and foods” demonstrated his ulterior motives 
for delaying a handover to the AOK.811
Eventually, Austro-Hungarian pressure caused Germany hand over control to the 
MGG/Serbia on 28 December,812 a week after the occupation regime had been established. 
Even afterwards, however, differences remained. On 10 January 1916 the AA complained 
that the AOK no longer allowed German requisitioning in the formerly German military 
hinterland, and that Austro-Hungarian nationals were given economic benefits in the region
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far beyond what Germans were given in southern Poland.813 Germany’s efforts to exploit 
Serbia were demonstrated Berlin’s desire to acquire what resources it could before the 
region fell to any of its allies. But the MdA and AOK pressured Germany hard to release 
Serbia to Austria-Hungary’s control, given the Monarchy’s eminent interest had in future 
control of this country.
lib . Austro-German Debate Over the Future of Serbia
With the Serbian war reaching its conclusion, the two allies began a lengthy debate 
on the future of the region. It became clear early on that harmonizing policies would prove 
difficult, in large part because Burian kept Berlin in the dark as to Austria-Hungary’s true 
goals. In an effort to score a diplomatic coup, Germany clung to the idea of signing a 
separate peace with Serbia, while the Austro-Hungarians saw no hope in such a venture. 
Both the AA and the OHL then began pushing for a unification of Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Albania, which was perceived as nothing short of grotesque in Vienna and Budapest alike. 
Realizing that he had to engage with the Germans to at least agree a framework for the 
future of Serbia, Burian traveled to Berlin on 10 November 1915 to discuss the most 
pressing issues, and to sideline an increasingly annexationist AOK, At Berlin, Burian 
espoused some of the MdA’s war aims, including annexing Belgrade and other vital 
Serbian and Montenegrin territory, and promoting a large Albania. Facing near total 
disagreement with their own plans for a sensible Balkan settlement, the Germans became 
wary of Burian, with whom they could only achieve a stalemate. Burian’s tough 
negotiating style was not, as some authors have argued, the result of incompetence or 
helplessness. Rather, Burian’s behavior was geared towards defending Austria-Hungary's 
interests from a position of relative diplomatic weakness. Burian’s actions represented a 
concerted effort aimed at securing the MdA’s primacy in war aims formulation \ is-a-vis the 
AOK, and insisting on parity with its powerful and confident ally.
Burian was hesitant to disclose his plans for Serbia to the Germans. On 30 October 
Tschirschky’s questioned the evasive Foreign Minister, recommending unconditional 
surrender by Serbia.814 Jagow also believed that an “unconditional subjugation” o f Serbia 
should be the goal, but recommended providing Serbia with peace terms as bait. The A A
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imagined that the diplomatic coup o f a separate peace with Serbia would eliminate the 
Salonika army’s raison d'etre, but Hohenlohe pointed out that any agreement made by 
Serbia under such duress would be meaningless.815 For Burian, the occupation question 
made the “future of Serbia” relevant from a “political and strategic perspective,”816 so 
Hohenlohe stated that only an unconditional surrender and the “cession of the territories 
demanded”817 would satisfy Austria-Hungary, including in Albania and Montenegro,
Jagow hoped that a separate peace with Serbia could be the first step in a general 
peace, and refused to get sucked in to other Balkan questions such as Burian’s insistence on 
a re-established and independent Albania. The State Secretary described Germany’s 
distaste for this venture in no uncertain terms, given that past experiences made him 
“tremendously skeptical.”818 Yet from Burian’s statements on the need for Austria- 
Hungary to control the eastern Adriatic coast and be contiguous with Albania, Jagow 
correctly inferred that the Sandjak of Novipazar would have to fall to Austria-Hungary, and 
that some form of protectorate would need to be established over Albania. As for Serbia 
proper, Jagow supported the plan to replace the Karageorgevic dynasty without unification 
with Montenegro, though this would later change. Rather, Jagow wanted to see Serbia 
become economically and military entirely dependent on Austria-Hungary and Germany.819
Tisza was of course intimately involved in the Serbian occupation question and the 
discussions over Serbia’s future, though Burian frequently told the Germans that he did not 
know Tisza’s positions.820 During talks in Budapest with a German official, Tisza pointed 
out that he did not believe that an immediate peace with Serbia was possible or even 
valuable, and that only the total defeat of the Serbian army -  rather than any diplomatic act 
such as a peace agreement -  would settle the situation in the Balkans.821 He added that 
Austria-Hungary’s alternatives were to either incorporate or satisfy Serbia, but that he did 
not want to incorporate the country' and Serbia could not be satisfied without completing its 
dream of a Greater Serbia at the Monarchy’s expense.822 He therefore proposed a third 
way, which was to obtain a “Serbia resigned to her fate” in order to quickly establish calm.
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This could be achieved most easily by removing Serbia’s access to the sea and making the 
country economically dependent and tied to the Monarchy.823
After significant pressure from Burian, Jagow on 2 November agreed that the 
“unconditional subjugation of Serbia” ought to be the primary objective, but that a separate 
peace option should remain. Burian did not believe in the value of a separate peace, but 
rather desired Serbia’s outright disappearance from the battlefield. He hoped that this 
would end the Entente efforts to assist Serbia and cause them to refocus against 
Constantinople,824 However, when Falkenhayn pressed Jagow to have the Austro- 
Hungarians formulate war aims against Serbia on 3 November, Hohenlohe responded that 
the first goal would be the defeat of Serbia, and that “everything else would fall into place.” 
Hohenlohe argued in favor of delay, stating that any decision reached prior to Serbia’s 
defeat would “adversely prejudice the future configuration in the Balkans.”825 The 
Austrians wanted to inflict a total defeat on Serbia before discussing peace terms, both for 
the reasons of prestige and to make the Serbs more malleable. Jagow was disquieted that 
Austria-Hungary seemed to not “know what it wanted,” but Hohenlohe argued that the 
future of Serbia depended on how w ell the war w ent for the Central Powers on other fronts. 
If Serbia were to sue for peace, providing it with terms beforehand would be 
counterproductive, felt the Ambassador, who like Burian believed that this question would 
not even arise because the Serbian amiy would resist to the last man,826
The Austrian and German positions on a separate peace option remained far apart. 
Falkenhayn had the German Embassy wTite to Burian on 4 November, stating that in order 
to end the war an end to the Serbian conflict was crucial. The OHL and AA believed it 
would be easier to obtain Serbia’s surrender and peace if the country knew the terms and 
did not have to “capitulate into the unknown,” but instead had a clear picture of its fate.827 
When the Austro-Hungarians refused to discuss peace terms or prospects regarding Serbia, 
the Germans put forward their own. In Falkenhayn’s opinion, they would entail the 
surrender o f the army and the unification o f a rump Serbia with Montenegro and Albania 
under a Montenegrin dynasty828 to ease Serbia’s ability to ask for an armistice. Horrified 
by the prospect of rewarding Montenegro and Serbia after a year of war, Burian on 5
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November informed the Germans that, although the issue would be expounded during his 
upcoming visit to Berlin, it could “already be seen as established that the unification” of 
these three states “would not be recommended.”829
The (for Vienna) preposterous ideas developed in Berlin showed that the Austro- 
Hungarians had to move quickly to finalize their own war aims in order to counter 
Germany. Now Conrad, in true military fashion, began an artillery barrage of letters 
designed to win over Burian to sweeping annexationist policies in opposition to the MdA’s 
protectorate ideas or the OHL’s and AA’s unification proposals. One such message from 
Conrad arrived on 5 November, in which he called for the “annexation of Serbia and 
Montenegro, at least as inseparable federal states” to obviate the threat posed by their 
independence, no matter how small they were.830 If necessary, rather than face a 
unification of the two as Germany recommended, Conrad w-as even prepared to make a 
modest compromise by putting up with a small, coast-less Montenegro, instead of any kind 
of Serbia.831 As Austrian triumphs, particularly the independent efforts in Montenegro and 
Albania, began to mount, so did the piles of messages from Conrad demanding ever-greater 
expansion. This was particularly striking with regard to Albania, regarding which on 5 
November he still felt that an independent state bordering on Austria-Hungary and under
SIT?the protectorate of the Monarchy was an acceptable solution.
Burian visited Berlin on 10-11 November to discuss the future of Serbia in relation 
to its western Balkan neighbors. The Germans were interested in advancing their 
Mitteleuropa program as a means of exercising control over the Balkans as well. Since the 
connection with the other allies had been established, thus achieving Germany’s main aim 
in the Balkans, Berlin now wanted to make a separate peace with Serbia on favorable 
terms.833 Notwithstanding Burian’s insistence on the uselessness of such an undertaking, 
Bethmann Hollweg pursued his Serbia-Montenegro-Albania unification idea as a means of 
achieving a swift separate peace. An irritated Burian managed to secure German agreement 
that it was generally the Monarchy’s right to arrange things in the Balkans according to its 
interests. Bethmann Hollweg in return pressed Burian, who insisted that Montenegro’s and 
Serbia’s statehood would remain “untouched,” albeit with a few qualifications. Among
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these qualifications were the areas of Serbia already promised to Bulgaria or the Albanian- 
inhabited areas which Austria-Hungary wanted to give to Albania. For the Monarchy itself, 
Burian desired to annex only metropolitan Belgrade and the Ma£va between the Save and 
Drina, as well as a “strategically necessary border rectification” on the upper Drina south of 
Bajna Basta. From Montenegro, taking the Lovcen and giving the Muslim portions to 
Albania was intended to protect Austria’s naval base at Cattaro, to render the small country 
“harmless in the future.”834
Thus, Burian supported long-standing AOK designs on the Sandjak o f Novipazar 
and the Lovcen and put forward MdA plans to keep Serbia down. It had a clear, 
overarching desire to (re-establish Austria-Hungary’s “sphere o f influence” over Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Albania, and although Burian did not disagree in principle with only 
Serbian-Montenegrin unification if it arose organically, he insisted that Vienna w’ould not 
assist such an effort.835 Germany’s idea of unification o f these two states with Albania, 
however, was something the MdA had to reject entirely. Under this model, Burian feared 
that the Albanians would be “either eradicated or expelled,” creating as strong a Serbia as 
before, with the additional benefit of “owning an important Adriatic coastline.” Besides, 
Burian saw no reason to sacrifice the independence of Albania just because the first attempt 
had failed, though the Germans repeatedly objected to a second attempt.836 In order to 
“effectively exercise influence in the Balkans,” Vienna only needed an extension of its 
territory along the Adriatic coast down to the border with Albania, and even if Albania 
failed to survive, he preferred other solutions than incorporation into Serbia. Burian thus 
resisted letting Albania fall to Serbia, Montenegro, or Bulgaria, as all of these states would 
“certainly work in concert with Italy to fight Austrian influence in the Adriatic.”838 Burian 
was already fearful o f Bulgarian expansionism in addition to established Serbian 
machinations. He was therefore hinting at an Austro-Greek division of an Albanian sphere 
of interest839 to prevent a Slav-ltalian cooperation from unifying around the eastern 
Adriatic,
The talks were concluded by Bethmann Hollweg expressing great satisfaction that 
the allies had openly discussed and solved the principal questions. Burian concurred,
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though he admitted privately not to have agreed. His internal report on the meeting makes 
very clear that the encounter had been a classic case of two ships passing each other in the 
fog. While the MdA had come mainly to put forward its proposals and designs for the 
Balkans, the Germans were interested in Poland, Mitteleuropa, and pacifying the Balkans 
quickly. These fundamentally different perspectives meant that each side irritated the other 
with its insistence on its own areas of interest, and led to no real agreement. Burian only 
generally agreed with the Germans that more cooperation was needed with regard to 
Mitieleuropa, while the Germans offered only academic assurances to Austria-Hungary 
while simultaneously making known what Burian considered “extensive claims.”840 
Although it was the Germans who had pushed for Vienna to reveal its position on Serbia, 
what they learned about it made Bethmann Hollweg extremely “reticent,” deferring any 
agreement. Now the Germans feared angering the Monarchy over what they realized were 
Vienna’s most important war aims in the Balkans, but were also unwilling to allow 
Austrian intransigence to threaten their plans for a quick exit. The Germans therefore 
continued their policy of seeking a small Serbia united under a Montenegrin dynasty, 
allowing it access to the Adriatic, and making it dependent on Austria-Hungary.841 These 
plans, which involved the rest of Serbia and northern Albania being annexed by Austria- 
Hungary, were impossible to achieve due to Tisza’s “lack of appetite”842 for Serbian- 
populated territory.
Buridn sensed this German plan would not be dropped, and warned that the MdA 
had to take “greatest care when asserting Austria-Hungary’s equal rights.”843 For Burian, 
the meeting was important to demonstrate Austria-Hungary’s desire to “hold steadfast” to 
the alliance, while at the same time ensuring “complete consideration” of the Monarchy’s 
own interests.844 His obduracy was aimed at maintaining allied parity, as Austria-Hungary 
had to “vigilantly defend” its interests, or it would succumb to German egoism and not 
obtain its fair share of spoils.845 Unfortunately, the Germans interpreted Burian’s 
inflexibility as sheer unreasonableness.
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The plans Burian shared with Berlin dazed Germans such as Jagow who were 
recommending a “sensible Balkan settlement,”8'46 but on the other hand fell far short of 
satisfying the AOK. The MdA thus had to be the negotiator and balancer between the 
extreme AOK and German points of view, and Burian, through his “pigheadedness which 
brought the German diplomats to the verge of despair,”847 maintained aims that he saw as a 
fair compromise between the needs of the Monarchy, the goals of the AOK, and the fears of 
the AA/OHL. There is no doubt that this behavior angered all concerned, which is why 
most authors848 have tended to agree with the “bureaucratic pettiness”849 assessment of 
Burian which dominated in the German hierarchy. To some extent, this was corroborated 
by Hohenlohe, who had told Berchtold that neither Burian nor Bethmann Hollweg knew 
what they wanted, so they spoke only of the need not to show weakness.850 In reality, 
however, Burian had by the time of his face-to-face meeting with Bethmann Hollweg 
developed clear war aims with Tisza and the Emperor’s support for his policies.
He. Competition in Macedonia
Germany was not the only ally the Austro-Hungarians had to worry about. The 
victory over Serbia meant that Bulgaria and Turkey also expanded their claims in the 
Balkans. The Bulgarians began their foray into Balkan expansionism in late 1915, 
attempting to eliminate Serbia entirely, establishing a wide contiguity with Austria- 
Hungary, and even attempting to reach the Adriatic Sea through Albania. Such 
expansionism was mirrored by the AOK, which under Conrad wanted to seize the Serbian 
territories not promised to Bulgaria. Uncertainty over Austro-Hungarian war aims and 
specifically the treaty line, which was meant to separate Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian 
occupation zones, sowed the seeds of discord between the two countries and would 
eventually result in open conflict in 1916. Even before Bulgaria joined the Central Pow ers, 
it became apparent that its appetite for expansion had to be kept in check, and now Burian 
was caught between the AOK and Sofia. Bulgaria’s assistance secured passage through the 
Danube and helped hasten Serbia’s defeat, which helped prevent any more states from
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joining the Entente. But allied Turkey and suspicious Greece831 were as watchful of 
Bulgaria as was Austria-Hungary.
Turkey, concerned about Bulgarian territorial expansion ‘ and the Entente troops in 
Salonika, voiced its desire to send its own forces to Macedonia in late 1915. Pallavicini 
noted that this latest suggestion proved that the Ottomans were still “engaged with thoughts 
of a westward expansion of European Turkey.”853 This, in turn, could not be tolerated by 
Austria-Hungary. Burian on 2 November rejected a Turkish request to be informed of the 
territorial terms of the Bulgarian agreement,854 recommending instead to Jagow to keep 
them secret for the time being. Jagow feared a backlash from Turkey,855 but Burian did not 
agree, arguing that Ottoman distrust was not as dangerous as the publication of territorial 
promises made to Bulgaria. The Foreign Minister had to spell out to the State Secretary the 
danger of Turkish hopes for “renewed expansion of Turkey westwards” threatening the 
core of the Ottoman-Bulgarian rapprochement.856 It took an extensive conversation for 
Hohenlohe to finally convince Jagow of the inexpediency of informing Turkey,857 The 
episode demonstrates that Austro-Hungarian interests were at stake, even though the 
territory in question was intended to go to Bulgaria. Macedonia, where Vienna claimed it 
had no territorial interest, still mattered greatly for securing its own territorial wishes and 
for ensuring its wider security.
The landing of about 130,000 French and British troops in Salonika between 5
n r o
October and 18 November and the violation of Greek neutrality put increasing pressure 
on Macedonia, allowing both Bulgaria and Turkey to suggest war aims with an eye to this 
threat. On 12 November the new Ottoman Foreign Minister Halil Bey presented his ideas 
to Pallavicini for the Balkan settlement. In what was essentially a recommendation for a 
westward shift, Greece would obtain the Dodecanese and south Albania for its neutrality, as 
compensation for Bulgaria taking Kavalla, Seres, and Drama. Finally, the Ottomans would 
obtain Greek islands on the Ottoman coast and western Thrace up to the Mesta river, 
including Dedeagatch (Alexandroupoli). The Turks felt their current European border,
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which was already subject to concessions to Bulgaria, could not be maintained in the long 
run, and the need for a European army to keep the peace in the Balkans was the justification 
for its demands in western Thrace.859 Bulgarian diplomatic indiscretion meant that on 20 
November 1915 the media published a Swiss interview, much to the distaste of Buri&n, 
which revealed Sofia’s aims against the Morava valley and Nisch.860 In the light of this 
information, the Turks began presenting Bulgarian expansion issue as a concern for 
Rumania and Greece, against whom the troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Salonika 
were respectively aimed.861 Whether or not these positions were merely a bluff, Halil Bey 
recommended that, as long as these Entente military threats were not eliminated, Central 
Power troops -  including Turkish ones -  had to remain in the Balkans.862 * The Ottoman 
request went unanswered, for it was far beyond anything Sofia woutd consider, or for 
which Vienna would put its prestige on the line to support. The need for a wartime and 
post-war connection to Turkey was clearly important to both sides, for apart from the 
strategic need to keep Turkey in the war by means o f munitions shipments, Austria- 
Hungary was in need of raw materials such as wool and copper.861
However, the Ballhausplatz was more concerned about the potential for Greek 
involvement as part of a Serbian retreat. A confident Burian demanded the Greeks disarm 
the retreating Serb forces in line with their Hague Convention obligations864 or face 
pursuit.865 Such an outcome would not only make avoiding war impossible,866 according to 
Szilassy, but also cause the “flowering of the infamous fairy tale of Austro-Hungarian 
aspirations against Salonika.”867 Yet it was more than a fairy tale, for at a meeting in Pless 
on 6 November, Falkenhayn resisted Conrad’s w ish to push the Entente Army of the Orient 
out of Salonika, ostensibly to defend Greece’s neutrality. This worsened AOK-OHL 
divisions, for Wilhelm had already promised the Greek king that no German or Bulgarian
e
troops would enter his territory'.
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Where no German vital interests were involved, Austro-Hungarian ambitions 
seemed significantly greater than those of Germany. Falkenhayn and the AA had approved 
support for Austria-Hungary against Serbia for the very limited aim of opening land bridges 
to their allies Turkey and Bulgaria,869 *which was particularly pertinent following the 
difficulty in securing transit rights over the Danube for munitions transport to Turkey. 
Now, however, arguments over the future of the Balkans led to an AOK-OHL split and on 
the same day Falkenhayn ordered the removal of German troops from the Balkan front, in 
anticipation of his February 1916 Verdun offensive.
Yet of all the allies, it was the Bulgarians who would be the most expansionist. The 
Bulgarian king felt that Serbia should be “wiped off the map,”871 *and his government 
pursued aims beyond the territory allocated in the agreement. For example, Radoslavov 
supported reworking the treaty to include the Sandjak of Novipazar (a major Austrian war 
aim) in the Bulgarian sphere. Following the defeat of Serbia at Kosovo Polje on 25 
November, the Bulgarian king and his Premier provided the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
with extensive detail on Sofia’s wide-ranging plans on 7 December. With regard to Serbia, 
Radoslavov spoke of “not having an interest” in Serbia’s continued existence, while the 
king unequivocally desired its elimination. Bulgaria hoped for a direct connection with the 
Monarchy beyond the Danube, stated Ferdinand, which could only be achieved if cither 
Bulgaria seized more Serbian territory or Austria-Hungary did so. The King recommended 
to Austria-Hungary the seizure o f further territory in the Morava valley and allowing 
Montenegro to grow as well.
Although the Bulgarians were lenient towards Montenegro, the elimination of the 
Karageorgevic dynasty in Belgrade was a war aim in Sofia as well as Vienna. Ferdinand 
also pressed Austria-Hungary to allow a greater territorial share for Bulgaria, as this would 
strengthen the bond with the Monarchy. He also agreed with the Turkish recommendation 
to grant southern Albania to Greece, though naturally he refused to cede any of his territory 
to the Ottomans. Regarding Rumania, he recommended against a cession of the Bukowina, 
and instead suggested Bucharest be punished for its behavior by being forced to give up 
Tum-Sevcrin.873 Clearly, Bulgaria’s victories had gone to its ruler’s head, but rather than
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this being a passing fancy, the Sofia government would for the rest of the war push for 
these aims and more. Contiguity with the Monarchy, expansion towards Albania and 
Greece, and no concessions towards Turkey were the principal demands Vienna would 
continue to face from Bulgaria. It is no surprise, therefore, that Burian found himself 
concealing from Radoslavov exactly how far discussions with Germany over Serbia’s 
future had progressed.874
Pallavicini presented his own views to Burian, warning that Austria-Hungary should 
be careful not to replace one South-Slav power (Serbia) with another (Bulgaria), as Sofia 
would likely seek to appropriate Salonika as well as the extensive gains it had made so far 
in an effort to create a “Greater Bulgaria.”875 His views expressed the concern that some 
Austro-Hungarians felt with regard to Salonika; it was not so much that they wanted it to be 
under Austria’s control, as the ‘Road to Salonika’ rumor would have it, but that it must stay 
out of the control o f a Slav power. Regardless of whether Bulgaria’s assistance made the 
collapse of Serbia possible, the Austrians wished to maintain a balance o f power in the 
Balkans so as not to have one powerful adversary instead of many w eaker adversaries. The 
best way to keep Bulgaria out of the Adriatic sphere was to award southern Albania to 
Greece or to reconstitute the Serb state to prevent a “Bulgarization o f the Serbs,” thereby 
maintaining the Bulgaria-Serbia antagonism, which had so well “worked to Austria- 
Hungary’s advantage.”877
By late December 1915 and after the defeat o f Serbia, Tamowski reported that 
certain military circles in Sofia had begun to speak of future military assistance by Bulgaria 
as dependent on “further, not agreed or anticipated territorial concession.”878 This 
concerned the AOK greatly, and Burian had to issue assurances to Conrad. Connected to 
this issue was the growing fear at the AOK that Bulgaria intended to push all the way to the 
Adriatic, which Burian only believed would be a possibility if Bulgaria had to be cajoled 
into staying in the war.880 Tarnowski’s reports helped in this regard, for he demonstrated 
that the Bulgarians believed that, as long as the Entente were not expelled from Salonika, *
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Bulgaria’s task was not complete.881 Thus, the Bulgarians and the Turks made their 
continued involvement in the Balkans dependent on the presence of the Entente in 
Salonika.882
This section has elaborated on the pressures facing the Austro-Hungarian leadership 
to either set war aims following the defeat of Serbia, or indeed to resist the few goals 
Burian had espoused at the highest levels. It has demonstrated the w idespread German and 
Bulgarian interests which clashed with the (in some cases still secret) Austro-Hungarian 
war aims, and sparked a series of discussions and conflicts. Berlin eventually backed down 
from its desire to exploit a defeated Serbia, but was more adamant on having a say in the 
region’s future than Vienna would have liked. The climax of inter-allied discussions on 10 
November in Berlin led to little common ground, with each side considering the other’s 
plans grotesque or unfeasible.
Burian, with Tisza’s backing, desired to keep as much control of the process as 
possible. He did so by hiding his intentions from the AOK, Bulgaria, and Turkey, lest they 
might prejudice his future decision-making. The Foreign Minister also pursued an 
extremely tough line with regard to the country he had no choice but to engage with, 
namely Germany, in an effort to protect Austria-Hungary’s parity status. However, the 
successful military campaign and the increasing encroachment by the Monarchy’s allies 
meant that the Austro-Hungarians would have to set formal war aims soon, which for 
Burian meant the unpleasant and difficult task o f pushing through his vision while keeping 
Conrad at bay.
SECTION III
The fall of Serbia and the disagreements with Germany during the Berlin talks on 
10 November sparked an acrimonious internal Austro-Hungarian debate on Vienna’s war 
aims. The ensuing discussions between Vienna, Budapest, and Teschen centered on Serbia 
and served to lay the groundwork for the heated GMR o f 7 January 1916. The crux of the 
issue was whether Serbia should be kept independent as Tisza had pushed for at the 
outbreak of war, annexed as Conrad constantly argued, or treated on the basis of Buriln’s 
centrist approach of using ‘border rectifications.’ This question brought up other related
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problems, such as what to do with Montenegro and Albania where the Slav, Muslim, and 
Albanian populations were deeply intertwined.
The AOK’s hand had been considerably strengthened, while that of the MdA 
weakened, resulting in more expansive war aims espoused by Conrad. Me sought the 
annexation of both Serbia and Montenegro, but w as still prepared to tolerate an independent 
though not enlarged Albanian protectorate. Direct opposition to the AOK came from Tisza, 
who used his link with the Emperor to call for a limitation of war aims. Although Tisza 
sought limited annexations in fertile border areas and even espoused a radical colonization 
idea to end the South Slav threat, his overall goal was to establish a small and isolated 
Serbia forced to rely on Austria-Hungary for survival. This section will demonstrate how 
Tisza’s aims, far from benevolently trying to re-establish Serbia, in fact sought a solution 
which brought the benefits of annexation in an achievable manner that would not harm the 
Monarchy’s delicate demographic balance. Burian, as usual, was caught between these two 
visions for Serbia, and disagreed with both. The Foreign Minister laid claims to Serbian 
and Montenegrin territory which in some cases overlapped with Tisza’s, but he was also 
very clear on the need to retain an enlarged Albanian protectorate for the purpose of 
keeping Serbia and Bulgaria from the Adriatic. Thus, by keeping Conrad out of the loop by 
speaking only to the Germans, and by rejecting outright Tisza’s more extreme suggestions, 
Burian retained control of the war aims setting process during the internal debate leading up 
to the GMR of 7 January 1916.
Due to the military successes in the Balkans in the winter o f 1915 and Germany’s 
resistance to his plans, Burian’s position had become weaker than ever before, particularly 
regarding military matters. After the victory at the Amselfeld (Kosovo Polje), Burian 
requested information about the intentions883 o f the AOK operations follow ing the defeat of 
the Serbs, rather than making specific requests about objectives. And on 26 November 
Burian requested information on whether the army intended to pursue the Serbs into 
Montenegro and Albania884 — which was the MdA’s war aim -  w ithout having any means 
to actually compel the general to consent. This loophole dates from 31 July 1914, when 
Franz Joseph declared the army answerable only to him and otherwise “entirety
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independent”885 in terms of military operations, cooperation, and questions, thereby 
preventing MdÀ involvement in military objective planning for several years. The AOK 
could therefore interfere in political decision-making, while Berchtold and Buriàn both 
discovered that the AOK ignored any wishes of the MdÀ regarding politico-military 
objectives.
Conrad’s earlier willingness to help Buriàn keep the Serbian occupation zone out of 
the Germans’ hands occurred because their interests coincided. But Conrad’s opening 
salvo against the MdÀ on the topic of Serbia w as a strong one. It came in one of the few 
examples of written material involving the Emperor directly, when on 22 November 1915 
Conrad insisted that Serbia should not be granted independence. Such an independent state 
would remain an “agitation cauldron” which could reignite another “catastrophic war” such 
as this one.886 Conrad recommended instead a simple solution, which was the complete 
annexation of both Montenegro and Serbia by the Monarchy, and dismissed as irrelevant 
the resulting increase in Austria-Hungary’s Slavic component. Annexation would also 
solve another war aim question, by establishing contiguity with Albania. Conrad had heard 
of the ‘border corrections’ idea that had been floated, but considered these completely 
unfeasible.887 An “artificial construct” that included only Belgrade, the Maiva, and the 
Sandjak to connect to Albania without wider annexation meant that the Monarchy’s 
southern border would be disjointed and indefensible, and would inevitably lead to a “most 
serious conflict.”888 Conrad stated unequivocally that the reasons for his recommendations 
lay in the fact that the Balkans represented the “most natural development region for the 
economic goals of the Monarchy,”889 and treated tire Polish question as subordinate to this 
one. .
Until the GMR came up with a plan for the future of Serbia, Conrad held most of
the cards against Burian on the ground because he did not have to listen to the diplomats’ 
policies when it came to the movement o f the armed forces. He employed his negotiating
strength vis-à-vis Buriàn, insisting that only in the annexation of Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Albania lay the “guarantee for perpetual security and valuable power increase.”890 With the
Archduke Friedrich’s help, Conrad continued to pressure Burian, stating on 27 November
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that Austria-Hungary ought to seize whatever parts of Serbia were not handed to Bulgaria, 
on the basis that a sphere of influence is limited to what one ow'ns.891 A day later he argued 
that a military defeat of Serbia would not be enough and that a forceful diplomatic act wjas 
necessary. Conrad had in mind removing Serbia from the European scene as punishment 
for the world war.893 The territory itself, he suggested, should be governed militarily by the 
Central Powers and divided at a later date. This would also have a strong positive effect on 
the other Balkan states,894 including the latent threat emanating from Rumania and Greece. 
Although he for the time being accepted a protectorate in Albania though desiring its 
division and annexation, Conrad was opposed to any thoughts of enlarging Albania with 
Albanian-inhabited Serbian and Montenegrin territory.895 On 7 December Conrad 
reiterated his support for annexing Montenegro and Serbia and warned Burian that any 
lesser solution “served only the alle£edly„M ^ alone” in a very “shortsighted”
manner. This was a jab at Burian’s relationship with Tisza, whose influence was still felt 
in Vienna at all times and who was a close friend of the Foreign Minister. Furthermore, the 
potential of Serbia/Montenegro being run by a German prince would actually increase the 
danger for the Monarchy,897 felt Conrad, who also feared German encroachment in these 
‘^ ital.flHestipns.”898
Berlin had other ideas. The Germans wanted to communicate to Serbia that the 
Central Powers did not seek the complete destruction o f the country, and could even allow 
a continued, albeit reduced existence.899 Although Pallavicini agreed with the German 
Minister in Constantinople that an independent Albanian state was a utopia, he disagreed 
with his suggestion of allowing Serbia access to the Adriatic and dividing Albania between 
its three neighbors. The Germans wanted to give Serbia the same limited coastline as 
Montenegro would receive, as this would help prevent the “greater danger” of an Italian 
presence on the east coast of the Adriatic.900
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While the AOK was pressing for more expansive war aims in the Balkans, Tisza 
was in Berlin in early December 1915 arguing that military successes would not secure 
peace, and only moderating the Central Powers’ war aims could do so. Tisza was the first 
to begin talking, as early as 4 December, about the need to limit Austria-Hungary’s war 
aims against Serbia. He wrote to the Emperor to urge the scaling down of Austria- 
Hungary’s war aims and thereby force moderation on the Germans as well. Tisza informed 
Franz Joseph that the German Kaiser was far too optimistic in the current worrisome 
military climate, and a decisive victory by Germany over France was unlikely in the 
foreseeable future.901 What this meant to the Hungarian Prime Minister was that neither of 
the two main adversaries would be defeated, and no matter how successful a defensive war 
the Central Powers fought, a “coercive peace” could not be imposed.902 Thus, although the 
Germans were still hopeful they could dictate at least some of the peace terms, Tisza 
believed that only reducing Austria-Hungary's war aims could determine whether the 
Entente even had the “intention” to make some kind o f peace.903 Tisza anticipated 
correctly that Austria-Hungary and with it the Central Powers would reach the “point of 
exhaustion”904 sooner than the population and resource-rich Entente, and that he had 
unsuccessfully attempted to bring Wilhelm to a more accurate appraisal o f the enemy’s 
strength.905 Although Tisza was pleased that the Germans dropped their request for 
Albania to be handed to Serbia in order to reach a separate peace, their new position was 
even more extreme, with Wilhelm supporting a “complete dissolution o f Serbia and the 
annexation of the remaining piece.”
Tisza, however, continued to oppose total annexation. In his opinion, the regions 
should not be incorporated, but rather economically and militarily bound to Austria- 
Hungary. Contrary to Conrad’s position, Tisza did not believe that annexing large swaths 
of Serbian-inhabited territory would be the most effective means of suppressing a 
resurgence of the greater Serbian threat, for the fast thing the Monarchy needed was more 
Slavs. Annexation would mean a great burden for the Hungarian state, for the inclusion of 
so many Serbs would, in Tisza’s words, mean the danger of Hungary losing its “tightly
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joined, unitary character,”906 and to believe that it would check Serbian machinations was 
an illusion. Tisza worried mainly about the legal status which the south Slavs would have 
in Austria-Hungary if included, which could only have the goal of secession. The 
Hungarian Premier therefore favored a smaller and isolated Serbia which would be granted 
statehood by Austria-Hungary, with which Burian concurred, believing it would lean on 
Austria-Hungary on its own.907 Tisza seemed to agree to a limited annexation, at least in 
his comments to Franz Joseph and Burian.908 He wanted to annex the north-west of Serbia 
and thereby connect with Bulgaria at the Morava. This would offer a “strategic line” in 
which annexed territory would be limited to the fertile river plains. Tisza therefore 
recommended not only valuable annexations by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, but also 
that Albanian-inhabited territory be taken from Serbia and Montenegro to ensure Albania’s 
“national development” and prevent Serbian or Italian involvement on the eastern Adriatic 
coast.909
The difference between Tisza and Conrad was that Tisza worried that annexation 
would eventually mean political power for the southern Slavs which could overwhelm the 
dualist configuration of the Monarchy, Burian’s position agreed in this case far more with 
that of Conrad, who did not intend to grant the Serbs, even in the case of annexation, 
“participation in the political life of the Monarchy.”910 Still, Tisza desired to keep the 
majority of Serbs out, and wanted to segregate911 the annexed from the non-annexed Serbs. 
The means to do this would be a lengthy transition period during which the Serbian 
territories were to be governed autocratically, while all the while the Monarchy executed a 
“generous colonization of Hungarian and German elements.” This new “patriotic majority” 
would form a wedge betw een the Serbian state and the Serbian population of Slavonia and 
south I lungary. In an analogous fashion, Tisza wanted to see a “systematic augmentation” 
of Hungarian and German tow ns in Syrmia, Bacska, and the Banat as a w all to protect the 
southern border of the Monarchy from without and repress the Serbian minority w ithin.912 *
** //>/«/.
17 Buridn handwritten comment: “magaiol betink esik,” in Tis/a-Franz Joseph. 4-Dec-19l5, RE7E-44.I4.3; 
also REZL-44.9.25.
** Tis/a-Franz Joseph, 4-Dec-!9l5, REZL-44,14.31; also RE7I.-44.9.25.
0 Burian side comment in Tisza-Franz Joseph, 4-!)cc>19i3, REZL-44.14.31; also REZL-44.9.25; “ugysem 
vohta szahaJ megtOrti’nnie”*~*“lhk must not be allowed to happen anyway.”
*" Tisza-Franz Joseph, 4-Dcc-!9I5, REZE-44.14.31; also REZJ.-44 9.25.
,,J Ibid.
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This solution, which was tantamount to demographic ethnic warfare similar to the 
German ‘Grenzstreifen’ concept, was a clear expansionist, aggressive policy developed by 
the man who, above all others, did not want to see extensive territorial growth by the 
Monarchy. Tisza believed this method to be the only solution, and although Russia would 
remain an enemy with this aggressive policy, the Hungarian Premier argued that the best 
chance for an honorable peace would come by leaving at least a portion of Serbia intact.913
While the Germans agreed with the AOK on Albania but clashed over the future of 
Serbia, and Tisza had his own ideas entirely, Burian negotiated his own path. Burian 
agreed with Tisza to a point, namely that the Monarchy would be unable to perpetually 
prevent South Slav irredentism inside Austria-Hungary, but believed that the danger of 
leaving things the way they were before would be more dangerous.914 Burian advised 
Franz Joseph that neither excluding Serbian territory from the Monarchy nor including it 
(as Conrad wanted) would kill the greater Serbian idea.915 Burian therefore began laying 
larger claims to that territory of Serbia which had not been promised to Bulgaria, wanted to 
cede only a small portion to Montenegro, and wanted Albania, provided it was not given to 
Greece, to become an Austrian protectorate.916
Burian faced strong German and AOK resistance to an independent protectorate in 
Albania.917 The Germans supported Albania’s partition and insisted that Serbia, even if not 
Montenegro, be granted a coastline.918 Facing this opposition, Buridn’s main backing came 
from the Ottomans, who recommended the re-establishment o f an independent Albania, and 
supported the cession of Valona to the Greeks. Another unexpected boost came from 
German Ambassador Tschirschky, never a close friend to the Austrians, who for once 
understood Burian’s concerns. Tschirschky argued that the majority of Albanians would be 
“slavicized in no time” if handed to Serbia and/or Montenegro, or many would emigrate.919 
The potential for an Albanian-Serbian-Montenegrin union, which the AA had been pushing 
for so intensely, would only lead to a new Greater Serbia, felt the Ambassador, which
” J Ibid.
914 Bunin handwritten side note to Tisza-Franz Joseph, 4-Dee-19l5, RF.ZL-44.14.31; also REZL-44,9.25.
915 Ibid.
14 Jagow-Treutler. 2-Dec-19I5, NARA-PG-1117, SA(T-t36), also Jagtm-Falkcnhayn, 2-Dcc*l915, KARA*
UM-3/1-297,
911 Paliavicini-Buridn, l-Dec-1915, HHSiA-PA-!-952g.
Tschirschky report-AA, I5-Dec-I915,NARA-UM2/I-854.
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would be a threat to the Monarchy with its 5-8 million now fully slavicized inhabitants.920 
Finally, Tschirschky recommended an Austro-Hungarian/Bulgarian border designed to 
separate Serbia from Albania, and supported Austrian designs on the Lovcen and Skutari 
for Albania.921
Regarding Serbia proper, Burián outlined his strategy on 10 December by detailing 
the Monarchy’s general “ultimate goals” to Tisza and Conrad. To Tisza, Burián stated that 
Austrian and Hungarian security were indivisible,922 while to Conrad he said he would seek 
some, though not all the annexations the AOK desired. Burián opposed both Tisza and 
Conrad’s “radical territorial reorganization.”923 It was not that Burián did not want to 
annex Serbian territory or to expand his war aims in the Balkans, but that he did not want to 
on the one hand sell himself short by committing himself too early, or to commit himself to 
annexations which could prevent an honorable peace. He did agree -  along with Conrad 
and Tisza -  that Montenegro must lose its coast, the Lovcen, some northern territory and 
territory to Albania, while Serbia must lose Belgrade, the Ma£va (north-west Serbia), and 
the territory given to Bulgaria.924 However, Burián could not say for certain what the 
future for rump Serbia would be, since he did not want to “prejudice the future.”925
This section has explored the pressure Burián faced from Tisza and Conrad when 
trying to formulate Austria-Hungary’s war aims against Serbia and the related issues. 
While the army’s hand was strengthened and Conrad moved further down the path of 
annexation, Tisza proposed some radical ideas aimed at protecting Hungary’s domestic 
position through limited annexations while also offering the hope to an exit from the war. 
Burián disagreed with both conceptions, but most ardently opposed Conrad. I le employed 
tactics aimed at isolating Conrad and the AOK from lite war aims setting process in late 
1915, in an effort to push through his own ideas for limited expansion in Serbia and 
maximum flexibility for the MdÁ in future peace talks. Although the setting of *934
920 ibid. 
m lbid.
*“  Buridn-Tisza, 10-Dec*l9l5, RE7I ,-44.3.3.
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934 Buri¡in-Conrad, 10-Dec-1915, HHSlA-PA-l-499; also Buriân-Tisza, lO-Dec-1915. REZL-44.3.3. l or
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authoritative war aims would have to wait for the GMR in the next year, Burian would not 
be giving up the MdA’s primacy in his war aims setting process.
SECTION IV
The impetus for the GMR to clarify and set Austro-Hungarian goals came with the 
final defeat of Serbian and Montenegrin forces in late December 1915. Conrad, having had 
enough of being sidelined, split his army from the Germans and independently conquered 
Montenegro in an effort to establish ‘facts on the ground’ for the politicians to follow. The 
general failed in this attempt, for the GMR convened on 7 January 1916 to finalize the issue 
of war aims did not endorse his wishes for total annexation of Albania, Montenegro, and 
Serbia. Despite opposition from among some ministers, Burian’s nuanced understanding of 
the Balkan issues allowed him to win on what his colleagues considered marginal matters 
about which they knew relatively little -  such as Montenegro and particularly Albania. The 
Serbian issue was also not solved as Conrad wished, for although he had strong backing for 
his annexationist plans from Stiirgkh, Kbrber, and Krobatin, it was Tisza’s stance against 
total annexation which forced a compromise. Although Tisza sought to reaffirm most of 
the 19 July 1914 GMR decision not to annex Serbia, his reason for doing so was to 
implement some limited annexations which did not threaten peace prospects or the 
Hungarian state’s stability. By seizing only the Maiva and instituting a colonization plan, 
Tisza hoped to avoid the annexation of more of Serbia. Buridn’s centrist supervision of the 
debate meant that he retained overall control by siding w ith the party which suited him best 
on any given issue. Hence the MdA implemented its own war aims conception in 
Montenegro and Albania, and retained utmost flexibility in Serbia. However, the same 
flexibility allowed Conrad to single-handedly keep up the pressure on Burian for the rest of 
the year on these issues, causing serious disagreement down the line.
Conrad’s patience with the MdA and the OHL had reached its limit, and on 20 
December 1915 he ordered the splitting o f the 3"1 k.u.k. Army under Kflvess from 
Mackensen’s overall command in order to march independently against Montenegro.926 He 
hoped not only to obtain Austro-Hungarian prestige victory in the Balkans, but also to force
Rumpler. “Krieg-sziele," 470.
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the MdA to accept the ‘facts on the ground’ which he was going to create unilaterally, in 
order to support his annexationist aims.
Conrad attempted to alter foreign policy by pressuring Burian with countless 
messages. He wrote on 21 December to complain that the Foreign Ministry had not set out 
clear political war aims for him to pursue, and did not respond sufficiently to his requests. 
Conrad said his main concern was for the morale of his troops, who without clear political 
leadership could begin to doubt the “value o f the monstrous and bloody sacrifices made.”927 
Conrad feared a Bosnia-style occupation without integration. The territory to be annexed 
from Serbia, which by Conrad’s suggestion meant the entire country north of Macedonia, 
must be integrated into the Monarchy -  an impossibility for Burian and Tisza. In the light 
of the imminent setting up of the MGG/Serbia on 22 December, Conrad asked for general 
goals to be pursued in the country. He reiterated that if Austria-Hungary did not try and 
solve the south Slav problem within the framework of the Monarchy and instead allowed an 
independent Serbia to survive, the war “had to be considered lost.”928 On 23 December, 
Conrad again recommended the division o f Albania, saying that only in this w ay could the 
Bulgarians be enticed into helping Austria-Hungary remove the Italians from Valona, as 
Sofia would not otherwise fight to establish an Austro-Hungarian protectorate.929 Even 
though the Germans assessed Valona’s defenses as “nothing serious”930 for the time being, 
Conrad feared Bulgarian-Italian cooperation against a future Albania. Tisza, however, 
supported Burian on the Albanian question against Conrad. He felt that extreme caution 
would have to be exercised in “revealing Austro-Hungarian war aims.”931
Burkin's delayed response on 25 December was filled with generalities, designed to 
keep Conrad at bay until the politicians could be brought in line behind MdA policy. 
Generally speaking, Buridn wanted a rearrangement on the Balkan peninsula and elsewhere 
that allowed for the “greatest possible increase in power and security” for Austria-Hungary. 
However, he also needed an exit strategy, which he identified as an honorable peace that 
could not be allowed to fail over limited, “non-existential questions.” Not only did he have 
to reach agreement with the enemy to secure peace, but Austria-Hungary’s allies needed to 
be won over as well. Hence Buridn wanted to have as much flexibility as possible.
921
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Nevertheless, he intended to neutralize the Serbian-Russian agitation, and to ensure that in 
some form or another Serbia and Montenegro should fall under Austria-Hungary s 
“political, military, and economic rule.”932 Albania would become the Monarchy s 
protectorate, while Poland would be kept away from Germany and affiliated with the 
Monarchy. Conrad, on the other hand, again insisted that only within the context of the 
Monarchy could the south Slav problem be completely solved. To allow a small Serbia to 
survive, argued Conrad, would mean that even after being militarily victorious the 
“Monarchy would have to consider the war a defeat.”933 Burian’s response was the same as 
on 21 December, insisting on Austria-Hungary’s growth in power and security, and the
935
political, economic, and military domination of Serbia and Montenegro.
Tisza’s message to Burian on the issue of w ar aims, sent on 29 December 1915, was 
a response to Conrad’s views. Despite what Tisza termed a military and political 
overestimation of its strength and underestimation of its enemies, the Hungarian Premier 
did not believe a complete victory was possible an w here  but in the Balkans. Austria- 
Hungary had to re-establish its prestige and secure its interests through military success 
there and the defeat of Italy, with peace being only possible once AOK managed to advance 
onto Italian soil937 Although Tisza was pleased with the successes the AOK and OUL had 
secured against Russia and Italy, this only placed the Monarchy in a relatively secure 
defensive posture, not a “complete, crushing victory.” Tisza warned against excessive 
objectives emanating from the AOK and elsewhere, because the Monarchy was not in a 
position to “set and achieve war aims as it saw fit. Rather, the war had to be ended soon, 
given Austria-Hungary’s manpower and economic exhaustion. Tisza wanted to reduce 
Austria-I Iungary’s imprecise war aims and establish precise peace conditions with which to
“convince” the Entente that an agreement was possible.
Despite setting such aims, he backed Buriin against announcing them, for fear this 
could damage the Monarchy’s prestige if they failed. He completely agreed with Burian on 
the Albanian protectorate question, and generally also on Serbia: control of the Balkans to 
prevent its resurgence against the Monarchy «as something he also completely supported,
«3 ,'C*rad.nuriSn,2|.Dee.l9l5,RfZMfH3l. Bunin’s »mmen,,. quoted by Cb-rad.
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though not the annexation of more Serbs. Arguing that the Hungarian state’s interests 
informed the Monarchy’s wider goals,938 Tisza believed that Hungary’s strength was “tied 
to Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status.” His main disagreement with Conrad stemmed 
from their opposing perspectives about whether annexation would eliminate the south Slav 
threat, or whether an independent Serbia could be in the Monarchy’s “gravitational pull.”939 
Tisza argued that neither the Croatians nor the Hungarians would be strong enough to resist 
the Serbs, and that annexation would lead to the “internal breakup” of the Monarchy rather 
than a power increase. Tisza believed, and Burian and the MdA officials generally agreed 
with him, that only by dividing Serbia and seizing the northwest portion could Serbia and 
Montenegro be brought into perpetual dependence on Austria-Hungary, which was his 
ultimate goal, and indeed the only outcome which he believed was achievable. Tisza 
therefore wanted to annex some Serbian territory, but opposed including all of Serbia. He 
had no objection -  as his colonization idea showed -  to an aggressive and expansionist 
policy in the Balkans. His recommendation to shrink and neuter Serbia was the limit of his 
expansionism purely because the Monarchy could not “digest” any more foreign 
nationals.940 Despite drawing support from the 19 July 1914 GMR decision not to annex 
large swathes of Serbian territory, Tisza admitted that “certain revisions” of that agreement 
were needed.941
Conrad’s response on 31 December, shortly before the GMR convened, showed 
how deeply he disagreed. Even regarding strategic border corrections, Conrad argued that 
annexations just of Belgrade and the Ma£va were “unnatural half-measures,” contrary to 
the Monarchy’s interests. Any outcome other than the annexation of Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Albania would be a “contrived solution” which would serve only the “special aims” of 
the “Magyar hegemony.”942 Despite being a soldier, Conrad submitted a remarkably 
political pamphlet to Burian entitled the Political Goals o f  the War. Arguing for an 
“immediate and radical solution” to the south-Slav problem, Conrad demanded the
m  Khuen-ItAderväry-Tisza, 10-Dec-19t5, REZL-44.18.40+41. Karoly Count Khuen-IledervAry de Ik'dervär, 
former Ban o f Croatia, former Hungarian Prime Minister, and Head o f the Hungarian Worker’s Party (Tisza’s 
Party), 10-Dec-1915 commentary arguing against inclusion of rump Serbia beyond strategic border 
corrections. Khuen-Hddervdry, Karoly Graf, österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon IS 15-¡950, Band 3, 
Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 196S, 318.
m  Conrad-Burian, 29-Dec-1915, REZL-44.14.31; See also Tisza-Burian, 30-Dec-)915, HHStÄ-PA-1-499; 
also REZL-44.18.4 0+41.
940 Ibid.
941 Ibid.
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complete disappearance of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania as independent states.943 
Railing against the perceived Magyar hegemony and its “one-sided and narrow-minded 
ambitions,” Conrad argued that allowing any southern Slav state to remain in existence 
would be outrageous and life-threatening for the Monarchy, equitable with an 
“assassination attempt on Austria-Hungary.”944 As for Albania, he argued that a 
protectorate was simply a useless burden.945 His fiercest anger he saved for Italy, against 
which Austria-Hungary would need to enlist Bulgaria and Greece,946 achievable by inviting 
them to partition Albania.947 Although he also saw the dangers of a Bulgaria bordering the 
Adriatic, Conrad felt it was the lesser of the two evils. Against Italy itself, a status quo ante 
peace was not possible, and border rectifications and the expulsion of Italy from the eastern 
Adriatic were necessary.948 Without success in this “indispensable war aim” Conrad 
argued that this war “would, even with a victorious end, for Austria-Hungary be absolutely 
lost.”949 Conrad’s absolutist perspective reflects the similarities between the AOK and the 
post-Falkenhayn OHL, for Ludendorff would later make almost identical remarks with 
regard to what he believed was the German need for widespread annexations.
As Montenegro was falling, Burian resisted Conrad’s wishes as well as German 
efforts for a peace treaty, in favor of the unconditional surrender that the Foreign Ministry 
wanted. On 3 January 1916, he informed Conrad that a separate peace offer to Montenegro 
would still require the same territorial terms as surrender, including the cession of its coast, 
the Lovden, Skutari, Ipek, Djakova, re-establishment of the Tara border, and binding 
political and economic treaties.950 As usual, Conrad had an even more extreme position. 
On 5 January, Conrad informed Burian that Montenegro already had its chance to sue for 
peace, and refused talks because he was not going to let his only independent triumph be 
negotiated away. Rather, Montenegro w'ould have to “capitulate and be at the mercy”951 of
m  Conrad-Buridn, 31 -Dec-1915, HHStA-PA-I-499, Underlining is Conrad’s own; also REZL-44.U.31; also 
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Austria-Hungary. For Conrad, the result should be the elimination of the Petrovic-Njegus 
dynasty and the complete annexation of the country.952
By the time the GMR convened on 7 January 1916, the positions of the AOK and 
the MdA had hardened. Despite waging a massive military campaign, Conrad found time 
to send innumerable messages to the civilian officials, including a supplementary note to 
the GMR participants stating the AOK’s annexationist position. In it, he argued that the 
non-annexation policy adopted 19 July 1914 at Tisza’s insistence was agreed when it had 
been a matter of a punitive expedition, but that the outbreak of a world war had changed all 
premises of that GMR.953 He further argued that full control of the Adriatic was crucial, 
meaning that the Italians had to be removed from the eastern coast.954 Interestingly, he 
agreed with Tisza in not advocating the dismemberment of Serbia as he had recommended 
for Albania.955 However, the reason for this position was that he wanted control of Serbia 
in its entirety, rather than partitioning it and acquiring only a portion. The fact that Conrad 
wanted to annex Serbia right down to the Greek border956 was in stark contrast to the 
promises made to Bulgaria. To improve his chances, Conrad had attempted to align 
himself with Tisza, by assuring him a few days before the GMR that he had no desire for 
“boundless annexations,” and claimed to identify with the Premier’s desire for moderating 
war aims.957 Naturally, this was simply a ruse. Conrad’s goals in the western Balkans were 
to throw the Italians out, avoid a protectorate o f Albania by dismembering it, and annex or 
at least perpetually occupy Montenegro and rump Serbia so as to keep Bulgaria in check.95® 
For Conrad, the “final delineation and stabilization” o f Austria-Hungary’s Balkan aims and 
borders represented of all political and military questions the “most vital o f the vital 
questions.”959
The internal GMR discussion to finalize Austro-Hungarian war aims was an 
opportunity for Burian to moderate the more extreme views of Conrad and Tisza and obtain 
ministerial backing for his own ideas. He also employed the process to allay fears that he 
was acting in Hungarian interests.960 Burian noted the areas of agreement, which were the
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seizure of two bridgeheads into Serbia and that Serbia would be reduced due to territories 
lost to Albania and Bulgaria. The question then became what to do with the remaining 
rump state of 1.5 million Serbs, i.e. whether to annex it or to grant it independence with or 
without rump Montenegro. Both options were fraught with danger, due to the internal risk 
to dualism if rump Serbia were annexed, or the continuation of irredentist agitation if it 
remained independent. Burian did not believe that pan-Serb agitation would be killed by 
annexation. He needed flexibility, and he stated unequivocally that he would overturn any 
GMR decision if the re-establishment of an independent Serbia were necessary to achieve 
peace with Russia.961 Burian stated that Montenegro would lose its Albanian populations, 
the Lovcen plateau, and its entire coastline.962 Contrary to his stated willingness to 
entertain German ideas for a Serb-Montenegrin union, Burian rejected this idea when 
speaking to Austro-Hungarian ministers. Spending more time discussing Albania than 
Montenegro and Serbia, Burian defended his plans to retain its nominal independence as 
the Monarchy’s protectorate. The purpose, he stated, was to align Albania with the 
Monarchy and thereby secure “hegemony in the Balkans.”963 A division of the country 
would not secure Austro-Hungarian interests, he considered, ever with an eye to preventing 
westward expansion by the new Bulgarian ally.964
Tisza was not keen on Burian’s Albanian project and said so, but was prepared to 
support a final attempt at Albanian independence. Regarding Montenegro he sided with the 
German model, which was for a possible unification with rump Serbia. Tisza pushed for 
his ‘Poland for Austria, Serbia for Hungary’ plan, given that he considered this the “most 
important question.”965 To incorporate rump Serbia would not assuage South Slav 
aspirations and would indeed increase the contradictions between Hungary and Croatia. He 
therefore advocated a Hungarian annexation of the Maiva, followed by an “intensive 
colonization” of reliable Hungarian and German farmers designed to create a wedge 
between the Serbs inside and outside the Monarchy. Tisza hoped that in this way Belgrade 
would sink to the level of a Hungarian provincial tow n and lose its dangerous South Slav
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attraction.966 Placing his Premiership on the line, Tisza threatened resignation should his 
colleagues decide to annex rump Serbia.
Stiirgkh agreed with Tisza that Albania was unlikely to succeed as an independent 
state, and urged a very firm protectorate if this solution were to be attempted. He supported 
Burian against Tisza on Montenegro, which he wanted to see reduced to the size and 
importance of an “American nature reserve” and denied unification with rump Serbia.967 
Sturgkh deemed an independent Serbia paradoxical, but rather than seeking partial 
annexations as Tisza had recommended, he suggested that no decision be taken to retain 
maximum flexibility as Burian desired. However, Common Finance Minister Kbrber urged 
complete annexation, on the basis that otherwise the ‘Greater Serbia’ agitation would never 
be extinguished.968 He also suggested a division of Albania as the only workable solution. 
War Minister Krobatin, fearing for a similar situation to 1914 in 10-20 years time, urged 
Serbia’s annexation by Hungary, and strongly supported Tisza’s colonization plans. 
Conrad said little at the meeting, but drew attention to his memorandum and the need for 
quick decisions. Regarding Albania, he urged a north-south division between Austria- 
Hungary and Greece, to prevent Italy and Bulgaria from intervening. He wanted to annex 
Serbia entirely, citing the military dangers that even a small country could cause.
Conrad carried the Austrians Stilrgkh, Korber, and Krobatin, while the Hungarians 
Burian and Tisza remained unconvinced.969 Tisza urged agreeing to a supplement 
reaffirming the 19 July 1914 GMR decision not to annex Serbian territory (in the current 
case not beyond the Maiva), but was resisted by Burian and Stilrgkh as this could tie the 
MdA’s hands,970 and by Conrad because the localized war conditions in which it was 
approved no longer applied.971 The final decision was that no specific determination would 
be made regarding Serbia, allowing for maximum flexibility, but that any territory to be 
incorporated into Austria-Hungary would go to Hungary.972 Some authors have 
erroneously taken this decision to imply that the GMR voted for Serbia’s wholesale 
annexation,973 but this was not the case. In his diary, Burian admitted that he personally
Komjäthy, Protokolle, 365.
947 Komjäthy, Protokolle, 367.
961 Komjäthy, Protokolle, 369.
999 Rauchensteiner, Tod, 3 18.
970 Komjäthy, Protokolle, 369.
971 Rumpler, “Kriegsziele” 470,
971 Komjäthy, Protokolle, 374.
97J Fischer, G riff 397.
preferred to annex Serbia,974 but was being pragmatic in discussions at the GMR. The 
reason he argued for indirect control was that peace with Russia could depend on a policy 
shift away from a Serbian annexation. Either way, Burian felt that the discussion was 
somewhat pointless, but felt that no matter what happened with Serbia and Montenegro, the 
separating Sandjak line would need to be under Austro-Hungarian control.975 Eventually it 
was decided that Montenegro and Albania would be handled via Burian’s formula,976 which 
was a victory for Burian’s Albanian protectorate project.
In the end, the winner was the Foreign Ministry over the AOK. The Austro- 
Hungarian ministers generally sided with Burian’s still extensive aims against Albania and 
Montenegro because they appeared moderate next to Conrad’s frenzied ones. Burian used 
Tisza’s insistence on reaffirming the GMR of 19 July 1914 to resist the overwhelming 
support for Conrad’s annexationist line, while simultaneously using the ministers’ 
territorial appetite to expand beyond the Ma£va. This willingness to annex Serbian territory 
in principle no doubt pleased all the Austrians, while Tisza’s powerful lone voice meant 
that Burian did not have to succumb to the strong pressure from the other participants to 
annex the country wholesale. Although neither side was happy with the result, which laid 
the foundation for future and even more bitter MdA-AOK feuds, it did give Burian the free 
hand he wanted, Buridn was generally able to retain control of the foreign policy-making 
apparatus because he covered some of Conrad’s mandate with his own extensive aims, and 
used the officials against one another.
Although there would be three more GMRs in 1916 during Franz Joseph’s reign and 
under Burian’s auspices, none would again address the issue of war aims. The GMR of 7 
January 1916, therefore, can be seen as the last war aims discussion involving the wider 
government where any conclusive agreement was reached until Czemin took the reins in 
1917. Burian received backing for his Montenegrin and Albanian projects, while the issue 
of Serbia was a compromise that allowed all parties to read into it w'hat they wanted. From 
here on out, the debate would once again be centered internally on the Burian-Tisza-Conrad 
triumvirate. The drawback for Burian was that the inconclusive decisions on Serbia meant
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Conrad would continue to pressure him and Tisza on all three interrelated issues -  Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Albania.
SECTION V
The GMR did not resolve expansion questions to the degree many had hoped. The 
uncertainty about Serbia and the relative fluidity on the ground meant that the AOK stepped 
up its conflict with the MdA to achieve its own vision of war aims in the western Balkans. 
Burian insisted on his foreign policymaking prerogative and Conrad nevertheless opposed 
him, even over matters as ostensibly settled as Albania and Montenegro.
The MdA had an unusually harsh policy of limited annexations and overall control 
of Montenegro, which was one of Burian’s most expansionist programs. This policy 
shocked the Germans, who sought a mild peace towards Montenegro, but did not go far 
enough for the AOK, which desired wholesale annexation. The differences over 
Montenegro stemmed from the goals each pursued. Germany pursued a mild peace in the 
hope of a public relations coup, and also to separate Montenegro from Serbia in the future. 
The AOK sought to have the best possible territorial and economic position when it came 
to peacemaking, so as to prevent the loss of Austria-Hungary’s South Slav territories, its 
control of the east coast of the Adriatic, and its Great Power status. Finally, Burian’s harsh 
policy was informed by his desire to solve the South Slav problem without annexing too 
many Slavs and ensure an enlarged Albania as an Austro-Hungarian protectorate to extend 
the Monarchy’s influence down to the Straits of Otranto. The MdA’s Montenegrin peace 
experiment, which was supported by Berlin, failed and subsequently strengthened the AOK 
which proceeded with implementing martial law. Nevertheless, Burian retained overall 
policymaking control, backed by the GMR and the MKSM at key moments, which even 
overt AOK blackmail could not overcome in the spring of 1916. The continuing 
disagreement and uncertainty about these two countries and their future relationship with 
Kosovo laid the foundation for an Austro-Bulgarian clash over their respective spheres 
which threatened to unravel the Vienna-Sofia alliance.
The Austro-Hungarian armed forces in Montenegro conquered the long-standing 
objective of the Lovden'on 11 January, the Montenegrin capital Cetinje on 13 January, and
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ceased hostilities on 16 January.977 This new situation on the ground unleashed a heated 
diplomatic and bureaucratic conflict over the future of this small state and its southern 
neighbor, Albania, whose fate was closely linked. The debate created fertile ground for 
some of the most detailed presentations of the various Balkan war aims positions. Burian 
was backed by Germany and the GMR in his desire for a peace treaty with Montenegro as a 
propaganda tool to display the Central Powers’ moderation, whereas the AOK wanted an 
unconditional surrender.
Before Buridn could turn his attention to this Montenegrin venture, he had to
contend with fluctuating AOK policies towards the beginnings of the Bulgarian
interference in Albania that would make itself felt for the rest of the war. Conrad pursued a
policy of national dismemberment for Albania, and desired Greek and Bulgarian
intervention to assist Austria-Hungary in expelling Italian troops. Burian informed Conrad
that he rejected granting Bulgaria more territory and that Greece could not offer adequate
support978 In his German-backed policy, Burian considered all of north- and central-
Albania as an exclusively Austro-Hungarian sphere of interest.979 Conrad was actually
surprised by Burian’s willingness to project Austro-Hungarian interests so far south. He
therefore reversed course and warned Burian against a Bulgarian presence in Kosovo
(Pristina-Djakova-Prizren) whose sole possible purpose would be to claim the territory. He
asked the Foreign Minister to make clear in Sofia that Austria-Hungary would not expand
its offers, and “declared all territories west of the agreed line in Montenegro and Serbia, as
well all of north- and central-Albania as its exclusive sphere of interest.”980 *This exchange
shows that Conrad had no problem aligning himself with Burian’s priorities, but only as a
stepping stone to greater claims. Burian did not fall for this tactic, however, and only
instructed his Minister in Sofia, Adam Tamowski, to remind Radoslavov that Austria-
*Hungary’s “war aim” was an ethnographic, independent Albania.
With the Albanian question temporarily out of the way, all interested parties spent 
the next two months arguing about what was to be done with Montenegro. Burian since the 
GMR had agreed with the AOK in demanding an immediate and unconditional surrender
977
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from Montenegro,982 contrary to the Germans who hoped for a domino effect if the peace 
treaty were mild.983 Unfortunately for Montenegro and Berlin, Burian was unwilling to 
offer much leniency. The Foreign Minister was not immune from AOK annexationist 
pressure as a result of the victories, and was caught again between Conrad’s demands and 
Germany’s anxiety. Conrad on 18 January pushed for annexation as the solution 
“commensurate with Austria-Hungary’s heavy sacrifices.”984 * At this point, the general 
would still accept a continued but narrowly confined Montenegro, albeit only as a last 
resort if there were insurmountable difficulties in the negotiations. Drawing comparisons 
with the difficulties Turkey had faced from Montenegro in 1879, Conrad argued that it 
would be irresponsible to allow a “similar plague spot”986 on the body of the Monarchy.
When Conrad later that day erroneously thought that the MdA had dropped any 
annexation plans, he wrote to Burian again. A sovereign Montenegro, he argued, would be 
a lever with which countries like Italy could “wrest Austria-Hungary’s Adriatic position”987 
from her. He threatened that if a peace were made in favor of Cetinje, he would have to 
insist on narrower borders for military reasons.988 Under this plan, Austria-Hungary would 
obtain the coast as well as Cetinje, moving Montenegro’s capital to Podgorica to protect the 
Austrian naval base at Cattaro. Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Burian’s goals were to 
ensure that Montenegro would not again become an enemy tool by seizing the Lovcen, 
Antivari, Montenegro’s coast, and bordering Albania.989 Buridn also coupled his demands, 
which went on to include the entire Sandjak, with demands on behalf of Albania (Djakova, 
Prizren, Ipek).990 91 In this previous shape, the sovereign Montenegro would have to closely
« 991align with Austria-Hungary, culminating in a customs union.
Even though Burian did not go so far as advocate the moving of Montenegro’s 
capital to Podgorica and the annexation of Cetinje as the AOK had done, Jagow was still 
horrified by what he deemed an overly harsh peace proposal. He felt that removing the 
coast, the Sandjak, and ethnic Albanian areas from Montenegro would make it no more
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than a “barren stone pile; nonviable.”992 Though he understood Austria-Hungary’s desire 
to seize the coast and eliminate Serbia, Jagow argued that it would make a terrible 
impression if the Central Powers were to destroy Serbia and strangle Montenegro.993 
Instead, he suggested compensating Montenegro in Serbia for losses to Austria-Hungary, in 
order to “drive a new wedge into the Slavic world.”994 Jagow argued that the Entente 
would use the strangulation of Montenegro to “rightly point out where peace with the 
Central Powers would lead.”995
Austria-Hungary and Germany each sought to limit the other’s annexationist thirst 
(an enterprise that eventually failed on all counts). Regarding Austro-Hungarian war aims, 
the Montenegrin question saw Burian squarely in the driver’s seat in terms of decision­
making. Whereas in the past he had to balance German wishes against AOK demands, he 
now had the luxury of formulating and implementing his own policy with GMR backing, 
and was to some extent courted by his adversaries. Burian was willing to push for as much 
as he could get from Montenegro, while still maintaining the fiction of a benevolent peace. 
Yet his policy of resisting AOK pressure to annex conquered territory remained consistent. 
His hardest decision, however, was how lenient to be without threatening Austro- 
Hungarian interests, and on this he continued to receive advice and pressure from all sides.
Taken from Burian’s own instructions to his top negotiator on 19 January 1916, the 
peace proposals issued to Montenegro would be “less about negotiations and rather about a 
dictate of Austria-Hungary’s peace conditions.”996 Montenegro would be reduced to its 
size following the Treaty of Berlin, losing the Lovcen, its coast, and militarily vital areas, 
and though it would remain nominally independent it would be in .Austria-Hungary’s 
political, military, and economic sphere of interest.997 Furthermore, Montenegro was to 
join a customs and monetary union with Austria-Hungary. Cetinje was expected to 
acquiesce in an Austro-Hungarian gendarmerie policing the country', a demand which had 
originally sparked the Great War follow ing Serbia's refusal of such a point in the 1914 
ultimatum. Finally, Montenegro’s army, which would “form an integral part of the k.u.k. 
defense forces,”998 was to be armed and trained by the AOK. Although Burian ultimately
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decided against pushing for Montenegro to become a “Federal State,”999 this was the closest 
he came to agreeing with Conrad’s push for annexation. In a message to Conrad on 20 
January, Burian stated that despite German hopes for a domino effect of peace requests, 
Austria-Hungary still “should not, if at all possible, give up the benefit of decisively 
eliminating one of its enemies.”1000
It was a moderate but not a mild policy. What Burian struggled with was 
uncertainty about how much value a ‘good peace’ with Montenegro would bring. Prince 
Fiirstenbcrg, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in neutral Spain, represented to the neutrals 
Burian’s line that a harsh peace was fair. In response to a question by the Spanish king as 
to whether mild treatment of Montenegro would not cause Belgium and Serbia to likewise 
make peace, Fiirstenberg argued that such considerations would not come into play because 
Serbia and Belgium were entirely in the hands o f the Entente, and therefore “extensive 
leniency towards Montenegro would not yield the desired result.”1001
It soon became clear, however, that the Germans thought Montenegro was being 
treated far too harshly, whereas the AOK felt Austria-Hungary was being unnecessarily 
lenient. Jagow and Bethmann Ilollweg pressed Hohenlohe on the issue. Although 
admitting that the Montenegrin question was “solely Austria-Hungary's business,” the 
Chancellor pointed out the positive results if the first state abandoning the Entente were not 
treated too harshly.1002 Burian responded immediately. Although he had informed the 
AOK that he did not want any unnecessary indignities1003 during.the surrender, he 
explained to the Chancellor why a too mild treatment of Montenegro would be a grave 
mistake.1004 In order to render Montenegro harmless, it would have to lose “alien-inhabited 
territories” which had artificially strengthened it, claiming that there were no Montenegrins 
in the Sandjak and coastal areas to be annexed.1005 A strong position in Montenegro, 
argued Burian, was a “life and death question” for the Monarchy.1006
Neither the Germans nor Conrad were convinced. The AOK on 22 January accused 
the MdA of ignoring military security requirements, for which the Monarchy “had drawn 
the sword and accepted the heaviest blood sacrifice,” in favor of a swift peace. In their
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view, Montenegro should be no more than a transit hinterland, and at best receive a 
“nominal, pseudo-independence.”1007 Bethmann, on the other hand, did not think the 
emphasis ought to be on rendering Montenegro harmless.1008 This was because if the 
Central Powers were victorious they would easily be able to keep Montenegro in complete 
dependency, while if they lost, the current peace terms would not make a difference 
anyway. By contrast, a lenient peace could be “bait”1009 for others to desert the Entente.
Jagow thought the Foreign Minister was simply being intransigent, after 
Tschirschky reported that Burian was against a unification of Montenegro and Serbia, as 
this would strengthen them and restart the antagonism with Russia.1010 Burian wanted to 
use Serbia as the bargaining chip with which to secure separate peace with Russia, meaning 
that Montenegrin unification with a part of Serbia would be impractical.1011 According to 
the Foreign Minister, any conciliation would only create increased confidence in Entente 
victory, meaning terms had to be dictated.1012 Jagow viewed this behavior as a return to 
Burian’s “Balkan-style diplomacy” and a “grave mistake” which risked sabotaging the 
peace negotiations and driving Montenegro to desperation.1013 To Falkenhayn, Jagow 
remarked that Austrian aspirations, particularly against Serbia, had increased beyond what 
was acceptable for the Bulgarians.1014 Tschirschky reported on AOK plans for the 
complete annexation of Montenegro,1015 while Falkenhayn charged the AA to finally “get 
Austria to clearly say what it wants.”1016
Confusing though Austrian policy seemed to be, the Germans themselves were far 
from unified. The AA and 011L recommended mild treatment and a quick resolution of the 
problem.1017 By contrast, the Bavarian King wanted Serbia and Montenegro to disappear as 
independent territories.1018 Kaiser Wilhelm, meanwhile, considered a separate peace 
“politically highly important.”1019 In a lengthy conversation with the MdA representative at 
Teschen, the German Emperor recommended that, rather than taking more than the Lovcen
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and the Adriatic coast, Austria-Hungary could offer Montenegro territorial compensation to 
ensure a “lasting and honest attachment” to the Monarchy. However, Wilhelm was simply 
following through on a pledge he had made to the Montenegrins through backchannels 
three weeks earlier. If Cetinje sued for peace with the Monarchy, Wilhelm had offered 
support for Montenegro enlarged towards Albania,1020 a policy squarely opposed to 
Burian’s. Jagow, moreover, felt that an increased number of Slavs in the Monarchy would 
“break the hegemony” of the Magyars, who “terrorized” Hungary and the whole 
Monarchy.1021 The Germans were willing to pursue policies diametrically opposed to AOK 
and MdA war aims in the western Balkans in pursuit of their own interests. Not being sure 
which side they feared more -  a Monarchy made unreliable due to the power of the 
Magyars or a pan-Slav irredentist movement racing towards the Adriatic -  made the 
Germans equivocate almost as much as the Monarchy. The difference was that Germany 
could afford to be without a clear policy, at least at first. Buridn’s battle with Conrad and 
the Germans, on the other hand, cost precious time and meant Bulgaria would be sucked 
further westwards by the vacuum left by the Monarchy’s unclear policies.
These differences soon became known. Burian was embarrassed on 23 January by 
the public discussion, initiated by the German press, on the future of Montenegro the same 
day as the country finally surrendered. He demanded press censorship under the war aims 
discussion restriction,1022 to which the Germans agreed.1023 This discussion was a 
particular problem because, in line with the AA position but against both the AOK and 
MdA positions, the German press was generally advocating accommodating peace 
terms.1024 The Germans did not want to do anything which would irritate Burian too much, 
for they hoped Burian would free himself from Tisza’s influence.1025 Berlin also realized 
that Buridn’s goals, though harsh, were closer to their own than Conrad’s.
Buridn was unwilling to make peace at all costs,1026 but still had significant 
differences with the AOK, particularly with regard to Berlin’s behavior.1027 German 
interference sent Conrad into a rage, and even Buridn did not quite understand why 
Bethmann was so involved. Unclear about which small states the Chancellor wanted to
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impress with a mild peace, Burián told Hohenlohe that it was paradoxical for Germany to 
suggest the elimination of Serbia and the simultaneous strengthening of Montenegro. 
Austria-Hungary’s goals, Burián stated, were to weaken Montenegro but then treat it well, 
and insisting on the borders prior to the 1913 Bucharest peace -  Burián’s minimum aim -  
did not constitute a humiliation.1028 Besides, Burián felt, giving Serb territory to 
Montenegro would not only be incomprehensible, but would also prevent a solution to the 
Serb problem. He repeated these thoughts to Tschirschky, adding that Montenegro would 
have to lose its “non-Montenegrin territory” since Austria-Hungary continued to seek an 
ethnographic and independent Albania.1029
In an attempt to relieve German pressure, Burián told them that he had managed to 
dissuade the General Staff from annexing Montenegro.1030 In reality, Conrad one day 
earlier had unleashed a tirade on the issue upon Burián, and in complete opposition to the 
German recommendations. Arguing that the future configuration of the Balkans depended 
more on battles between the Great Powers, Conrad said that the Entente would not keep 
fighting longer than necessary on account of their Balkan protégés.1031 As a result, Conrad 
felt that immediate annexation of the non-Bulgarian parts of Serbia and a plebiscite in and 
subsequent annexation of Montenegro were requirements if Austria-Hungary did not want 
to suffer perpetual problems. Quiet was a prerequisite for the future political and economic 
position, or else the result would be the “loss of Austria-Hungary’s south Slav territories, 
the east coast of the Adriatic, and its entire Great Power status.” In this all-or-nothing 
approach, Conrad argued that the establishment of an independent Albania as the MdA 
wished was next to impossible without annexing Montenegro, for merely taking the 
Sandjak and the coast would result in continuing embarrassment, great military burdens, 
and danger. Besides, Conrad felt, more than north Albania (up to the Mati river) could not 
be taken in this war -  an estimation that proved to be accurate -  and so Greece ought to 
take Valona instead.1032
As if these demands were not clear and forceful enough, Conrad also tried 
blackmail. If, he declared, the MdÁ insisted on an independent Albania, he would not send
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strong contingents to north Albania.1033 He did not want to tie down his forces simply to 
vacate the region once the war was over. Conrad had always considered the Balkans a 
secondary concern to surviving the crushing might of Russia and gaining vengeance against 
Italy, quite contrary to the politicians who, since Berchtold, perceived the pacification of 
the Balkans as politically critical. However, annexation was always alleged by the AOK to 
be the easiest way to deal with the troublesome southern neighbors. Therefore, while 
Conrad’s characterization of Albania as a “side-aim”1034 represented AOK doctrine, his 
interference in the political future of Albania demonstrates just how much he attempted to 
change MdA policy. Thus, it would seem, the goal of creating an independent Albania was 
impossible without Conrad’s consent to send forces. The Foreign Minister was therefore 
faced with the task of pacifying Conrad if he wanted to implement his own vision for the 
future of the western Balkans.
Yet, Burian ignored Conrad’s blackmail and simply glossed over the problem. 
Burian admitted that he had no control over troop levels but urged more k.u.k. troops to be 
used in Albania to implement the k.u.k. government’s political program in the interest o f 
the Monarchy.1035 Conrad responded the next day by reaffirming that, since Burian was 
persisting over the creation of an independent Albania and ruling out the annexation of 
northern Albania, live AOK would be using its forces elsewhere.1036 This finally forced 
Burian to give the AOK a clearer vision o f MdA goals in the western Balkans. Although 
Ritter erroneously states that his note o f 30 January 1916 w as the first time Burian had 
done this, it was indeed his most thorough explanation on this topic. Burten first made 
clear that a unified Albania served Austria-Hungary’s interests more than a divided one, 
and he intended to protect these interests by annexing the Antivari coastal strip and the 
Sandjak.1037 As opposed to the AOK plan for limited annexations in Albania, the MdA 
plan allowed for the benefit o f extending the Austro-Hungarian sphere of influence right to 
the Straits o f Otranto, thereby making the Monarchy the “predominant power on the entire 
eastern coast of the Adriatic.” 1038 Still, Burian w as careful not to demand too much from
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the AOK, merely asking for Conrad’s expendable forces to be sent to Albania, in an effort 
to give the Austro-Hungarian future occupation the “widest possible extension.”1039
Meanwhile, with Montenegro starving,1040 Burian and Conrad continued to fight 
over its future. To place further pressure on the MdA to follow his recommendations on 
Montenegro, Conrad floated the idea of a plebiscite to legitimize Austro-Hungarian rule in 
the country. This AOK plan was as unpopular at the MdA as Conrad’s annexationist 
program. Eduard Otto, former Minister in Montenegro, argued on 27 January that a 
plebiscite as recommended by the AOK would be seen by the population, the Montenegrin 
King, and the neutral foreign countries as an exploitation of Montenegro’s complete 
defenselessness in a futile attempt to force an unacceptable peace on the country.1041 
Burian agreed,1042 arguing that a plebiscite would be seen abroad as a farce of doubtful 
value, and had no practical method of enforceability.1043 Even Conrad agreed that a 
plebiscite would elicit calls of foul play from abroad, but argued that this would prove that 
the Entente would be disadvantaged by it.1044 *In spite of the Foreign Minister’s opposition, 
the option remained on the table, given that Otto informed Burian that the population 
desired peace at all costs, if necessary even at the price o f annexation.1043 This played right 
into the hands o f Conrad, who wanted Montenegro to have a military agreement with the 
Monarchy which would tie it to Austria in the way that other German states were tied to 
Prussia.1046 Coupled with a plebiscite, such a military convention would lead to de facto 
control of Montenegro, even if Burian would not attempt it dejure.
However, Conrad sensed that Burian would not budge and insisted on meeting him 
in early February. He felt that Albania and Montenegro were serious issues which were 
“decisive to the entire future of the Monarchy.”1047 Insisting that his goals were based on 
sound military analysis and the tenets o f self-preservation, Conrad argued that he did not 
seek “boundless imperialist ambitions.”104* With all the losses taken and successes 
achieved in the Balkans despite the pressure o f the Russian and Italian fronts, the AOK
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believed it would seem incomprehensible to the public that the Monarchy should want to 
re-establish these Balkan states. Not only did the Entente not worry about legitimacy as 
much as Austria-Hungary (as the Greek case showed), but the future of the Balkans would 
anyway be decided by the outcome of the world war, prior to which the Monarchy ought to 
implement the most suitable solution. This solution could only be found in the “immediate, 
declared annexation of Montenegro.” With regard to Albania, Burián’s resistance to its 
division did not persuade Conrad either. In order to re-establish that state, Austria-Hungary 
would, as a prerequisite to the MdÁ plan, have to conquer the country, which could not be 
done without endangering Austria-Hungary on the Russian and Italian fronts “to the 
extreme.” Thus, the only alternative would be to offer Italian Valona to Greece or 
Bulgaria, which would end the Italian blockade in the Adriatic and was preferable, 
according to Conrad, to the current intolerable condition.1049 But such a solution was 
opposed to MdÁ plans, for trading one occupier of Valona for another ran counter to 
Burián’s hopes for the country’s independence under Austro-Hungarian tutelage.
By February 1916, Burián’s diplomatic initiative to conclude a formal peace with 
Montenegro had failed and Conrad was now aggressively pursuing his goals in light of the 
MdA’s disappointment. Gloatingly, Conrad argued that the MdÁ’s hesitation about letting 
the AOK take control o f the country had led to a situation where the population could 
become hostile in the rear o f the k.u.k. army.1050 Conrad argued against any future 
diplomatic experiments because they “threatened decisive military successes through 
hesitant indecision.” He used the excuse o f having to disarm two Montenegrin units in 
order to demand military rule of Montenegro, and to reiterate his request to the MKSM for 
annexation as the “only method o f a radical, definitive solution” to the Montenegrin 
question.1051
Left with no choice, Burián on 25 February wrote to the Emperor endorsing 
Conrad’s plan for military control, given that Austria-Hungary had not received a positive 
°r negative response from the Montenegrin king. Stressing the provisional nature1052 of the 
occupation, Burián wanted Montenegro reduced to its size before the Bucharest peace and 
not annexed. The Foreign Minister requested, however, that the implementation of martial
Conrad-Burián, 23-Fcb-l9I6, MlStA-PA-I-996. 
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and Without external manifestations in thelaw be done “without causing a stir”1053 
press,”1054 Conrad had previously denied such requests, for an “inconspicuous coming into 
effect” was not workable1055 on the logical basis that the population needed to know that it 
had taken place. Nevertheless, on 26 February 1916 Franz Joseph authorized the AOK to 
place Montenegro under a ‘Militargeneralgouvernment’ (MGG), combined with Burian’s 
recommendation of installing it “without causing a stir.”1056 The Emperor also boosted 
Burian’s greater Albania hopes by instructing the AOK to rule the Albanian-inhabited 
territories in such a way as to prevent the “appearance of Slavicization.”1057 In this rare 
instance, Franz Joseph intervened through his MKSM since no formal peace could be 
reached and the MdA could not delay any longer.1058 Conrad had won this round o f the 
battle for Montenegro, but would continue in vain to seek the country’s annexation by the 
Monarchy, which Burian and future foreign ministers continued to effectively resist.
Although the AOK and MdA were closer on Montenegro and Albania than on other 
issues, Austria-Hungary’s war aims against these two countries remained a serious bone of 
contention. Burian’s efforts at limited annexation in Montenegro horrified the Germans, 
while Conrad was so distraught over MdA leniency that he threatened to refuse to send 
more troops to the region in order to liberate all o f Albania. The differences resulted from 
what each party hoped to gain from the western Balkans. The Germans wanted a public 
relations victory in the form of a mild peace, while Conrad wanted security for the 
Monarchy’s eastern Adriatic position and thereby Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status. 
Buridn, whose policy of limited annexation was ultimately backed by the GMR and the 
MKSM, sought a solution to the South Slav irredentist problems without incorporating a 
targe number of Serbs or Montenegrins. Rather than enlarging the Monarchy, he sought to 
enlarge his Albanian protectorate, so as to extend Austria-Hungary’s control even further 
south than Conrad had envisaged. This demonstrates Burian’s expansive war aims in the 
western Balkans as well as his strength in standing up to Conrad’s interference. Although 
he faced obstacles, pressure, and even blackmail, Burian ultimately successfully fended off 1043
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involvement in Albania and Montenegro from Berlin and Teschen in the early months of 
1916.
SECTION VI
The extent of Austro-Hungarian war aims became most apparent when there was a 
clash with Bulgaria in Kosovo, between February and April 1916. The following section 
analyzes the diplomatic and military clash over Prizren and Pristina, which risked igniting a 
conflict and unraveling the Quadruple Alliance. The section is divided into three parts. 
First, it argues that the Bulgarians, hoping for access to the Adriatic, sought to expand their 
influence into Albania, and were prevented from doing so by German and Ottoman support 
for Austro-Hungarian policies there. Second, it discusses the diplomatic deterioration of 
Austro-Bulgarian relations in Kosovo, where Bulgaria sought to install its own civilian 
administration contrary to the agreed treaty border. German organs were split over which 
side to support, with the OHL backing the Bulgarians and the AA helping Burian. Finally, 
the section will explore the second and more serious confrontation between Austro- 
Hungarian and Bulgarian forces in Kosovo, during which Conrad led the effort to expel 
Bulgarian civilian administrators from the Monarchy’s sphere of interest there. 
Provocations and diplomatic spats resulted in a military standoff, which ended only by 
means of a Falkenhayn-brokered military arrangement; a result which w'as contrary to 
Burian’s wishes.
Buridn’s unwillingness to annex or in another way publicly lay down war aims for 
the Kosovo region resulted in Bulgarian advances into areas beyond the treaty border. 
However, once the Bulgarian interests became apparent, the extent of OHL and MdA desire 
to control Kosovo and Albania meant a strong response was inevitable, beginning w ith 
clear statements about Austrian spheres o f influence and ending with military 
confrontation. Overall, although Burian lost the battle over administrators in Kosovo -  
which Conrad in effect split with Bulgaria to avoid a military engagement -  the MdA 
continued to uphold its interests and demonstrated without a doubt its very significant and 
extensive war aims in the region.
Via. As the Germans began to understand Austro-Hungarian war aims in the 
Western Balkans, they attempted to balance Vienna’s w ishes against the increasing pressure 
applied by the Bulgarians, who wanted to seize parts o f Albania that would grant them
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access to the Adriatic. Jagow supported an Austro-Hungarian protectorate not only to fight 
Italian aspirations and intrigues on the east coast of the Adriatic, but also to “resist an 
encroachment by Bulgaria,” to prevent it from uniting with Italy and “enclosing Austria in 
the northern Adriatic.”1059 This admission demonstrated an astonishing amount of distrust 
of Bulgaria in Berlin as well as Vienna.
Hohenlohe informed the Germans in late January about Austrian concern about 
Bulgaria, indicating that although Bulgarian formations would be assisting Austria- 
Hungary in subduing Albania, their future militaty presence in the country would give rise 
to claims of ownership rights by Sofia.1060 The Ambassador requested that the upcoming 
visit of the Bulgarian King to Pless be used to support the Austro-Hungarian case, given 
that Vienna “attached great importance to the establishment of an independent Albania.”1061 
This ‘independence’ was naturally qualified as under Austrian influence, designed to resist 
Italian encroachment.1062 Although agreeing to this Austrian request, Jagow did complain 
to Hohenlohe that Germany was not clear about Vienna’s plans with regard to Albania and 
other conquered Balkan territories and hoped that Burian would express himself more 
clearly on these matters.1063 Burian complied on 2 February. Believing the Albanian 
people to be “no less capable of an independent existence than other Balkan peoples,” 
Burian wanted an independent Atbania over which the Monarchy would have the leading 
supervision and support the country in its administrative and economic development.1064 
The necessary land bridge to Albania would be established along the formerly Montenegrin 
coastline and the Sandjak of Novipazar, while northern Albania would be expanded into 
formerly Serbian and Montenegrin areas that were “purely Albanian,”1065 implying 
expansion towards Kosovo and southern Montenegro.
Jagow informed Vienna on 11 February' that the Germans had backed Austrian 
wishes with regard to Albania against the Bulgarian King Ferdinand, describing Vienna’s 
Position as “correct and appropriate.”1066 The Ottomans also supported Burian, who felt 
that only Austria-Hungary could be the “support-granting Great Power,” while the Ottoman
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Empire for its part renounced any future influence in Albania.1067 The Turks’ desire was to 
see a viable Albanian entity, and they supported Austria-Hungary as its “protecting 
power.”1068 The Bulgarians, however, “attached very great importance” to the ownership 
of Pristina and Prizren in Kosovo, which fell on the Austrian side of the treaty border and 
according to the Ottoman Ambassador were two-thirds Muslim in population. The lack of 
Bulgarians in this region of Kosovo made Sofia’s “pretensions quite unjustifiable.” To 
give the territory to Bulgaria would mean the subjugation or even “eradication”1069 of the 
Muslim presence.
However, as this allied support for Burian did not deter the Bulgarians, who had 
their sights set on Kosovo and beyond, more firmness seemed necessary. When, on 13 
February, the Bulgarian King Ferdinand visited the AOK at Teschen, Conrad made it very 
clear that Pristina, Prizren, and Ipek were all in Austria-Hungary’s “area of interest.”1070 
Jagow reinforced this at Pless, where Radoslavov again made claims on Albania and the 
State Secretary resisted it being reduced beyond giving Epirus to Greece. Kaiser Wilhelm 
himself repeatedly advocated to the Bulgarian King “the independence of Albania under 
Austrian protection.”1071 The Germans hoped that united support for Austrian control of 
Albania and Montenegro would lead to a favorable turn of events with regard to the Austro- 
Polish solution. This plan, put forward by the MdA, was an attempt to acquire Congress 
Poland and rule it as a sub-Dualist entity, in large part to limit Polish involvement in 
domestic Austrian politics by granting Poland a degree of autonomy. According to Fischer, 
Berlin was worried that Germany would not receive adequate “spoils of war,”1072 and an 
Austro-Hungarian success in the Balkans could facilitate a German rejection of the Austro- 
Polish solution.
On 23 February Burian, in his talks with Radoslavov, learned that although the 
Bulgarians had withdrawn their requests regarding Albania1073 — demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the pressure applied -  they still laid claim to Albanian-inhabited Prizren, 
Pristina, Dibra, and Djakova which w ere all on the Austrian side of the treaty border, on the 
basis that Bulgaria had conquered them. Burian countered that the Morava valley had been
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conquered from the north yet would be handed over, as per the agreement, to Sofia. Vienna 
was clearly pushing for Sofia to stick to the letter of the treaty which gave only the south­
east Serbian territories -  but no Albanian ones -  to Bulgaria. Austrian unwillingness to 
entertain Bulgarian wishes worried Berlin, but both Tschirschky and Jagow tried in vain to 
get Burian to show greater accommodation.1074 Their unease was shared by Falkenhayn 
who, even though he was preparing for the Battle of Verdun which he launched on 21 
February, had devoted considerable time to these Balkan problems. Buridn’s systematic 
shutting out of Austria-Hungary’s allies from matters relating to Montenegro and Albania 
worried him, and on 24 February he complained that Burian was directing matters in these 
countries as though he had complete discretion.1075 Arguing that an Austro-Hungarian 
advance against Montenegro and Albania would not have been possible without the 
Germans covering the southern flanks, he felt the OHL was entitled to a decisive voice 
“before every new step.” Falkenhayn feared for German interests in the Balkans as well as 
the possibility of “open hostility”1076 between Austrian and Bulgarian troops.
The differences which developed during the spring of 1916 between Austria- 
Hungary and Bulgaria increased the risk that Sofia would turn to Berlin as the guardian of 
its interests. This was bad news for Burian, who still hoped that Bulgaria would lean on 
Austria-Hungary rather than Germany.1077
VIb. While no final agreement was reached with the Bulgarians, Tschirschky 
reported that Burian had plans for a greater Albania including Ipek, Djakova, Pristina, 
Prizren, Tetovo, and Dibra,1078 Radoslavov had stated Bulgarian desinteressement in 
Albania,1079 but this excluded Kosovo and the Macedonian regions with Albanian 
Populations. Concerned that Austria-Hungary was now responsible for provoking the 
Bulgarians with the AOK’s “outrageous” dispatch of troops and administrators to Pristina, 
Prizren, and Elbassan, Falkenhayn said he w ould be prepared to send a German detachment 
to “emphasize Bulgarian wishes” if Burian proved unable to “redress Conrad’s 
violation.”1080 A divide opened in Germany, whereby the AA was reluctantly supporting
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Burian’s plan, while the OHL was supporting the Bulgarians. All agreed, however, that 
Conrad’s intransigence was increasing the tensions between the allies. According to 
Radoslavov, Conrad was trying to form a “parallel government.”1081 Burian assured 
Tschirschky that he did not seek the creation of a greater Albania, merely a viable state.
He did, however, admit to having asked the Bulgarians to pull their administrators out of 
Prizren and Pristina, for those two regions fell under Austro-Hungarian control according to 
the agreement and because the Monarchy would be cut off from Albania on that side if 
Kosovo went to Bulgaria. Burian, while confident that Sofia would not deviate from the 
alliance, was determined to deal with “people like the Bulgarians” by confronting them 
with a fait accompli to demonstrate Vienna’s resolve.1083
The first Austro-Bulgarian crisis took place after Austro-Hungarian troops were 
prevented by Bulgarian troops from entering Kazanik (Ka<?anik, southern Kosovo) on 27 
February. Conrad immediately halted all deliveries of war supplies to the Bulgarians.1084 
Falkenhayn, who reported this to Jagow on 1 March, argued that OHL warnings would not 
be heeded until “clear delineations”1085 had been established between Vienna and Sofia, 
with German help. Jagow protested that such delineations had in fact been “precisely laid 
down,” and that if Bulgaria now desired to extend this border beyond the treaty, it would 
have to do so through negotiations in which Germany would mediate.1086 Supporting 
Burian’s recommendation to have Mackensen mediate (contrary to Conrad’s wishes), 
Jagow remained extremely concerned about the independent actions by the Bulgarian and 
Austro-Hungarian High Commands, which could result in further clashes. Although Jagow 
sympathized with Falkenhayn for having to moderate a man such as Conrad, he insisted 
that Buridn was a “no less difficult partner.”1087
Burian informed King Ferdinand that “west of the treaty border began the Austro- 
Hungarian sphere o f interest” and insisted to Jagow that it was only due to the “cool heads” 
° f  the AOK that more serious incidents had not taken place.1088 Falkenhayn would not 
admit this, and argued that Buridn had “no right whatsoever” to claim the western region as 
Austria-Hungary’s sphere of interest without consulting the Germans, particularly as the
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Bulgarians had conquered Kosovo.1089 Falkenhayn would often change his mind as to 
whether conquest warranted continued territorial control beyond the treaty line, but in this 
case he sided squarely with the Bulgarians, even though he was concerned about their 
expansionism.1090 *Though the situation had been resolved to “approximately the status quo 
ante”xm with Austro-Hungarian troops removed from the area, Vienna would still not 
allow Bulgarian administration of Kazanik, and instead maintained its troops in Pristina and 
Prizren to keep an eye on the Bulgarians and demonstrate Austria-Hungary’s continued 
interest there.
Vic. Though potential military clashes had been headed off, diplomatic 
disagreements continued, and over the course of March, the MdA dealt extensively with 
Albania and with opposing Bulgaria in Kosovo. Though Bulgarian designs may have 
ultimately extended to a portion of Albania in order to obtain access to the Adriatic, Vienna 
had to disrupt Sofia’s incremental steps towards acquiring Albanian border areas first. The 
problems arose because Bulgarian troops were in administrative control of a territory in 
Austria-Hungary’s sphere of interest, namely Kosovo. It would only be a matter of time 
before the occupying troops treated it as theirs.
Burian’s plan with regard to the Bulgarian designs on Kosovo (Pristina-Prizren) was 
to continue friendly negotiations,1092 while at the same time strengthening the hand of the 
AOK1093 in its German-mediated negotiations with its Bulgarian counterpart. 
Unfortunately for Conrad, German pressure did not make much difference on the ground. 
On 7 March the AOK learned of a written Bulgarian order to the k.u.k. troops in Pristina- 
Prizren prohibiting further requisitioning by the Monarchy’s soldiers, against which the 
AOK promptly protested in Sofia. Incensed by this affront, Conrad demanded further 
diplomatic assistance against these “ever larger and more alarming violations,” since the 
Bulgarians knew precisely, that the Monarchy was not currently able to “defend its rights 
with military means of coercion.”1094 He demanded that the Bulgarians agree to a partition 
of the Pristina-Prizren region, recognize Austria-Hungary’s exclusive military authority in 
north Albania as far as the Skumbi river and all of Montenegro, and retreat from Djakova
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because Austria had defeated Montenegro alone.1095 This episode opened a second Austro- 
Bulgarian crisis.
Now that Conrad and Buriân had a common adversary in the Bulgarian High 
Command, Buriân did what he could to mend his fences with the AOK. On 10 March 1916 
he informed Conrad of his continued efforts on behalf of the AOK to uphold the 
Monarchy’s “unquestionable rights” against Bulgarian interference.1096 However, Buriân’s 
adherence to the treaty border and his repeated pleas to the Bulgarians not to install a 
civilian administration beyond it all fell on deaf ears.1097 The Bulgarians felt that they had 
the right to install a civilian administration on any territory they conquered. On the other 
hand, a joint Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian military commission to control Pristina-Prizren 
was rejected by Conrad,1098 a fact that Buriân deeply regretted.1099
While the AOK and MdÀ positions were harmonizing, the Bulgarians remained 
aggressive. According to German reports, the Austro-Hungarians viewed Bulgarian 
designs in particular with regard to the rest of Albania as “exaggerated.”1100 On 15 March, 
the German Minister in Sofia reported that King Ferdinand, during his latest visit to 
Vienna, had been irritated by Conrad, Buriân, and Tisza, who had all attempted to dismiss 
Bulgaria’s “rightful claims” with “crudeness and scorn.”1101 Reminding the Germans that 
it was the “blood of 20,000 Bulgarians” that had managed to reverse Potiorek’s failures and 
seize the Lovéen, the King felt unable to simply give up Prizren-Pristina. Even though 
Radoslavov used more careful language, the Austrians were certainly afraid that the 
Bulgarians would not be willing to part with the territories they had conquered.1102 These 
fears were reinforced when on 16 March the Bulgarians beat pro-Austrians in Djakova 
(Montenegro), against which Conrad could do little except protest and remind the local 
Bulgarian commander that the “full maintenance of Austro-Hungarian sole influence” in 
Bjakova was his duty.1103 Even Tisza, who badly needed the Bulgarians to keep Rumania 
,n check, was shocked by their “exorbitant greed.”1104 Nonetheless, he still felt that there
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existed “no colliding interests” with Bulgaria, and the alliance would hold since both sides 
had the same enemies. For Tisza, the Rumanian question was far more significant, and he 
urged Tamowski to handle any misunderstandings “with cool blood.”" 05
With attempts to influence the Bulgarians failing at all levels, the Austro- 
Hungarians turned to the Germans for assistance. The MdÀ received support from the AA, 
which urged Falkenhayn “not be too ‘Bulgarian’” in the dispute."06 Jagow had previously 
reminded the King Ferdinand and Radoslavov that the “creation of a viable Albanian state 
was a war aim” in Vienna, and suggested the Morava valley as potential compensation."07 
The German understanding was that Austria-Hungary had a greater political interest in 
Albania than the areas along the Austro-Bulgarian treaty border. Having initially given 
Austria-Hungary a free hand in Albania, the AA now defended Vienna’s interests there and 
pointed out that Bulgarian claims initially only focused on the Morava valley. Only when 
the Bulgarian military attaché Colonel Gantschew showed Jagow a map of Bulgarian 
demands, was it clear that Sofia’s desired border fell deep w ithin Albania, leaving the latter 
deprived of valuable territory and, indeed, “hardly viable.” Jagow w as well aware that, in 
the question o f Albania, “Austria would never back dow n.”" 08
In another twist, on 18 March the Bulgarians demanded Prizren, Pristina, and 
Elbassan retain their Bulgarian civilian administrations. Buriàn told Jagow this would 
prejudice the future political decisions in Bulgaria’s favor, and recommended instead that 
no civilian administration be installed at all -  which Jagow supported and suggested to 
Radoslavov. Jagow considered such a plan was fair and beneficial to Germany as well, 
since otherwise “a serious conflict with Vienna” could result, which must be avoided “at all 
costs.”" 0l> However, Buriàn rejected Radoslavov’s counterproposal, whereby the 
Bulgarians would declare that their occupation zones would not set a precedent, and 
insisted on a Bulgarian withdrawal -  a view that even Tamowski found “brusque.”" 10 
Jagow feared that this dispute could lead to his ultimate nightmare of a Bulgarian defection, 
since he believed that the “the bloc whose coalition first goes to pieces” would be doomed 
to lose the w ar.""
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Meanwhile, the situation on the ground again became precarious. By 23 March the 
Bulgarian administration in Djakova (Montenegro) was engaging in “terrorist methods” to 
exact obedience and prevent by force the population from following the directives of the 
k.u.k. commands,"12 whereas Conrad instructed his military attache in Sofia to raise the 
matter with the Bulgarian High Command. Unless the local Bulgarian commander 
received instructions to abstain from meddling in matters of the Austro-Hungarian 
administration, a “conflict with Austro-Hungarian troops” would be the “inevitable” 
result."13 Despite this threat, and although on 25 March the Bulgarians sealed off the 
treaty border treating it as the “new Bulgarian national border,”" 14 they still retained troops 
on the Austrian side in Kosovo. This development actually served Conrad’s interests, as 
his removal of a k.u.k. battalion deployed beyond the treaty border -  a de facto acceptance 
of the ‘new’ Bulgarian border -  gave him the opportunity to call upon the Bulgarians to do 
the same with their units on the Austro-Hungarian side of the treaty border, namely in 
Pristina-Prizren, Djakova, and Elbassan.1" 5 For this reason, Conrad pushed for this 
resolution over his previous, more intransigent behavior.
Falkenhayn used Conrad’s position on this for a last attempt to broker an 
agreement, whereby Prizren-Pristina be vacated by the Austro-Hungarians, and Djakova 
and Elbassan by the Bulgarians."16 Buriàn, employing uncharacteristic brinkmanship, 
rejected this proposal out o f hand, and informed Conrad that the proposal was 
unsatisfactory because Falkenhayn did not take into consideration Austria-Hungary's 
“special interests” in Montenegrin-inhabited Djakova and Albanian-inhabited Elbassan."17 
Thus, neither city could be regarded as compensating Austria-Hungary for a Bulgarian 
Prizren-Pristina -  an idea which Buriàn characterized as “giving up the contested in order 
to obtain the uncontested.” Buriàn therefore continued to reject the “unjustified Bulgarian 
claims” on Pristina-Prizren, and was pleased that the AOK returned troops there to enforce 
his wishes."18 Conrad had also heard of Bulgarian plans to seize the low er Morava valley 
and the west bank of the river. Apparently, Sofia regarded Serbian territory west o f the 
Austro-Bulgarian treaty border as fair game because the Austrians had not laid claim to it
'''*  Wiesner-Buriàn, 24-Mar-1916, RF.ZL-4 5/16.
„ ■
lMt Thum-Burian. 25-Mar-1916, REZL-45/16.
"'ibid.
tliJObemdorfl-Jaeow, 28-Mar-!916, NARA-UM-U5/777-795.
Burión-Wiesncr, 25-Mar-1916, RLZL-4S/16.
238
beyond a Belgrade bridgehead and the Schabatz."19 Conrad therefore urged Burian to state 
that the “formerly Serbian territory' west of the treaty border remains reserved exclusively 
under Austro-Hungarian dominion.” The alternative to making the necessary declarations, 
feared Conrad, would be that the Austro-Hungarian “sphere of interest would crumble 
piece by piece.” He urged Burian again to finally define the Monarchy’s war aims for this 
region or risk losing German support,"20 and he forwarded his request again to the MKSM, 
yet to no avail. Receiving no support, Conrad proceeded to ensuring what he believed the 
MdA had jeopardized, namely exclusive control over the western region of the treaty 
border.
Whereas in Sofia Ferdinand remained intransigent and Radoslavov threatened 
resignation because Germany had sided with Austria, Jagow in Berlin feared that the only 
way to “avoid a conflict at this moment” would be to force Austria-Hungary to accept 
Sofia’s proposal that a Bulgarian civilian administration in the disputed areas would not 
imply a precedent."21 This surrender to Bulgarian blackmail was avoided, when on 27 
March (and contrary to Burian’s stated position on the matter), the AOK provisionally 
vacated the Pristina-Prizren area in exchange for the Bulgarians doing the same in Djakova 
and Elbassan, as Conrad had wished."22 This move came without prior knowledge in 
Berlin or Pless"23 but did manage to satisfy the Bulgarian King."24 Having been 
circumvented without achieving the Bulgarian civilian administration’s withdrawal from 
Pristina-Prizren, Burian attempted to plead ignorance of the military deal.1125 In the end, he 
was forced to acknowledge the AOK’s acceptance o f the Falkenhayn division as a “military 
provisional arrangement,” though this was done “against the objections of die MdA.” 
Burian rejected Conrad’s accusations that his failings had whetted the appetite of the 
Bulgarians for Kosovo in the first place, pointing out that the MdA had repeatedly informed 
Bulgaria that the western portion of the treaty border was “an Austro-Hungarian sphere of 
interest.”1126
The agreement between the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian High Commands on 
their respective administrative zones was signed on 1 April, with no further talks being held
^  Conrad-Buridn, 25-Mar-l 916. REZL-45/t6.
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on the topics of Serbia and Albania.1127 This, Jagow believed, was because the Austro- 
Hungarians did not want to threaten a potential separate peace with Russia, which would be 
difficult if Vienna laid claims on Serbia. Thus, rather than prejudice the Balkan situation 
before an agreement with Russia could be reached1128 in an effort to keep his diplomatic 
options open, Buriàn chose a path of ambivalence even vis-à-vis the AOK. Yet it was 
precisely this ambivalence towards the Serbian territory west of the treaty border which 
gave Bulgaria an opening to lay claim to Elbassan and Djakova. Germany thought 
Bulgaria wanted Serbia to be eliminated immediately, while the Austrians -  who desired 
annexation of “certain border areas such as Belgrade and the Malva’’1129 -  had to contend 
with Hungary’s opposition to a further growth in its Serb population.
Having been involved in the negotiations over the Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian 
border dispute, the OHL now had a better understanding of w ider Viennese goals, including 
the annexation of the Lovcen and the continued desire to keep Albania autonomous but 
under Austrian influence.1130 The Ottomans too, aware of the Bulgarian designs on 
Albania, given that King Ferdinand had recommended an annexation of Albania by 
Bulgaria or at least a royal union, also supported this Austro-Hungarian aims in Albania. 
This was partly out of concern at possible Bulgarian design on Elbassan, which would 
reach deep into Albania, leaving the country w ith nothing but a narrow coastal strip “shorn 
of its best parts.” The Germans were unsure how the situation in the Balkans would 
develop, given the heterogeneous w ishes of their partners, expecting future development to 
be dependent on the Russian position and state o f the war. Jagow expected Germany to 
naturally have a decisive say, to ensure that a “potential accommodation with Russia not 
fail over the Balkan question,” a need that Buriàn wholly recognized. Jagow, fully aware 
that it would anyway be difficult to reduce Bulgarian demands on Serbia, Rumania, and 
possibly also on Greece to an acceptable degree, did not want to make new promises that 
could make the Bulgarians even more difficult to deal with.1131 In the end, Buriàn and 
Jagow would have to work hard even to insist that the military' agreement over Prizren- 
Pristina was a temporary one, and that tire Austrian government “fully maintained its
m7 Jagow-GrflnauII.udcndoriT}, l-Apr-1916, NARA-FT 5004-(T-l20,2522).
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demands” on Kosovo,1132 a position which sent the Bulgarian King into “vehement 
lamentations,” as he had clearly hoped the issue was settled in his favor.1133
The history of this little-known dispute has illuminated the extent of both AOK and 
MdA war aims in Kosovo and adjacent regions demonstrates the desire of Bulgaria to reach 
the Adriatic and the very serious opposition this faced in Vienna and Teschen. With 
faltering backing from the Germans -  who were split on which side to support -  Conrad 
and Burian relied instead on a surprising level of internal cooperation and external 
brinkmanship to protect the Austro-Hungarian interests in Kosovo. The dispute -  which 
centered on the creation of a Bulgarian administration in Prizren and Pristina contrary to the 
treaty border agreement with the Monarchy -  risked igniting a wider conflict as both sides 
sought to further their interests.
Although Burian was unable to secure MdA policy in every aspect of this clash with 
Bulgaria, his plan of supporting the AOK to protect w ider Austro-Hungarian goals was one 
of the rare moments when diplomatic and military objectives overlapped. Thanks to a 
united front, the Austro-Hungarians were able to effectively resist Bulgarian expansion to 
the Adriatic, although the future of Kosovo itself remained in doubt. The incident helped 
crystallize internally and externally Austro-Hungarian war aims in Kosovo, which the 
Monarchy insisted was its to administer, dissect, and redistribute.
SECTION VII
Concurrent with the Austro-Bulgarian dispute, the internal debate about the future 
of Serbia continued. Against the backdrop of Sofia’s threat to Kosovo and Albania and the 
danger of a homogenized Greater Bulgaria, Tisza had a tough time defending his policies 
against an AOK unwilling to abide by the GMR decision. Whereas Conrad sought to 
redress directly with the Emperor (via the MKSM) the GMR decision to limit annexations 
in Serbia, Tisza worked with Krobatin and more successfully with Buridn to isolate the 
AOK. The MdA’s weakening influence forced Burian to side more openly with Tisza, 
insisting that the MGG/Serbia was merely a placeholder, disallowed from making political 
decisions on the country’s future. Tisza’s goals w ere twofold. First, he sought to limit the 
AOK’s and MGG/Serbia’s annexationist occupation tendencies, for fear that future Austro-
, ,n  Obemdorfl-Jaeow, 9-Apr-1916, NARA-FT S004-(T.t 20.2522).
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Hungarian prestige might be compromised if Serbia had to be vacated after a peace deal. 
Second, he sought to ensure that in the occupation Hungarian administrators were given 
preference over Austrian ones, in an effort to prepare for limited Hungarian annexations of 
key Serbian regions.
With both sides believing that these questions in the Balkans represented the most 
vital of Austria-Hungary’s war aims, the clash between Tisza and Conrad escalated. 
Following a visit to the occupation zone, Tisza suggested logistical and political changes 
for a less lenient occupation, to prepare the region for eventual exclusive Hungarian 
control, and to avoid loss of prestige if the Monarchy had to retreat from most of it. 
Nonetheless, the AOK pursued an openly independent policy, ignoring and rejecting the 
GMR position on Serbia, and taking its case directly to the Emperor for approval. Tisza, 
employing Burikin as a counter, was unable to implement the drastic change in Serbia he 
had hoped for, due to the onset of the devastating Brusilov offensive in June 1916. Thus, 
while the GMR decision still stood and the Burian-Tisza axis determined its future policy, 
the two men were unable to implement ground-level changes to suit Tisza’s Hungarian­
centric plans. For its part, however, the AOK was unable to secure the change in political 
decision-making it needed to ensure Serbia’s future annexation. This meant that although 
this episode was a partial defeat for Burian and Tisza, Conrad was unable to overcome their 
united front against his annexationism, demonstrating the MdA’s continued, albeit 
weakened control over the foreign policymaking process.
From the winter o f 1915 until the onset o f the Brusilov offensive in June 1916, 
Albanian-inhabited Serbian territory became the focal point o f Austro-Bulgarian tensions, 
culminating in the military confrontation of March 1916. Connected to this issue was the 
matter of Slav and Muslim repatriation in occupied Serbia. The AOK, with Buridn’s 
support, rejected the repatriation of Serbian refugees,1134 and in return the AOK supported 
Burian’s policy of repatriating Muslims in the Sandjak.113* A return of the Muslim 
refugees and an exclusion of Serbian refugees from the same occupied territory serv ed to 
strengthen the Muslim element in the occupation zone and, by weakening Serbia, to assure 
Austro-1 lungarian supremacy.
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This policy did not extend to ‘New Serbia’ (Bulgarian Macedonia), where Sofia’s 
policy of Macedonian homogenization also clashed with Vienna’s interests, since the same 
friendly Muslim element was desirable here too. Burian therefore resisted the emigration 
of Muslim Albanians from the Bulgarian-administered Serbia into the MGG/Serbia. To 
allow Bulgaria to create an ethnically homogenous Macedonia would have threatened 
Austria-Hungary’s long-standing policy of dividing and weakening Balkan states. Such 
tools would remain vital to Vienna if Bulgaria one day replaced Serbia as the proclaimed 
unifier of the South Slavs and thereby threatened the Monarchy. Burian therefore rejected 
the emigration of Albanians from Bulgarian Macedonia to the Monarchy’s occupation 
zones, as this would “support Bulgarian pretensions” on Balkan territory as far west as 
possible.1136 He did this by asking the AOK to drag their feet on the settlement of 
Macedonian Muslims who did manage to cross, which was the first instance of the Foreign 
Minister’s attempt to sabotage the Bulgarian ethnic homogenization plans for their 
occupation zone.
The desire to keep Macedonia heterogeneous was a deliberate policy of Burian’s to 
prevent the rise of a Greater Bulgaria which could threaten -  either currently or in the 
future -  Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia itself. The Bulgarians began early on seeking
I «
territory in the MGG/Serbia for themselves, such as the Semendria-Nis railway line. 
Burian rejected any request which would infringe on the “clear border” as laid down in the 
Austro-Bulgarian agreement.1138 Burian’s stance so soon after the region fell to the 
invading forces showed how determined the MdA was to support the AOK in defense of 
Austro-Hungarian occupation territory. Even if Serbia were to be resurrected, which was 
the subject of much acrimony between the AOK and the MdA, both sides nevertheless 
agreed that while the country was also administered by Austria-Hungary, Bulgarian 
ambitions must be kept in check.
Against this backdrop of Bulgarian expansionism not only in Kosovo but also in 
other areas of MGG/Serbia, the continuing uncertainty gave rise to a conflict between Tisza 
and Conrad. Neither Conrad nor the Bulgarians wanted to see a resurrected Serbia, and for 
this reason Conrad informed the MKSM that Tisza's intentions ran counter to the AOK, 
OHL, AA, and Bulgarian policy. Although Conrad often stated that Bulgaria would, if *7
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necessary, independently go after a small Serbia to eliminate it, on 18 February' he went 
even further, arguing that the loss of Bulgaria as an ally -  which would be the likely result 
of such an invasion of Serbia -  would be “synonymous with the loss of Austria-Hungary’s 
influence on the Balkan peninsula.”" 39 He expanded on the Bulgarian war aims on 26 
February, when he explained how Sofia’s aggressive demographic and cultural 
readjustment policies were designed to create a “South Slav Balkan Great Power.” The 
methods used to build such a Greater Bulgaria included “death marches,” executions, and 
cultural measures aimed at eliminating the non-Bulgarians and upper classes.1140
Tisza, however, would not be deterred by any AOK threats. Over the course of the 
first few months of 1916, he continued to oppose any annexation of Serbian territory, and 
officially did not even recognize the Monarchy’s intention of annexing strategic territory, 
merely administering it. On 13 February he reminded War Minister Krobatin of his 
perspective that widespread annexations in Serbia were contrary to Austro-Hungarian 
policy."41 Concerned that the MGG/Serbia “misunderstood” its role in this regard, Tisza 
asked Krobatin to make clear to his subordinates that Austria-Hungary' was simply in 
military occupation o f certain Serb territory but that there could be no talk of incorporation 
because such a move would be contrary to the “official, unanimous decision” o f the 
GMR."42 Tisza warned Krobatin of the negative consequences for Austria-Hungary’s 
prestige and future status in Serbia if the MGG pursued goals contrary to the policy set 
forth by the diplomats and politicians.
The AOK intended to govern uniformly the entire Serbian region it had occupied, 
but Tisza urged Krobatin to prevent this. Serbia had to be merely saved from starvation, 
not resurrected as it was before the war. Rather, the likely future border corrections would 
be absorbed by Hungary, meaning that it would fall to the Hungarian government to make 
future administrative decisions."43 This was an important point, for it meant that Tisza 
intended to keep Serbia off the agenda for as long as possible, so that when the final 
territorial disputes took place he would not have to contend with conflicting k.u.k. Imperial 
policy as instituted by the army in his efforts to install a Hungarian administration. He 
realized that only when the territory was officially handed to Budapest would he be able to 976
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implement his Hungarian administration plan. This behavior was not about preventing 
Austro-Hungarian expansionism; it was a policy of preventing Austrian or Imperial 
expansion into Serbia for the benefit of securing Hungarian expansion. Strictly speaking, 
Tisza’s policy was about limiting Austro-Hungarian war aims, though it was for the 
purpose of expanding independent Hungarian ones.
Despite Tisza’s blatant Hungarian-centric attitude, Burian still supported the 
Premier. The Foreign Minister agreed that Austria-Hungary did not seek to incorporate 
Serbian territory, and so the MGG/Serbia would have to redefine its role as being as 
minimalist as possible.1144 Where he disagreed with Tisza was merely in the matter of 
ethics; although he did not want to help Serbia too much, he did want to assist it enough to 
survive at a “bare minimum.”1,4S The problem was that while Stiirgkh stated plainly that 
the Austrian half could not help, Tisza wanted to feed Serbia with Bulgarian or Rumanian 
grain.1146 Burian did not see this as feasible, given the hostility exhibited by Rumania and 
the very limited quantities available to Bulgaria.1147 For this reason, if Hungary was to be 
the next owner of Serbia or part of its territory, it would have to be Budapest that offered 
the provisions necessary to prevent Serbia from “perishing.”1148 Thus, if Tisza wanted to 
seize Serbian territory, he would have to initially put up the provisions.
Due to its diminishing influence over AOK activities on the ground in the 
MGG/Serbia, the MdA began to ally itself more closely to the Hungarian government.1149 
The AOK’s decision, for example, to remove Cyrillic in Serbia led to a strong objection by 
Tisza, who was backed by Burian. The issue was not so much about Cyrillic, but rather a 
turf war on who would have the say in Belgrade. Other disagreements included the 
unnecessary use of Serbian politicians for MGG/S administration or the Military Governor 
Johann Ulrich Graf von Salis’ open talk o f Serbia’s political, cultural, and economic future 
under Austro-Hungarian leadership.1150 Burian did not want to see any measures that 
would “raise thoughts o f annexation” or a similar precedent, only to have to possibly 
abandon these regions later,1151 so he informed Salis that his role was threefold: protection 
of Austro-Hungarian military interests, ensuring security, and minimal support for the
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population. Everything else would have to be decided by the MdA in conjunction with the 
Austro-Hungarian politicians, for questions of peacemaking, future territorial control, and 
economic questions all went right to the heart of the Monarchy’s war aims in Serbia. Given 
that the future of Serbia remained uncertain, the Foreign Ministry wanted the MGG/S to 
keep its activities there “to a minimum.”1152
Burian’s pressure on Salis had limited effect, for although Salis agreed that he must 
not prejudice the future development of Serbia, he claimed to be merely a “vassal of the 
AOK.”1153 This meant that to resolve the issues surrounding the differing war aims against 
Serbia, Burian had to deal with Conrad directly. The MdA was significantly more 
concerned about prestige and not creating obstacles to peace than was the AOK, making 
this turf war unavoidable. Burian believed the MGG/Serbia, backed officially by the AOK, 
was trying to change facts on the ground which would have repercussions on foreign policy 
and the future of Serbia, which it was not authorized to do.1154 Buridn contended that even 
the AOK’s support for MGG/Serbian actions went beyond its competencies, since only the 
MdA was “responsible for the conduct o f foreign policy” in the Monarchy.1155 Although 
Burian later claimed to sympathize with the need to replace Cyrillic, he rejected the AOK’s 
efforts to do so in occupied Serbian territory, given that the MGG/Serbia was merely a 
“placeholder for the future regime.”1156 Towards the AOK, at least, Burian maintained that 
all of the MGG/Serbia, or at least most of it, would be resurrected, much to Conrad’s fury.
Conrad decided to involve the Emperor’s MKSM to resolve the issue of Serbia. On 
16 April, he requested a “clarification of Austria-Hungary’s war aims” regarding Serbia, as 
uncertainty was making its administration increasingly difficult.1157 Conrad argued that 
“economic dependency, protectorate, and overlordship” were all “worthless and 
unsustainable fabrications” which would not solve the problem of Serbia remaining a 
“crucible o f agitation.” Accusing the Hungarians of pursuing selfish aims, Conrad argued 
that extreme nationalist positions in Budapest were behind the MdA’s delaying tactics. The 
Hungarians, he claimed, would never make sacrifices that could threaten their dominance
usi
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within the Dual Monarchy. He bemoaned the “estrangement” of the two halves and desired 
war aims which were in the interest of the entire monarchy.1158
Conrad was correct in suspecting that Tisza was trying to appropriate control over 
Serbia in the medium term and that Burian was assisting in this endeavor. However, he 
was mistaken in thinking that Tisza did not want any annexations at all for fear of 
incorporating Slavs. Tisza was willing to consider what annexations were necessary, but 
these had to be on Hungarian terms, attached to the Kingdom of Hungary, and the territory 
concerned to be colonized with Hungarians and Germans.
By contrast, for Conrad the question of war aims centered on two issues, Poland and 
the Balkans, of which the Balkans was unequivocally “the most vital.” It was here that 
certain offensive aims had to be met, for without minimum gains the war would “with all 
its sacrifices have to be considered lost.”1159 Only a “radical solution” here could protect 
the Monarchy from new crises and “catastrophic entanglements.”1160 Blaming the 
Hungarians generally and Tisza specifically for their Magyar stance of preventing Serbia’s 
annexation, Conrad argued that re-establishing Serbia would continue the pre-war dangers, 
while limited annexations around Belgrade and the Ma£va would be an “irresponsible 
threat to the existence of the Monarchy as a w hole.”1161 Begging the Emperor not to favor 
the Hungarians’ special interests and the MdA’s bridgehead plan over what he saw as the 
Dual Monarchy’s interests, Conrad recommended annexation of all Balkan (i.e, Serbian, 
Montenegrin, and Albanian) territory not occupied already by Bulgaria. To do otherwise 
would grant the land-hungry Bulgarians the possibility of sacrificing the alliance to seize 
the rest of Serbia in pursuit of “Balkan hegemony,” leading to a Greater Bulgarian threat to 
Austria-Hungary’s South Slav regions.1162 Should Bulgaria seize all o f Serbia, Conrad 
warned, the Monarchy would not only lose all influence there, but also the “considerable 
natural resources and defensibility.”1163
Tisza seized the initiative back from Conrad during a visit between 12 and 16 May 
to MGG/Serbia. Although the Military Governor “protested against this civilian 
inspection” of a military outfit, Tisza did not relent, interv iewing soldiers and scrutinizing
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the MGG’s files. The result was that the Hungarian Premier called for a “systemic and 
administrative change” in Serbia.1164 In a personal letter sent on 25 May to Archduke 
Friedrich as head of the AOK, Tisza urged him to accept the assistance of the 
ZiviJlandeskommissar and other civilian functionaries who had so far been marginalized. 
He also complained of the fact that Hungarian administrators had not been given priority in 
Serbia the way Austrian ones were leading in Poland.1165 In economic terms the Austrians 
also retained control, contrary to the parity desired by Tisza. Regarding the MGG/Serbia as 
a whole, Tisza expressed concern that the Monarchy’s prestige was being damaged by the 
all too lenient treatment of the Serbs. He believed that the Serbs were “an oriental nation 
nurtured to hate the Monarchy,” who had harassed the retreating Austro-Hungarian forces 
only a few months before, and that any current friendliness was opportunistic. Although 
Tisza did not advocate “unnecessary harshness or even mistreatment,” he wanted the 
Serbian population to see that the Austro-Hungarians were the conquerors who had life and 
death control over them, so as to develop “awe and gratitude.”1166
Although Tisza wanted the army to be seen as conquerors, he rejected the 
MGG/Serbia’s “obvious aspirations to act as the definitive ruler” which demonstrated a 
“clear intention of annexation.” In his opinion, an annexation o f Serbia would be a 
“misguided and dangerous experiment.” If Austria-Hungary did nothing during its 
occupation to threaten the re-emergence of a new Serbian state, Tisza argued, the 
Monarchy would be able to set up a dependent state. More importantly, the withdrawal 
from an annexed MGG/Serbia after a peace would seem like a defeat for the Monarchy, 
which would have forced a retreat by Austria-Hungary, damaging prestige on the entire 
Balkan peninsula. Although Tisza highlighted a number of inconsistencies between the 
MdA and AOK approaches to the Serbian occupation, his main opposition was towards 
measures which did not fit into the “framework of the Hungarian state,” as it would be this 
country which would “annex everything that the Monarchy obtains from Serbia.”1167
In the light of Tisza’s pressure and his desire to push the issue up the agenda all the 
Way to the Emperor, Archduke Friedrich in his owm message to the MKSM on 31 May 
emphasized, contrary to the GMR decision and Tisza’s pleas, his and Conrad’s opinion that *
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the problem of Montenegro and Serbia should be solved by annexation.1168 Even so, 
Friedrich argued, the Monarchy would need to maintain an MGG-style occupation for at 
least a generation in order to eliminate agitation. In his private message to the MKSM, 
Friedrich termed Tisza’s efforts “Hungarian propaganda against the army and 
administration,”1169 indicating that he had completely cast aside all of Tisza’s efforts at a 
negotiated understanding.
Tisza also elaborated on his concerns to Burian on 3 June, highlighting the dangers 
of the diverging viewpoints between the MdA/GMR and the AOK over Serbia’s future. In 
his talks with Conrad and Friedrich aimed at creating an accord between the two sides, 
Tisza had found that particularly Conrad operated under the assumption that the current 
administration was aimed at a “definitive seizure of the entire territory” and establishing a 
lasting military administration in occupied Serbia.1170 Although Tisza pointed out that the 
GMR on 7 January had reaffirmed the 19 July 1914 position that Serbia would not be 
annexed in its entirety, Conrad remained hostile, stating unequivocally that he viewed the 
GMR decision as “academic.” Conrad now stated, contrary to his pledges to run Serbia 
“apolitically,”1171 that he would not be held back from running MGG matters “according to 
its own views,” even if this “prejudged” the government’s plans for Serbia.1172 This was a 
remarkable example o f Conrad’s insubordination to the civilian government, going well 
beyond his competency, but for which he was not disciplined.
Realizing the situation had to be solved from above, Tisza asked Buridn to request a 
decision from Franz Joseph. Tisza’s position remained firmly rooted in the summer 1914 
decision, in particular because circumstances could develop whereby a separate peace from 
Russia might depend on the re-establishment of an independent Serbia, and Austria- 
Hungary’s greater interests would be better served through such a peace. The AOK, in 
Tisza’s opinion, should therefore be limited to maintaining order and remain objective and 
apolitical. Conrad’s current stance was in opposition to the “vital interests” of the 
Hungarian state and also contrary to the decisions of the political leadership of Austria- 
Hungary. Tisza therefore asked Buridn to obtain from His Majesty a binding decision 
whereby the AOK would be required to forgo any measures that would be in the “direction
Friedrich(AOK)-MKSM. 31-May-I916,KA 25-1/4 cx 1916.
\ZIbH
, Tisza-Buridn, 3-Jun-1916,1H fSlA-PA-I-973.
, Tisza-FriedrichiAOK), 25-May-I9I6. HHStA-PA-1-973; also REZL-44.18,37-38.
Tisza-Buridn. 3-Jun-l 916. HHSiA-PA-1-973.
. 249
of an annexation” or aimed at “establishing a lasting military administration.” His greatest 
concern, however, was that territory promised to Hungary should be treated as such by the 
AOK.1173
On 9 June, shortly after the Brusilov offensive began, Burian found himself in the 
uncomfortable position of issuing his own recommendations with regard to this Tisza-AOK 
dispute directly to the Emperor. As might be expected, he sided w ith Tisza on almost every 
issue, in most cases employing Tisza’s own wording and arguments which he had received 
privately on 3 June. Concerned mostly by Conrad’s comments of the “academic 
importance” which the GMR held for the AOK decision-making, Burian requested that his 
(originally Tisza’s) recommendations be accepted.1174 Burian asked the Emperor to issue a 
decree to the MGG/Serbia that the MdA’s Zivillandeskommissar have an expanded role as 
decision-maker in non-military administration questions.1175
Such a decision would not be forthcoming. The collapse of k.u.k. forces and the 
rout by Brusilov meant that the issue o f Austria-Hungary’s administration in Serbia took a 
backseat to the renewed danger to the Monarchy’s survival. Notwithstanding German 
assistance and Conrad’s diversion o f troops from the Italian front, Brusilov kept up the 
pressure and reached the Carpathians by September. The scale o f Austria-Hungary’s defeat 
broke the back of the Austro-Hungarian army, eliminated for the rest o f the war the 
possibilities of independent operations and corresponding independent war aims, and led 
directly to Rumania’s entry in August 1916. Against this backdrop, the issue o f Serbia’s 
future was left undecided, just as the issue had reached its critical climax. By 12 June 
Burian was noting the serious losses on the Russian front, and complained of increasing 
dependence on Germany. Even at the subsequent audience w ith the Emperor on 13 June in 
Schdnbrunn the issue of Serbia had completely given way to the military and political 
concerns following the onset of Brusilov’s devastating attack.1176
Once again, no decision would be handed down by the Emperor. Because the 
civilian officials sought to alter current AOK behavior, the lack o f a formal judgment meant 
fhat the AOK could continue along its own path. But it was a pyrrhic victory, because the 
AOK’s efforts to achieve an annexation had equally failed. This meant that Buriin and 
Tisza continued to dominate in long-term foreign policy, while the AOK dominated in *6
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ground-level administration matters. The episode was very significant in setting and 
crystallizing AOK and MdA war aims against Serbia.
Tisza had a two-fold approach to the Serbian occupation. On the one hand, he 
wanted it to be harsher and apolitical, preparing the region for limited Hungarian 
annexations, while on the other hand retaining sufficient flexibility to ensure an exit was 
possible without the loss of Austro-Hungarian prestige. Far from not having any radical 
plans for Serbia, he sought Hungarian control or at least influence over the wartime 
MGG/Serbia to ensure some annexation and colonization in the post-war period.
The MdA’s weakening position forced Burian to align himself more closely with 
Tisza, in an effort to uphold the GMR decision not to annex Serbia and implement the 
changes the Hungarian Premier desired. Both sides sought the highest approval for their 
respective plans, but due to a lack of decision-making by the Emperor or the MKSM and 
the onset of the Brusilov offensive, the status quo was sustained. This meant that despite 
Conrad’s apparent victory in the bitter battle to determine how to govern occupied Serbia, 
he had also been unable to force a change MdA policy on its wholesale annexation. This 
policy -  of retaining an exit strategy and adhering to the GMR decisions not to annex the 
entire country -  remained the official Austro-Hungarian position and represented a victory 
in the MdA’s attempts to retain control o f the foreign policymaking and war aims setting 
process in the Balkans.
SECTION VIII
One reason Burian was less involved in the Serbian questions than Tisza was 
because of his focus on Albania. Following the clash w ith the Bulgarians, Burian wanted 
to achieve his aims in Albania as a means o f preventing Kosovo or oilier parts of the region 
from falling to Bulgaria. To do so, he sought to create a nominally independent, unified 
(and preferably enlarged) protectorate in Albania, in order to expand Austro-Hungarian war 
aims as far south as the Straits of Otranto. The success of his policies in Albania remained 
a vital war aim for Buri&n, who put an extraordinary amount of time and attention into 
achieving it.
The predominant point o f resistance came from Conrad, who ignored the fact that 
the GMR had backed Burian and sought to set a precedent through the current de facto 
bipartite division of Albania. According to Conrad, continued control over the east coast of
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the Adriatic and with it the maintenance of Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status could 
only be upheld through annexation. Like with Serbia, Franz Joseph and his MKSM 
remained largely aloof from the issue, unwilling to hand down judgments in the AOK-MdA 
dispute over Albania. This left Conrad with the marginally stronger hand in the short term, 
able to control facts on the ground and use the Archduke Friedrich to back his annexationist 
policies.
However, even though the AOK retained the short-term advantage due to Franz 
Joseph’s indecision and the army’s occupation of northern Albania, Burian did not in fact 
need Conrad’s acquiescence to install the post-war protectorate which the GMR had 
already backed. Thus, Burian’s main purpose was to prevent a worsening of Austro- 
Albanian relations, keep Bulgaria out, and insist on the MdA protectorate policy through a 
dogmatic and dilatory approach.
With the establishment in March 1916 of an occupation zone in Albania under the 
XIX. District Command (KK/Albania1177), Burian recommended Consul August Krai, 
Austria-Hungary’s former representative in Skutari, as the civilian commissioner for 
Albania. His policy goals prior to the establishment o f a protectorate were to expand the 
Albanian occupation zone through military successes, achieve a Bulgarian departure from 
Albanian-inhabited territory (including, Buriim hoped, Prizren-Pristina), and reach a 
potential AOK-MdA decision to hand MGG/Montenegrin territory inhabited by Albanians 
(presumably Ipek) to the KK/Albania. The stated aims of the KK/Albania would be 
security, the protection of Austro-Hungarian political and economic interests, and the 
exclusion of foreign interests.1178 On behalf of Albania and with the smallest possible 
Austro-Hungarian administration, the MdA recommended the cultural and economic 
raising of the country and the “education of the people tow ards self-government and unified 
national consciousness.”1179 By forwarding these aims to Conrad, Burian attempted to 
prevent AOK annexation of any part o f Albania, and sought the army’s help in creating a 
unified, stronger, and above all friendly state. Furthermore, by placing Krai at the side of 
the KK/Albania and requiring the KK to seek his advice on all non-military matters, Bunin 
hoped to maintain influence over his Albanian project. *
1177
Shorthand for XIX. Korps Kominando (District Command] in charge o f  Albania; no MOO was 
established as in Montenegro and Serbia due to the partial occupation.
* Durian-Thum, 3-Mar-1916, REZL-45/16. 
m  Ibid.
252
With the Austro-Hungarian/Bulgarian disagreements tentatively settled by means of 
a military concordat and the front in the Balkans once again static, Burian and Conrad 
shifted their attentions to the Albanian issue minus the provisionally vacated areas of 
Prizren-Pristina. Burian continued to hope that these Kosovo districts would be integrated 
into a unified and independent Albania, while Conrad was pleased that the partition with 
Bulgaria gave him a free hand everywhere west of the treaty border and hoped to fulfill his 
northern Albania annexation plans. Having lost in his tough stance against Bulgaria, 
Burian now attempted to regain MdA influence, naturally causing further tensions with the 
army.
Keeping a high profile in Albania supported Austria-Hungary’s claim of influence 
and Vienna’s plan to keep it out of Sofia’s hands. Unfortunately, AOK activities worked 
contrary to MdA policies. Krai reported that the local military commanders were recklessly 
requisitioning and in some cases looting the country, and simply ignored the MdA position 
that Albania was “foreign neutral territory.”1180 Although the GMR had accepted Burian’s 
formula for Albania, as in Serbia he had only a limited ability to influence matters on the 
ground. He had greater success keeping foreign influences out. Although wanting the 
North Epirus border region to be granted to Greece, he resisted effectively Athens’ 
pretensions to seize as much as one-third of Albania. In defiance o f Greek and 
Bulgarian wishes, Burian drew on support from the Ottomans. Constantinople was 
prepared to give its blessing to an Austro-Hungarian “direction” provided a local were 
crowned king and material support was given.1183 This meant a suppression of elements 
supporting Wilhelm von Wied, the former Prince of Albania, and so Burian requested the 
Austro-Hungarian military organs to ensure that no party be perceived as a likely 
successor. Burian even went so far as to ask Conrad that the influence of any “non- 
Albanian, native ruling elements” be “meticulously eliminated.”1185 Keeping all other 
Parties out of Albania was the key to implementing Burian’s ow n plans, and overcoming 
AOK resistance. Burian asserted Austro-Hungarian dominance over Albanian political 
affairs and MdA priority over the AOK in political decision-making. To reinforce his
0 Kral-Buridn, 2-Mar-I9I6, REZL-45/16.
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primacy, Burian condemned Conrad for the military errors and the erroneous attitude of 
some k.u.k. Army elements that perceived Albania as a “conquered land.”1186
Such friction between the MdA and AOK threatened to reignite the 
annexation/protectorate debate between Burian and Conrad. On 4 April, Burian fired the 
first shot by explaining to Conrad the MdA-drafted future of the Albanian state. Burian 
reminded Conrad that the MdA, backed by the GMR, still desired the establishment of “an 
independent Albania under the effective protectorate of the Monarchy.”1187 As important 
as Burian’s desire for perpetual control of Albania was the country’s intended size, which 
was to be created on an ethnographic basis, meaning that the MdA intended to hand ethnic 
Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro and Serbia. Burian clearly had his eye on the 
Prizren-Pristina region as well as Ipek in Montenegrin Kosovo. Still unsure of how the 
military operations and diplomatic situation would play out, however, Burian did qualify 
his plans by making Albania’s future dependent on these factors and any peace 
negotiations, which of course did not rule out “certain Austro-Hungarian 
modifications”.1188
This challenge to AOK planning did not initially lead to an angry response by 
Conrad, probably because he felt secure that the treaty border agreement with the 
Bulgarians would hold and that no ethnographic Albania would be established while the 
country was divided between so many belligerents. The MKSM also backed Conrad, who 
pressed Burian to agree to conscripting an Albanian defense force to relieve the k.u.k. 
Army.1189 However, this was an unpopular policy at the MdA, and Burian pressed for 
volunteers instead of a draft so as not bring the Monarchy into conflict with the “principle 
of Albania’s independence and its neutrality.” The Foreign Minister’s concern was 
preserving the Monarchy’s current popularity as hard-eamed “political capital for future 
peace negotiations.”1190
Yet Burian’s plans for a unified Albania began to look increasingly unrealistic to 
many, including to the MKSM. According to a German OHL assessment, w ith the current 
distribution of forces, an offensive action against the 65,000 Italians in Valona was
| 116 ¡bid.
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impossible.1191 Conrad, equally aware of this, advocated annexing those parts of Albania 
that were under Austro-Hungarian control. Attempting to dissuade Burian from the 
establishment of a non-viable “independent Albanian state -  even under the protectorate of 
the Monarchy,” Conrad on 18 April provided an exhaustive account for his reasoning.1192 
He argued that four states were in control of parts of Albania: Bulgaria in Prizren-Pristina 
as well as east and southeast of Elbassan, the Italians in Valona, the Greeks in North 
Epirus, and lastly the Austro-Hungarians in the north and center. None of these states, 
Conrad believed, would be likely to give up any territory, and many had further goals 
against Albania, such as Bulgaria’s desire for a port on the Adriatic. Thus, an independent 
Albania could not be obtained, argued Conrad, without a new war for the Monarchy, which 
it “cannot and will not do for the sake of Albania.”1193
This did not mean, however, that Conrad would stop his insistence on wider 
annexations. On 16 April, when Conrad wrote to Franz Joseph criticizing Tisza on Serbia, 
he also addressed the Albanian question. Given Conrad’s great distaste for Burian’s 
protectorate plan in Albania, he wanted to allow Bulgaria to reach the Adriatic if  it means a 
partition of Albania and ensuring the third war aim after the Balkans and Poland, which 
was the “expulsion” of Italy from the east coast of the Adriatic.1194 Without achieving 
these minimum goals, and argued, the war would have to be considered “absolutely lost” 
for Austria-Hungary.1195
Since the Emperor did not hand down a judgment on this issue either, it is safe to 
assume that he supported his Foreign Minister’s and the GMR’s policies without wanting to 
get too closely involved in the war aims discussion. Burian was probably aware that these 
recommendations were made by Conrad to the highest level, for he would not have 
otherwise spent time dealing with the Albanian issue and protecting his ministry’s rights to 
set policy there.1196
Without effective decision-making at the top, the conflict over Albania continued. 
Conrad accused the Albanians of being on the “lowest level o f civilization; lazy and living 
off theft.”1197 As such, an Albania under the appearance o f an Austro-Hungarian *
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protectorate would remain a constant danger for the Monarchy, would swallow vast sums 
of money, and then become a “casualty of its internal battles and a prey of its neighbors.” 
Conrad’s only fruitful and “harm-preventing solution” to the Albanian question, as he had 
told Burian personally several times, was the annexation of the occupied portions of 
Albania. Not only through annexation would he be able to bring “order and discipline to 
the wild mountain tribes” in Albania, but also he could eliminate the “various hostile 
influences of the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Italians.” It is telling which of the various 
adversaries he listed first, given that the treaty border agreement was supposed to have 
prevented Sofia’s influence in the rest o f Albania. To do as Burian recommended, 
however, would mean to take on “futile sacrifices” for a “certainly not unitary” but 
politically and culturally immature people. Since Conrad’s battlefield aim, as opposed to 
his previously outlined political aim, was to evict the Italians from Valona, and because this 
could not be done directly (militarily) or indirectly (diplomatically), he recommended 
Austria-Hungary call upon Bulgarian assistance, which would be die “lesser evil.”1198
Thus, Conrad’s desire to capture Valona was incompatible with Burian’s hope for 
an independent and unified Albania. Since Burian’s goals could also not be met without 
Valona, the debate continued as a hypothetical one, with the facts on the ground and 
Conrad’s inability to send greater forces to the Balkan front considerably limiting the 
MdA’s bargaining power. But Burian did not give in, slating simply that the MdA would 
not change its mind on the question, since the AOK. fears o f greater costs and danger would 
be heightened rather than lessened by an annexation.1199 To dismember Albania prior to 
the conclusion of the war would mean to “voluntarily and prematurely give up" a part of 
the “Monarchy’s expected sphere o f interest on the eastern Adriatic coast” Instead, in late 
April 1916 Burian still wanted to enlarge the country', by uniting Albanian-inhabited 
regions of Montenegro w ith Albania,1200 in an effort to secure a second land connection to 
his protectorate. When Conrad rejected this MdA attempt to redraw borders, unless it was 
done as a domestic matter follow ing the annexation of northern Albania,1201 a deadlock 
resulted.
Burian and Conrad were unable to reach an understanding because both wanted to 
dictate developments in Albania. The titular Commander in Chief, Archduke Friedrich,
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supported Conrad’s stance against Burian and argued that facts on the ground would “ride 
roughshod” over Burian’s idea of a protectorate in Albania.1202 To nevertheless force such 
an outcome would place the Monarchy in a “pernicious state,” against which he protested 
because the army would have to execute any harebrained border plans “with its blood.” 
Much as Ludendorff used Hindenburg’s prestigious name to enact his own policies, so too 
Conrad used Friedrich to gain the advantage over Burian on issues that mattered greatly to 
him. Given the MdA-AOK differences, Friedrich attempted to leave the issue as a 
stalemate, stating that there was no alternative than to “wait the outcome which would 
support the AOK’s point o f view.1203 Though Burian did not respond immediately, his 
plans did not change, as his instructions to Krai a few days later show, when the Foreign 
Minister insisted that his goal remained the creation of “independent Albania under the 
effective supervision o f the Monarchy.”1204 * Except that Burian avoided the term 
‘protectorate,’ it appears that Friedrich’s note was entirely disregarded. The MdA would 
pursue its own policies regardless of what anyone in the military apparatus said; a fact that 
W'ould further deteriorate relations.
Unable to change Burian’s mind through argument, a more assertive Conrad began 
limiting the MdA’s communication with its civilian commissioner. Krai by 7 May had 
been completely cut off from Vienna by the KK/Albania.,20S This was not merely an 
administrative error, for shortly afterwards the KK/Albania’s second in command asserted 
that the MdA “had no say in Albania” and therefore did not require a representative,1206 
Burian now had to write a belated response not only to Friedrich’s earlier admonition but 
also to the AOK infringement on the rights o f the MdA representatives. On 15 May he 
instructed Thum to explain to the AOK that he had undertaken a “detailed deliberation” 
Prior to deciding that forming a protectorate would be the best way of solving the Albanian 
question.1207 Such a policy would allow Austria-Hungary to “exercise its influence” in this 
geostrategic and therefore vital coastal nation with the “greatest benefits and fewest 
drawbacks.” To assert, once and for all, the dominance of the MdA in future political 
decision-making -  even if the decisions would have to be enforced by the military -  Bunin 
informed the AOK that the MdA would take “full responsibility” for what it believed to be
iil! Wiesner-Buriin,26-Apr-1916, REZL-4S/I6; also Wiesncr-Burian, 4-May-t916, M!StA-l‘A*I-l005g.
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the “correct solution to the problem.” To take a different approach meant that the AOK 
would be responsible for any “mistakes.”1208
Fortunately for Burian, the AOK had far more important priorities than enforcing 
its will, at least at the moment, in Albania. On 15 May, the same day Burian sent his 
message chastising the army for its behavior and asserting his dominance in political 
decision making, Conrad initiated his Trentino (Asiago) Offensive during a lull between the 
fifth and sixth Italian Isonzo offensives. However, this initially successful attack would be 
halted by Italian redeployments and the onset of the devastating Russian Brusilov Offensive 
the following month.1209 As a result, the AOK only managed to issue a dismissive response 
to Burian on 19 May. The AOK informed the MdA that it would act more kindly to the 
Albanians,1210 but these assurances were mere platitudes. The military on the ground in 
Albania continued to operate in an unchanged manner. On 22 May Krai reported that the 
higher officers in Albania continued to speak of an annexation of the country by Austria- 
Hungary, perceiving the Monarchy’s march into Albania as analogous with those into 
Serbia and Montenegro. Such perceptions, which led the soldiers to treat the country as a 
“conquered land,” rested on the “directives and utterances” of the military leadership.1211 
However, Conrad’s argument for the country ’s incorporation into the Monarchy began to 
be framed more on grounds of “economic potential,” rather than a mere land grab.1212
When the KK/Albania on 3 June designated the river Skumbi as its demarcation 
line, with southern Albanian areas merely being its “sphere of interest,”1213 Burian insisted 
on a “unitary” administrative system for Albania. He considered anything else a “blatant 
opposition to his intentions,” for such an act could set a dangerous precedent.1214 Conrad 
rightly argued that handing the Albanian-inhabited portions of the MGG/Montenegro to the 
KK/Albania would also be a precedent, but Burten felt that the transfer of territory from 
one MGG to another was as “provisional” as the establishment of the MGGs themselves. 
Burian was willing to alter principles to his favor if they suited his interests in Albania. But 
these interests were of eminent importance for Austria-Hungary. Not only were these small 
cessions designed to strengthen the national homogeneity o f Albania, Burian’s geostrategic
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project in the eastern Adriatic, but they were also a “life question” for the Catholic 
Kelmendi tribe, which was inherently Austrophile. Burian therefore continued Austria- 
Hungary’s pre-war policy of establishing a homogenous Albania, incorporating Albanian- 
inhabited areas of Montenegro to Albania, and seeking to detach the Sandjak from 
Montenegro.1215 Annexationist precedents by the AOK or KK were rejected out of hand by 
Burian, despite similar border changes being continually defended.
Burian went far to ensure success in his Albanian protectorate project, which had 
eminent importance for him. Conrad, unwilling to abide by the GMR ruling and instead 
pursuing an independent policy, sought to undermine Burian and pushed for annexation. 
Although the AOK and KK/Albania had operational control and therefore a short-term 
advantage, Burian nevertheless retained overall policymaking control and did not back 
down in the face of Conrad’s pressure and threats. Burian continued to pursue his war aims 
in Albania, irrespective of what the generals believed should be post-war policy.
As elsewhere in the Balkans, Burian was able to play for time; he was aware, as 
long as the GMR backed him and the Emperor did not undermine his policy through a 
ruling by the MKSM, there was nothing the AOK could do to accomplish an annexation 
during the war. Although the debate petered out as a result of external developments such 
as the Trentino and Brusilov offensives, the decline in emphasis on Albania served Burian’s 
dilatory tactics and overall interests well.
CONCLUSION
The emphasis which the Foreign Minister placed on the future o f small and weak 
countries such as Montenegro and Albania may seem curious to those more acquainted 
with Austria-Hungary’s territorially grander plans in Poland, or those of Germany. But it 
was precisely in these countries that the dangerous larger Slav states -  the opponent Serbia 
and the ally Bulgaria -  could be prevented from reaching Austria-Hungary’s nautical 
lifeline, the Adriatic, and the Monarchy could achieve its war aim of establishing 
hegemony in the Balkans. Johann von Schbnburg, Minister to the Holy See, put it well 
when he outlined these questions in a peace memorandum1216 shortly before the Brusilov
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Offensive. Afraid that Hungary’s nationality policies “pursued entirely different goals” 
from those of Austria which made southward expansion difficult, he nevertheless argued 
for territorial expansion to ensure that Austria-Hungary retained the “necessary guarantees 
and security safeguards” for the future in all military, political, and economic questions. 
By shrinking Serbia, the recalcitrant neighbor would be “hemmed in” between the 
“overwhelming Bulgaria,” Greece, Albania, and the Monarchy, thereby protecting the “first 
and foremost important-seeming point in Austria-Hungary’s war aims, the Adriatic!” '218 
Important for the Monarchy’s self-defense, but also for its “gain in power,” control of the 
strategic portions of the Adriatic would grant the Monarchy “superiority” against Italy in 
order to become “//?e power of the Adriatic.”1219
The importance of the Adriatic can therefore not be overstated when it comes to 
Austro-Hungarian foreign policymaking. Control of the eastern coast of this body of w ater 
W'as what separated the Monarchy from loss of Great Power status and second-class 
inconsequentiality. Only with the eastern Adriatic -  and therefore western Balkans -  under 
Vienna’s thumb could the Monarchy have a say in the “great world problems."1220 Burian 
and many others in the MdA perceived control of the Balkans as the only means to secure 
the Monarchy’s Adriatic lifeline, and with it Austria-Hungary’s continued role as a Great 
Power in European (and by extension world) affairs. In order to achieve these war aims in 
the Adriatic, Burian had to ensure that the Balkans were first conquered and then molded 
according to MdA plans. The fact that these were not merely the ‘pet projects’ o f one 
man1221 was demonstrated by the intensity with which Conrad resisted MdA plans and 
Tisza supported them. It is therefore safe to assume that Austria-Hungary’s war aims 
against the western Balkan states mattered at least as greatly as those against Serbia, and 
more so than Poland.
Once these territories were conquered, Burian at first hid his war aims from both 
Germany and the AOK, seeking to retain overall foreign policymaking control. However, 
particularly regarding Serbia, the AOK’s independent actions and Germany’s involvement 
meant that serious disagreements became inevitable and had to be addressed. The Foreign 
Minister therefore disclosed the Dual Monarchy’s war aims in the Balkans, seeking to
1517
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prevent Germany’s extension into the Austro-Hungarian backyard. Confident that this had 
been achieved, Burian faced an arguably more difficult task in securing internal 
acquiescence to his policy of limited annexation and maximum flexibility in the post-war 
Balkans. Although his plans were supported at the critical GMR of 7 January 1916, the 
serious disagreements with the AOK, the imprecise nature of Austria-Hungary’s public 
policy towards rump Serbia, and the expansionism of the new Bulgarian ally meant that the 
decisions reached in Vienna were threatened from all sides. The Austro-Hungarians thus 
fought off a serious Bulgarian diplomatic and military challenge to their hegemony in 
Serbia, Albania, and Kosovo. Once a working external compromise had been reached, the 
disagreements over these territories descended into a domestic battle over the Monarchy’s 
war aims, involving mainly the AOK, MdA, and Tisza as the key decision-makers. Notable 
in this process was the absence of Franz Joseph, who remained aloof.
Burian’s foreign policy remained consistent and Balkan-centric. Even though 
Conrad, Buridn, and Tisza pursued similar overall policies for Austria-Hungary -  Balkan 
hegemony, eastern Adriatic control, internal cohesion -  their strategies for achieving these 
aims were very different. Although the AOK had been strengthened by its operational 
control in the occupied territories, the Foreign Minister aligned himself even more closely 
with Tisza in an effort to rebalance the internal debate and retain policy-making control 
against a hyper-active Conrad. The GMR represented the apex of Burian’s domestic 
achievements by buttressing his limited annexation policy in Serbia/Montenegro and his 
protectorate policy in Albania. Despite strong pressure from Germany, Bulgaria, the AOK, 
and at times also Tisza, Burian until the Brusilov offensive maintained parity in the alliance 
and policymaking control at home by stubbornly pursuing MdA interests. Thanks to the 
backing of the GMR and the lack of MKSM directions, Burian merely needed to pursue a 
dilatory approach to ensure that Conrad would not be able to force his annexationist agenda 
upon the Monarchy, This meant that the Foreign Minister’s policies appeared moderate by 
comparison with both Conrad on Albania/Montenegro and Tisza on Serbia. They were not, 
however, more benevolent, for Austria-Hungary under Burian’s leadership pursued a 
Program of extensive annexation in the occupied territories and informal expansion beyond. 
This chapter has therefore demonstrated that Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans 
were far-reaching and of immeasurable domestic importance.
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CHAPTER 6
June 1916-May 1917
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans between the onset 
of the Russian Brusilov Offensive in June 1916 and the departure of the Monarchy’s last 
‘old guard’ personality, Istvan Tisza, in May 1917. It covers Rumanian intervention and 
subsequent defeat, the death of Franz Joseph, and the fall of Burian and Conrad as Ottokar 
Czemin and Arz von Straussenburg took over under Karl’s leadership.
The first three sections cover the period prior to Franz Joseph’s death in the winter 
of 1916. Although the great Entente attacks threatened the very existence of the Monarchy 
for the First time since 1914, Section I argues that Burian and Conrad continued to treat the 
Balkans as the central issue in Austro-Hungarian war aims policy and planning. It 
demonstrates that Burian retained overall policymaking control by fighting off German and 
AOK pressure, almost to the point o f ignoring the dangerous military realities. Section II 
analyzes the Austro-German discussions following the successful defense against 
Rumanian hostility. It argues that Burian continued to try to secure the MdA’s Balkan war 
aims and used German involvement to marginalize Conrad's severity. By contrast, the 
military disasters did not restrain his own wishes, and Burian adopted maximum war aims 
in an effort to retain parity with Germany. The section demonstrates that Berlin lost 
confidence in Vienna, causing Burian’s efforts to fail and the Monarchy’s influence to 
plummet. Section III argues that Germany began to impinge on Austria-Hungary’s core 
interests in the Balkans, demonstrating that lire Monarchy w as on the road to being ignored 
by Berlin. The drafting of the December Peace note allowed Burian to formulate his key 
aims, all of which lay in the Balkans. Since Germany prevented Austria-Hungary from 
formulating an independent war aims declaration, Burian’s goals began to matter only as a 
domestic factor and were ignored by Berlin. Until the death of Franz Joseph and the end of 
his term, Buridn sought to maintain the Balkans as the principal war aims focus o f the 
Monarchy, limit the extent of AOK interference, and pursue border rectifications that could 
strengthen the Monarchy without upsetting the dualist balance.
The final three sections describe the beginnings of Czemin’s term in office, and 
argue that although his politics were initially consistent with Burian’s, the more serious
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issues of hunger and potential revolution led to reduced war aims. Section IV argues that 
although initially playing the peacemaker, Czemin retained most of Burian’s Balkan 
priorities on the question of war aims. Under Karl and Czemin, Austria-Hungaiy planned 
to expand against some Balkan adversaries like Montenegro and Rumania, while leaving 
others like Serbia intact for the purpose of achieving a swift peace. With Conrad's 
replacement in February 1917, Czemin’s MdA obtained the near-total control in foreign 
policymaking which Burian had insisted on for so long. Section V argues that Czemin’s 
hand in directing the Central Powers’ peace policy was weakened by German and 
Bulgarian expansionism, to the point where the Foreign Minister began to pursue a 
‘desperado’ policy aimed at ending the war as soon as possible. While professing to 
Germany the Monarchy’s absolute inability to keep fighting for much longer, Czemin still 
sought territorial compensation for its efforts thus far. The section concludes that although 
Czemin was ultimately unsuccessful in scaring Germany into a swift peace, he did manage 
to slow Bulgarian advances in the Balkans and obtained a recognition of continued Austro- 
Hungarian primacy in some of the Monarchy’s Balkan areas of interest. Section VI 
concludes that, given the overwhelming dangers of hunger and revolution, Czemin moved 
away from pursuing Balkan territorial or economic war aims as a principal purpose for 
fighting on. Instead, peace and integrity took over as the Foreign Ministry’s principal 
objective, meaning expansion became secondary and his war aims became less ambitious. 
Although Czemin tried to balance Germany’s extravagant claims by demanding the 
Monarchy’s own, he was unable to push them through and had to accept German 
predominance. After Tisza’s dismissal in May 1917, the Foreign Ministry had become 
domestically paramount in war aims planning, but now had a leadership that no longer 
desired anything but survival, peace, and bread. It was at this point that the importance of 
Austria-Hungary’s war aims planning began a final, definitive decline, after having 
remained consistent and Balkan-centric since the outbreak of w ar three years earlier.
From Consolidation to Decline 
June 1916-January 1917
SECTION I
This section analyzes the impact of the devastating attacks launched by Brusilov 
and Rumania in the summer o f 1916 and Austro-Hungarian war aims planning in the 
Balkans and beyond. Remarkably, the shock was not enough to halt all war aims planning,
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and Buriàn and Conrad engaged in bitter debates, particularly over western Balkan issues, 
throughout June and July. Burian became extremely concerned about Bulgarian, Turkish, 
and German economic and political encroachment on Serbia, as well as the loss of the 
austrophile Muslim element in the region. At the same time, he rejected any AOK 
annexation suggestions for Albania and Montenegro that could score propaganda points for 
the Entente. Burian was engaged in limiting foreign as well as AOK influence as much as 
possible, for retaining flexibility particularly in Serbia was crucial to protecting the 
Monarchy’s prestige and possibly to signing a peace with Russia. He continued to perceive 
the Balkans as one of the Monarchy’s highest priorities, and attempted to retain sole control 
over the region’s future without compromising Austria-Hungary’s prestige or dualist 
nature.
Even when the Rumanian danger became critical, Burian, already under enormous 
pressure from Conrad to look east and north, continued to view the eastern Adriatic as the 
pressing concern of the day. Only when Rumanian intervention was imminent did Buriàn, 
at the behest of an increasingly agitated and aggressive Tisza, turn his attention eastwards, 
though his role was limited to adjudicating between the Hungarians and the AOK on the 
question of defense. While Tisza sought a purely defensive posture for die purpose of 
protecting Hungary, Conrad sought to hold on to the conquered Balkan territory. Yet 
Buriàn’s MdÀ retained mastery over the foreign policymaking process and rejected calls 
for a surprise attack on Rumania. When Rumania’s armies marched practically unopposed 
into Transylvania, only a two-pronged German-led counterattack saved the Monarchy, 
Burian and Conrad had spent extensive political capital and time on Balkan issues that now 
seemed trivial. Nevertheless, Balkan war aims would remain central to their relationship 
and to Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy, even after Austria-Hungary’s dependency on 
Germany had become obvious to all.
The tempest arrived on 4 June 1916, when to ease pressure on Verdun, Russia 
launched a massive and devastating attack on the eastern front.1222 By 7 June Brusilov had 
broken the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army and by 10 June broke the Seventh Army.1221 
The severity of the defeat was marked by the over 400,000 k.u.k. soldiers taken prisoner,
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the extent to which the Austro-Hungarians had to rely on the Germans for salvation, and the 
depth of the Russian advance towards the Carpathians. After the Brusilov offensive, 
Austria-Hungary was in the weakest position since the war began. The disastrous 
performance by the k.u.k. army meant Conrad was forced to accede to a joint overall 
command headed by the Germans on 27 July.1224
The summer brought a dramatic decline in the MdA’s ability to control foreign 
policymaking, as the enormous Russian offensive put the country’s salvation and with it the 
initiative into the AOK’s hands. The effects were felt regarding Austria’s Balkan planning 
as well, and though Burian held steadfast to his convictions, Conrad became increasingly 
assertive. Yet, the two men remained highly engaged in the Balkans even during the great 
attacks, demonstrating the importance that both placed on their vision for the future of the 
region.
In the midst of existential danger, the Foreign Minister continued to pester the AOK 
with his aims for the western Balkans. Burian insisted on the (for him) vital issue of 
Albania, arguing in contrast to the AOK that Albania was viable and criticizing the 
KK/Albania’s policies which were not in line with the MdA’s.1225 The Foreign Minister 
reiterated his support for the creation o f an independent Albania under the ‘effective 
protectorate’ of the Monarchy, making an annexation of northern Albania impossible. 
Burian borrowed Conrad’s own arguments to convince him that annexation of a portion of 
Albania was best avoided. If, as Conrad stated, the Albanians were such a low-standing 
nation, their incorporation into Austria-Hungary would be a military, material, and cultural 
burden. By contrast, a protectorate over an independent Albania would merely imply the 
exclusion of foreign influences and a decreased burden for the Monarchy. Burian also 
argued that indirectly dominating Albania could be done with a small force, thus giving a 
protectorate a financial, political, and military advantage over annexation.1226
To incorporate Albania into the Monarchy implied assuming responsibilities which 
Buridn was not willing to bear, specifically for its defense. Burian understood the 
constitutional dangers that Conrad’s annexation plan emailed. He therefore fought tooth 
and nail not to draw Albania loo close to the Monarchy, but rather to keep the country' at 
arm’s length while simultaneously controlling it enough to dominate the eastern Adriatic.
12«  Shanafelt, S ecre t E nem y, 88.
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If another war came and Albania were a mere protectorate, its military and political 
surrender would not come at the same cost as the sacrifice of an integral part o f the 
Monarchy. As we can see from his policies, Burian did not want to be bound to Albania in 
the same way as he was bound to Galicia, or any integral component of the Monarchy.
Although Conrad snubbed this argument,1227 Burian on 23 June went on to discuss 
the impending, MKSM-backed military draft in Albania. Hoping to avoid a stir, Burian 
requested the AOK omit any announcements with regard to symbols, insignia, and oaths 
that could be interpreted as a sign of intended annexation.1228 Although the Foreign 
Minister had at first spoken out against conscripting Albanians, now that the MKSM had in 
a rare example of intervention backed the AOK, Buriin attempted to conduct as much 
damage limitation as possible, and asked the AOK to prevent drawing foreign attention by 
censoring the operation in the domestic press.1229 Preventing the Entente from using 
Albania as evidence that Austria-Hungary had an annexationist policy matching Germany’s 
became Burian’s goal, and while he consistently desired a close present and future 
association with Albania, he was always wary of how various actions there could be 
represented in the neutral and enemy press.
Matters were no simpler in Montenegro, where hunger w’as the primary cause of a 
level o f internal unrest that threatened Burian’s plans there1230 and resulted in martial 
law.1231 Although Archduke Friedrich claimed to be treating the Montenegrins with the 
‘‘best intentions and benevolence,"1232 the MdA was concerned that repressive measures 
could further alienate an already generally hostile population.'  The possibility of a revolt 
was a concern for the MdA, as negative press would lessen the prestige o f the Monarchy in 
the occupied territories that it might one day wish to annex. Although no revolt took 
place,1234 Burian blamed the AOK’s “failed measures” in Montenegro for causing the 
difficulties,1235 similar to those in Albania.
Burian’s and Conrad’s investment o f time and political capital in the western 
Balkans, even at the height of the Brusilov Offensive, demonstrates the continued
‘ Thurn-Buridn, 18-Jun-l916,1IIJSiA-PA-l-999h.
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importance both placed on the region. The Foreign Ministry continued to insist on its 
future influence in the Balkans and defended it vis-à-vis the Germans. On 4 July, Germany 
pushed hard for Austria-Hungary to accept a subordinate role in Poland, on the basis that a 
German-influenced Poland was a “kind of parallel to the ‘Balkans’ for Austria- 
Hungary.”1236 Buriàn resisted equating the two on the basis that Austria-Hungary did not 
“intend to annex considerable territory” in the Balkans, and given the very modest 
economic benefits involved, it could not be seen as a German renunciation. The Foreign 
Minister was downplaying Austria-Hungary’s future role in the Balkans in order to achieve 
parity in the Polish question, which for the sake of the discussions with the Germans he 
argued was “politically, militarily, and economically” the Dual Alliance’s “most important 
joint accomplishment.” However, German control over Kurland and Lithuania, he 
argued, would be of greater benefit to Berlin than the Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania 
grouping would be to Austria-Hungary. * This approach demonstrated how Buriàn tried 
to treat the Balkans as non-negotiable w ith the Germans, just as Berlin would not have 
looked fondly on Vienna interfering in the Baltic. The key difference, however, was that 
Germany helped win the war in the Balkans which Austria-Hungary could not manage 
alone. Still, Buriàn wanted to ensure parity on Poland to justify the Monarchy’s sacrifices 
there, w hile exercising exclusive control in as much of the Balkans as possible.
Diplomatically, the summer defeat weakened Vienna’s bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the Germans, but did not prevent it from continued tussling regarding the Balkans, where 
Austria-Hungaiy had more problems with its allies than its enemies. The greatest concern 
in mid-1916 was that Muslims from across the treaty border with Bulgaria were emigrating 
to Turkey due to shortages, inflation, and the harshness of the administration and thus the 
“only Austrophile element” was departing in droves.1239 Bulgaria continued its attempts of 
shifting the demographic balance in the Balkans, appropriating the property of Serbs 
fleeing from MGG/Serbia, while rejecting the re-entry of Serbs who had fled from 
Macedonia,1240 a policy which Radoslavov did not even deny.1241
I“ ! Burian-llohenlohe, 4-Jul-1916, lfllSiA-PA-t-501; also REZL-45/17.
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Although the Turkish Government was sympathetic to Muslim emigration, and 
possibly even supported the population exchange,1242 MdA policy on MGG/Serbia was to 
forcibly prevent emigration in order to ensure that this friendly population remained in 
Austria-Hungary’s orbit.1243 The Evkknzbiiro agreed, feeling it was desirable to support 
the Albanian Muslims as well as Slav Muslims, as they were “largely loyal” and their 
interests “went hand in hand” with Austria-Hungary’s.1244 Apart from the loss of a strong 
anti-Slav faction, any policy hostile to the Muslims would damage Austria-Hungary’s 
domestic policy in Bosnia as well as its relationship with Turkey.1245 With the Ottomans 
employing Serbian Muslims in their regular army, Burian became concerned about a 
resurrection of the “pan-islamistic idea” of subordinating all Muslims under the Ottoman 
flag. Such a resurrection, particularly if the Balkan Muslims were Albanians, might revive 
Ottoman rule in Albania or possibly even further.1246 A legal resurrection of Ottoman 
power in the Balkans would threaten Austro-Hungarian war aims and w'ould have to be 
countered.
Mackensen’s High Command had analogous concerns about Bulgarian behavior in 
Macedonia. The k.u.k. representative attached to Mackensen, Dr. Friedrich Wiesner, 
reported the German general’s view that the Bulgarians were seeking to “cleanse” the 
region of all non-Bulgarian elements, “exterminate” the intelligentsia, and unite the 
southern Slavs under Sofia’s banner, all o f which Wiesner deemed decidedly dangerous for 
the Monarchy.1247 With the Muslims, characterized as the “only Austrophile clement in 
Macedonia,” leaving en masse, the result would be disadvantageous for Austria-Hungary. 
Wiesner argued that if Macedonia became “completely Bulgarian within a few years," 
Sofia’s next goal would be Salonika and Valona, where in tire latter case they would come 
into conflict with die Monarchy.1248 Since the Bulgarians were indebted to the Germans for 
building infrastructure and providing war materials, Wiesner believed that a complete 
“economic crowding out” of the Monarchy could easily happen.1249 With the Bulgarians
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cleansing Macedonia of Serbs and Muslims, however, it would be difficult for the 
MGG/Serbia to withstand the overflow effects even into the fall of 1916.1250
Matters across the treaty border with Bulgaria were also worrying Conrad. He 
opposed any plans that the MdA might be brewing to move the Bulgarian border to the 
west of the Morava, which Conrad wanted for Austria-Hungary. His fear stemmed from 
the question of portions of Adrianople, which both Berlin and Vienna wanted returned to 
Turkey, but for which Germany was considering compensating Bulgaria in Serbia 
proper.1251 Conrad was worried that the Germans were considering offering Bulgaria gains 
at Austria-Hungary’s expense.1252
Nonetheless, the main focus of debate in Vienna was not Bulgarian-occupied 
Serbia, but Serbia proper. Burian on 10 July reiterated his expectation that the MGG/Serbia 
be run “apolitically,” in line with the GMR decisions of 19 July 1914 and 7 January 1916, 
and complained that the MGG’s current welfare activities were “misguided by good 
intentions” and prejudiced the situation by betraying an “intention to remain.”1253 Burian’s 
concern was not that Austria-Hungary could not remain in the country, but rather that its 
present annexationist behavior could have a devastating effect on the Monarchy’s prestige 
if Vienna had to pull out of Serbia as part o f a future peace deal. This was in contrast to 
Sofia’s wishes, where it was hoped that Austria-Hungary would remain in five administered 
territory in perpetuity. The Bulgarian Crown Prince was a supporter o f this policy, and 
hoped that the Monarchy would not resurrect a “small and weak” Serbia which could act as 
a haven for Serbian agitators, as this would threaten Bulgaria as well.1254
Peace with Russia, however, was preferable to continued war, even if it meant 
resurrecting Serbia. In the meantime, Burian asked the AQK to instruct its occupation 
regime to employ the MdA’s Zivillandeskommhsar to ensure a smooth administration. 
Szechenyi confirmed in late July that as a result of Tisza’s recommendations to the 
Emperor and of Buridn’s pressure, the governor-general o f Serbia Gdl Salis had been 
replaced with Gdl Freiherr von Rhemen,1255 Along with this change, Buridn received 
another boost from Franz Joseph, who decreed on 15 July that the AOK had to inform the
Szdchcnyi(Bclgradc>Buri4n, 27-Sep-19I6, HHStA-PA-I-975.
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Foreign Minister -  who would then inform the two Prime Ministers -  about the military 
situation. This meant Burian could, whenever he needed information on the “military 
situation for the purpose of ruling,” obtain the necessary secret details directly from the 
AOK.1256 This was an unusual step for Franz Joseph, who tended to side with the military 
on such matters, and possibly reflected a desire to give his civilian leadership the tools 
necessary to achieve peace.
As holding off the Russians took priority, the disputes of the first half of 1916 
between Burian and Conrad were temporarily put aside. Burian was forced to refocus on 
averting the imminent Rumanian invasion and insisting on parity with Germany in Poland. 
Conrad, following the failure o f his autonomous 'Strafexpedition' (Battle of Asiago) in 
Italy as a result of poor execution and Brusilov’s enormous interv ention, coupled w ith the 
Rumanian threat, temporarily dropped the Albanian question on 7 July in the light of the 
MdA’s apparently immoveable position.1257 Yet, when responding to Burian’s claim that 
the AOK did not keep the MdA sufficiently informed as instructed by Franz Joseph, 
Conrad could not suppress his astonishment.1258 Proceeding to inform Burian of the stark 
realities of the situation, Conrad wanted that the Entente had 442 infantry divisions against 
the Central Powers’ 221.1259 If things continued the way they had so far on the battlefield, 
it was clear to all which side would be “consumed.”1260 These grim assessments while 
Rumania was threatening to enter the war on the Entente side put the Balkan question into 
perspective. Conrad was both unwilling and unable to send more than the “ indispensable 
minimum” of troops to maintain order in the MGGs, protect the coast, and safeguard 
against the Italians in Valona.1261
Although Burian and Conrad no longer wrestled over local questions at the highest 
echelons of power in the Monarchy, their clashes over war aims continued despite the 
buckling of the northern front The Foreign Minister insisted that the military authorities 
not treat Albania as an enemy state,1262 because continued positive relations with Albania 
were essential, particularly in the light o f the counter-planning that was happening in the
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Entente camp. Hopeful of an Austro-Hungarian retreat from the Adriatic, Italy and Serbia 
were already haggling about the division of spoils. On 13 August, the Germans learned 
that Pasi£, while not disputing Italy’s future hegemony in the Adriatic, had laid claim to the 
exclusively Slav areas of the Dalmatian coast as well as Fiume.1263 Sonnino had resisted 
this, arguing that the first goal of the Entente in the region was the re-establishment of 
Serbia, rather than the creation of a “greater Serbia.”1264
Meanwhile, fuelled by Entente propaganda, the Albanians were showing resentment 
against the Austro-Hungarian military administration, for which Burian blamed Conrad.1265 
Highlighting that the Albanian question was “not trivial,” the Foreign Minister urged the 
AOK to remedy the situation on the ground for fear that the Albanians would side with the 
enemy. Two days before Rumania entered the war and opened a fourth front for the 
Monarchy, Burian was still asking Conrad to give his attention to the “important” issue of 
Albania.1266 Buridn would not accept the militaiy leadership’s unabashed policy on 
Albania’s division, the continued treatment of the country as conquered enemy territory 
instead of a friendly neutral, and the tendency of the military bureaucracy to ignore the 
recommendations of the MdA-appointed representatives like in Serbia, so he insisted on a 
personnel change. He asked the AOK to replace General Trollman and the XIX. District 
Commander Colonel von Lustig, and allow his civilian commissioners greater authority.1267 
Burian’s hope was for an improved situation in Albania, similar to the improvement after 
MGG/Serbia’s General Salis had been removed for attempting to forcibly slavicize the 
Muslims.1268 Two days later, however, Rumania declared war and invaded Hungary.1269 
Italy was making preparations for another attack on 31 August 19 1 6,1270 and the entire 
Monarchy nearly crumbled under the impact of combined offensives.
Back in June 1916 Buri^n had still assured Conrad that there was currently no 
danger of an intervention by Rumania, and that Conrad’s idea of sending a warning from
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Sofia would only make the Monarchy seem “weak and helpless.”1271 However, his 
messages to his minister in Bucharest belied this outward resolve, for his instructions were 
to seem unconcerned about the military situation so that the Rumanians would not smell 
Vienna’s fear and attack.1272 Burian admitted that the Rumanian question was “potentially 
the decisive wartime question”1273 and he knew that a further advance by Russia into the 
Carpathians could have a galvanizing political effect on Bucharest.1274 Hohenlohe had 
prophesied on 27 June 1916 that Austria-Hungary might not survive this war.1275 The future 
Foreign Minister Czemin shared this foreboding: the opposing coalition would not 
succumb before Austria-Hungary first faced “catastrophe,” and he warned Burian of the 
“mathematical certainty” of a complete Central Power defeat the longer the war lasted.1276 
In this message, Czemin for the first time laid out the ideas which he would pursue as 
Foreign Minister, including peace without annexations or indemnities, international 
disarmament, and re-establishing of Belgium. The army was also dismayed by the Brusilov 
disaster and the prospect of another enemy to the east. On 5 July, Archduke Friedrich 
stated that even i f  the Monarchy could stop the Russians, Conrad and he believed that the 
time would come when it would “run out of breath” and have no manpower reserves 
left.1277 The situation was so dire that the army -  formerly annexationist -  was asking 
Burian what concessions he was prepared to offer to secure peace soon.1278
Everything seemed to depend on the Rumanians, who for their part continued to 
play a duplicitous game. Throughout June and July, Bucharest insisted that it would disarm 
the Russians if they violated Rumanian territory'1279 and proclaimed its continuing 
neutrality.1280 The tension in Vienna but particularly in Budapest was beginning to become 
unbearable, now that according to Tisza the war was reaching its “climax.”1281 In Tisza’s 
opinion, the only way to defend Transylvania from Rumania was to offer Bulgaria adequate 
compensation in the form of Salonika, Seres-Kavalla, the Dobrudja, and even a “majority
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of Serbia together with central Albania” on condition that it employed a considerable 
portion of its army against Rumania and allowed Turkey a greater role in the Balkans.12*2 
This dramatic shift in policy demonstrates Tisza’s fear of Rumania, so much so that he was 
willing not only to abdicate Austria-Hungary’s protectorate role in Albania, but also use 
Serbia as a bargaining tool vis-à-vis Bulgaria. Tisza’s goal was to reposition all Austro- 
Hungarian troops currently stationed in Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania to the 
Transylvanian mountain passes as a deterrent against Rumania. He wanted to ensure that if 
Bucharest did attack, Bulgaria would be ready and willing to conduct more than a diversion 
in the Dobrudja, and actually strike at the heart of Rumania. Although he admitted this 
strategy would be a “heavy sacrifice,” and would represent a territorial and geostrategic 
loss for Austria-Hungary in favor of an enlarged Bulgaria, Tisza was adamant that it was 
the only possibility of resisting a Rumanian invasion which, if unobstructed, would mean 
the “demise of the Monarchy as a Great Power.”12*3
These were extraordinary suggestions. Not only were they contrary to Tisza’s 
previous attitudes but they also were diametrically opposed to Buriàn and Conrad’s 
positions. Because Conrad would not simply abandon the conquered territory and Buriàn 
would not give up the collateral to Bulgaria, Tisza’s proposal stood no chance of success. 
Nevertheless, Buriàn and Conrad had to at least listen to Tisza’s ideas. Conrad admitted 
that, given the Entente’ “2:1 advantage,” his forces were “not strong enough” to retake the 
Bukowina in a counterattack and therefore could not deter Rumania from intervening. He 
confirmed that Austria-Hungary only had “modest"* 1284 fortifications along the Carpathian 
passes and had no soldiers available, short of weak border guards reinforced by field- 
gendarmerie. He therefore, remarkably, favored a “limitation of the more aggressive war 
aims” of the Central Powers.1285 Conrad was more concerned with holding on to what w as 
still under Austrian control in the Balkans than liberating occupied parts of the Monarchy 
°r even formerly occupied parts of Poland.
Buriàn understood well how important Rumania was. In his opinion, the Entente 
were attempting to crush Austria-Hungary from the north and the south, before seeking a 
final defeat of Germany.1286 He was as concerned as Tisza about Bulgaria’s intentions and
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abilities to intervene against Rumania, should the latter depart from its neutrality.1287 By 
July, Czemin insisted that Bratiano was just leading the Central Powers on,1288 and the 
Rumanian government was simply waiting for an opportune moment to enter Transylvania 
virtually unopposed.1289 Buriân had obtained information about Rumania’s secret talks 
with the Entente,1290 and only had legalistic arguments left with which to persuade the 
Rumanian king to avoid war.1291 Tisza was also exasperated. lie wrote to Buriân in 
dismay that while the Bulgarian forces were tied down in the south, the military exposure 
of Transylvania practically invited the Rumanians to take a “military walk-through 
[Spaziergang]" against Hungary.1292 The lack of a successful counteroffensive against 
Russia meant that only defensive measures against Rumania were possible, and the “serious 
sacrifices”1293 Tisza had recommended two weeks prior seemed the only way out.
Buriân’s options, however, were limited. At this late hour, the diplomats seemed 
unable to agree on policy towards Rumania. Although the Rumanian-Russian talks were 
far advanced,1294 Buriân could do little more than ask Conrad to brief him and the Prime 
Ministers on the military situation.1295 To Czemin, Tisza professed steadfast confidence in 
the eventual success of the Central Powers, and reassured him that preparations had been 
taken to defend against the Rumanians.1296 When Jagow vetoed Buriân’s idea to ask 
Bulgaria for a threat to keep Rumania out,1297 the MdÀ in turn had to veto Conrad’s idea of 
a joint Quadruple Alliance communiqué threatening Bucharest.129* Conrad nevertheless 
pushed the issue and on 12 August 1916 even recommended attacking before the 
Rumanians were ready.1299 Again the MdA rejected such dishonorable actions, and had the 
hacking of Falkenhayn who also recommended a delaying tactic.1300 As in other cases, the
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MdA “maintained mastery”1301 of the Monarchy’s foreign policymaking, this time with 
German support, even when the military disagreements regarding Rumanian intervention 
were overwhelming. Despite several MdA attempts at maintaining Rumanian neutrality, 
the country declared war on 27 August 1916, making the Monarchy’s survival dependent 
on its Central Power allies sending troops to Transylvania and Dobrudja,1302
With Rumanian troops advancing deep into Transylvania, Burian feared that the 
loss of the province was inevitable. l ie received no reassurances from Conrad, who did not 
know what the outcome would be.1303 Thanks to the German General Mackensen’s attack 
from Bulgaria and reinforcements sent by Conrad and the Germans, the Rumanians were 
halted in Transylvania and returned to fight Mackensen on 15 September. Under 
Falkenhayn’s overall operational command, the Central Powers counterattacked on 18 
September. Fierce fighting continued on both the Dobrudja and the Carpathian fronts until 
mid-October, when the fall of Constantza and Czemavoda and the retreat of Russian forces 
heralded the victory for the Central Powers. A final Rumanian counterattack was broken in 
late November, and Falkenhayn’s cavalry seized Bucharest on 6 December, the government 
relocating to Ia$i (Jassy).
The Monarchy had survived, but it was now entirely dependent on its allies, 
particularly Germany. Although the current and subsequent Foreign Ministers would 
continue to try to maintain parity and retain control o f the Balkans, the summer of 1916 had 
been the turning point. From here on, Berlin would no longer need to listen and Austria- 
Hungary’s expansionist war aims planning had become little more than a pipedream. The 
main question that still mattered was the internal debate, specifically whether the MdA or 
the AOK would have the final say over what little remained under exclusive Austro- 
Hungarian control.
SECTION II
As Rumania was pushed back, two war-aims conferences with the new German 
military leadership under Hindenburg and Ludendorff followed in quick succession in 
October and November 1916. The sw ift defeat o f the Rumanian army and the halting of
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the powerful Brusilov offensive put the peace and war aims discussions back into the 
forefront of Austro-Hungarian domestic as well as allied thinking. Burian’s approach was 
to secure Austria-Hungary’s territorial and economic gains by adopting war aims programs 
jointly with Germany. The tasks he faced were securing German acquiescence, which was 
not forthcoming, and marginalizing Conrad’s more extreme war aims.
The two war aims conferences demonstrated two different approaches used by 
Burian. At the first in Pless, he pursued a pre-Brusilov war aims policy, sought parity with 
Germany, and treated the Balkans as non-negotiable. Following the bitter realization that 
Germany did not need to agree to his suggestions and that the Austro-Polish solution was 
slipping from his grasp, he became increasingly frustrated. Germany now ignored many of 
his wishes, and inside Austria-Hungary Burian was losing friends and allies. This 
weakened him so much that he had to agree to the AOK’s wish for Montenegrin 
annexation. His new approach during the second war aims conference in Berlin was to fire 
from all guns, proposing maximum war aims for both countries so as to protect the 
Monarchy’s integrity, ensure territorial expansion, and obtain German acquiescence in a 
peace agreement. This tactic, designed to prevent Italian or Serbian control o f the eastern 
Adriatic, backfired when the confident Germans forced Burian to back down on his aims 
without moderating their own.
Following the Brusilov and Rumanian campaigns, Austria-Hungary’s goals were of 
decreased importance to its northern ally. The MdA’s basic goals seemed to be rejected by 
Berlin, mortally weakening Buridn. Nevertheless, war aims in the Balkans remained 
principal among his goals and he retained foreign policy mastery in Vienna.
The Central Powers were now in a position to offer peace from relative strength, 
and on 18 October, Burian visited Pless, where he recommended to Bethmann Hollweg that 
war aims be published. Since the Monarchy was facing “exhaustion” and the new year was 
likely to bring further difficult battles,1104 he advised that peace was necessary to prevent 
collapse. But the Germans felt otherwise, and the Reichskanzler, although supporting a 
peace offer, did not want to specify war aims. As usual, when w inning the Germans were 
afraid of asking for too little, which Bethmann argued would be unacceptable to the 
German public.
1,04 Buridn Memorandum, 3Q-Ocl*l916, HHSiA-PA-I-955.
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The Austrians realized that getting the Germans to discuss peace was inextricably 
linked to war aims. Buriàn resolutely pursued his now untenable pre-Brusilov policy of 
asserting that Austria-Hungary’s war aims lay in the Balkans but that Poland would have to 
be divided or fall to the Monarchy.1305 He negotiated for Poland while keeping the Balkans 
firmly in his orbit, ignoring the military realities. Due largely to the OHL desire for Polish 
volunteer soldiers, Buriàn was unable to secure the Austro-Polish solution, and had to 
acquiesce to the German plan of a nominally independent Poland by means of an 
independence proclamation (issued on 5 November).
The difficulty was to get the Germans to define their war aims outside Poland so 
that final decisions could be taken and spoils divided. Given the Central Powers’ economic 
weakness,1306 Buriàn recommended to Bethmann Hollweg that an effort be made to seek an 
end to the war “without the relinquishing of vital interests,” and on the “basis of 
reason.”1307 For Buriàn, this meant abandoning the Austro-Polish solution if the Germans 
abandoned Belgium.1308 Compensations could be found in the Baltic for Berlin and in die 
Balkans for Vienna. If the Germans wanted a trade, it would have to be Belgium for 
Austro-Poland, not the Balkans for Austro-Poland. However, the Germans did not play 
along, with Bethmann Hollweg agreeing only to a general willingness to negotiate 
peace.1309
Buriàn was by contrast willing, after the dual Brusilov and Rumanian shocks, to 
define Austria-Hungary’s war aims. The remarkable thing was that the devastating attacks 
did not seem to affect how the Austro-Hungarians saw their war aims and interests in the 
Balkans. The military situation had sufficiently stabilized by mid-September for the 
Foreign Minister to again turn his attention to Balkan questions, picking up where he had 
left off in June. He asked for Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia to be at the Monarchy’s 
disposal, while obtaining “strategic border corrections” vis-à-vis Italy and Rumania, 
Fischer agrees that Buriàn pursued a “consistent”1310 war aims policy worthy o f a Great
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Power. The Foreign Minister was aware of his weakness due to the military situation, but 
he insisted on parity in war aims even against Tisza and Stiirgkh’s wishes.1311
However, Burian’s attempts at formulating common war aims failed because the 
Germans refused to let themselves be nailed down on the Belgian question, because they 
were preparing new peace feelers, and because they still had high hopes for Poland. The 
German plans also extended to the Balkans, where they still hoped to bring Greece into the 
Central Powers’ camp by dividing Albania, which unbeknownst to them was what the 
AOK recommended. Bethmann’s thinking was expanded by Wilhelm in his last message 
to Franz Joseph on 1 November 1916, in which the German Emperor explained why 
publishing Central Power war aims would be a mistake. If they asked for maximum war 
aims, Wilhelm argued, the Entente could justifiably reject them, as well as deal a 
propaganda blow to the Central Powers. By asking for minimum war aims, on the other 
hand, he feared tying his hands.1312 These sorts of allied positions caused Conrad to state 
that Austria-Hungary’s “only true enemy are actually only the Germans,”1313 for it was they 
who prevented it signing a peace and making the gains he so wished for. Now that the 
AOK’s decision-making had been fused with the OHL’s, Conrad considered Austria- 
Hungary “completely at Germany’s mercy.”1314 The only remedy, he believed, was a 
“conflict with Germany,” which in the current circumstances was “impossible.”1315
The one place where the Germans were actively seeking peace was Rumania. In 
order to do so, Bethmann suggested to Durian that he issue mild terms to Bucharest. As 
Austro-Hungarian demands, Bethmann on 24 October recommended the Iron Gate at Tum- 
Severin and border rectifications along the Carpathian mountain passes. He also 
recommended Bulgaria should re-obtain the former Bulgarian Dobrudja and that the 
Central Powers be supplied with grain.1316 For Germany, a swift conclusion of peace -  at 
the expense of Austrian but no German demands -  would have an enormous effect and 
Berlin was willing to be accommodating in exchange for a “significant relief of the military 
situation.”1317 Although the AOK would have liked to move to discussions about future
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territorial adjustment,1318 Burian did not believe that Bucharest was capable of taking any 
independent decisions while French generals still commanded the remnants of Rumania’s 
army and Russian troops stood on its soil.1319 For him, economic questions were more 
important. Burian signed an agreement on 29 October in Berlin, whereby Rumania would 
be handled economically “by parity,”1320 though the political leadership of the occupation 
would be under a German general. Austria-Hungary would obtain grain and Germany 
would obtain crude oil. Although the Germans agreed with this arrangement, it would not 
be long before they impinged on the parity rights of the Austro-Hungarians quite 
dramatically.
In Vienna, it was clear the Pless talks had not gone as intended. The German (and 
AOK) plans ran counter to Burian’s goals, and the Austro-Hungarian position would have 
to be more unified before talks with the Germans could be fruitful. This meant a detailed 
domestic discussion on the Albanian, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Rumanian issues. Burian 
hoped for rectifications at the expense of Russia and Rumania, the restoration o f Serbia 
minus Macedonia and its Albanian-populated areas, and the prohibition of economic 
warfare against the Central Powers after the conclusion of peace.1321 He would use 
Montenegro as a bargaining chip to win over Conrad, though it would be a tough battle.
Back in September 1916, Burian had addressed the AOK w ith concerns about the 
Balkan Muslim populations seeking to emigrate to Turkey. These developments required 
the “greatest attention” because the Monarchy had a “pre-eminent interest” that there be no 
weakening of the Muslim element, particularly in Albania.1322 Even in light of the 
contemporaneous military events, the Foreign Minister felt this issue was “extremely 
urgent”1323 and did not want to give the Serbs the upper hand in Albania, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro.1324 Burian’s obsession with Albania’s geostrategic importance while the 
Rumanian campaign was still in full swing seemed curious not only to the AOK but also to 
foreign governments.1325 But this surprise did not limit their meddling. Turkey suggested a
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division of Albania along religious lines, which ran counter to Burian’s goals of a unified 
protectorate and against AOK wishes for annexation of the entire north, whether Muslim or 
not.1326 Although the new Hindenburg-Ludendorff OHL supported Turkey on this issue 
and asked Vienna to let go of “prestige concerns,”1327 by mid-October Conrad had rejected 
this impractical solution.1328 While Vienna interpreted this as Turkish meddling in its 
backyard, Turkey feared an Austro-Hungarian attempt to turn Albania into a “Catholic 
province.”1329
While pushing for the incorporation of Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro into 
Albania, Burian finally agreed by November 1916 to an “annexation”1330 of the rest of 
Montenegro, precisely one year after Conrad had originally demanded it. According to 
Shanafelt and Rumpler, Burian also desired Montenegro’s annexation by the Monarchy,1331 
but in fact he did so only after he ran out o f ways to resist this AOK policy. However, 
having won this battle over Montenegro, Conrad still refused to budge on the Serbian and 
Albanian questions. He insisted that the South Slav question must be solved and demanded 
the annexation of all o f Serbia, minus the eastern and southern (Macedonian) regions to be 
given to Bulgaria.1332 The re-establishment of even a small and weak Serb state would be 
tantamount to the resuscitation o f an “unforgiving enemy.”1333 On the other hand, Burian’s 
planned protectorate for Albania did not go far enough for Conrad. He reiterated that even 
a harsh protectorate, whereby Albania did not have an independent foreign policy, defense 
force, or finances but was entirely in the hands of the Monarchy, w'ould still be an 
“irresponsible half-measure” which would bring Austria-Hungary nothing but new 
sacrifices, embarrassment, and enmity.1334
B urin 's  perspective that Albania formed a vital geo-strategic link to the 
Mediterranean and other Austro-Hungarian allies was further undermined in the autumn by 
Grand Admiral Anton llaus, the Head o f Naval Affairs at the War Ministry. Haus was 
generally regarded as the authority on matters relating to the Adriatic.1335 On 12 November *1
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the Foreign Minister asked Haus for an explanation of the naval plan for Valona, alongside 
the well-established MdA position on the Turkish Straits. Burian recommended that they 
remain the sovereign territory of Albania and the Ottoman Empire respectively.’336 On 15 
November, precisely w hen Burian was to set joint Central Power war aims, Haus torpedoed 
the Foreign Minister’s plans for Albania. Questioning Burian’s understanding of the 
“difference between abstract strategic principles and palpable reality,”1337 Haus explained 
that the control of Valona -  even if indirectly through a protectorate -  was not vital for 
Austro-Hungarian security. While the Italians controlled this “theoretically immensely 
important and valuable” port, Valona brought Rome no advantages at all. This was because 
Italy’s naval supply lines via the Straits of Otranto could easily be targeted by submarines 
and mines. Thus, whether and to what extent the Italians fortified Valona was completely 
irrelevant. Direct control of the port would, of course benefit Austria-Hungary more than 
Italy due to its contiguity with Albania for supplies and there no longer being a need to 
secure the Straits of Otranto, but would also be a burden because the country was 
economically backward and would have to be improved at the Monarchy’s expense. The 
less of Albania Austria-Hungary seized the better, argued Haus, and he recommended as 
the “very best solution” that Burian give Valona to the Greeks and partition the rest of the 
country between the Greeks and Bulgarians, abandoning Durazzo and keeping for Austria- 
Hungary only Skutari and Medua. It was a stunning example o f a naval chief resisting tire 
seizure of a naval base. Thus, Haus felt that Burian’s idea of a protectorate was 
“incomprehensible,”1338 further weakening Burian’s geo-strategic argument on the 
Albanian protectorate plan and strengthening Conrad.
Although Montenegro’s annexation had been decided, neither Conrad nor Buriin 
could give in on the Serbian and Albanian issues. Burian could not, for constitutional and 
diplomatic reasons, allow an annexation of Albania, while Conrad saw no alternative, 
Rumpler states that despite the relatively good military situation between 1914 and 1916, 
Vienna did not seek a wider annexationist program, and argues that Burian’s restraint and 
moderation were more an “expression of perplexity,” leading to his aims to re-establish the 
situation as it existed before the war.1339 However, as we have seen w ith regard to the 
Western Balkans, Buridn had clear goals towards Albania and Montenegro early on.
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Certain annexations were to take place to prevent Montenegro from reviving its enmity 
towards the Monarchy, while the intended protectorate in Albania was designed to project 
Austrian power to the Straits of Otranto and ensure that the Adriatic never became an 
Italian lake. Burian’s problems resulted from AOK pressure and some differing ideas in 
Berlin. Had Burian been as “at a loss”1340 as Rumpler claims, he would not have insisted 
on limited goals and would have aligned himself with AOK recommendations as an easy 
way out that required no thought. However, Burian instead insisted on his position, for the 
most part successfully fighting off major threats by the AOK to his clearly outlined policy, 
as well as pressure from both Germany and Bulgaria to behave otherw ise.
In the end, Burian successfully resisted both domestic and allied pressure on almost 
every occasion. Given the MdA’s sole jurisdiction in defining post-war policy, the AOK’s 
window of opportunity to influence post-war matters was closing and would cease as soon 
as the war ended. Thus, Burian’s goal was not to push through his own program for post­
war Albania and Montenegro immediately, so much as to prevent the AOK from instituting 
its annexationist plans and prejudicing the outcome of peace negotiations. In doing so, and 
by pursuing a dilatory negotiation style w ith Conrad, Bttridn prevailed, for he had generally 
prevented the AOK from achieving permanent changes to national borders. The exception 
was Burian’s agreement to annex Montenegro, which as we shall see was only a promise 
and merely a ploy designed to keep Conrad at bay while he discussed matters with Berlin. 
Burian therefore successfully pursued his limited but by no means lenient policies towards 
the western Balkans during the difficult negotiations o f 1916. Now, in Austria-Hungary’s 
weakest posit ion since w inter 1914, he would face the difficult task of getting his war aims 
past the Germans.
Burian’s failure to obtain a formal peace proposal at Pless weakened him greatly, 
and he faced opposition from all sides, including Hohenlohe, Bethmann Hollweg, and 
Forgach.1341 He had sacrificed his Montenegrin independence policy for apparently 
questionable gains against Conrad, though this was done to keep the AOK out of tire 
proceedings. Still, Burian’s lack o f domestic or international allies severely undermined his 
moderate position during the 15-16 November war aims talks w ith the Germans, during 
"hich Austro-Hungarian war aims took a dramatic turn. In an attempt to satisfy Germany
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and bring it to the negotiating table with the Entente, Burian set forth widespread and 
annexationist aims for both empires as a starting point. He was willing to commit himself 
to supporting full integrity for all members of the Quadruple Alliance plus German 
colonies, as well as expansion of German territory in the Congo, Liege, Briey/Longwy, 
Luxembourg, Kurland, and Lithuania.1342 In exchange, he wanted to secure Austria- 
Hungary’s own territorial integrity and annex the whole o f Montenegro, minus the 
Albanian-inhabited areas. Against Rumania, Burian pushed for a border rectification at the 
Iron Gate and south of Brasso, i.e. beyond Bethmann’s recommendations. Bulgaria would 
receive eastern Serbia, Macedonia, and the Dobrudja, whereas Austria-Hungary would only 
take a “border strip” in northern Serbia. Forming a large Albania under an Austro- 
Hungarian protectorate and annexing Montenegro and parts of Serbia,1343 would make a 
large, re-established Serbia impossible. This new policy was in line with Bulgarian wishes, 
too, though the Bulgarian King greatly hoped for Serbia’s complete disappearance.1344
In the north, Austria-Hungary would only expect minor border rectifications against 
Russia and recognized the independent Poland agreed to at Pless, officially proclaimed on 5 
November.1345 By accepting the very extensive German territorial demands, Buriin was 
trying to secure for Austria-Hungary moderate but important gains in the Balkans. The 
goal was to protect Austro-Hungarian integrity, ensure territorial expansion, and give the 
Germans what they wanted fast enough for a peace to be signed. For domestic reasons, 
Burian’s foreign policy rested on securing territory to justify the war, and ending it as 
quickly as possible by agreeing to almost all German demands. His goal was to have all 
belligerents publish war aims as a first step towards a peace conference. But instead of 
issuing the war aims Burian had accepted, Germans merely used the peace note as 
preparation for unrestricted submarine warfare.1346
Tisza made his views on this trip o f Burian’s known directly to the Foreign 
Minister, More important to him than border corrections against Montenegro, Italy, and 
Rumania was Serbia, which the Hungarian Premier did not want to see reach the Adriatic, 
but on which the Germans were dragging their feet. Importantly, Tisza for the first time
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saw the need to establish an independent, official Hungarian position on the Monarchy’s 
peace conditions, which he would defend at the GMR in much the same manner as at the 
time of the ultimatum to Serbia in 1914.1347
Burian’s independent actions notwithstanding, the Austro-Hungarians were far 
more internally divided than their German counterparts. Although Fischer overstates the 
fact that Bethmann Hollweg was in general agreement with the OHL on the recognition of 
Congress Poland or the annexations in Kurland, Lithuania, and Longwy-Briey,1348 
Bethmann’s dilatory approach to Austria-Hungary showed that he leaned more towards the 
generals’ wishes than Vienna’s. However, Bethmann Hollweg was unsure how much to 
tell the Austrians, for fear of tying the German government down too early. By the time 
Burian and his entourage reached Berlin, Bethmann Hollw-eg had resolved to resist 
publishing joint war aims coming from all four of the Central Powers,1349 on the basis that 
it was still too soon.1350
During the discussions, Germany put forward its claims which the Austrian 
diplomats attempted to harmonize with their own. Burian unsuccessfully attempted to 
lessen the German annexation-hunger by speaking of “border rectifications”135' in 
Alsace/Lorraine and Kurland/Lithuania. Although Burian had become more annexationist, 
the Austro-Hungarians remained moderate compared to the Germans. For Serbia, Burian 
suggested major rectifications along the country’s borders in favor of Austria-Hungary (in 
the north), Albania (in Kosovo), and Bulgaria (in Macedonia), but was willing to re­
establish the rest of the country as an independent state. Montenegro was not to be so 
lucky, being entirely annexed by Austria-Hungary as Burian had promised Conrad, except 
for the Albanian-inhabited areas which would be incorporated into Albania.1352 Though 
Albania’s re-establishment under Austro-Hungarian protection was a stated war aim in 
Burian’s recommendations, he was willing to give North Epirus to Greece in return for its 
continued neutrality in the war.
Germany’s designs on Belgium and the north of France faced strong criticism from 
Burian, while the Germans in turn criticized Austria-Hungary’s goals in the Balkans,1353 *134
Tisza-Buriiin, 24-Nov-19I6. RE7X-45/15.
134‘ Fischer, Griff, 402.
1149 Ibid., 406.
,JS0 Burian Aide-Memoire, IS-Nov-1916, l!HSt\-PA-t-524. 
Xm Ibid.
>mlbid.
I3' J Fischer, G riff 406.
284
and threatened to negotiate separately with the Entente, rather than jointly.1354 Bethmann 
Hollweg even questioned out loud whether the Austrian demands to annex Montenegro did 
not “go too far.”1355 In a recommendation that showed Germany’s anti-Austrian policies in 
the Balkans, Bethmann Hollweg suggested Austria-Hungary keep Montenegro’s coast and 
the Lovcen, while unifying the rest o f the country with Serbia.1356 Jagow went even 
further, suggesting building a strong Serbia and giving it access to the Adriatic at the 
expense of Albania. Jagow’s outrageous plan had been rejected by Buridn in telegrams 
before, but now the Foreign Minister encountered open hostility to his protectorate plan.1357 
An important concern here would be that Greece would then fall into Germany’s sphere 
and could grant it a port in Valona, a goal which would become explicit later on. Thus, to 
limit Austro-Hungarian expansion and improve their own post-war Balkan standing, the 
Germans had changed their war aims from punishing Belgrade to creating a Serbia as 
“economically as strong as possible,”1358 linked to Vienna but nevertheless independent. 
These suggestions by the Germans, which Fischer called an “intrusion into the most 
fundamental interests of Austria-Hungary,”1359 dramatically exposed Vienna’s weak 
diplomatic position as a result of the recent military debacles and dw indling strength.
Burian fought the Germans, particularly on the western Balkans question, but 
mainly to protect his interests in Albania. Forced into a comer, he sacrificed the recently 
agreed annexation of Montenegro, which was “not such a vital interest”1360 for the 
Monarchy. Never really wanting the annexation which Conrad had thrust upon him, Burian 
could now blame the Germans for being forced to drop it. He went even further, and did 
not categorically rule out the Serbia-Montenegro unification.1361 Such an enlarged Serbia 
could even be included into an Austro-Hungarian “economic sphere.”1367
Sacrificing practically all Austro-Hungarian positions on the western Slav questions 
of Serbia and Montenegro, Burian still resisted pressure on the Albanian question. He 
simply refused the German request to grant Serbia a port in the Adriatic at the expense of
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Albania.1363 Such an act would give Serbia’s prestige such a boost that Vienna would 
“really have to ask itself why it was fighting this war.” Arguing that there was no need to 
be pessimistic about Albania, he felt rather that Austrian policy there was most 
“promising.”1364 To replace the Italian danger with a Serb one was not something Burian 
was prepared to do.
In what appears to have been Burian’s first moment of doubt about his Albanian 
project, he told the Germans that, even if the demand for an independent Albania 
protectorate should fail, the primary goal in the country should be to push out the Italians 
from Valona, even if it meant a greater involvement by Greece and Bulgaria.1365 This was 
a request by Conrad, who had always suggested employing Bulgarian troops to eliminate 
the Italian threat emanating from Valona. Yet, even in light of Grand Admiral Ilaus’s 
expert naval assessment, Burian stuck to his geo-strategic thinking on the importance of an 
Albanian port for Austria-Hungary. The Foreign Minister made clear that if  Albania were 
to be divided against the Monarchy’s wishes and the Italians could not be removed, he 
would “bind northern Albania”1366 more closely to Austria-Hungary. This was a clear 
departure from his insistence on Albanian independence as an indirect extension of 
Austrian interests. Burian’s overarching goal was not to establish an Albanian ally, but in 
some way control a port closer to the Straits of Otranto and neutralize the Italian threat to 
the Balkans. Thus his Albanian ‘obsession’ stemmed from his aversion to the Italian 
presence. Only by securing an Austro-Hungarian port such as at Durazzo would the 
drawbacks of having the Italians remain in Valona post-war be somewhat alleviated.1367
In sum, at this war aims conference Burian did not so much set clearer Austro- 
Hungarian aims and moderate German ones, but rather scaled down his own without a clear 
benefit in sight. Such was the w eakness o f Austria-Hungary in the Dual Alliance that even 
the stubborn Burian could not accomplish basic positive goals.
Although both war aims conferences can be seen as failures for Austria-Hungary, 
this section has demonstrated that even as his international leverage decreased dramatically, 
Burian never lost control o f the debate in Vienna and continued to pursue negotiations on
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the basis of parity in Berlin. This approach gave Czemin a foothold upon taking office but 
definitively weakened Burian politically. Buriân’s consistent approach to his principal 
goals -  most of which lay in the Balkans -  could not be pursued for much longer. Given 
the hunger in the Monarchy and the differences with Germany on publishing war aims, a 
new approach would be needed, and this could only come follow ing a replacement of the 
current policymakers, which began in the winter of 1916-1917 and took several months to 
complete.
SECTION III
The aftermath of the two failed w ar aims conferences was characterized by a steep 
decline in Austria-Hungary’s influence and a determination by Germany to go it alone. As 
far as the AOK was concerned, not achieving its war aims or signing a status quo ante 
peace would be a total defeat. The fact that the Germans seemed to expect Austria- 
Hungary to fight an endless war in order to win a return of their colonies led to dismay in 
Vienna. Another factor, namely Germany’s designs on Austro-Hungarian goals in the 
eastern Adriatic, would also have led to serious friction, had the Germans not kept them 
secret. Berlin’s deception demonstrated that Austria-Hungary had lost all influence, and 
that Burian was being ignored. Contrary to their actual intentions, German policymakers 
kept the Austrians believing that specific war aims would be issued in the December Peace 
Note, which is why the records in Vienna are so extensive and so much needless discussion 
took place.
The death of Franz Joseph did not initially change matters, since old guard thinking 
prevailed for the time being. The MdA led the way in formulating Austria-Hungary’s 
policy with regard to preventing the Bulgarians from reaching the eastern Adriatic, 
shrinking Serbia without making a peace with Russia impossible, and obtaining border 
corrections against Italy and Rumania. All o f this was consistent w ith previous Austro- 
Hungarian war aims policy, but Germany’s deception meant that none o f it was 
communicated to the Entente. The sole purpose of the peace note was to prepare for 
Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare, meaning an escalation, rather than a peace 
process, would take place. In the sunset days o f the Burian ministry', Conrad and the 
Foreign Minister returned to the issue o f Albania, demonstrating the importance it had for 
Burian and the disdain with which Berlin treated Vienna’s w ishes.
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This section will demonstrate that Germany shifted towards ignoring Burian even 
more, but that this did not affect his war aims planning. Domestically, the Foreign Minister 
remained in the driver’s seat. His low standing in Berlin simply meant that he had more 
time to focus on the issues which mattered to him, such as the western Balkans, rather than 
getting into further discussions over Belgium, the Baltic region, and Poland. Burian’s war 
aims, which were meant to be part of the peace proposal package, demonstrated the 
consistency and coherence w ith which he pursued his Balkan goals in Berlin. Until the end 
of his term, he rejected AOK. interference, nursed his Albanian project as the lynchpin of 
anti-Serbian and anti-Montenegrin war aims, and sought border rectifications capable of 
strengthening the Monarchy without upsetting the dualist balance.
The 15 November war aims conference was a failure for Austrian diplomacy. The 
extent to which Burian gave in to German demands over Poland shocked Conrad, who 
grew increasingly concerned about Austria-Hungary’s position in the Balkans. Conrad was 
worried that without binding agreements in the current discussions the Germans would, at 
the conclusion of peace, withdraw support for Austria-Hungary’s Balkan goals.136* His 
worst fear was that Germany would come to an agreement with the Entente over Austria- 
Hungary’s head. As far as the Chief of the General Staff was concerned, any result in the 
Balkans w hich even remotely resembled the re-establishment of the status quo ante had to 
be considered a “complete defeat.” He railed against the Magyar position -  personified in 
Tisza’s softer attitudes -  which prevented, for apparently domestic, dualistic, and “national- 
chauvinistic” reasons the drastic solution which would benefit the Monarchy in the 
future.1369
But Buridn had already sided with Tisza on many of these questions, as he 
demonstrated in his comments to the Turks and Germans. To Bethmann Hollweg, Buriiin 
reiterated his desire that conquered territory be jointly employed as collateral to enable the 
Central Powers to recover their occupied territory and obtain reparations.1370 This approach 
was consistent with what he told the Turks. Burian told Halil Bey on 24 November that 
Austro-Hungarian territorial aims were limited to border corrections, and that the Monarchy
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desired “no substantia] territorial expansion.”1371 Territory that was currently occupied 
would be returned once the Central Powers’ territory was also returned. At this juncture, 
Burian was more interested in liberating conquered Austro-Hungarian lands rather than 
incorporating foreign territory. Only once the Germans had guaranteed this provision 
would Buridn be looking for independent Balkan expansion. Yet from Vienna’s 
perspective, the Germans were the problem, and as the year drew to a close Berlin rejected 
a solidarity agreement the MdA desired, continued to refuse to define their war aims, and 
opposed Burian’s Albanian project in order to pursue their own plans in Valona.
Burian was making his last push for peace before the winter set in. He had his 
Minister in Bern tell a Parisian newspaper that there existed “no obstacles” to peace as far 
as Austria-Hungary was concerned. Though he hoped the powers would forget about 
the Balkans, it was not Burian’s attitude that hampered peace, but the German one. 
Bethmann confided his frustration to 1 lohenlohe on 28 November, in which he lamented 
Jagow being forced out on 22 November and Wilhelm’s decision-making in favor of the 
army m all areas. The new Austro-Hungaian Emperor Karl also became increasingly 
concerned about the rise of a “military dictatorship” in Germany,1374 Yet although the 
strength of Bethmann Hollweg seemed to be waning, he was Austria-Hungary’s most 
important ally and Burian by all means wanted to obtain agreement on the “collateral” 
question.1375 Related to the collateral issue was the problem of what constituted a return of 
occupied territory. Burian for the first time on 5 December 1916 questioned Germany’s 
desire to include colonial possessions in this regime, for he noted that Tsingtau and the 
Marianas could not be compared with the value of the allies’ “old territory.”1376 Bethmann 
Hollweg remained intransigent, however, insisting that these colonial losses had hit 
Germany hard, though Hohenlohc insisted that they could not assure security for the allies 
in Europe.1377
The issue was not buried with the dismissal o f Burian as Foreign Minister and his 
replacement by Ottokar Czemin on 20 December. Czemin received word from Hohenlohe 
two days after his appointment that Rethmann Hollweg had essentially rejected the
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solidarity agreement proposed by Burian. Hohenlohe argued that maintaining the original 
borders was of greater importance than the recovery of the German colonies.1378 For the 
Monarchy, which had no overseas territory to regain, the “main exigency of peace was the 
creation o f a reliable, enduring protection of the continental possessions.” If Austria- 
Hungary rightly refused to fight on “endlessly” for German colonies, Hohenlohe stated that 
Germany would in turn not be prepared to bind itself to an unenforceable treaty which 
could limit its peace negotiations down the line.1379
What Burian did not know during his last few days in office was that the Germans 
were playing for time and had no intention of issuing detailed war aims to the enemy, 
making the elaboration of Austro-Hungarian ones moot for this purpose. The Germans did 
not want to tie their hands and hoped that an improvement in their war fortunes would give 
them access to even greater territory. This entailed a stark divergence with the Monarchy’s 
goals, for example in the Mediterranean. To ensure Germany’s ability to conduct 
submarine warfare and maintain access to raw materials in wartime, a port in the 
Mediterranean was as vital as the Flanders coast. Grand Admiral Haus’s counterpart in 
Berlin, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, recommended to Bethmann Hollweg in a top- 
secret memorandum on 26 November that Valona be the German base in the 
Mediterranean, with a land connection preferably to Austria-Hungary or at least Bulgaria. 
Valona, he remarked, “must become German.”1380 Contrary to Haus’s assessment, 
according to Holtzendorff Valona was the “ideal strategic base,” given its defensibility. 
For the German navy’s chief strategist, control of the Azores, Valona, Dakar, and Tahiti 
were war aims, though the first two belonged to neutral states. Such naval demands flew in 
the face of Germany’s Austrian ally, but Holtzendorff thought Vienna would acquiesce for 
fear of Italy.1381 Burian’s protectorate plan, already well known in German circles, was 
simply ignored. Given German information about the “clumsy” policies the Austrians 
employed in Albania, which “spoiled all sympathies”1382 in a country that had greeted them 
as liberators, it was no surprise that the German military feared Albania leaning towards the 
Italians and therefore ignored the protectorate plan. These internal and external conflicts 
0ver Balkan spoils of war were intense over Rumania, Serbia, and the western Balkans,
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with each of the Central Powers attempting to carv e out a sphere of influence. This stands 
in stark contrast to Rauchensteiner’s claim that no one cared for Montenegro and Albania 
because the regions were so poor that no Great Power desired them even as colonies.1383
The Germans kept their intentions secret, and this policy served them well, given 
the events which were taking place in Austria-Hungary. The death of Franz Joseph on 21 
November heralded a new era for Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans, though the 
change took several months to become noticeable. The new Emperor, Karl, would make 
incremental changes to Austria-Hungary’s overall peace policy, but he had to tread 
carefully. In the initial stages, little changed at the higher echelons in Vienna. Shortly after 
taking power, Kai l replaced Burian and later Conrad, and he pursued a new policy of peace 
and territorial integrity for the empire. For the remainder o f 1916, however, AOK and 
MdA policies remained the same.
A day before the old Emperor’s death, Burian informed his diplomats of the peace 
initiative agreed to at Berlin, which would be the December Peace Note. The Monarchy’s 
Balkan goals featured high on the agenda, along with territorial integrity. Vienna wanted to 
see local border rectifications against Italy, incorporation of the non-Albanian-inhabited 
regions of Montenegro, “strategic corrections” along the border with Rumania, the re­
establishment of a small Serbia as discussed in Berlin, the establishment of an enlarged 
Albanian protectorate, and finally the territorial integrity of Greece.1384 Burian placed these 
Balkan issues ahead of financial questions and freedom of the seas, and the Italian border 
corrections ahead of the Austro-Polish solution. These priorities supported his claim to 
Conrad that Albania “remained to this day a matter of foreign policy.”1385
One major concern in Vienna was Bulgaria. With Rumania and Serbia out of the 
way, Bulgaria also needed to be tied down on one front, even by its own allies, or else it 
might make a separate peace. The Bulgarian King’s visit to Vienna on 10 December 
offered the Germans a glimpse into these Austro-Bulgarian problems. Botho Graf Wedel, 
the new German Ambassador in Vienna following Tschirschky’s death, reported that 
Vienna was concerned about Berlin's support for Sofia, with MdA official Mercy 
grumbling that Germany took the Austro-Hungarian alliance for granted while indulging
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Bulgaria. Even Wedel recommended that Berlin support Austria against Bulgarian 
greed.1386 These issues mattered greatly in the peace proposal that the Central Powers were 
to put forward on 12 December, because although many in Vienna had realized that the re­
establishment of Serbia was inevitable”1387 Bulgarian expansionism and obstructionism 
could wreck the more important points of the plan. Mercy’s fear of Bulgarian “insatiable 
greed” was so great that he described a revived Serbia as a potential buffer state between 
Sofia and Vienna.1388 Burian’s Albanian protectorate served a similar purpose, namely to 
hem in the Bulgarians, whose eyes were already “peering towards the Adriatic.”1389 
Austria-Hungary was therefore caught between limiting its two allies’ war aims on the one 
hand, and on the other preserving its own and pushing for peace.
Radoslavov’s visit to Vienna showed that Burian, too, now felt that the re­
establishment of Serbia had become “unavoidable.”1390 But Burian remained willing to 
reassign conquered territory to other countries, as in the case of Pristina and Prizren’s 
transfer from Serbia to Albania, in opposition to the wishes of the Bulgarian government, 
which wanted to annex them itself. Merey clarified these plans for Wedel on 22 December. 
Holding on to the coast down to the border with Albania was a priority, as was the 
annexation of all of Montenegro to protect the coastal strip. Serbia was to lose Belgrade 
and the Maiva, making Kragujevac the new capital. Together with the loss of Macedonia 
to Bulgaria, Wedel worried that Russia would not accept the re-establishment of a 
miniature Serbia and wondered whether this state would even be viable,1391 much as Jagow 
had worried about Montenegro in 1915. Merey felt that, if the Hungarian agrarians who 
initially bullied Belgrade could be prevented from doing so again, a considerate economic 
policy towards Serbia could once again make for friendly relations.1392 To allow Serbia 
access to the Adriatic, however, was even for the moderate Merey not possible “under any
circumstances »1393
On 12 December the Central Powers finally published their peace initiative, in an 
atmosphere o f confidence following the victory' against Rumania and the successful, if 
extremely costly, continued defense against the Russians. However, given Germany’s
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opposition to presenting a detailed plan to the Entente as envisaged by Buridn, the 
declaration was vague and pompous. Of all the Austro-Hungarian annexationist plans, 
which included the Lovcen and coast from Montenegro, Belgrade and the Maiva from 
Serbia, and border rectifications against Rumania to the Iron Gate,1394 none were brought to 
the Entente’ attention in the note. As the Monarchy’s position weakened, Burian had given 
in to Conrad’s demands on many of these issues, but when the time came to present the 
peace plan, the Germans vetoed any detail. Instead, the note boasted of the Central Pow ers’ 
successes and indestructibility, while stating that the annihilation of the enemy was not a 
war aim.1395 Responsibility for continued war in the light of such conciliation, it stated, 
would thus lie with the Entente.1396 The peace note was rejected on 20 December, the same 
day that Burian was replaced by Ottokar Graf Czemin as Foreign Minister.
One day after the peace note was issued, Conrad sent Burian an analysis of Austro- 
Hungarian military aims in Albania, particularly a naval assessment drawing on Haus’s. It 
was to be the last of the many discussions Conrad had with Burian. Contrary to the 
glowing German assessment of Albania’s strategic value, Conrad reminded Buri&n of 
Haus’s belief that from a “purely military perspective” the Albanian coast up to Valona was 
of “no value.”1397 Italian-occupied Valona was dangerous as an airbase, but did not greatly 
hamper Austria-Hungary’s war effort. Its value, argued Haus, was as an Italian base for 
propaganda and expansion into the Balkans, which Austria-Hungary could not effectively 
counter.
Where Conrad disagreed with Haus was in asserting Valona’s “immense 
importance” for land warfare, given its ability to threaten the Monarchy’s “position in the 
western Balkans.” 1398 Hence, Conrad perceived Austria-Hungary’s interests as 
necessitating the control of Valona and its hinterland, in order to create transport assets 
necessary for resupplying any military position in Albania. Such control could only be 
obtained through annexation of north Albania, and also required the removal o f Italy by 
force, for which he again recommended seeking Greek or Bulgarian help. Although he was 
aware of the disadvantages o f a Bulgarian presence in the Adriatic or a Greek one in
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Valona, he still preferred them over Italy. Hence, Conrad agreed only with Haus’s 
assessment that a protectorate over all of Albania was incomprehensible, though not with 
the value of Valona.1399
Despite siding with Conrad on an Austro-Hungarian Valona, it came too late to 
make a difference for the peace note. In the end, Burian stood by his protectorate plan even 
in opposition to German concerns, his naval commander’s views, and Conrad. Although 
Burian probably did not expect such strong support from Conrad on the value of Valona, he 
was already well versed in the AOK annexationist policies. Conrad had already blamed the 
Hungarians for preventing annexations two years into the war, based on their attitudes 
towards the South Slav problem. The general called it a fallacy to believe that the 
irredentist problem could be solved while at the same time allowing an independent state of 
the same group, such as Montenegro or Serbia, to survive. Rather, such states needed to be 
annexed, thereby allowing only compatible national development.1400 Hungarian 
opposition to annexations was the reason, Conrad felt, that the Foreign Ministry refused to 
entertain them in areas such as Albania. Burian’s status as a Hungarian and an ally o f Tisza 
probably did not help his standing in Conrad’s eyes.
The Balkan policies set into motion by Burian were completing their cycles under 
Czemin. On 28 December, a proclamation by the XIX. District Command, developed after 
intense AOK-MdA, discussions informed the Albanians that the Monarchy would “train the 
people towards autonomy” in order to grant them an “independent state under an effective 
Austro-Hungarian protectorate.”1401 This was the first time the Albanian protectorate was 
publicly declared, making it impossible for Czemin to wash his hands of the matter.
This section has demonstrated that Burian put the Balkans first, even when the 
Germans no longer wanted to hear of his plans and pursued diametrically opposed policies. 
In the region, Buriin continued to pursue a coherent and consistent policy aimed at 
isolating Serbia and Montenegro, preventing their expansion to the Adriatic, and keeping 
Bulgaria tied down and loyal. Burian’s war aims included Italian and Rumanian border 
rectifications, and above all a desire to implement an Albanian protectorate. The section 
has shown that although Germany and Austria-Hungary began pursuing independent
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strategies, the MdA remained in control of the war aims formulation at home and sought 
parity with its allies. The latter attempt ultimately failed, but Burian’s approach kept 
Austria-Hungary relevant far beyond the dictates of political and military realities. He also 
laid the groundwork for the subsequent Foreign Minister to employ Austria-Hungary’s 
weakness and hunger as a jumping off point from which to push for immediate peace and 
warn of collapse if Germany did not heed him.
Czernin would seek to avoid minute Balkan detail upon taking office. In one of his 
first dispatches on war aims following his taking over at the Foreign Ministry, Czcmin 
defended the vaguely worded peace proposal by telling his diplomats in neutral countries 
that a unilateral publication of Central Power war aims would strengthen the pro-war camps 
in all enemy states.1402 War aims would still be relevant under Czemin, but Burian’s 
attempts to get the Germans to publish comprehensive aims in order to show the Central 
Powers’ moderation ended once and for all. The third war year would see Czemin seek to 
guarantee Austro-Hungarian integrity and end the war as soon as possible, before 
irreparable damage was done to the Monarchy, rather than focus on the minutiae of 
occupation policy.
Re-evaluation: New Leaden and the Quest for Peace 
January 1917-M ay  1917
SECTION IV
The new year saw policy discussions involving the GMR, Karl, and Germany, and 
Czemin’s new approach to foreign policy and war aims began to crystallize, Czemin had 
replaced Burian because Karl needed an immediate peace, while at the same time retaining 
all Habsburg possessions and expanding where possible. This required duplicity, and 
although Czemin played the peacemaker, his most important war aims were very similar to 
Burian’s, and the Balkans (including Rumania) represented Austria-Hungary’s best chance 
for expansion and securing its future position. The first GMR under the Karl/Czemin duo, 
"hich set forth minimum and maximum w ar aims for Austria-Hungary, had at its core the 
survival and integrity o f the Monarchy, but also foresaw expansion against Rumania and 
Montenegro, rather than against the principal enemies Italy, Serbia, and Russia, Czemin’s 
Purpose was to retain flexibility at the peace negotiating table, even going so far as 140
1401 Czertiin-Fiirstenberg'Franz/UadikCfiiikra’Hohenlohe, 27-Dec-19l6, HHStA-PA-1-954..
allowing Serbian access to the Adriatic, if it meant an immediate, general peace and 
territorial and economic benefits for the Monarchy. Although Czemin no longer believed 
anything other than a negotiated settlement was possible, he strongly supported the German 
alliance and felt that total defeat was preferable to the unacceptable peace terms the Entente 
were putting forward. Apart from the Serbian Adriatic issue, Czemin had very similar, pro- 
Muslim policies in the Balkans to Burian, but he did not pursue them in a dogmatic or 
inflexible manner.
The MdA’s primacy in setting Austro-Hungarian war aims actually increased as the 
Monarchy’s military position weakened. This was chiefly due to Conrad’s replacement in 
February 1917, leaving only Tisza and llohenlohe able to apply pressure on Czemin. But 
Czemin, who was very secretive, did not give in to external pressure, making the 
documentation on war aims during his tenure sparser. Nevertheless, this section argues that 
as a result of the Russian revolution, Tisza aligned himself with Czemin to secure territory 
in Rumania, protect the German alliance, and defend Austro-Hungarian interests in the 
Balkans against a powerful Bulgaria. Even Karl, who professed only to seek peace, will be 
seen to have advocated widespread territorial expansion in the Balkans when military 
fortunes benefited the Monarchy.
The former Minister to Rumania Ottokar Graf Czemin von Chudenitz replaced 
Burian as Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary on 23 December 1916. The major issue for 
Czemin after taking office was making peace quickly. Most of his efforts in this direction 
took the form of peace feelers and media exposure in the neutral countries,1403 wherein he 
concealed br altered Austria-Hungary’s war aims to appear as a peacemaker. He resisted 
publishing peace terms on 24 December1404 as President Woodrow Wilson requested in his 
note two days earlier, though only because he did not want to damage peace options by 
publishing unacceptable unilateral aims, and because it would have threatened the 
Quadruple Alliance.1405 Instead, Czemin suggested a verbal exchange between the 
belligerents,1406 which was rejected. That Czemin was insincere in claiming to be moderate 
°ver war aims was demonstrated by his rejection of the limited Italian proposals he
C7crnin-!'Urstenbcrg(Madrid), 27-Fcb-19i7, HHStA-PA-1-1046.
^  Czemin*Bcrlin/Conslanlinoplc/ik)fia.,Hague'C<»pa\hagen?SttKkhoiin'Madrid, 24-t)ec-19!6,1IIISiA-I’A-l-
Czcrnin^’allavicim/Hohcnlohe, 28-Dm>, 9 , 6. ¡417.1.-45 15.
Czcmin-American Embassy Vienna, 26-Pec-1916, REZL-45/15.
296
received on 26 December, which included Trieste as a free city and the cession of the 
Italian-speaking Trentino.1407 Peace terms therefore had to restore the status quo ante, and 
Czemin would not give Austria-Hungary’s worst enemy the satisfaction of meeting its war 
aims in the Tyrol. When Germany’s peace note was also rejected by the Entente on 10 
January 1917, Czemin made clear that, as long as the Entente desired a “dissolution”1408 of 
the Monarchy by supporting the nationalities, no peace could be possible.
The Foreign Minister therefore returned to using the neutral intermediaries and 
press to strengthen the Monarchy’s position.1409 Czemin instructed Mcnsdorff, who was on 
a mission to Denmark and Sweden, that although some border corrections would become 
necessary, Austria-Hungary nevertheless desired a “negotiated peace without conquest.”1410 
Although he categorically rejected any notion that there would be border corrections 
against Austria-Hungary,1411 he did claim not to desire conquest.1412 Mensdorff acted on 
these instructions by telling the neutrals of Austria-Hungary’s determination never to 
discuss the cession of its ow;n territory to “revolutionaries like Serbia” but its sincere desire 
not to injure other nations’ rights.1413
The first opportunity for Czemin to begin to shape Balkan war aims policy was at 
the Common Ministerial Council (GMR) on 12 January, two days after the Wallachian 
portion of Rumania had been conquered under Mackensen’s leadership. With the new 
Emperor Karl presiding, his ideas for a minimum and maximum war aims program were 
discussed. Czemin supported Kail’s ideas for a minimum program that demanded merely 
the complete integrity of the Monarchy and a dynastic change in Serbia, coupled with the 
seizure of the Lovcen, which would be the Monarchy’s only annexation. 1414 The 
maximum aims included the Austro-Polish solution, the annexation of Montenegro and the 
Ma5va (the northwest portion o f Serbia), and border rectifications against Rumania.1413 
Although he warned that a compromise peace was necessary’, Czemin pushed Karl’s
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minimum program a small step further, making the Iron Gates in Rumania a key 
component of his plan.1416
Thus, the Austro-Hungarian minimum program, approved at the highest level, 
included two annexations against adversaries considered marginal -  Rumania and 
Montenegro -  rather than against its principal military adversaries, Russia and Serbia. 
Austria’s peace conditions rested with territorial acquisition in the Balkans rather than 
anywhere else, for it was here that the military requirements -  elevated by Czemin above 
any political ones -  set forth the most important annexations.1417 In order to bring England 
on board and to avoid reparations, Czemin also recommended “pretending” that there were 
no victors.1418
The Foreign Minister’s positioning between the opposing blocs was similar to 
Burian’s experiences, though one important difference was intention. Burian’s goals were 
to maintain Austro-Hungarian independence, prestige, and Great Power status, while 
Czemin, from the very First GMR onwards, was trying to protect the Monarchy's integrity 
and sheer survival through an immediate, general peace. This was the reason he was 
appointed by Karl in the first place, and though differences would arise between them, 
these goals remained consistent.
At the GMR Tisza reiterated his perspective that “securing Austro-Hungarian 
interests in the Balkans was a principal axiom” of its policies.1419 His goals were to weaken 
Serbia, seize the Montenegrin Lovcen and Antivari, and strengthen Bulgaria without letting 
it reach the Adriatic. He rejected the new Austrian Premier Heinrich Karl Graf Clam- 
Martinic’s suggestion, which was backed by Conrad, to annex Serbia.1420 Rather, Tisza 
sought the unification o f Serbia and Montenegro, to be brought into utter dependency 
through some sort of customs union.1421 Czemin eventually threw his w eight behind Tisza, 
stating that an annexation of Serbia would probably not be possible,1422 but broke with him 
by wanting to allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic or economically incentivize -  rather than 
dominate -  the country.
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On Albania, Tisza wanted to give up Valona to Greece, seeking to control the 
occupied portions directly. With Burian out of the way, Conrad called the Albanian project 
an embarrassment and again recommended the annexation of Montenegro, the Lovcen, and 
occupied parts of Albania. But Valona remained important to the general, and so 
recommended a direct strike against Italy to obtain it. Only if this failed did Conrad agree 
with Tisza and Clam that either Bulgaria or Greece should obtain it. On what was a GMR 
first, Conrad also suggested incorporating Italian territory.
On Rumania, Conrad suggested border corrections and taking the Iron Gate. He 
also suggested the annexation of Wallachia. Czemin disagreed, arguing that a seizure of 
Wallachia by the Monarchy would make achieving peace more difficult.1423 This was a 
position Czernin would later -  with the onset of the Russian revolution -  reverse 
completely.
Karl concluded his first GMR by emphasizing that Austria-Hungary’s "principal 
war aim” was to maintain the Monarchy’s integrity and to allow Serbian survival.1424 A 
separate peace with Russia, Karl and Czemin thought, was the key to ensuring the survival 
of the Monarchy.
Czernin’s perspectives since his time as Minister in Rumania had not changed 
drastically. He believed in January 1917 as he had in September 1915 that "a victory in the 
sense that we will be able to dictate to a beaten Europe the conditions we want” was not 
likely and inconsequential anyway.1425 However, with the rejection of the Central Power’s 
winter peace note, Czemin was forced to seek a more aggressive line, even against his own 
wishes. Among the “unacceptable” conditions set forth by the Entente reply, Czernin took 
particular offense at those parts which called for the liberation o f the nationalities under 
Austro-Hungarian hegemony, thereby attacking the Monarchy’s core integrity. Believing 
that the dissolution of the Monarchy was the Entente’ ultimate goal, Czemin had no choice 
but to support a continuation of the war, particularly given that the military prospects were 
“at their very best.”1426 O f course, such talk was only designed to sway the neutrals and 
intimidate the enemy. However, at the dawn o f 1917, Czemin had little choice, given that *143
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even if the Central Powers suffered a “complete collapse,”1427 the Entente war aims could 
not be harsher than they were now.
A problem for the new peace-seeking Austro-Hungarian leadership equal to that of 
Entente aims was German obstinacy and overconfidence. Unrestricted submarine warfare 
had been decided on 9 January (declared 1 February), without much thought being given to 
Austrian concerns. Likewise, Vienna was virtually ignored in the German response to 
Wilson’s second mediation offer, causing Czemin to issue his own in February, offering a 
peace without victors, annexations, or indemnities. Under Buridn, war aims had generally 
been debated internally and peace matters only discussed with Germany. Now under 
Czemin the situation was the reversed, with war aims become subject to the overall goal of 
bringing about a peace. An understandable result was that all war aims, even those 
mentioned as critical at the latest GMR, ceased to have the same importance as under 
Burian. In the western Balkans, the MdA pushed for generally acceptable terms with 
minimal safeguards for Austro-Hungarian influence and prestige. Burian, who had stayed 
in the government as the Common Finance Minister, supported this approach, since he 
realized specific demands would not be possible until after a solid defense in the spring.14*8
Czemin set the higher policy, but no matter how hard he tried, he could not escape 
the minute Balkan details which forced an elucidation of his war aims. When the 
Bulgarians offered to give up Pristina, but not Prizren, to the resurrected Albanian state, 
this sparked irredentism fears in the AOIC. Both cities had a majority Albanian population. 
Prizren with its 90% ethnic Albanians and 10% Serbs was of special importance to Sofia as 
the historic seat o f Bulgarian kings. According to Wedel, the Austrians insisted on Prizren 
becoming Albanian not just for ethnographic reasons, but because the Prizren area was the 
only region of reasonable agricultural value and Albania would not be viable without it.1429 
On the Bulgarian side, this annexationist policy was apparently being pushed personally by 
King Ferdinand, rather than by Radoslavov.1450 The AOK recommended against attaching 
even Prizren to Albania, and Conrad questioned the political wisdom of such a move. If the 
MdA pushed it through, however, the AOK feared analogous aspirations in Montenegro
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and elsewhere in Serbia.1431 This was of particular importance to Conrad, because he had 
just recently succeeded in having Buriàn accept his annexation plan for Montenegro, and 
did not want to lose the Sandjak of Novipazar and Plevlje. Against Serbia, the Kosovo 
precedent could mean the loss o f Prijepolje and Mitrovica, over which the MGG/Serbia 
now had a weak hold, given the GMR decision to resurrect Serbia.
These two issues led to Czemin’s first extensive policy elucidation on the western 
Balkan issues, which for him were never of critical importance. Czemin clarified that the 
Prijepolje, Novipazar, and Plevlje districts (all formerly part of the Sandjak of Novipazar) 
had a majority Muslim Slav element and that only Mitrovica und Ipek had an Albanian 
Muslim majority. Nevertheless, the Serbs and Montenegrins, during their brief rule over 
these areas, had not managed to “suppress and annihilate” either of the two Muslim 
elements. By maintaining this Muslim Slav-Albanian distinction, the Sandjak could, in its 
entirety, be “incorporated” into Bosnia and the Albanian areas (Mitrovica and Ipek) be 
incorporated into Albania proper.1432 By reorganizing the MGGs in this fashion, Czemin 
felt that the Monarchy’s political goals could be met, even during these provisional 
administrations.1433 By creating facts on the ground which worked in the Monarchy’s 
favor, Czemin hoped that when the general peace came these rectifications would be 
upheld by the Entente ‘for the sake o f national self-determination.’ If successful, he would 
be able to perpetually strengthen the well-disposed Muslim element vis-à-vis the hostile 
Orthodox Slavs, which was a consistent goal of Austro-Hungarian policy. Thus, the towns 
of Ipek, Djakovica, Gusinje, and Podgorica should be shifted from Montenegro to 
Albania.1434
In these instructions, Czemin went beyond what had been agreed as the minimum 
war aim at the GMR and also what he would offer Wilson the following month. Giving the 
AOK the expectation of annexing the Sandjak (whether or not Montenegro would 
eventually be annexed as well) was an attempt to pacify Conrad’s concerns, while at the 
same time retaining maximum flexibility both to annex more or to grant critical territory to 
the friendly Albanian state. In substance, Czemin’s policies were not far removed from 
Buridn’s, though the latter had been more dogmatic in the way he pursued them. Czemin 
"anted to avoid petty internal squabbles in order to focus on the w ider peace questions.
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The new Foreign Minister’s perspective was much more holistic, and though he walked the 
middle road as his predecessor had vis-à-vis the army, Czemin understood that the 
divergence between Germany and the Entente, rather than bits of land the Monarchy 
wanted in the Balkans, would make or break the prospects for peace.
On 27 February, Kai l replaced Conrad with Arthur Freiherr Arz von Straussenburg 
as Chief of the General Staff. This move would cause a wave of relief in the MdÀ, as its 
main opponent in foreign policymaking circles had been removed. The conciliatory and 
apolitical Arz would generally keep out of such questions, focusing instead on advising the 
Emperor only on military matters. Henceforth, the strongest annexationist pressure had 
been removed, giving Czemin a free hand to conduct war aims matters in conjunction only 
with Karl and the Hungarian Premier. Unfortunately for historians, this also meant that the 
MdÀ no longer had to justify its policy as intensively as before, making Austro-Hungarian 
war aims more difficult to delineate. The only remaining domestic threat which prevented 
a total MdA-dominated war aims policy formation was the Hungarian Premier, who was 
becoming increasingly isolated. What is certain is that, from this point forward, positive 
war aims would always be subsumed within peace questions as pursued by Czemin and 
also independently by Karl using Sixte de Bourbon and the Meinl Group.
The possibility of a separate peace arose with the outbreak of the Russian February 
revolution,1435 until Kerensky decided to continue the war on the side of the Entente. Still, 
the Austrians hoped for greater possibilities for peace in the east. Kajetan Mérey von 
Kampos-Mére, one of Czemin’s assistants in the MdÀ and former Ambassador in Rome, 
recommended that the Monarchy seek a status quo ante helium, as not only would 
annexations cause problems for the Dualist system, but also there were no territories 
“whose incorporation was particularly desirable.”1436 Even Mercy, however, recommended 
obtaining concessions in economics and finance, to offset forgoing any territorial ones.1437 
Forgetting the constant pressure the AOK had exercised for over two years. Mérey was 
adamant that Austria-Hungary did not have territorial hunger like Germany or Bulgaria. If 
the Central Powers were successful, then the Monarchy would be left with nothing 
compared to its allies. Interestingly, Mérey did not see a problem with this, given that
'4is February 23 (March 8 by Gregorian Calendar), 1917.
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Germany “paid more in this war.”1438 Mérey worried that any attempts at parity (through 
Austrian expansion in Wallachia or Moldova) would grant Germany an excuse for even 
wider annexations. Only towards Italy, where he had been Ambassador, did Merey seem to 
have any antagonistic feelings, though again he insisted on not even so much as a border 
rectification.1439 With Conrad’s annexation drive gone, the more moderate faction within 
the MdÀ pushed for even less than the institution had traditionally supported vis-à-vis the 
AOK.
Czemin, for whom such ideas were too pacific, could nevertheless entertain them 
and negotiate with the Entente while at the same time pursuing his own secret plans in the 
Balkans and Rumania. As late as March 1917, Czemin refused to give his Ministers in the 
region even a hint of what would happen to the very important Sandjak of Novipazar.1440 
Such matters were to remain quiet and off the Entente radar if the matter of general 
European peace was to be addressed.1441 Czemin also pushed the peace line vis-à-vis 
Germany, as on 16 March 1917 when Bethmann was in Vienna for talks. Tisza joined the 
Foreign Minister in trying to convince him that the war could not be continued for much 
longer, as the Monarchy was at the end of its strength.1442 While the Austrians hoped to get 
the Germans to agree to reduce their western aims in return for gains in the east (Poland), 
the Germans attempted to buy Austrian perseverance by offering Rumania.1443 Rejecting 
any notion that Alsace-Lorraine should be ceded, the Germans instead wanted the Longwy-
Briey iron ore in exchange for some villages in Alsace-Lorraine, though at best for 
nothing.1444 Caught between insisting on immediate peace and demanding parity with 
Germany, Czemin chose the latter. He opposed ending the war with considerable territorial 
gain for Germany and Bulgaria, while the Monarchy, which was “bleeding from a hundred 
gashes,” was left empty handed or even territorially diminished.1445 The prestige of the 
Monarchy prevented even Czemin from pursuing a peace policy which was against its own
territorial interests. Getting the Chancellor to agree in principle, Czemin demanded no less 
than complete “parity with Germany in economic and territorial questions” and no return o f 
any Balkan or Russian territory until lire occupied portions of the Monarchy were
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restituted.1446 Czemin, even from a position of admitted weakness, nevertheless negotiated 
a very hard line vis-à-vis Germany that would have made Burián proud. But it was a bluff, 
for while Czemin professed utter military weakness but insisted on absolute parity, he was 
planning for a golden middle o f Balkan rectifications and, if possible, the Rumanian 
acquisitions as well. It is unclear how he expected the Germans not to see through this 
ruse, or why he should be given parity when the Monarchy was militarily on its knees. In 
the end, Czemin was being squeezed by the dilemma of eventual parity through 
acquisitions versus immediate integrity through peace.
Czernin reported his talks to the GMR on 22 March 1917, at which Poland was 
officially renounced in favor of Germany, whose compensation for peace, it was hoped, 
would be in the east. Czemin and Karl hoped that by giving up Poland, Germany could 
be persuaded to be more lenient in the west, or even relinquish its claims there.1448 In 
exchange, the ministers hoped, the maximum program could be achieved in the Balkans, 
including in Rumania, on which Czemin was very keen.1449 The Russian revolution put 
things into a more positive light than they had been two months prior, allowing the 
ministers a modicum of optimism. In fact, Bethmann Hollweg had been forthcoming on all 
points except Italy, where he declined to give guarantees because the military situation 
made it impossible to force Italy to hand over occupied Austrian territory or occupied 
portions o f Albania.1450
Still, Tisza was the most positive of all, asking his colleagues to avoid a “desperado 
policy” of peace at all costs, as Austria-Hungary had no reason to act “half-heartedly.” 
Although the incorporation of 3-4 million antagonistic Rumanians w’ould be difficult, he 
felt it w as necessary not to come out of this w ar empty handed.,4S1 The Russian revolution 
did not change Tisza and his colleagues’ desire to further weaken Rumania and improve 
relations with Austria-Hungary’s gigantic northern neighbor by ensuring Bessarabia 
remained Russian. However, reflecting the traditional Austro-Hungarian mistrust of the 
allied Bulgarians, Tisza insisted that Rumania not be weakened to the point where it 
became non-viablc, for fear o f it becoming a victim of its avaricious and ambitious
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southern neighbor.1452 Oddly, Tisza did not perceive the seizure of Bucharest -  which was 
one of the plans the Hungarian Premier advocated -  as taking too much from Rumania. 
The Hungarian Prime Minister also suggested that the Rumanian territories in western 
Wallachia should be incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary, while Bosnia-Herzegovina 
would finally be attached to Austria.1453 By ruling Wallachia dictatorially directly from 
Budapest, the frictions between the two halves of the Monarchy during the Bosnian 
condominium rule would not be repeated.1454 Since Bosnia would not be enough 
compensation for Austria, however, and the Austro-Polish solution had been abandoned, 
Tisza offered an increased Hungarian participation to the war costs.1455 Tisza was 
concerned that Germany could prevent any such plans in Rumania, which is why he asked 
Czemin to insist on Rumanian compensation in exchange for the German Polish one. The 
greatest resistance to Tisza’s plan came from Clam, who deemed it insufficient for Austria 
given that it would have to give up Poland, Italian rectifications, and Valona in exchange 
merely for Bosnia.
Karl intervened in the squabbling to clarify that the matter was not an internal 
constitutional one between the two halves of live Monarchy, but rather which policies the 
Monarchy as a whole would employ to allow Czemin to negotiate authoritatively w ith the 
Germans. The Emperor therefore rejected Tisza’s recommendation to leave issues such as 
Lovcen, Antivari, and the Serbian bridgeheads like Belgrade out o f the talks. Given 
Austria-Hungary’s weakening status, Karl realized that only with German agreement would 
these regions fall under his scepter.1456
The k.u.k. ministers also deliberated on the future of Serbia, and w hether to grant it 
independence but tie it to a framework o f an Austro-Hungarian economic sphere, which 
was originally a German suggestion.1457 The ministers approved Czcmin’s plans for parity 
and expansion into Rumania and the Balkans, wherein the Lovcen would fall to the 
Monarchy, Wallachia and the western Moldova would be annexed, and a shrunken Serbia 
Would be restored into an Austro-Hungarian customs area.1458
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Although evidence about MdA policy surrounding Austro-Hungarian war aims is 
far scarcer following the departure of Conrad, the documentation suggests that Czemin and 
Karl pursued similar expansionist Balkan policies to the old guard under Burian. They did 
this, however, under the guise of peacemaking and ensuring the flexibility required to 
handle the increasingly aggressive and militaristic Germans. Under Czemin, the Balkans 
remained the principal Austro-Hungarian point o f expansion, was to be pursued without 
offering territorial or economic compensation (such as reparations) to the Entente, and 
served to buttress the Monarchy against Germany, Bulgaria, and other potential future 
enemies. His goals were not dissimilar from Burian’s, demonstrating a consistency in 
Austro-Hungarian war aims planning, though Czemin approached his task in a more 
circumspect manner. Czemin’s MdA also retained control of the foreign policymaking 
process, and after Conrad’s departure faced a reduced need to justify its actions and 
choices. The old frictions with Berlin and Sofia remained, however, and it was here that 
the greatest obstacles lay for Czemin to overcome before a general peace could be 
attempted.
SECTION V
Although Czemin’s MdA no longer faced serious impediments to its war aims 
planning from the military side, negotiations with the Monarchy’s allies still generated 
much discussion on the topic. As the Monarchy’s position became more precarious -  
chiefly due to its desperate food shortages -  Czemin’s hand was weakened against German 
and Bulgarian expansionism. With Tisza’s ability to resist seeking peace at all costs 
waning, Czemin attempted to convince the Germans of the need to end the war by the 
autumn of 1917. Yet Czemin was caught between desiring territorial compensation for the 
Monarchy’s efforts and insisting on peace. On the one hand he wanted to divide Rumania 
for conquest, while on the other -  much to 1 lohenlohe’s horror -  he offered Serbia access to 
die Adriatic Sea. He abandoned integral Austro-Hungarian aims particularly in the western 
Balkans, while not satisfying the Germans, wbo did not want to be compensated in Poland 
find who did not believe in Czemin’s doomsday visions. Czemin pursued a foreign policy 
mdependent o f Karl and the GMR, making him unpredictable and enigmatic. Meanwhile, 
Germany was becoming increasingly confident and Czemin’s ability to retain parity was 
teetering on the brink of collapse.
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Bulgaria presented another serious obstacle to Austro-Hungarian war aims in the 
Balkans. With Germany resisting Austria-Hungary in Rumania, and Bulgaria pushing 
north into the Dobrudja and west across the peninsula, Czemin’s priorities in the eastern 
Balkans rather than the west became apparent. Berlin’s and Vienna’s interest in Rumania 
angered Sofia, which wanted to annex the Dobrudja but was prevented from doing so by its 
more powerful allies. Yet, although Czemin succeeded in slowing Bulgarian advances in 
Rumania, he was unable to push through his own war aims in the eastern Balkans.
Czernin traveled to Berlin on 26 March, a few days after the GMR, to come to an 
understanding on war aims.1459 Prior to Czemin’s departure, Wedel informed him that 
setting war aims was not possible at this time, and warned Zimmermann that the Austrians 
did not appreciate the economic damage caused to Germany by the loss of its colonies.1460 
As soon as the talks began, Czemin immediately and repeatedly insisted that a continuation 
of the war beyond summer 1917 was impossible for the Monarchy.1461 Zimmermann later 
informed the OHL that the reason for this pessimistic analysis was that both human and raw 
material resources were depleted: both halves of the Monarchy were starving, the harvest 
would not be sufficient, and the Rumanian yield would not be enough either.1462 While 
Czemin viewed a fourth war w inter as out o f the question, Zimmermann admitted that even 
for Germany it would be difficult to fight on.1463
The Germans accepted Czemin’s plan to pursue whatever peace feelers became 
available. In terms o f war aims, Czemin pushed for the territorial integrity of the 
Monarchy and incorporation of Wallachia, as agreed at the GMR.1464 But Czemin was not 
just executing GMR-approved policy. He informed the Germans that his own view -  not 
formally approved by Karl or the GMR -  was that Serbia should be granted an outlet to the 
Adriatic. This, Czemin hoped, would get the Entente to agree to negotiate, and still protect 
the Central Pow ers by having Serbia join an Austrian customs union and Bulgaria obtaining 
Macedonia.1465 If this succeeded, the Foreign Minister felt, then Wallachia could fall to *
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Austria-Hungary, Moldova to Russia, and Dobrudja to Bulgaria.1466 For the Danube Delta, 
Czemin -  on his own authority again -  suggested the creation of a small state the size of 
Monaco or Liechtenstein,1467 to keep the delta a buffer and separate the Bulgarians from 
Russia.
Zimmermann supported the Moldovan plan, as well as the exchange of Poland for 
Rumania, but could not easily understand Czemin’s ‘Monaco plan.’ Given the revolution, 
Zimmermann did not expect Russia to border Bulgaria at all, even if all of the Dobrudja fell 
to Sofia. Apart from the expected territorial changes, however, the State Secretary did not 
give details on how he intended to prevent a Russo-Bulgarian common border. Bethmann 
Hollweg immediately picked up on Czemin’s idea, however, and described the Serbian 
Adriatic idea as “advantageous.” It was Hohenlohe alone, of all the participants, who 
questioned it and stated that there would not be any disagreement between Italy and Serbia, 
but the control of both sides o f the Adriatic by states which hated Austria-Hungary.1468 
Czemin admitted that it would be a “colossal concession” on the part of the Monarchy, but 
that this or Serb-Montenegrin unification might be necessary in order to induce the Entente 
to accept a diminished Serbia. Either way its importance was limited, Czemin emphasized, 
because Austria-Hungary’s “days and months were numbered,” even if the Monarchy 
would “naturally not show any weakness until the last moment.”1469
Given the “catastrophic” provisions situation, there was merely a hope and no 
guarantee that the Monarchy could fight on until September or October 1917.’470 Still, 
Czemin and the Germans categorically rejected handing any territory to Italy at all -  again 
in contrast to the GMR decision a few days earlier -  even though the Italians were seven 
kilometers outside Trieste. Hohenlohe pointed out that if the Italians were to remain so 
close to Trieste and the Serbs obtained a port on the Adriatic, the “continued existence of 
the Monarchy was as good as finished,” though Zimmermann disputed this conclusion. 
Strengthened by Zimmermann and State Undersecretary Wilhelm von Stumm, Czemin 
argued against his own Ambassador that the Monarchy must allow the heavy sacrifice o f 
allowing Serbia to the sea. Czemin used this tactic to pressure the Reichskanzler about 
Alsace/Lorraine. But Bethmann understandably did not want to give up German territory if
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Austria-Hungary did not give up territory to Italy. During the talks, each side used all 
available arguments to bend the other to its will. Czemin suggested that even taking 
Rumania would be resisted by the Magyars, although Tisza was its biggest proponent. On 
the German side, Bethmann Hollweg insisted that total renunciation of annexations in the 
west would be unacceptable to the German public. Although agreement was reached on the 
Polish question, the details of what to offer the Entente when sending representatives to 
Switzerland remained uncertain.1471
The following day, on 27 March, Czemin and Bethmann signed an accord following 
the talks which described the minimum and maximum aims which the two sides had 
agreed. According to the minimum program, the Central Powers’ armies in Russia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and Rumania would retreat only if the status quo ante bellum 
were restored in east and west. The maximum program would include expansion “in the 
east” for Germany and in Rumania for the Monarchy.1472 The extent of these annexations 
depended on the diplomatic options at peacetime and on the “performances/achievements” 
by each of the allies, which implied that Germany would receive larger territories.1473 As 
Czemin’s desire for peace grew, his policies shifted away from territorial war aims and, 
despite being sent to Berlin to implement GMR policy, he pursued an independent track 
which sought far fewer of the traditional MdA war aims than had been agreed. Only for his 
Rumanian plans would Czemin seek to enforce Austrian interests, while he undermined his 
own colleagues in Vienna on Serbia and the western Balkans,
Interestingly, however, Bethmann seems to have kept this agreement to himself. 
Fischer notes that as late as February 1918 Herding said he had never heard o f such an 
agreement between Czemin and Bethmann Hollweg. Unfortunately, Czemin’s carelessness 
on the Serbian Adriatic question had set the ball rolling in Berlin. Hohenlohe wrote on 31 
March that leading German statesmen perceived an advantage in giving Serbia access to the 
Adriatic, mainly because of the antagonism that would ensue with Italy.1474 This concept 
had originally been developed in 1916 by Jagow, whose ideas of letting Serbia take 
Montenegro and northern Albania were now resurrected. In his reporting, the generally 
very measured Hohenlohe argued frantically against these German ideas, just as he had
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done with Czemin when the Germans were sitting across the table. One of Austria- 
Hungary’s most important and best informed Ambassadors, Hohenlohe warned against the 
domestic repercussions, not to mention the effect on the greater Serbia pretensions of such 
a move. In uncharacteristically colorful language, Hohenlohe worried about a rise in 
Serbian expansion and rejected the hoped-for Italian-Serbian conflict.1475 This 
“catastrophic” plan would damage Austria-Hungary’s economic livelihood in the Balkans, 
and by leaving Italy in Valona would make the Adriatic a “mare clausum [closed sea].” 
With Albania’s main advocate (Burian) relegated to the role of k.u.k. Finance Minister, 
Hohenlohe took it upon himself to remind Czemin that Serbs on the Adriatic would mean 
the “complete abandonment” of the Albanians. Such a move ran counter to Austro- 
Hungarian interests, for strengthening Albania to create a counterweight to the Slavs had 
always been a “cornerstone” of its Balkan policy. For the same reason, Hohenlohe resisted 
Bulgarian expansion in a similar direction. All of these disagreements in Berlin, the 
Ambassador noted, stemmed from the fact that Vienna was still unable to define its war 
aims clearly enough so that German statesmen would stop thinking up alternatives in areas 
for which they have “surprisingly little understanding.”1476
Back in Vienna, Czemin confirmed Austria-Hungary’s stance on Italy on 31 March, 
telling the Germans that any separate peace w ith Rome could only come about on the basis 
of a status quo ante, and any territorial concessions w ere out of the question.1477 Yet, after 
adamant refusals to entertain cession of territory to Italy, on 2 April he told Wedel that he 
would hand over South Tyrol or Galicia in exchange for an immediate peace.147* This 
came as a result of an Italian offer o f separate peace in exchange for the Trentino a few 
days earlier, which had initially been turned down.1479 Going back and forth on policy -  
without the approval of Karl or the GMR -  w as typical of Czemin’s policymaking. These 
comments were designed to get the Germans to agree to what he believed was the 
comparatively small sacrifice o f Alsace/Lorraine and tire non-annexation of Briey. But the 
more Czemin frantically looked for a way out, the more hardened the Gentian diplomats 
became. Wedel refused to even talk about a German renunciation in the west, and instead *479
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suggested Austria-Hungary cede the port of Sebenico (Sibenik/Sibenning) in Croatia to 
Germany.1480
Not only did the Germans effectively parry Austro-Hungarian attempts to discuss 
AIsace/Lorraine, but their assertiveness in the face of Vienna’s weakness underscored how 
the balance within the alliance had shifted. Although Germany had been demanding 
Austro-Hungarian territorial concessions since the beginning of the war, Stumm described 
Czemin’s plan to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, which the now k.u.k. Foreign Minister 
had been peddling since his tenure in Bucharest, as “grotesque.”1481 A certain degree of 
Austro-Italian tension was useful for Germany, as keeping Italy in the war meant keeping 
the Austrian ally in it as well. But it was not just about geopolitics -  Germany was now in 
a position to demand much more due to Austro-Hungarian weakness. For example, the 
Germans had no problem suggesting Austria-Hungary grant parts of eastern Galicia to 
Russia in exchange for the German occupation of Kurland and Lithuania, an impertinence 
Czemin rejected in no uncertain terms.1482
Although commissioned to push for peace, Czemin was equally involved with 
managing and expanding Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans, particularly vis-à-vis 
Bulgaria and Germany. In doing so, his goals were surprisingly similar to Buriàn’s, though 
his approach involved greater subterfuge. As we have seen, Czemin was not immediately 
successful against Germany, and realized he faced expansive aims from Berlin while also 
being asked to limit his own. The Bulgarian allies were at times even more trying for the 
MdÀ in areas such as Rumania and Serbia, being proportionately even more land hungry 
than the Germans.
The biggest problem regarding Rumania was to identify territorial priorities and 
restrain the Bulgarians and Germans, in late December, the Austro-Hungarian naval 
commander had insisted on ownership o f the Iron Gate,1483 with which the Foreign 
Ministry agreed, but which became increasingly difficult to obtain due to German 
resistance. LudendorfT opened the first salvo when he refused to allow an Austro- 
Hungarian representative at the German MGG/Rumania, arguing that no similar post
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existed in Serbia.1484 This irritated Vienna, and things would only get worse in relations 
over Rumania. Bulgaria’s demands were even more serious. Against Serbia, Radoslavov 
pushed for a unification of the rump Montenegro and Serbia,1485 in contrast to previous 
aims involving their elimination, probably due to a desire to ease the peacemaking vis-à-vis 
Russia. The main openings for Bulgarian expansion, however, were in Macedonia and the 
Dobrudja. In the push towards the Adriatic, Bulgaria began to include territories such as 
Monastir and as far west as Ohrida in its claims,1486 and as the questions over Rumania 
became more pressing Buriàn and Czemin were less able to concern themselves with 
eventual Bulgarian expansion westwards across the Balkans. Indeed, Buriàn had requested 
on 8 December 1916 that troops be moved from Rumania and elsewhere in the Balkans to 
reinforce Austria-Hungary’s position around Trieste against Italy. The Austro-Hungarian 
fear of losing Trieste was linked to the beliefs about Italian war aims -  confirmed in 
February 19 1 71487 -  that the Italians had wider designs on Austro-Hungarian, non-Italian- 
inhabited territory. To defend this position, he argued that to protect and liberate its 
sovereign territory was o f “incomparably higher importance”14*8 for the overall military 
situation than the Macedonian front. By contrast, the purpose of the Bulgarian desire to 
send freed up forces from Rumania to Macedonia was to establish its position there as the 
future owner o f the territory -  which intelligence reports indicated the Entente would allow 
to prevent future Austrian penetration through Macedonia towards Salonika.1489 With 
Czernin’s appointment, the goals against Macedonia, Salonika, or anywhere south and east 
of Albania began to fade from foreign audiences, opening up space for Bulgaria to act 
against New Serbia. On New Year's Day 1917, Radoslavov requested that the entire 
Morava valley be handed over to Bulgaria,1440 in exchange for an agreement to abandon 
Pristina in favor o f Albania and Austria-Hungary.
Where Czernin did resist Bulgaria openly was in the Dobrudja. Nor was he alone, 
s*nce the Ottomans were also reportedly concerned about Bulgaria’s intentions against 
more than the lost southern Dobrudja it had been promised in the Quadruple Alliance 
treaty. If Sofia was to obtain the entire Dobrudja up to the Danube Delta, including the
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important port of Constantza, then the Ottoman Empire would be “entirely dependent”1491 
on the powerful post-war Bulgaria for trade w ith Europe. Czemin too was opposed to such 
a large Bulgaria, which was why he insisted on the policy that the Dobrudja be ceded to a 
condominium of the four allies, rather than to Bulgaria directly.1492 The Turks stated that 
they would be prepared to discuss the cession of Constantza to Bulgaria under certain 
guarantees,1493 in particular that the railway lines to the Orient be kept under Turkish or 
Austro-Hungarian control,1494 a demand which would be difficult to sell to Berlin or Sofia. 
Mittag in Sofia did not believe the King really wished for a border with Russia, while the 
Germans were only worried about Bulgaria’s intentions due to its “avaricious national 
character.”1495 The problem lay in the German Emperor’s own utterances, whereby he had 
promised Radoslavov the entire Dobrudja during his New Year’s visit to Berlin, which the 
AA tried hard to correct as a “misunderstanding,”1496
Where there could be no misunderstanding was the attempt by Berlin to keep 
Austria-Hungary out of Rumania. Conrad again expressed this fear on 17 January, staling 
that Germany seemed to be methodically attempting to expel Austria-Hungary from the 
valuable portions of occupied Rumania, particularly in Wallachia.1497 He w as worried that 
Germany intended to appropriate, by means o f the administration it controlled, all valuable 
resources and services such as Danube transport, food reserves, industry, and agriculture. 
O f all of these, his greatest concern lay w ith Tum-Severin’s “largest and most efficient 
dockyard” which the Monarchy needed for military and commercial reasons and which, 
together with the Iron Gate, represented a central war aim against Rumania. Conrad, in one 
of his first conversations with Czemin, had pointed out that, regardless o f what happened to 
Rumania, the Monarchy “could not relinquish ownership o f Tum-Severin,” as this was 
indispensible for the control of the Iron Gate.1498 Czemin’s emphasis on Rumania shone 
through in his strong support for Conrad’s overall concern. Although the new Foreign 
Minister, like Burian before him, would have problems with Conrad, he did try hard to
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limit a turf-war.1499 Czernin urged Conrad to work together with him on the Rumanian 
question, to prevent a peace treaty until the Monarchy had extracted what food and raw 
materials it could.
The Germans had returned the southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, but remained in 
control of the old Rumanian Dobrudja from its administrative headquarters in Constantza. 
The current division of spoils as per an agreement from 2 December 1916 involved 
granting a portion of the current food and petroleum stocks to the armies in the field and to 
Bulgaria and Turkey, while what remained would be divided between the Dual Alliance 
members. Conrad was willing to consider granting the Dobrudja to Bulgaria on conditions 
of effective longer-term control over railway, shipping, and oil production facilities, which 
would undermine Bulgarian administration and serve the interests of the Monarchy and 
Germany.1500 Czemin was more reserved, becoming suspicious of why Ludcndorff would 
be willing to offer the territory to Bulgaria, when he had previously not wanted Germany to 
depend on Bulgaria for materials transit to Turkey and had wanted Rumania to retain at 
least part of the Dobrudja w ith the Danube Delta. Since Czemin did not want to be draw n 
into the Germans’ trap of being first to refuse Bulgarian demands in tire Dobrudja, he 
reluctantly agreed, and added the very Buriánesque caveat that he gave his support on the 
basis that the Bulgarian administration did “not prejudice” the final status.1501 Unlike 
Burián, however, Czemin did not seek input from Tisza on these questions, his friendly 
previous relations with the Hungarian Premier notwithstanding. This was probably due to 
his view that while a Trialist system was out o f the question, the Dualist system was not 
much better, given the complications it created for centralized control.1502
Bulgarian resentment against Germany over the Dobrudja misunderstanding began 
to have serious consequences on 1 March 1917, when Radoslavov began pressing for 
effective Bulgarian civilian administrative control in the northern Dobrudja and an end to 
tire supposed Rumanophile tendencies o f the Germans.1503 Afraid that the Bulgarians 
would not continue to “blindly submit to a policy that they found incomprehensible”15114
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and that Austria-Hungary would lose the vital Radoslavov government,1505 Czemin 
intervened in Berlin and stated that a conflict with Bulgaria would be better after the war 
titan at the moment, when a defection by Sofia would still be welcomed by the Entente.1506 
Although tempers cooled by 5 March when the Germans requested Bulgarian wishes in 
writing,1507 the episode demonstrated how serious the claims of Bulgaria were regarding the 
Dobrudja and how far Austria-Hungary was willing to sacrifice its own interests there to 
maintain the Radoslavov government in place.
Under Czemin, Austria-Hungary’s war aims still lay squarely in the Balkans, 
although with a much greater emphasis on Rumania. His hand was strengthened at home as 
Karl distrusted Tisza and dismissed Conrad, but vis-à-vis the Germans and Bulgarians 
Czemin faced an uphill battle. Desiring peace at all costs forced Czemin to cry wolf to the 
Germans about Austria-Hungary’s imminent collapse, which also meant that demanding 
parity was unrealistic. At the same time, however, he sought to divide Rumania three ways 
and even seemed to be prepared to allow Austria-Hungary’s prestige to be damaged if it 
meant territorial gain and peace. These incongruous aims of peace and territory would 
inevitably reach a breaking point, and as we shall see Czemin would slowly give up his 
insistence on territory in order to focus on an immediate peace which could feed the 
Monarchy and allow it to survive intact.
SECTION VI
As 1917 progressed, Czemin’s desire and desperation for peace intensified, now 
unchecked by the likes of Burian or Conrad. Only Tisza, whose influence was also waning, 
still stood between the Foreign Minister and a dangerous ‘desperado’ policy. Czemin’s 
focus had by May 1917 dramatically shifted from securing Austria-Hungary’s war aims to 
helping the Monarchy overcome what he considered the most burning questions of the war, 
namely hunger and revolution. The anxiety in Vienna strengthened the army’s hand in 
Germany, which began to impinge more blatantly on Austria-Hungary’s war aims in the 
Balkans. German pressure eventually became so overbearing that Czemin was forced to 
insist on acquiring Balkan territory merely for prestige and to balance against Germany’s
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extravagant claims. Austria-Hungary’s weakness was palpable as even mid-level German 
officials plotted against the Monarchy and Berlin began to disregard Vienna’s interests. 
Caught between hollow German assurances and insincere Entente offers, Tisza 
strengthened Czemin enough to secure at least the western Balkans for Austria-Hungary, 
with Rumania an Austrian territory in name only. With Karl’s dismissal of Tisza in May, 
the last of the old guard departed the scene and with him the final obstacle to Czemin’s 
fear-mongering.
With the final dissolution of the old guard the focus on the Balkans as Austria- 
Hungary’s principal objectives ended as well. Although Czemin would continue to press 
for gains in the western Balkans and Rumania, these were designed merely to appease the 
domestic public and justify the costs of war, and besides w'ere all the Germans were 
prepared to offer the downtrodden Monarchy. Thus Austria-Hungary’s war aims shrank 
but remained geographically consistent almost by default. What remained purposefully 
consistent was the Ballhausplatz’s control over the foreign policymaking process, which 
was even expanded under Czemin’s leadership. As Tisza and the AOK faded from view as 
factors in policymaking, Czemin was able to focus on his true objective, namely to secure 
the Monarchy’s integrity, rather than its expansionist w ar aims, by means of an immediate 
peace.
On 3 April, a few days before the United States declared war on Germany, the new 
Emperor Karl and his wife visited Bad Homburg to meet Wilhelm. The fear of a revolution 
in the Monarchy of the kind w itnessed in Russia frightened the Emperor and his advisors. 
During the talks, Karl and Czemin made clear that revolution was a greater threat than the 
Entente. Only by Austria-Hungary giving up Congress Poland as well as Galicia, Czemin 
and Karl thought, could they persuade the Germans to give up Belgium and 
AIsace/Lorraine.1508 Austrian concerns also rested on Berlin’s own insistence, in tire form 
of Wedel’s comments, that Germany was “incapable” of fighting another winter campaign 
and “must finish this summer.”1509 Czemin virtually begged, therefore, that the German 
statesmen buy vast concessions in the west before the Central Powers “must sue for 
peace.”1510
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But as the Austrians were desperately seeking peace, Balkan questions gave Czemin 
more headaches. On 7 April, in response to the Dual Alliance’s request to set war aims, the 
Bulgarians sent their maximum goals to ensure that some of them were implemented in the 
general peace. Sofia demanded not only all of Macedonia, but also Pristina and Prizren 
again, and Radoslavov also asked for the Dobrudja up to the Danube and everything east of 
the Morava valley.lsn Ottokar Czemin’s brother Otto Czemin, who was the new Minister 
in Sofia, recommended that Vienna agree to at least as much as it had to fear the Entente 
would offer,1512 for the stalemate on the Greek front and the defeat of Serbia and Rumania 
satisfied Bulgaria’s expansion and therefore her reasons to keep fighting.
Czemin kept these allied claims in the background while insisting to the Germans 
that food and revolution, not war aims, were the burning questions for the Monarchy. On 
12 April 1917, Czemin sent an expose of the current situation to Karl, who immediately 
forwarded it to its intended recipient, Wilhelm II. In it, the Foreign Minister said that 
Austria-Hungary’s military' power was “reaching its limit.”1513 The Monarchy had almost 
no resources left for munitions production, faced the complete exhaustion of human 
material, and had a starving population. In these circumstances, peace had to be made by 
late summer or autumn at all costs, or revolution would surely follow. According to 
Czemin, the Germans had given in to certain fallacies, and he believed that a bad peace was 
better than the social upheavals which would follow a fourth winter campaign. Only 
through an immediate end to the fighting would the two Monarchs be able to prevent their 
populations from “making peace over their heads.”1514 Addressing the failure of the 
unrestricted submarine warfare which began on 1 February and forced American entry into 
the war, Czemin argued that one could “not even begin to think about” the defeat of 
England, which was the Central Powers’ most “formidable and dangerous” enemy and 
which the Germans said would be defeated in six months.1515 The German plans, therefore, 
had turned out to be “utopian illu sionsand  the result would have to be extensive painful 
sacrifices on the part o f the Centra! Powers. Even if Germany were to fight on after the late 1
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summer, it could not count on the Monarchy any longer because it was at the end of its 
powers.1516
The Germans, however, did not buy into this line of reasoning. In terms of Austro- 
Hungarian starvation, German officials categorically blamed the Hungarian Premier. 
Wilhelm von Stumm, the AA’s political department director, argued that Tisza had 
prevented distribution of adequate food in Austria, even though Hungary apparently had a 
surplus according to Wedel.1517 Only requisitioning could solve this problem, he felt, and 
so it is no surprise that the Germans simply chose to shift responsibility away from 
themselves. While Czemin pushed the Germans to end the war, the Germans in turn 
pushed him and Clam to drop Tisza and secure the Austrian half of the Monarchy’s 
sustenance. For Czemin, the food problem was becoming “the most burning question of 
the whole war,”1518 which meant that while Tisza’s days were numbered, his insistence on 
immediate peace would also not cease. The Hungarian Premier probably knew this as well, 
for his political program and support in the Hungarian Parliament held him even against the 
wishes of Karl, who had wanted to drop him since January.1519 Aware that Czemin’s 
frenzied and fearful messages about starvation would (and did) prompt a response which 
blamed Hungarian food distribution policies for the starvation, the Premier also wrote to 
Czemin with ‘hold fast slogans,’ speaking o f “good nerves and cold-bloodedness.”1520 For 
the Foreign Minister, the problems the Monarchy faced could not be solved with 
requisitions in Hungary, where he anyway did not believe a surplus existed. When official 
German channels failed to bring a resolution, Czemin tried to influence the Reichstag in his 
favor through contacts with the German Centrist Parliamentarian Matthias Erzberger.
While Vienna trembled, the German military and diplomatic representatives met at 
Kreuznach on 23 April 1917 to internally define their war aims, virtually ignoring the 
Austrians’ pleas. Although Bethmann did not feel bound by the results of this meeting, his 
influence was waning anyway. The OHL put forward excessive demands and forced 
diplomatic acquiescence. In east and west, Germany would politically control Belgium and 
Poland, while annexing the Baltic regions, Luxemburg, and Longwy-Briey.1521 In Balkan *1
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matters, Hindenburg and LudendorfTs recommendations were impinging quite blatantly on 
Austria-Hungary’s own aims, though Fischer overstates how anti-Austrian the final 
agreement truly was. The Germans agreed to grant Austria-Hungary territory in Serbia, 
Wallachia, and Moldova to the Sereth, in exchange for a strong and independent 
Rumania.1522 The rest of Serbia would be unified with Montenegro and Albania to form a 
“south Slav state integrated into the Monarchy.”1523 This was a much more serious threat to 
Austria-Hungary, since it implied a domestic constitutional shift away from Dualism, as 
well as a German veto over the Monarchy’s plans for annexation in Montenegro and the 
protectorate in Albania. More than Austria-Hungary, it seems, Germany wanted to limit 
Bulgaria’s growth, even in favor o f Rumania. Germany wanted to prevent Bulgaria from 
extending even up to the Czemavoda-Constantza line, not to mention the rest of the 
Dobrudja, to protect Germany’s passage to Turkey.1524 These plans for the Balkans came 
as an effort to strengthen Germany’s own position there, irrespective of how opposed these 
suggestions were to Vienna’s stated policy and the reason it was fighting the war. Vienna’s 
weak position which Czemin was constantly emphasizing meant that, when peace came, 
Germany could get what it wanted in the east, the west, and the Balkans while buying off 
the Austro-Hungarians with territorial compensation as suited Berlin.
Zimmermann knew, however, that reaching a peace even with the provisional 
government o f Russia would mean a cession o f Austro-Hungarian territory, a move which 
he admitted Wedel would have trouble selling to Czernin.1525 Thus, while Germany would 
receive Russian territory at no cost to her, Austria-Hungary was to receive west-Wallachia 
and parts o f Serbia in exchange for cessions in Galicia. Separate peace terms with Russia 
would probably have been better than those offered by Germany. The AA played the 
intermediary, attempting to convince Vienna to make such sacrifices for the greater good, 
and also insisting that the proposal to be made to Russia -  which contained the 
aforementioned OHL aims -  was only going to be a last concession if the negotiations 
warranted it, rather than part o f the program.1526 Hohenlohe’s positive reaction made the 
Germans even more confident. How ever, Czernin’s sense o f prestige was greater than his 
fear o f the consequences of a continued w ar, and he refused to entertain Austro-Hungarian
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cession of the Bukowina and Galician territory on 5 May 1917. Such a move would 
threaten the dynasty, Czemin argued to Wedel, given the “comparison between Germany’s 
gains and Austrian losses.”1527 Wedel admitted to his superiors that getting Czernin to 
agree would not be a “cakewalk.”1528 Czemin actually did change his mind and considered 
giving up territory in Bukowina and Galicia for suitable compensations in Serbia and 
Montenegro, though not through wholesale annexation.1529 To grant Serbia a port in the 
Adriatic would be the second unpopular concession and sacrifice for Vienna.1 S3° At 
Wedel’s suggestion, Czemin agreed to this to secure western Wallachia for Austria- 
Hungary, despite expected energetic Hungarian resistance.1531 Wedel pursued two goals 
with this recommendation, no doubt at the behest of the Wilhelntstrasse, which was on the 
one hand to drive a wedge between the north and south Slavs by joining the non-Slav 
Magyars and Rumanians and on the other to secure Austria’s friendship by maintaining the 
Austro-Russian antagonism.1532
Even Czernin succumbed to the Great Power fantasies that Gemi any fell prey to. 
No matter how bad the situation in the Monarchy was and how grim the prospect if no 
peace were secured, prestige and war aims eventually took precedence. A separate peace 
was unlikely, unilateral, and dangerous, the Austrians knew, while the gains of unified war 
aims -  for which Germany would take over a guarantee if agreed -  could only be achieved 
in conjunction with Berlin. The Germans shrew dly took advantage of this, choosing to talk 
about war aims much more readily now than anytime prior, for when the Austrians spoke of 
their aims and their country’s prestige, they were distracted from thoughts of how to end 
the war. In so doing, Berlin could make demands on Austria-Hungary that in reverse were 
considered grotesque by the AA. Knowing that Austria-Hungary’s position was so weak, 
Buriàn urged the GMR of 6 May 1917 to push through still during the war a desired four
j tii
billion Mark loan from Germany.
The German response to Czemin’s exposé o f 12 April came almost a month later, 
on 9 May, showing little urgency. Stating that the Russian revolution had eased the 
situation on the eastern front and that both members o f the Dual Alliance had enough raw
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materials and foodstuffs after the seizure of Rumanian stocks, Bethmann emphasized that 
England had far greater problems thanks to the unrestricted submarine warfare. Placing all 
his bets on this card, the Reichskanzler argued that peace talks would lead nowhere and be 
interpreted as “hopeless exhaustion.”1534 His note was evasive and did not address 
Czemin’s and Karl’s main concerns. Guessing the ulterior motives which led the Vienna 
statesmen to behave so frantically -  namely the fear of losing not only conquered but also 
their own territory -  Bethmann assured Czemin that Germany would support Austria* 
Hungary to “guarantee a promising future”1S35 for both allies.
On 12 May, a few days before the Austro-Hungarians would again return to 
Kreuznach for the last major war aims conference in the first half of 1917, an internal 
discussion took place at the AA with State Under Secretary Freiherr von dem Bussche 
presiding. The purpose was to set internal aims before negotiating with the Austrians. The 
discussions included a provision to obtain rights to develop the rail system in Bulgarian 
Serbia and thereby control the raw material production. The Germans also intended to 
intervene economically in Austrian spheres of interest. In Rumania, regardless of whether 
the state would become independent or part of Austria-Hungary, unhindered transport of 
petroleum to Germany had to be guaranteed and diversified to avoid monopoly formation, 
while a similar rail agreement as in Macedonia needed to be reached. To ensure transport 
by sea, the AA officials agreed to press both Radoslavov and Czemin to make Constanza a 
free port and the railway link Czemavoda-Constanza an internationalized (i.e. German- 
dominated) one.1536 Realizing that Bulgaria would more likely resist such German 
encroachment in Rumania than Austria-Hungary, the officials discussed supporting 
Bulgarian western Balkan aims against Czemin. To assuage Bulgarian disappointments 
over the Dobrudja, Germany should support Bulgarian intentions against Prizren, Pristina, 
Djakova, and the west bank o f the Morava, all of w hich Austria claimed as its sphere of 
influence. In exchange, Czemin was to receive a “much stronger attachment” of Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Albania down to north Epirus, which would go to Greece to keep her 
friendly.1537 While playing their allies off against each other, the AA officials hoped to
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maximize German penetration in an area of deep traditional -  and current -  Austro- 
Hungarian interest.
The Austro-Hungarians also deliberated on what to discuss at Kreuznach, and their 
perspective was quite different from that of the Germans. Czemin was not pleased, and 
Wedel noticed not only from him but from k.u.k. statesmen and members of the court a 
“growing resentment and mistrust” against Germany.1538 The Austro-Hungarians were 
rightly concerned that Germany might disregard their wishes in the event of victory.1539 
Indeed, on all border questions, the Germans pushed for solutions opposite to Austro- 
Hungarian interests. As examples, Wedel cited the loss of Poland and w ith it potentially 
Galicia and Bukowina, giving precedent for cessions to Italy as well, in addition to the re­
establishment of greater Rumania and Serb access to the sea. The Ballhausplatz was on the 
diplomatic defensive against the Wilhelmstrasse on every major issue and on every Austro- 
Hungarian front. From fear of losing Austria-Hungary to the Entente against which it now 
only had one major front, even the anti-Austrian Wedel recommended “satisfying” offers 
be made to Czemin, in order to strengthen the Foreign Minister’s hand and those Viennese 
circles who wanted to see a “continued unity” with Germany continue post-war.1540
The transcripts o f the Austro-German Kreuznach talks, which took place on 17-18 
May, showed that wide divergence of views about a post-war settlement continued in spite 
of Wedel’s pleas, particularly on the Balkan questions. Czemin insisted first and foremost 
on Austro-I lungarian integrity plus the Lovéen. These were and remained his two principal 
war aims. Poland had been entirely dropped, where Vienna expressed its 
“désin téressem entOnly then did other questions come into play, such as “military border 
rectifications”1541 in the Maiva. Czemin was w illing to accept a re-established Montenegro 
and Serbia, provided Serbia did not have a port and Albania received Prizren and 
Pristina.1542 Regardless of how they were to be resurrected, all three western Balkan states 
would have to be militarily, economically, and politically dependent on Austria-Hungary. 
Any Serb state with access to the Adriatic, even if it were under Vienna’s thumb, would be 
considered a “great sacrifice.” 1543 The Germans recognized that, w hen push came to shove,
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the core of Austro-Hungarian interests had shifted back to the Balkans, after the flirtation 
with northern expansion into Poland. Bethmann HoIIweg therefore wisely dropped the 
AA-entertained idea of a unification of Albania with its two Slav neighbors. He still 
recommended, however, the idea of unifying Montenegro with Serbia -  no doubt to achieve 
the Serb access to the sea he desired. Vienna was not opposed to this idea, mainly because 
already under Burian/Conrad the decision had been reached to annex the Lovien and with it 
the Montenegrin coast, thereby continuing to exercise control over western Slav access to 
the Adriatic.
Both sides agreed that Italy would have to be removed from Valona. For the first 
time in a war aims conference with Germany, the issue of Salonika came up as well. In the 
light of the Entente actions there and the traditional Austrian and German interests in the 
Mediterranean, both sides agreed to make Salonika a free port if at all possible.'544 The 
Germans then attempted to convince the Austrians o f what was decided at the internal AA 
meeting. Germany recommended Austria-Hungary grant the western Morava bank and 
railway to Bulgaria, as well as give Germany a “free hand” to mine raw materials in New 
Bulgaria (Macedonia).1545 Although the pre-1913 Rumania was to join Austria in some 
manner, its economy would remain dominated by Germany. Here, Berlin demanded a 
“predominant proportion” of ownership over raw materials (notably oil), shipping, and rail, 
together with a guarantee against Austrian-imposed tariffs.1546 Conveniently forgetting its 
unilateral control policy in the Baltic -  where Austria-Hungary would have no say or 
concessions — Berlin reiterated Vienna’s “gain in power” with Rumania and “advantages” 
of access to the Black Sea.1547 These assurances were primarily designed to draw Czemin’s 
attention away from the fact that Austria-Hungary lost to Germany all the economic 
advantages of owning Rumania. Finally, both sides agreed to maintain some kind of parity 
in gains, but the Rumania-Baltic comparison showed how Germany would interpret that 
According to Fischer, the combination of Valona, Salonika, and Constanza would be the 
basis of a German economic empire in the Balkans, regardless o f whose territorial control 
(Bulgarian or Austrian) these regions fell to.154* In the end, Austria-Hungary was forced 
into accepting wide-ranging economic concessions for Germany and support for its colonial
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and oriental endeavors,1549 in exchange for control in the western Balkans and nominally in 
Rumania. In the western Balkans question, Austria-Hungary found itself negotiating over 
its direct and unquestionable sphere of interest, and the principal reason it entered the First 
World War.
Czemin’s pursuit of a peace for the purpose of securing the Monarchy’s integrity 
superseded any expansionist previous war aims. Although maintaining the Balkans as a 
region of expansion remained consistent with what Burian had pursued, Czemin did not 
seek territory for its own purposes (except the Lovcen), but merely to protect the 
Monarchy’s prestige, maintain an imagined parity with Germany, and satisfy a war-weary 
public. As the old guard faded, Czemin’s power to formulate foreign policy went 
unchecked, and he pursued a dramatic and frantic desperado policy aimed at achieving an 
immediate peace. For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the highest ranking 
official was prepared to end the war with seemingly no gains at all, had the Germans been 
amenable.
CONCLUSION
The departure of Tisza in May 1917 and the advent of Czemin’s independently- 
minded peace policy effectively marked the end of Austro-Hungary war aims planning as it 
had developed since the outbreak of war. Both under Burian and initially under Czemin 
territory and economic concessions in the Balkans represented the principal Austro- 
Hungarian war aims. Burian retained control over the war aims development process and, 
with Conrad’s departure, Czemin’s MdÂ had unprecedented discretion in formulating the 
Monarchy’s goals. What changed after May 1917 was merely the Foreign Ministry’s 
emphasis; although it had more power and faced fewer obstacles, it chose instead to focus 
on peace and hunger, rather than war aims. For this reason, Tisza’s departure can be seen 
to mark the end of the expansionist Balkan war aims planning. Although Czemin would 
retain a policy largely consistent with Buriân’s, its relegation to secondary importance 
meant that no longer would Austria-Hungary prevent peace if it did not meet these war 
aims.
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CHAPTER 7
_______ Epilogue and Conclusion ________________
The departure of Burian, Conrad, and Tisza marked the end of an era when Austro- 
Hungarian war aims in the Balkans were the principal offensive objectives of the 
Monarchy. Although war aims discussions continued right until the end o f the war, the 
turning point came in May 1917, when other issues -  food, raw materials, and manpower 
shortages -  overtook the leadership’s focus on territorial and economic benefits. From then 
onward, Czemin and later Burian emphasized the need for a peace agreement to end a war 
which threatened the Monarchy’s very existence. If certain consistently followed war aims 
could be met at the same time, so much the better.
This final chapter is divided in two parts. The Epilogue analyzes the decline and 
eventual eclipse of Austro-Hungarian war aims, while the Thesis Conclusion summarizes 
the arguments made. The Epilogue argues that the Foreign Ministry remained in control of 
war aims development (in fact now more than ever), and that the war aims it espoused w ere 
consistent with previous planning. Where the Epilogue differs -  and which is the reason 
this period is discussed separately from the rest o f the thesis -  is that the Balkans, while 
still important, were no longer the principal arena of the Monarchy’s ambitions -  indeed 
territorial war aims were no longer principal among Austria-Hungary’s goals. After May 
1917, the Monarchy was also for the first time w illing to make peace even if its war aims in 
the Balkans remained unmet. For this reason, the Epilogue will provide examples of where 
War aims planning continued, and explore the pressures which caused its eventual 
abandonment.
The Thesis Conclusion summarizes the arguments o f the thesis and explains the 
reasons why understanding this hitherto under-researched area is so vital for First World 
War scholarship.
EPILOGUE
In the last year and a half o f the w ar, the MdA-AOK-Hungarian triumvirate o f w ar 
aints planning remained in place, though the new Emperor joined the debate with much 
Sreater enthusiasm than Franz Joseph ever had. Although Czernin executed Karl’s peace- 
first strategy, both men retained their own goals — which sometimes contradicted each 
0,ber. Hungarian and AOK influence took a backseat while Czemin and Karl pursued their
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peace policy. When this approach failed, even before Czemin was replaced in April 1918, 
the Hungarians and AOK each enunciated territorial war aims which seemed ludicrous 
given the state of the Monarchy.
The Epilogue will first give examples of Czemin’s policies that were consistent 
with previous MdA war aims thinking and contrary to his repeated statements in favor of a 
status quo ante bellum. The second section will give examples of Karl’s meddling and 
inconsistent war aims statements, which he made publicly, thus undermining Czemin’s 
secretive approach. Once this approach failed, the third section will provide striking 
examples of Hungarian and AOK expansionism, which tended to become more pronounced 
rather than reserved as the military situation deteriorated. The final section will show how 
Bur&n’s return as caretaker did not result in the abandonment of all war aims, although the 
emphasis shifted from the western Balkans to Rumania.
I, Czernin
Outwardly, Czemin discussed only peace, and even endorsed Woodrow Wilson’s 
ideas on disarmament, international arbitration, and the League of Nations. Inwardly, 
however, his desire for Balkan expansion remained strong, even though other relevant 
parties remained in the dark.1550 By aligning himself with the peace parties such as the 
Meinl Group, Czemin sought to prove that Austria-Hungary was not “fighting a war of 
conquest.”’S5‘ Secretly, however, he wanted to “arrange" particularly Balkan questions 
“according to Austria-Hungary’s wishes.’’1552 *154 In Montenegro, for example, the Foreign 
Minister sought to create a “kind of fa it accomplFns3 by annexing the entire Lovien
» 15M
outright, as well as enough of Montenegro’s coast to create a connection with Albania.
He planned to create facts on the ground which the Entente might perceive as minor enough 
not to let the entire peace conference fail. These wishes for the coast and Lovcen were 
consistent with previous Austro-Hungarian war aims, and Czernin was willing to mask his 
ftne intentions to achieve them. Even at Brest-Litovsk, which was supposed to be a 
'uctorious and dictated peace, all Austria-Hungary could hope for was Russian
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acquiescence for the Lovcen to be transferred from Montenegro.1555 So weak was the 
Monarchy’s position by 1918 that Czemin was even prepared to accept a peace with “no 
gains whatsoever”1556 as long as there was peace with Russia.
Threats to Czemin’s designs in the western Balkans came from Germany and 
Bulgaria. Berlin, realizing Vienna’s weakness, wanted to secure for itself naval bases in 
the Adriatic. HoltzendorfT considered a German port opening on the Mediterranean as an 
“absolute imperative,” and contrary to the k.u.k. Admiral Haus, he viewed Valona as 
“strategically unusually advantageous.”1557 As the Monarchy was weakening, the Germans 
even sought to have Austria-Hungary cede Cattaro to Germany,1558 or allow for a continued 
license to station German warships there.1559 Although Wedel pointed out that this was 
highly improbable, control of Valona would be a valuable substitute due to the region’s 
high occurrence of “crude asphalt [Asphalistein]” the exploitation of which could “save 
millions” as it would no longer have to be mined in Miltelafrika,1560
The German threats to Austro-Hungarian power in the Balkans were not negligible. 
Particularly after Bethmann Hollweg’s replacement in July 1917, as the OHL began to 
dominate the political landscape through a quasi-military dictatorship, the MdA constantly 
lost ground to the extremist attitudes and goals o f the Hindenburg-Ludendorff duo. 
Ludendorff sought to limit Austria-Hungary’s influence in Rumania and Poland, where 
Germany tended to dominate, and thereby exacerbated Austria-Hungary’s food situation, 
given that the Monarchy’s own occupation zones in Montenegro and Albania could “barely 
even feed their own populations.” 1561 Ludendorff was against making Austria-Hungary 
strong by granting it Poland, as doing so would eventually mean “war with Austria,’ 
Although Hindenburg stated that the alliance had to remain in place for now, he insisted 
^ a t the “contest” with Austria-Hungary' “must come.”1565 Hence, Ludendorff wanted 
unrestricted German transit across the Danube, a port in Valona or even the Austro-
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Hungarian base at Cattaro, and a policy of regulating western questions without regard to 
Vienna.1564
Another consistent threat to Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans came from 
Bulgaria, which now had the backing of an increasingly extremist Germany. On the basis 
of maintaining Bulgarian-Turkish relations, the Germans were more prepared to give 
Bulgaria freedom to expand than the Austrians, whose vital interests would be touched.
Hohenlohe believed that the Germans still considered a Bulgarian “expansion” up to the 
Adriatic “acceptable,”1565 in blatant opposition to Vienna’s concerns. The dedication with
which Austro-Hungarian officials reported on and resisted Bulgarian expansion 
demonstrates their continued interest in the region.1566 The KKMlbania, for example,
reported intense violence against the Albanian and any pro-Austrian elements in the 
Bulgarian zone of occupation, violent agitations and political propaganda in the Austrian 
controlled areas of Albania, and widespread requisitions leading to deaths by starvation east 
of Pristina.1567 The Monarchy’s own citizens were targeted as well, for any non-Bulgarian 
element was seen as a threat to Sofia’s Macedonian designs. Austrian and Hungarian 
nationals were being “extracted” from Macedonia and the Monarchy “stigmatized” as 
though it were the “most dangerous enemy,” all in the name of assimilation and a 
“resurfacing” fear of the Austrian expansion to Salonika rumor.1568
Czemin was well aware of these developments and sought to limit Bulgaria’s 
expansion, surprisingly by means of keeping Bulgaria militarily engaged against the 
Entente. He believed that any weakening of the Entente in the Balkans would strengthen 
Bulgaria, which would then seek to secure Salonika and Kavalla.1569 Although peaceful 
relations between the Dual Alliance on the one hand and Turkey/Bulgaria on the other were 
vital for Czernin’s plans for post-war stability and control in the Balkans, Czemin made no 
secret of his deep distrust of Bulgarian intentions. Even though he supported and trusted 
Radoslavov’s cabinet, it was clear to the Foreign Minister that it was the Sarrail army 
which, as the “obvious and perpetual” threat to Bulgarian Macedonia,1570 kept Bulgaria in
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the war. A defeat of or voluntary retreat by Sarrail would mean that Bulgaria had achieved 
its “principal war aim” and could be “fruitful ground” for a separate peace offer by the 
Entente. Even after the Kerensky offensive had opened on 29 June and Greece had 
formally joined the Entente, Czemin argued that an “elimination” of British and French 
forces in Macedonia would, for a variety of reasons, be “undesirable.”157 572
Otto Czemin, the Foreign Minister’s brother and Minister in Sofia, was also worried 
that further Bulgarian expansion would weaken the pro-Austrian Albanian element in 
Macedonia and Kosovo, if not transferred to a “viable Albanian state” and backed up with 
Vienna’s Great Power status.1573 Hohenlohe also backed this plan, designed to keep 
Bulgaria from spreading westwards, which was Austria’s “principal interest.”1574 Ottokar 
Czemin therefore pursued a policy of pointing Bulgaria towards Greek Salonika in order to 
prevent Sofia from impinging on the Monarchy’s interests and obtaining the entire Kosovo 
for Albania.1575
With the Germans resisting the Austro-Polish solution, Czemin attempted to 
redirect Austro-Hungarian policy towards acquisitions in Rumania. Vienna’s goal vis-à-vis 
Bucharest was the abdication of the king, his replacement with a new dynasty, and an 
“alignment” with Austria-Hungary.1576 The Foreign Minister sought to dominate Rumania 
without German interference, but this would soon be unveiled as a pipedream. When 
Wilhelm II had a change of heart on 23 September and wanted to control Rumania instead 
of (or as it turned out in addition to) Poland, Germany offered Poland to Austria-Hungary 
but granted it only the “illusion of mastery.”1577 Flindenburg additionally demanded mines 
and natural resource exploitation, the exclusion of foreign companies, and parts of Austrian 
Silesia around Teschen in exchange for the Austro-Polish solution.1578 A total union of 
Poland with the Monarchy remained “impossible” for Germany.1579 Thus, the October 
1917 agreement seemed to grant Poland to Austria-Hungary, in exchange for Germany
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receiving a 20-year alliance, a military convention, economic control of Rumania, a 
guarantee of goods transit through the Monarchy, and the alignment of what were to be 
autonomous regions in Kurland and Lithuania.1580 The Austro-Polish solution would not be 
implemented in full, however, because Germany retained an equal say in Poland’s military 
and financial matters.1581
Czernin attempted to persuade Germany to seek an immediate peace by releasing 
Belgium, which he hoped it would do if Galicia were offered to the new states of Poland 
and Ukraine.1582 This recommendation was also put forward by the AOK in July 1917 
(Fig. 4, below) but rejected by the Germans as irrelevant.1583 * The proposal illustrates that 
the AOK was prepared to forgo Austrian territory, provided that Hungarian territory was 
enlarged and Balkan priorities were met. Even Rumania was to be offered territory, in 
exchange for deeper Carpathian borders for the Hungarian side of the Monarchy.
1580 Rauchensteiner, Tod, 521; also Kilhimann-Czemin, 22-Oet-1917, HHStA-PA-I-504,
1581 Kühlmann-Czernin, 22-Oct-1917, HHStA-PA-I-504.
1582 Summary of Michaelis Talks in Vienna, l-Aug-1917, NARA-T-120-1498-D627063-627714; also
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The one country with which no compromise was possible was Italy, Austria- 
Hungary’s Balkan Aims prevented any solution which would have allowed for a separate 
peace with Rome, or even permitted Italy to join its allies in seeking a general peace. The 
secret Armand-Revertera talks between French and Austro-Hungarian representatives saw 
the French emissary on 22 August request border territory to be given to Italy,1585 1586which 
was out of the question for Austria-Hungary,
An internal MdA policy memorandum dating from November 1917 proposed that 
such territorial concessions could be offered, following the successful Caporetto offensive, 
but Czemin’s response was clear and left no room for discussion. He simply and
« f g j C
emphatically commented: “never!” Czemin’s dogmatic stance -  the only example of 
his being completely inflexible -  served AOK interests well. It was here that the AOK 
developed suggestions, which were received at the MdA without rejection, that Italian 
territory be ceded to Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of the war (Fig. 5, below). This 
sort of suggestion was in line with previous AOK behavior to suggest annexation or 
expansion following a military victory. Interestingly, this was not one of the AOK’s more 
extreme suggestions. Arz merely desired border corrections in the Trentino, so as to 
withstand a new assault on the Monarchy, In one case, west of Lake Garda, Arz even 
recommended a minor cession of Austrian territory so as to increase defensibility. While 
the western portions of the existing border remained largely intact, adjustments made in the 
east would serve to protect Austria-Hungary without incorporating many more Italians. In 
the east, the AOK intended to bring the border forward to the Tagliamento, though not as 
far as the Piave which would have unacceptably threatened Venice.
1585 Shanafelt, Secret Enemy, 145.
1586 MdA Memorandum, November 19!7, HIlStA-PA-I-496.
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II. Karl
Although Karl was even more desperate for peace than Czemin, he too was 
unwilling to pursue a peace based on the status quo ante. On the surface, the reason for this 
was clear. During the latter part of 1917, Austria-Hungary was completely freed from 
foreign forces, albeit in large part thanks to German help. The Italians had been repelled, 
and the battle of Caporetto would break their offensive spirit until the closing stages of the 
war. Austrian MGGs had been established in Serbia and Montenegro, and a KK for 
northern Albania. Vienna directly controlled one-third of Russian Poland through its MGG 
at Lublin and ruled Dobrudja in condominium with its allies. Unbelievably, by 1917 
Austria-Hungary had met its critical war aim, namely its own integrity. Territorially, it had 
even surpassed what in 1914 and 1915 had seemed unattainable.
But Karl also knew that the longer the war lasted, the more his dynasty was in 
jeopardy. Until late 1917 the policy was to liberate all occupied regions of the Monarchy 
before seeking peace. After its territories were liberated with German help and Czernin’s 
pleas for peace fell on deaf ears, the Austrians fell in with the German line and waited for 
salvation around the next comer. Another war winter was ahead of them, and although 
consolidation was the Monarchy’s goal, both the AOK and MdA refused to make a separate 
peace without Germany. Instead, they began to believe the Germans’ own propaganda in 
late 1917/early 1918 about the end of the war stemming from the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
separate Russian armistice, the peace at Brest-Litovsk, the peace with Rumania, or 
Ludendorff s Spring Offensives.
During this time o f flux, Karl gave inconsistent signals to both his own government 
and the Germans. Whereas Franz Joseph was uninvolved in the war aims question 
probably due to his advanced age, Karl’s greater involvement and independent contacts 
undermined Czemin. WTtile Czemin focused on Rumania, border corrections, and holding 
on to the Balkan territories, Karl told the Germans on 5 January 1918 that he did not seek 
expansion into Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania at all. Rather than incorporate any more 
Slavs into the Monarchy, Karl instead preferred a semi-independent Poland held at arm’s 
length. He made these statements no doubt to smooth the way to immediate, “open and 
frank” discussions of “jdl war aims,”1588 even if his government’s Balkan policy was not as
15M Cramon-Wilhelm, 5-Jan-1918, N ARA-T-120-1498-D627063-627714.
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negative as Karl claimed. While telling Berlin of the burdens they were prepared to take 
on by accepting the western Balkans into their orbit, internally the Austrians were seeking 
as many advantages as possible. In Montenegro, these advantages lay in annexation of at 
least the coastal strip and the Lovcen, while in Albania Karl’s MdA was fighting the AOK 
to enlarge a friendly Albania.1589
Due in part to Karl’s enunciations on Poland, Czernin was swayed back to the 
Austro-Polish solution. Czemin knew that extensive annexations in the Balkans were no 
longer possible given the overall military situation and the Monarchy’s own weakness. 
However, he disguised this fact by claiming he could not expand in that region because it 
would incorporate too many Slavs into the Monarchy.1590 Yet on 22 February in Homburg, 
Karl discussed Polish matters with Wilhelm and made a u-tum. He told the German Kaiser 
that Montenegro and Serbia’s fusion with the Crown of St. Stephen (i.e. Hungaty) would 
alleviate Austria’s problem of too many Slavs.1591 These remarks were likely his own, for 
the Hungarians had always resisted this solution and made no claims on Montenegro. They 
demonstrate, however, that Karl still harbored territorial goals if the Germans and the 
military situation would allow it,
III. AOK & Hungarian Territorial Aims
From fall of 1917 onwards, Arz began pushing the MdA to set clearer war aims as 
the military and food situations deteriorated. Arz no longer believed that the MdA 
“considered it beneficial to set Balkan war aims in one direction or the other,”1592 and 
therefore became involved in the war aims question for the first time since taking the top 
military post. Aware that Austria-Hungary’s fortunes were fading fast, Arz sought to issue 
terms in Albania under which the Monarchy could secure its political and economic 
influence if the peace terms required a retreat from the country.1593 Control of monopolies, 
of its most critical exports, and most importantly its ports were deemed vital by Arz, who 
issued these guidelines to the XIX. District Command after having consulted the MdA’s
. 1SQ4representative Krai.
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This is not to imply that the AOK had dropped its plans for annexation, for it had 
not. After the Sixte affair and the resulting humiliating Spa agreement, the MdA shrank its 
war aims in the Balkans to an absolute minimum, but still tussled with the AOK over what 
exactly these were. In Italy, Austria-Hungary’s potential gains were minimal, and the 
Germans had all but pushed Austria-Hungary out of Poland and Rumania. Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Albania were the only areas where Vienna’s voice still held sway, and as 
the number of independent occupation zones dropped, so the stakes rose. Unsurprisingly, 
the last Austro-Hungarian organ to give up its territorial thirst was the AOK, but unusually 
it was also joined by the so far very cautious Hungarians. Towards 1918, and as the 
territorial appetites of Karl and Czemin weakened, the AOK allied itself with the 
Hungarians to seek beneficial war aims for both parties. An AOK-developed map from 
July 1917 (Fig. 6, below) demonstrates some of the overlapping interests of the two new­
found allies.
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In this proposal, the AOK put forward its traditional plans to divide Albania, 
strengthen Bulgaria, and compensate Greece. This plan was more moderate because it 
acknowledged that an eliminated Serbia would probably be unacceptable to Russia, 
recommending therefore a Serbia-Montenegro union incorporating northern Albania as 
well -  a plan which the Germans also advocated. Under such an arrangement, the Italians 
would be pushed out of the western Balkans, the viable Austrian allies Bulgaria and Greece 
strengthened, and the Albanian experiment ended once and for all. This plan was also the 
first example of AOK backing for Hungarian expansion. The Negotin Circle in north-east 
Serbia, currently under Bulgarian control, would be passed to Hungary.
More suggestions came on 16 December 1917, when Arz provided Czernin with 
maps detailing the AOK’s and the Hungarian government’s maximum and minimum 
demands in north-east Serbia and Rumania (see below).1596 The first striking point was that 
neither of the two presented particularly extensive annexationist recommendations, which 
was not surprising coming from the Hungarians but downright startling coming from the 
AOK. The second striking issue here was that, although neither set of recommendations 
was particularly annexationist, at almost every step of the way Hungarian demands 
exceeded AOK demands on both Rumanian and Serbian territory.
In their maximum demands (Fig. 7, below), the Hungarian government admitted to 
seeking “greater” annexations than the AOK. The reasons were economic. The 
Hungarians wanted control of the oil-rich areas of Tirgul-Ocna (‘B’), a prize which the 
AOK did not seek. Still, even at their most extensive points, the AOK and Hungarian 
annexations reached only approximately 15 kilometers into Rumanian territory. It was 
clear that the border rectifications here were indeed to be just that. The Hungarians claimed 
that these changes would offer greater defensibility and access to water and forestry 
resources. Deeper cuts went into north-east Serbia, where the AOK wanted nothing but 
from which the Hungarians wanted the entire Negotin District, along with the Majdanpek 
mines (3£). The Hungarians claimed that not territorial expansion for its own sake caused 
them to include Negotin, but rather that it offered protection for the newly acquired Iron 
Gate. This, the Hungarian government hoped, would lead to a de-intemationalization of the 
Danube for this area, a development of the Austro-Hungarian shipping industry, and “that
15,6 Arz-Czemin, 16-Dec-l 9 17 .1II IStA-PA-I-1053.
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Hungarians were more interested in securing the Iron Gate through the Negotin District 
than Tum-Severin, which the Rumanians would no doubt be loath to part with.
The Hungarian/AOK minimal program was also issued with a detailed map (Fig. 8, 
below), to be employed if bad news came from Brest-Litovsk and Galicia were handed to 
Poland, East Galicia to Russia, and the Bukowina to Rumania. While both the AOK and 
the Hungarian government were willing to forgo deeper penetration into Rumania (about 5- 
10 km depth along the border), again the Hungarians favored wider annexations and had 
goals which were non-negotiable. The army was willing to forgo all major gains except 
the Kladovo (‘E’) region, which included the Iron Gate. The Hungarians, by contrast, 
would actually expand their claims to Tum-Severin if their ambitions for the city of 
Negotin were not met. Dividing Rumania from Serbia also remained a key war aim. By 
securing a bridgehead across the Danube, this plan also gave the Hungarians control of the 
lucrative Majdanpek mines ( ^ ) .  Most importantly, the bridgehead into Serbia would help 
defend the Iron Gate for the Hungarians. “Economic exploitation” of the iron ore-rich 
Negotin district was so vital that, even if Hungary did not directly control it, its annexation 
by Bulgaria was deemed unacceptable by the Hungarian government.'599
ISW Arz-Czcrnin, I6-Dec-1917, HHSiA-PA-I-1053.
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about Bulgarian westward encroachment that he informed Karl of the need to renegotiate 
the treaty border with Sofia. If he could secure the Majdanpek and Bor mines in the 
Negotin Circle from Bulgaria, he was prepared to support Sofia’s claims to the entire 
Dobrudja (which was being ruled in condominium among the members of the Quadruple 
Alliance).1601 This was clear example of how Hungarian and AOK recommendations 
which the Foreign Minister eventually identified with became MdA policy at the end of 
Czemin’s term.
IV. Buridn and the AOK
With Czernin’s replacement and Burian’s return on 16 April 1918, Arz’s patience 
with the MdA had run out. While the AOK was gearing up for the Piave offensive, which 
would turn out to be Austria-Hungary’s last offensive in the war and run from 15 to 25 June 
1918, Arz was also preparing to discuss the western Balkan question with Burian on 27 
May. Insisting that a final decision be reached by the MdA on whether the future Albanian 
state was to be a “protectorate or an annexation,” Arz pressured Burian for the latter.1602 
Burian’s responses made it clear why Arz chose to create facts on the ground instead. On 5 
June, Burian stated that he “must adhere” to his prior policy of “preparing Albania for 
future self-government under the effective protectorate” of Austria-Hungary. He argued 
that even Italy had given up its Balkan colonialism and embraced national self- 
determination principles, making it impossible for Vienna to backtrack and pursue 
“annexationist tendencies.”1603 While these arguments made sense in a diplomatic context, 
they did not in the least satisfy Arz, who perceived MdA attitudes merely as further delay 
in Austria-Hungary’s last region of potential expansion, which was quickly slipping out of 
its control.
Even though the material and psychological exhaustion of the Monarchy was 
threatening its collapse, the AOK began to push annexation questions as if the war were 
being won on all fronts. In reality, Ludendorff suffered a major setback after the failure of 
his Champagne-Marne Offensive of 15-18 July 1918. Arz himself was heavily involved in 
planning the ultimately unsuccessful counterattack in Albania set for 24 July. Nevertheless, 
on 21 July Arz wrote to Burian with an extensive, far-fetched memorandum of what
1601 Czernin-Demblin, l-Mar-1918, HUSlA-PA-XL 57.
1602 TrauttmansdorfT-Buridn, 27-May-19I8,HHStA-PA-I-J007; also Arz-Buridn, ll-Jun-1918. KA-AOK- 
Fasz-3543, MV-318.295, based on Sehwanke.
I60J Burian-TrautmannsdoriT, 5-Jun-1918, HHStA-PA-I-1007,
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Austro-Hungarian war aims in the western Balkans should be. He provided four elaborate 
maps detailing the division of territory in best-case to worst-case scenarios, and even his 
minimum war aims involved widespread annexations of Serbian and Montenegrin territory. 
Since Conrad’s replacement, Arz had not articulated such extensive aims, which serve as 
evidence of the AOK’s continued annexationist tendencies.
The first striking point is that Arz had come round to the idea of an “autonomous” 
Albania,1604 possibly because he was simply unable to change Burian’s mind and had 
incorporated this issue into his own grand designs. In exchange, however, Arz insisted that 
Austria-Hungary’s “war aims in the Balkans must be the complete incorporation” of both 
Serbia and Montenegro into the Monarchy, and the formation of a Balkan coalition under 
Vienna’s leadership.1605 According to Arz, a victor had the right to decide the aftermath of 
his victory, and Arz argued that Austria-Hungary was undoubtedly “victor in the Balkans.” 
This perspective ignored the fact that Bulgaria still maintained massive claims right across 
the Balkans, that the Entente still held a so far impenetrable front from Valona to Salonika, 
and that Germany was slowly making itself dominant in Rumania.
Arz believed that only by preventing the resurrection of an independent Serbian 
state could the danger of Greater Serbia be “eliminated.”1606 Echoing Conrad, Arz 
elaborated on why the continued, even if just nominal, existence of Serbia would remain a 
South Slav “crucible of agitation” and threaten the Monarchy again, just as it had managed 
to do in this war. But Arz pointed to another reason why Serbia could not be left 
independent, and that was Sofia. Serbia’s “sworn enemy” Bulgaria would undoubtedly 
seize whatever Vienna chose not to annex, even at the “cost of dropping out of the 
Quadruple alliance.”1607 Arz pointed out quite unequivocally that such a strengthening of 
Bulgaria would be “tantamount” to a “hegemonic takeover” in the Balkans. In turn, this 
would mean an Austrian “loss of hegemony” in the only area where the Monarchy was still 
capable of exercising it. If Vienna were politically and economically rolled back in the 
Balkans, it would lose “all elbow-room” and would be forced into a new war to secure 
territory which it needed for its economic expansion.1608 Arz presented these plans because
1604 Arz-Burian, 21 Jul-1918. HHStA-PA-I-500.
1605 Ibid.
'“«Ibid.
1607 Ibid.
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he had come to understand that only in the Balkans could Austria-Hungaiy hope to pull any 
territorial gains at all out of this disastrous and costly war.
Arz was also prepared to be magnanimous, stating that an independent Montenegro 
would be of significantly less danger to the Monarchy, provided it was devoid of “any 
coastal territory” at all. Its small population and weakness in resources would force it to 
align itself with Austria-Hungary. Naturally, even such independence needed to be 
qualified, so that Montenegro would have no foreign policy and must implement trade, 
finance, defense, and military policy according to Vienna’s guidelines.1609 Still, “complete 
annexation” was for Arz, who now sounded identical to Conrad, the guarantee for 
continued security, and was proportionate to Austria-Hungary’s military successes.
For these goals, Arz was prepared to allow an independent Albania, with contiguous 
borders and constitutionally bound to the Monarchy. This would be a concession on the 
part of the AOK, which had consistently proposed no less than annexation. Still, his 
concern to maintain the Monarchy’s “maritime mastery” was a key demand, for the loss of 
any part of Albania would imply the “complete and irrevocable constriction” of the 
Adriatic Sea and bring it under Italian hegemony.1610 Recognizing that seizing Valona 
would be difficult, Arz recommended it be transferred to Greek control. Seizure of Albania 
by Italy or another Balkan state would be against the Monarchy’s interests.1611
Arz prepared a number of options for Burian to consider, dependent on the 
diplomatic possibilities during peacemaking. As a maximum goal he used the treaty border 
established with Bulgaria on 9 September 1915. As shown in Sketch 2 (Fig. 9, below), the 
Monarchy would annex Montenegro and Serbia’s “vital artery,” the Morava valley, in its 
entirety.1612 This would secure the mining facility at Majdanpek and give Austria-Hungary 
control over Belgrade and Cetinje. Although Pristina and Prizren were eyed up by the 
AOK for annexation, their majority Albanian population being transferred to Albania 
would be an acceptable outcome as well. Arz intended to use Kosovo as a bargaining chip 
for the Negotin district in north-east Serbia, for he did not really care if it fell to Bulgaria or 
Albania. Still, by incorporating Albanians into Albania, Serbs into Austria-Hungary, and 
Bulgaro-Macedonians into Bulgaria according to the divisions listed in Sketch 2, the AOK
m *lbid.
1610 Arz-Burian, 21-Ju!-1918, HI IStA-PA-1-1007.
Arz-Burian, 21-Jul-19!8, HHSlA-PA-t-500.
1612 Ibid.
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hoped to achieve the “most advantageous solution” to the western Balkan settlement and 
eliminate the South Slav question once and for all.
Aware that the MdA and the Hungarians would resist wholesale incorporation of 
these territories, Arz laid out in Sketch 3 (Fig. JO, below) the military border rectifications 
necessary if an independent Montenegro and Serbia had to be created. In this case, a rump 
Serbia would lose its half of the Sandjak (and therefore its contiguity with Montenegro), the 
Tum-Severin district to protect the newly-acquired Iron Gate, and Belgrade. Arz wanted to 
secure the important crossings of the Danube at Belgrade and the Save at Semendria to 
ensure a defensible border. Montenegro would lose its main port at Antivari, its entire 
coastline, and its capital Cetinje, giving Austria-Hungary a second land bridge to Albania. 
The control of the Lovien would secure the naval base at Cattaro. Under this model, 
whereby Austrian influence would not extend into Kosovo except by means of the Sandjak, 
Prizren and Pristina would be annexed to a client Albanian state. The “recovery” of the 
Sandjak was a matter of particular interest to Arz, who considered it vital for both military 
and ethnographic reasons. The Muslim population there had supported the Monarchy’s 
forces in 1915 and Arz believed they desired incorporation into the protective Monarchy, 
rather than being exposed to Serbian and Montenegrin “vengefulness.” Control of the 
Sandjak would allow the Monarchy to drive a “wide, militarily defensible wedge” between 
the two Slav states to prevent their unification and cooperation. Furthermore, and in line 
with the widely held belief of an Austrian desire to expand to Salonika, control of the 
Sandjak would go a long way towards the “economic penetration of the western Balkans,” 
given that most of the road down to the Aegean would now be in Austro-Ifungarian or 
friendly Bulgarian hands.1613
Finally, Arz presented Sketch 4 (Fig. 11, below), which showed his minimum 
demands and without which Austro-Hungarian interests would suffer “most serious 
damage.” Here, Arz remained committed to Austria-Hungary’s oldest interests in the 
region, namely the Lovccn and the Sandjak. However, it was still not a very generous 
offer, because Cetinje and Belgrade would still be annexed. Though Arz included the 
Majdanpek mines in his plans every step of the way, at no point did he recommend the 
annexation of the Negotin District from Bulgarian Serbia. Negotin had featured in 
Conrad’s, Burian’s, Tisza’s, and Czemin’s writings as a key city for control of its regional
resources such as iron ore. Regardless of which solution would be implemented, Arz 
recommended one thing above all, to ensure that its populations would remain loyal to the 
Monarchy. Arz wanted neither Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor any of the regions that were to be 
annexed, to become political experiments, but rather to be under military rule “for 
decades.” Only the army, he argued, possessed adequate political neutrality, respect, and 
power to properly “educate” the populations.1614
These policy recommendations were followed by a second lengthy message by Arz 
assuring Burian that he in no way intended to interfere in the MdA’s sphere, admitting that 
it held “responsibility for the management of the Monarchy’s foreign policy.”1615 
However, his policy recommendations were based on the fact that the AOK carried the 
responsibility for Austria-Hungary’s “disproportionately large sacrifices” in men and 
materiel dispensed in Albania. Disease and conflict had weakened the contingent of the 
KK by 70,000 men, down to the current 113,000. Due to recently increasing 
“interruptions” by Entente forces of the naval supply lines, Arz argued that the AOK’s 
continued sacrifices in the country would only be possible to justify if a certain 
“equivalence” between goals and sacrifices were established, and that a protectorate would 
not suffice. Since a “so-called effective protectorate” could only be done with “complete 
military occupation” it would effectively be the same as an “annexation” by the Monarchy. 
Arz made this recommendation with an eye to a successful outcome to the war and argued 
that he did not know of a single example in world history where annexationism was not the 
policy choice towards a protectorate. Only through such a policy decision by the MdA 
would the AOK be able to justify the effort and material necessary to prepare the seizure of 
Valona, which was planned for early 1919, In its current capacity, the Monarchy’s 
presence in Albania was merely to provide flank defense for the German-Bulgarian forces 
in Macedonia, and to lose tens of thousands of men to malaria for this was “irresponsible” 
in the general’s opinion. Arz warned that Austria-Hungary’s passivity with regard to 
Albania would be exploited by the Bulgarians and the Germans, both of whom had interests 
that conflicted with the Monarchy’s and damaged its prestige. Drawing a connection 
between the two fronts, Arz argued that Austria-Hungary’s “unpreparedness” for the peace
l6H Ibid.
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negotiations in the north-east and Poland had resulted in very “detrimental consequences,” 
and that such mistakes should not be repeated with Albania.1616
Although he tried to be accommodating, even at this late stage, Burian did not back 
down on the annexation question. On 30 July he told Arz that he recognized the suffering 
and sacrifices of the armed forces, but failed to understand the necessity of “transitioning to 
a policy of conquest” in the western Balkans.1617 Burian claimed that his protectorate plan 
was “sufficiently flexible” to adapt to the possibility of a successful conclusion to the 
war.1618 It was here that Burian for the first time explained that not only in Albania was the 
protectorate plan beneficial, but also in general it would ensure maximum wider expansion 
and influence for the Monarchy,1619 Burian’s obsession with Albania stemmed from 
concern about his allies Germany and Bulgaria as well as his adversaries Italy and Serbia. 
Only in late 1918 did Burian for the first time admit that the vagueness which MdA policy 
had espoused from early 1915 was designed to secure maximum gains for the Monarchy 
and could be adjusted to suit any of the war’s possible outcomes. Burian reached out to 
Arz to assure him that his opposition to the AOK’s policies was simply to ensure final 
results in the western Balkans which were in the AOK’s interest as well. But the Foreign 
Minister argued that it was the constant change in military personnel, the officers’ South 
Slav origins, and the suppression of local administrative elements that had undermined 
these efforts.1620
This message served to reassure Arz that both the AOK and the MdA were pursuing 
policies beneficial for the Monarchy, but that the MdA determined whether the direction 
would be more or less annexationist. Still, it required more than convincing words to 
achieve MdA goals in the western Balkans. Buridn’s concession was to bow to the wishes 
of the AOK and replace his representative Krai, on the condition that the XIX KK be given 
the stringent order to consider an Albanian protectorate the goal of the administration. 
Furthermore, the Albanians were to finally be treated as a “neutral, friendly, and 
likeminded” people.1621 After delivering it, Trauttmansdorf informed Burian that Arz and 
the AOK had now comprehended the goals of the MdA’s policy in Albania.1622 The AOK 
had made extensive concessions to get rid of Krai, but while the MdA scrambled to secure 
what war aims it could, the army prepared for inevitable changes on the ground. As a result
1617 Buridn-Arz, 30-Jul-1918, HHStA-PA-I-1007.
"i"  ibid
'"'ibid
1620 ¡bid.
1621 Burian-Traumannsdorf, 29-Jul-l 918, HHStA-PA-I-999.
1622 Thurn-Burian, early August 1918, HHStA-PA-I-1007.
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of the Entente advances and the bleak outlook, the AOK abandoned the efforts to arm a 
militia.1623
Apart from fending off Arz, Burian also had to contend with German pressure 
designed to keep Austria-Hungary out of northern expansion questions. In a meeting with 
Hertling and Kuhlmann on 11 June, Burian proposed the Austro-Polish solution but was 
pointed towards compensations in Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Burian responded by 
pointing out that annexations of large swathes of territory in the latter two countries was 
“not part of Austria-Hungary’s policy program,” and admitted to personally being 
“decidedly opposed” to any annexations in Serbia whatsoever,1624 contrary to AOK and 
Hungarian wishes. However, talk of Austrian expansion into further Slav territory seemed 
a pipedream anyway. On 28 June, Lansing stated that it was Wilson’s goal to liberate all 
branches of Slavs from Germany and Austria-Hungary, a position eventually supported by 
both France and Britain. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was fighting for its own 
survival, and though the Germans had offered Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania, they 
retained rights in Valona and over petroleum, trains, and shipping.1625 Vienna was slipping 
into vassalage to Berlin, as evidenced by the fact that Austria-Hungary had to keep fighting 
in Europe for German plans as far away as the Crimea, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.
V. Final W ar Aims and Collapse
By September 1918, when Burian met Kiihlmann’s successor Paul von Hintze in 
Vienna, it was clear that a collapse of the Central Power war effort was underway. What 
remained was to identify minimal joint aims that could be reached. Whereas Burian 
continued to speak about Austro-Hungarian “war aims,”1626 which he wanted Germany to 
guarantee, Ilintze’s notes on the conversation refer only to common “peace goals,”1627 
indicative of how the two men approached the problem. According to Ilintze’s handwritten 
records, the two sides put forward the following aims. Germany wanted its territorial 
integrity, freedom of the seas, no annexations, and the independence of Belgium, to which
1623 Arz-Buriän, l-Aug-1918, HHSlA-PA-I-1005; also TrauUmansdorfT-Burian, 4-Aug-19l8, HHStA-PA-1- 
1005.
Burian Report ofHertling/Kühlmann talks, 11-12-Jun-l918, HHSiA-PA-I-505; also HMSlA-PA-T-536.
1625 Bridge, Habsburg Monarchy, 363.
1626 MdÄ Aufzeichnung of Buriän/1 lintze conference. 5-Sep-1918, HI !SiA-PA-I-524k.
1627 Hintze Handwritten Notes, 6-Sep-1918, NARA T-120/1500.
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it was prepared to grant compensation.1628 Hintze suggested the latter point to Austria- 
Hungary in agreement with Ludendorff,1629 meaning it was genuine. Burian also desired 
the status quo ante, but put forward his “small territorial expansions.”1630 These peace 
conditions included the Lovcen and a “border strip” in Rumania.1631 Even at this late stage 
in the game, when Germany no longer felt it could prosecute an effective war, Burian 
insisted on Hintze taking responsibility for Austria’s most crucial war aims. Indeed, Burian 
demanded limited expansion as opposed to Hintze, who by this time was prepared to accept 
the status quo ante bellum if it meant immediate peace.
According to Burian’s notes of the same meeting, “integrity of the Monarchy” was 
Burian’s sole peace condition, and he assured Hintze that what he called “certain border- 
securing areas” would be dropped if they proved to be an obstacle to peace.1632 To further 
assure the Monarchy’s at least partial integrity, Buridn attempted to get Hintze to agree that 
any territorial sacrifice that might be required should be shared among all allies.1633 
Particularly with an eye on Poland, Burian did not want to be the only one forced into 
territorial losses simply because his country was a multi-ethnic one. This request for 
common sacrifices was acknowledged in both reports, but these talks ended merely in notes 
rather than in an agreement.
However, Hintze’s dilatory tactics and attempts to prevent direct Central Power- 
Entente conversations without guaranteeing Austria-Hungary’s territory in exchange for its 
loyalty only served to spur the Austrians into action. One day before the 15 September 
1918 Balkan offensive that would break the Bulgarians’ back fourteen days later, Burian 
issued Karl’s emotional ‘to all’ enunciation. In it, Austria-Hungary recommended that, 
without ceasing military operations, all belligerents send official delegates to a neutral state 
to discuss a peace.1634 Bur^n attempted to achieve what had failed so many times before; 
that all belligerent nations armed with their authoritative war aims should come together 
and reach a compromise peace. Although he had gone behind the Germans’ back, it was 
not due to a desire for separate peace. However, the initiative did not result in anything
1628
1629
16 30
1631
1632
1633
1634
Buriun Aufzeichnung of private Hintze talks, 6-Sep-1918, HHStA-PA-I-524k.
Stevenson, First World War and International Politics, 223.
Ilintze Handwritten Notes, 6-Sep-1918, NARA T-120/1500.
Ibid.
Buriân Aufzeichnung o f private Hintze talks, 6-Sep-1918, HHStA-PA-I-524k.
Hintze Handwritten Notes, 6-Sep-l 918, NARA T-120/1500.
Scott, Official Statements, 386.
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except, as the Germans had warned, being interpreted as a capitulation. After this, 
Vienna’s voice ceased to matter in international circles.
By the end of September there was a collapse on every Central Power front from 
Syria to the Somme. The Bulgarians requesting a ceasefire led Ludendorff to demand an 
armistice at once, even before the Hindenburg line was breached. The issue of war aims 
was swept under the carpet in Berlin, as its officials hoped to initiate a revolution from 
above and requesting peace on the basis of Wilson’s 14 Points. The situation in Austria- 
Hungary was even worse. On 27 September the AOK began its retreat from Albania.1635 
The collapse of the Bulgarians and their armistice on 29 September meant that Austria- 
Hungary could no longer hold Albania without being outflanked, and was probably going 
to be pushed out of Montenegro and Serbia as well by the advancing Entente army. On 3 
October Burian attempted to calm the government in Constantinople by assuring the Grand 
Vizier that although the situation was “serious,” it was “by no means hopeless.”1636 This 
was a sanguine view to say the least. It was clear that the Central Powers were swiftly 
collapsing, and nowhere were the conditions of disintegration worse than in Austria- 
Hungary. On 10 October Burian’s final goals were to ensure that Austria-Hungary received 
the same treatment as Germany, if an armistice was to be reached. The Entente had been 
ignoring Austria-Hungary, so Burian wanted to regain their attention by asking the AOK to 
retreat from all Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian territory, in line with the American 
request issued to Germany to retreat from foreign territory.1637 This was the first indication 
that Burian had abandoned his western Balkan ambitions (particularly the Lovien), but was 
designed to secure his other two peace conditions which w'ere territorial integrity and 
border rectifications against Rumania. However, by this time the Monarchy had begun its 
internal disintegration, leaving no possibility for such aims to be achieved.
Burian on 11 October resorted to legalistic devices to force the Entente to negotiate 
with Austria-Hungary, The Dual Alliance, he argued to Hohenlohe, required Germany to 
insist to the Entente that they must treat Austria-Hungary as a “unitary international legal 
entity.”1638 Buridn accepted all proposals, including Serbian access to the sea and the re­
establishment of Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, and Romania. His final war aim was a
1635 Lejhanec-Burian, 27-Sep«1918. HHStA-PA-1-999.
1636 Burian-Pallavicmi, 3-Oct-1918, HIIStA-PA-I-965.
1637 Burian-TrauttmansdorlT, IO-Oct-1918 ,HHStA-PA-I-966.
1638 Burian-Hohenlohe, 11-Oct-J9J8, HHSiA-PA-I-966,
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border rectification against Rumania, which he insisted should not be seen as an 
annexation.
All of these efforts came to nothing. Burian had tied his country to Germany and 
now demanded that Germany defend Austria-Hungary, but the game was up. Germany was 
in no position to negotiate terms on behalf of Austria-Hungary with an adversary 
uninterested in such a conversation. On 14 October Burian unilaterally requested an 
armistice, which was followed by Karl’s promise of a federalized Austria (though not 
Hungary). Lansing responded on 18 October stating that the 14 Points no longer applied to 
Austria-Hungary. All hopes for imperial gains ended definitively on 19 October when 
Burian acceded to a request by Kovess to seek a ceasefire in the Balkans.'639 Five days 
later Burian resigned and Karl severed the alliance with Germany on 26 October, in the 
midst of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto. The battle ended in a defeat for Austria-Hungary 
and a separate peace by means of armistice on the Italian front. After the South Slavs, 
Czecho-Slovaks, and even Hungarians had all declared independence, Austria-Hungary 
ended not only its tragic involvement in the First World War but also its political existence. 
After more than four years of total war, the offensive goals that the government and 
military had wrangled over disappeared along with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
,6M Burian-Trauttmannsdorf, 19-Oct-1918, HIIStA-PA-I-966,
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THESIS CONCLUSION
As the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was ripped apart from within and without at the 
end of 1918, those elements of its population which did not seek to create small national 
ethno-centric states from what had been a multi-national Great Power must have wondered 
how it could have ended this way. The elites which began and continued the conflict were 
being swept away by populations no longer willing to fight on in a catastrophic war.
We have explored the reasons why the elites sought to fight on in this war, which 
risked and eventually cost the ultimate price a state could pay, namely its own existence. It 
has been has shown that the political leadership in Vienna and Budapest retained 
predominant influence on decision-making over the Monarchy’s military elements. Thus, 
we must conclude that the continued conflict served a political purpose, and this thesis has 
demonstrated that positive, offensive Austro-Hungarian war aims were among the 
underlying causes of a protracted war. Of all the war aims it could establish against its 
ever-growing list of opponents, this thesis has further demonstrated that the Balkan 
peninsula contained Austria-Hungary’s most vital interests and therefore most extensive 
goals. In so doing, the thesis has addressed one of the most significant gaps in the literature 
on Austria-Hungary, namely an understanding of its war aims and the motivations behind 
them.
The thesis has analyzed the war aims and peace conditions of Austria-Hungary 
between July 1914 and May 1917. It has put forward four overarching arguments which 
the evidence provided has attempted to prove.
First, the thesis has demonstrated that Austria-Hungary’s principal political, 
economic, and military objectives for the post-war world lay in the Balkans, rather than on 
the Italian or Russian frontiers. The fact that the majority of the armed forces were 
engaged on the latter two fronts is not a testament to where Austria-Hungary saw its future 
expansion of territory and influence. Rather, the Monarchy’s military engagement there 
had to do with a defense of its territory against invading forces, not a desire to defeat Russia 
and Italy in order to expand in their direction. This was not true against its Balkan 
neighbors, where formal and informal expansion as a result of the military conflict brought 
on by its ultimatum to Serbia was indeed a war aim.
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Second, this thesis has demonstrated that the Foreign Ministry had and retained 
overarching decision-making authority in the war aims question throughout the entire war. 
Initially, this was because the army, with its historic role as the Monarchy’s protector, faced 
a prestige crisis as it failed to hold back the Russians or defeat the Serbs. Later, when 
Balkan victory did come thanks largely to German and Bulgarian military assistance, the 
army had a radicalizing effect on the MdA and pursued goals on the ground in opposition to 
the Foreign Ministry’s wishes. However, realizing that the status of occupation was 
temporary prior to incorporation or the acceptance of a more informal kind of influence, the 
MdA resorted to dilatory tactics aimed at resisting AOK wishes until a time when the 
latter’s influence would be significantly diminished. Unlike in Germany, at no time did the 
AOK manage to usurp control over foreign policy decision-making in Austria-Hungary and 
force a draconian and annexationist peace on its adversaries.
Third, this thesis has demonstrated that despite the ups and downs of military 
victory and defeat, political turmoil, and war aims radicalization among various elements 
which influenced the MdA, the Monarchy’s foreign policy remained surprisingly consistent 
across foreign ministers, fluctuating only in degree and not undergoing wholesale alteration 
and expansion as was the case in Germany. While some have argued that Austria- 
Hungary’s apparently moderate war aims were due to confusion and lack of clear goals, 
this thesis has demonstrated that the MdA’s goals were extensive, consistent and coherent.
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated that MdA war aims were moderate only when 
compared to those of the AOK, Bulgaria, or Germany, and that until May 1917 the Foreign 
Ministry did not seek any kind of conciliation until its Balkan war aims were met. Only 
after May 1917, with the departure of the last old guard politicians and generals, and with a 
new leadership beginning to realize that hunger and defeat could lead to revolution and the 
end of the Monarchy, did a new conciliatory approach begin. However, as the Epilogue has 
shown, even after May 1917, many of the offensive war aims remained in place, though 
this time more covertly than before. Thus, the fourth argument is that the Great War was 
prolonged as a direct result of Austria-Hungary’s aims in the Balkans and its unwillingness 
to conclude anything but a general peace that would have maintained its staunch alliance 
with Germany. If it was Austria-Hungary’s willingness to stand by its German ally until 
the end that kept Germany in the war by allowing it to fight on without complete 
encirclement, it was the Monarchy’s Balkan aspirations that kept Austria-Hungary in the 
war in the first place.
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In covering the entirety of the Great War, the thesis has deployed various sub­
arguments and provided evidence to support its four over-arching themes. From late 1914 
onwards, Berchtold espoused victory in the Balkans as the principal goal, even at the cost 
of Russian occupation of Galician territory. This MdÂ goal, backed by Tisza, was 
necessary to establish Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the Balkans. After the weakening 
Berchtold outlived his usefulness to Tisza, the latter’s protégé Buriân was brought in to the 
Foreign Ministry to keep the rising AOK at bay, ensure Austro-Hungarian parity of 
influence with Germany, and prevent hostile intervention by Rumania and Italy. Buriân’s 
foreign policy in 1915-1916 supports the four key arguments of this thesis. He viewed the 
the Monarchy’s Balkan war aims as primary and thus subordinated many other issues -  
such as Turkish survival, Rumanian or Italian intervention, and Bulgarian assistance -  to 
achieve them. The MdÂ’s dominance in foreign policymaking and war aims setting was 
thereby demonstrated, despite enormous pressure from the Germans, Hungarians, and the 
AOK. For example, despite flirting with the idea of a separate peace with Serbia, Buriân 
always intended to punish that country and re-establish Austro-Hungarian influence in the 
Balkans, even at the cost of prolonging the war.
Due to the Balkan victories achieved with Bulgarian and German assistance in 
1915-1916, a ‘bad’ peace was no longer on the agenda, merely the extent to which the 
annexations advocated by a more assertive AOK were to take place. The Foreign 
Minister’s policies appeared moderate by comparison with those of Conrad towards 
Albania/Montenegro and those of Tisza towards Serbia. Nonetheless, Austria-Hungary 
under Burian’s leadership still pursued a program o f extensive annexation in the occupied 
territories and informal expansion beyond. Although his plans were supported at the 
critical GMR of January 1916, the serious disagreements with the AOK, the imprecise 
nature of Austria-llungaiy’s public policy towards rump Serbia, and the expansionism of 
the new Bulgarian ally meant that the decisions reached in Vienna were threatened from all 
sides. Austro-Hungarian war aims in the Balkans were far-reaching and of immeasurable 
domestic importance, leading to serious internal and international disagreements and nearly 
causing open warfare between Bulgaria and the Monarchy, which would have unraveled 
the Quadruple alliance. Only following the departure o f Buriân, Conrad, and finally Tisza 
by May 1917, was the emphasis on war aims planning replaced with an emphasis on
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seeking peace, although Czemin, Arz, and even the Hungarians maintained some of their 
basic Balkan war aims right through to the end of the war.
This thesis fills the gap in an under-researched area. Despite increased interest in 
Austro-Hungarian occupation policy,1640 the central political decisions which gave rise to it 
have not been addressed. This dissertation has moved away from the ‘Fischer thesis’ that 
Germany was the driving force in formulating the war aims of the Central Powers, and that 
its allies did not matter or were marginal. On the contrary, Austria-Hungaiy formulated 
extensive and independent war aims which led to serious disagreements between Vienna 
and Berlin. What few Austro-Hungarian war aims Fischer does acknowledge, he believes 
were inexcusably intransigent and represented unjustified daydreaming. Yet this 
dissertation has shown that the Austrian elites were willing to resist the Germans to 
implement their war aims, particularly in the Balkans. Already in the July Crisis of 1914 
Austro-Hungarian war aims helped to instigate the Great War, and reworked versions of 
these aims helped to prolong it. By pursuing independent objectives and acting as a foreign 
policy driver among the Central Powers, the Monarchy continued to be a vital player well 
after 1914. Its geography made it indispensable to Germany, and though Fischer 
marginalizes Austria-Hungary, Kronenbitter considers that it pursued its own Great Power 
objectives and operated as an independent actor. The war was not brought on by German 
expansionism, but rather by a change in Germany’s Balkan policy which now supported 
Austria-Hungary’s own.1641
Even historians such as Ritter who are extremely critical of the Fischer thesis have 
tended to continue to marginalize Vienna’s role, on the grounds that Poland and Rumania -  
where Germany dominated — were the only significant zones of Austro-Hungarian desired 
expansion. However, as we have seen, the Austro-Hungarian internal grand plans tended to 
focus on the Balkan region. Austro-Hungarian war aims were, in fact, comparable to those 
of other Quadruple Alliance members, and even some Entente ones. The dissertation has 
demonstrated that the Monarchy had extensive freedom of action in the zones it controlled, 
and pushed hard for its conceptions o f the future order in areas where it shared 
responsibilities, such as Kosovo or Rumania. The underlying motive, as Bridge has noted, 
was to maintain the Monarchy’s integrity and Great Power status by repressing the Serbs
1640 See. for example, Scheer, MUtarverwaUungen. Gumz, Uabsburg Serbia, or Prende!, BesatzungspolUlk.
1641 Kronenhitier, Krieg im Fríe den. 485.
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and by keeping German and other countries’ political and economic ambitions out of the 
Balkans.1642
This thesis therefore serves as a starting point for future work on the grand strategy 
of Austria-Hungary. Given that it in large part concerns Burian’s tenure, about which no 
monograph has yet been written, this work serves as a basis for a wider study of his two 
stints as Foreign Minister. The war aims question is also relevant for Czemin, who has 
traditionally been analyzed with the focus on his peace policies, but who as this thesis has 
shown had offensive war aims as well. Despite Tisza’s playing a very large role in this 
narrative, there also remains much to be explored on the role of the Hungarian leadership 
and its influence on the Ballhausplatz’s war aims policy. Finally, Czemin’s, Arz’s, and 
Wekerle’s clandestine war aims against the backdrop of a Monarchy seeking peace at 
almost all costs constitute another fruitful future field of inquiry.
1642 Bridge, Itabsburg Monarchy, 347.
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